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
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THE

WORKS

OF THE

MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,

JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.

SOMETIME LORD ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH,
PRIMATE AND METROPOLITAN OF ALL IRELAND.

WITH

A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

AND A COLLECTION OF HIS LETTERS.

VOL. IV.

OXFORD:
JOHN HENRY PARKER.
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PREFACE.

In the volume now published will be found the whole of Bramhall's Discourses against Hobbes, which form the third part of his collected Works. An account of the controversy that gave rise to them has been given in vol. i. pp. xxxi—xxxiii. A list of the tracts relating to it is here subjoined.

1. A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity by John Bramhall Bishop of Derry.—Written, and sent to the (then) Marquis of Newcastle to be transmitted to Hobbes, in 1645, after a verbal discussion of the subject in the Marquis's presence; but first published in 1655 with the two tracts to be next mentioned.

i. Of Liberty and Necessity; a Treatise wherein all Controversy concerning Predestination, Election, Free will, Grace, Merit, Reprobation, &c., is fully Decided and Cleared: in Answer to a Treatise by the Bishop of Londonderry on the same Subject. Lond. 1654. 12mo. by Thomas Hobbes.—Written as a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle, Aug. 20. 1645[a], from Rouen, in answer to

[a] The original edition of this letter (in 1654) the present editor has not seen; and Hobbes (Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader, p. 19) speaks of it as written in 1646 instead of 1645. But as Bramhall had had the MS. in his possession a considerable time so early as April 1646 (see p. 23 of the present volume), and as the date of the letter as published in 1679 by Bp. Lancy (see p. 19, note b of this vol.) is as above given (viz. Aug. 20. 1645), it seems probable that Hobbes was himself mistaken, and that 1645 is the true date.

Bramhall's Discourse, and to be transmitted to him. It was first published in 1654 without Hobbes's knowledge, with the above title and a Preface, for neither of which is Hobbes responsible, and with the erroneous date of 1652[b].

2. Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent Necessity, &c. &c., by John Bramhall, D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry. In answer to the last named; written in 1646, and communicated then to the Marquis of Newcastle and to Hobbes, but first published in 1655 (8vo. Lond.), upon the appearance of Hobbes's Letter just mentioned; the original Discourse and that Letter being divided into sections, and published together in one volume, section by section, with Bramhall's reply to each.

These three tracts, thus intermixed one with the other, constitute the first Discourse in the present volume.

ii. The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, clearly Stated and Debated between Dr. Bramhall Bishop of Derry and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury (Lond. 4to. 1656).—Containing all three of the above named tracts, printed section by section, together with Hobbes's rejoinder, in the shape of "Animadversions" upon each section.

3. Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last Animadversions in the case concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity, by John Bramhall, D.D. and Bishop of Derry (Lond. 8vo. 1657—1658).—The second Discourse in the present volume.

4. The Catching of Leviathan or the Great Whale, &c. &c., by John Bramhall, D.D. and Bishop of Derry (Lond. 8vo. 1658):—at first designed to form a part of the Castigations,

[b] Molesworth in his late edition of Hobbes's Works (vol. iv. p. 278) has mistaken the matter altogether. He imagines 1652 to be the correct date of the letter, and gives 1646 as the erroneous date of the original publication in 1654: the case at best (i. e. supposing 1646 were the true date and not 1645) being precisely the reverse.

but enlarged afterwards into a distinct tract, although still printed as an appendix and continuation of that work. It is professedly an exposure of the gross and dangerous errors of Hobbes's Leviathan, but refers also to his book De Cive and to his Questions just now mentioned: and forms the third Discourse in the present volume.

iii. An Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall, late Bishop of Derry, called The Catching of the Leviathan; together with an Historical Narration concerning Heresy and the Punishment thereof: by Thomas Hobbes.—Published at London in 1682 (8vo.) after the author's death, but written (according to the Advertisement to the Reader) ten years only after the publication of Bramhall's book (which had not sooner come to the writer's knowledge). This would mark its date to 1668, in which year Hobbes was in great alarm lest legal measures should be taken against him on account of his writings (see his Life in the Biogr. Brit. note K).[1] Among other steps to justify and protect himself, he appears to have composed this tract; of which the first part is an "answer" (what Hobbes at least called such) to the first chapter of the Leviathan, that relating to his religious sentiments. To the Castigations he made no reply, nor to the remainder of Bramhall's attack upon his Leviathan.

Such was the course of the controversy, with which the present volume is concerned; from which Hobbes appears to have come off with less loss of credit than from his complete defeat he deserved (see, for instance, Brucker's account of the matter). It is to be regretted, that Bramhall should have been led to cast his thoughts upon such a subject into the form of an answer to Hobbes's tracts. The consequence is, that instead of a complete and connected discussion of a very abstruse subject, such as his peculiar talents and knowledge especially fitted him to produce, and

of which passages in these tracts as they at present stand afford a specimen, the course of his argument is now too often broken off by the necessity of perpetual replies to the feeble and perverse crotchets of his adversary: and the reader is forced to conclude, that in this (as in nine-tenths of his other writings) Bramhall's fame would have stood higher, had his opponent been more worthy of him.

A. W. H.

August, 1844.

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THE WORKS

OF

ARCHBISHOP BRAMHALL.

PART THE THIRD;

CONTAINING

THE DISCOURSES AGAINST MR. HOBBES.

DISCOURSE I.

A DEFENCE

OF

TRUE LIBERTY

FROM

ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSECAL NECESSITY;

BEING

AN ANSWER

TO A LATE BOOK OF MR. THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY,

ENTITLED

A TREATISE OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

WRITTEN BY THE RIGHT REVEREND

JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.

AND

LORD BISHOP OF DERRY.

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RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE,

&c.

SIR,

IF I pretended to compose a complete treatise upon this subject, I should not refuse those large recruits of reasons and authorities, which offer themselves to serve in this cause, for God and man, religion and policy, Church and commonwealth, against the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive opinion of fatal destiny. But as mine aim, in the first discourse, was only to press home those things in writing which had been agitated between us by word of mouth (a course much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as being freer from passions and tergiversations, less subject to mistakes and misrelations, wherein paralogisms are more quickly detected, impertinencies discovered, and confusion avoided), so my present intention is only to vindicate that discourse, and together with it, those lights of the Schools, who were never slighted but where they were not understood. How far I have performed it, I leave to the judicious and unpartial reader, resting for mine own part well contented with this, that I have satisfied myself.

Your Lordship's most obliged
to love and serve you,
J. D.

TO THE READER.

CHRISTIAN READER, this ensuing treatise was neither penned nor intended for the press, but privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared from mistakes[a]. The same was Mr. Hobbes his desire at that time; as appeareth by four passages in his book, wherein he requesteth and beseecheth that it may be kept private[b]. But either through forgetfulness or change of judgment, he hath now caused or permitted it to be printed in England[c], without either adjoining my first discourse, to which he wrote that answer, or so much as mentioning this reply, which he hath had in his hands now these eight years[d]. So wide is the date of his letter,—"in the year 1652[e],"—from the truth, and his manner of dealing with me in this particular from ingenuity (if the edition were with his own consent). Howsoever, here is all that passed between us upon this subject, without any addition, or the least variation from the original.

[a] [For an account of the dispute which led to the publication of this and the following tracts, see vol. i. pp. xxxi.—xxxiii. of the present edition of Bramhall's works, and the Preface to this volume.]

[b] pp. 18, 26, 35, and 80. [viz. of Hobbes' Letter to the Marquis of Newcastle as first published, Lond. 12mo. 1654: see below Numbers xi, xiv, xv, xxxvii. The latter part of Hobbes' Letter, viz. from Numb. xxv. inclusive to the end, was republished in 1676 (12mo. Lond.), with "Observations by a Learned Prelate of the Church of England lately deceased," viz. Dr. Benjamin Laney, who was Bishop of Peterborough, Lincoln, and Ely, successively from 1660 until his death in 1674; and the whole letter was published again, according to Wood (Ath. Oxon., iii. 1212), in 1684 (8vo., as the third edition).]

[c] [The present editor has been unable to meet with the original edition of Hobbes' Letter; but it appears from Hobbes' reply to Bramhall's Defence (Animadv. on the Bishop's Epistle to the Reader, p. 19), that it was printed in London without the author's knowledge or consent, by "an English young man," who had been allowed to translate it for the benefit of a French acquaintance of Hobbes', and who, "being a nimble writer, took a copy of it also for himself." See also Bramhall's Castigations of the Animadversions (below p. 751, fol. edit.), Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]

[d] [Scil. 1646—1654. See below notes a, b. pp. 23, 24.]

[e] [It appears by the passage of Hobbes' reply to Bramhall's Defence above quoted in note c, that the person who edited Hobbes' Letter in the first instance, mistook the date, and printed it as "in 1652," instead of Aug. 20, 1645, which was the true date.]

Concerning the nameless author of the preface[f], who takes upon him to hang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism, to invite passengers to purchase it, as I know not who he is, so I do not much heed it, nor regard either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical expressions. The Church of England is as much above his detraction, as he is beneath this question. Let him lick up the spittle of Dionysius by himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest that it is more sweet than nectar[g]: we envy him not; much good may it do him. His very frontispiece is a sufficient confutation of his whole preface; wherein he tells the world, as falsely and ignorantly as confidently, that "all controversy concerning Predestination, Election, Free-will, Grace, Merits, Reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared[h]." Thus he accustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth and discretion, to let us see that his knowledge in theological controversies is none at all, and into what miserable times we are fallen, when blind men will be the only judges of colours.

"Quid tanto dignum feret hic promissor hiatu[i]?"

There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire to advertise the reader. Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to [A.D. 1645] his Book *De Cive*[k], it is true, that ten years since I gave him about sixty exceptions, the one half of them political, the other half theological, to that book, and every exception justified by a number of reasons; to which he never yet vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now desire it; for since that, he hath published his Leviathan—

"Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum[l],"—

which affords much more matter of exception. And I am informed, that there are already two, the one of our own Church, the other a stranger[m], who have shaken in pieces

[f] [Scil. to the surreptitious edition of Hobbes' Letter. Who this was does not appear; further than what has been said above. For the style of his Preface, see below in the Castigations of Mr. Hobbes' Animadversions, Answ. to Animadvers. on the Bishop's Epistle to the Reader, p. 751 (fol. edit.), Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]

[g] [Athen. Deipnosoph. vi. 13.]

[h] [From the title-page, apparently, of the first edition of Hobbes' Letter.]

[i] [Hor., A. P., 138.]

[k] p. 1. [of T. H.'s Letter, ed. 1654. See below Numb. i. p. 23.]

[l] [Virg., Æn., iii. 658.]

[m] [See below, in the Preface to the Catching of Leviathan, p. 869 (fol. edit.), Disc. iii. Pt. iii.]

the whole fabric of his city, that was but builded in the air, and resolved that huge mass of his seeming Leviathan into a new nothing, and that their labours will speedily be published. But if this information should not prove true, I will not grudge upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that his principles are pernicious, both to piety and policy, and destructive to all relations of mankind, between prince and subject, father and child, master and servant, husband and wife; and that they, who maintain them obstinately, are fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts, than in any Christian or political society[n]. So God bless us.

[n] [Vide The Catching of the Leviathan, &c., below, Disc. iii. Pt. iii., at the end of this volume.]

DISCOURSE I.

A

VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

FROM

ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSECAL NECESSITY.

[FIRST PRINTED AT LONDON, A.D. 1655.]

[INTRODUCTION.]

NUMBER I.

DISCOURSE I. [Introduction of the subject.]

J. D.—Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty against necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have obtained the cause, and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I ought not to be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable necessity[a].

[*Introduction of the subject.*]

T. H.—Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer J. D.'s objections to my book *De Cive* in the first place, as that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine this discourse of liberty and necessity, which (because I never had uttered my opinion of it) concerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordship's and J. D.'s desire, that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do. And here I present and submit it to your Lordship's judgment.

[Reply.]

J. D.—The first day that I did read over T. H. his defence of the necessity of all things, was April 20, 1646: which pro-

[a] [The present "Discourse" is composed of three several tracts, printed in successive portions: viz. 1. "a discourse of liberty and necessity," written by Bramhall in 1645 in consequence of a conversation between Hobbes and himself in the presence of the Marquis of Newcastle, but not printed until 1655; 2. Hobbes' answer to this discourse, written also in 1645 as a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle, and surreptitiously printed in 1654; and 3. Bramhall's reply to Hobbes' answer, written also in 1645, and sent at that time (through the Marquis) to Hobbes, but printed for the first time (with his original discourse and Hobbes' letter, as here reprinted) in 1655.]

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ceeded not out of any disrespect to him[b]; for if all his discourses had been geometrical demonstrations, able not only to persuade but also to compel assent, all had been one to me; first my journey, and afterwards some other trifles (which we call business), having diverted me until then. And then my occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend awakening me, I set myself to a serious examination of it.

[T.H.'s own words convict his theory of falsehood.]

We commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if they have line enough, confute themselves, and their speculatives and their practicks familiarly interfere one with another. The very first words of T. H. his defence trip up the heels of his whole cause;—"I had once resolved." To "resolve" pre-supposeth deliberation; but what deliberation can there be of that, which is inevitably determined by causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate? Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed or not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he should increase in stature. Secondly, to "resolve" implies a man's dominion over his own actions, 650 and his actual determination of himself; but he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this dominion over himself, and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the second extrinsecal causes, in which he makes all his actions to be determined. One may as well call again yesterday, as "resolve," or newly determine, that which is determined to his hand already. I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H. his answers, considered his reasons; and conclude, that he hath missed and misted the question, that the answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in himself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore, by his favour, I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps another man, reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent and well founded. How comes this to pass? The treatise

[b] [Hobbes' letter was dated Aug. 20, 1645, from Rouen. The journey of Bramhall alluded to appears to have been his return from Paris (where he had met Hobbes) to Brussels, which was his ordinary place of residence from 1644 to 1648: See above in vol. i. p. x.]

is the same, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolution is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and loose? Do they necessitate me to condemn, and necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The difference must be in ourselves; either in our intellectuals, because the one sees clearer than the other, or in our affections, which betray our understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference is in ourselves. The outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to the other resolution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolutions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total and adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect. If it be so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denied or doubted of. When all the causes have actually determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they are together in time. And the old rule is,—"whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is[c]." This is no absolute necessity, but only upon supposition,—that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we question whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question whether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary *in sensu composito*—after we have resolved and finally determined what to do, but whether they were necessary before they were determined by ourselves, by or in the precedent causes before ourselves, or in the exterior causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true liberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to be determined by another without itself.

T. H. saith further, that "upon your Lordship's desire and" mine, he "was contented" to "begin with this discourse of liberty and necessity," that is, to change his former resolution. If the chain of necessity be no stronger but that it may be snapped so easily in sunder, if his will was no

[c] ["Τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὅταν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἐστί, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης." Aristot., De Interpret., c. ix. § 11.]

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otherwise determined from without himself but only by the signification of your Lordship's "desire" and my modest entreaty, then we may safely conclude, that human affairs are not always governed by absolute necessity, that a man is lord of his own actions, if not in chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth, and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral persuasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which otherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He that can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things, and a physical or natural determination of all causes, "shall be great Apollo to me[d]."

Whereas T. H. saith, that he "had never uttered" his "opinion" of this question, I suppose he intends in writing. My conversation with him hath not been frequent; yet I remember well, that when this question was agitated between us two in your Lordship's chamber by your command, he did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute necessity of all events, and for the ground of this necessity, the flux or concatenation of the second causes.

NUMBER II.

[*T. H.'s boast.*]

T. H.—And, first, I assure your Lordship, I find in it no new argument, neither from Scripture nor from reason, that I have not often heard before; which is as much as to say, that I am not surprised.

[Reply.]

J. D.—Though I be so unhappy, that I can present no novelty to T. H. yet I have this comfort, that if he be not 651
"surprised," then in reason I may expect a more mature answer from him, and where he fails, I may ascribe it to the weakness of his cause, not to want of preparation. But in this case I like Epictetus[e] his counsel well, that the sheep should not brag how much they have eaten, or what an excellent pasture they do go in, but shew it in their lamb and wool. Apposite answers and downright arguments

[d] ["Et eris mihi magnus Apollo." Virg., Ecl., iii. 104.]

[e] [Vide Epicteti Enchirid., c. xlvi. § 2. p. 222. ed. Schweigh.]

advantage a cause. To tell what we have heard or seen, is to no purpose. When a respondent leaves many things untouched, as if they were too hot for his fingers, and declines the weight of other things, and alters the true state of the question, it is a shrewd sign, either that he hath not weighed all things maturely, or else that he maintains a desperate cause.

NUMBER III.

T. H.—The preface is a handsome one, but it appears even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus—"If I be free to write this discourse, I have obtained the cause,"—I deny that to be true; for 'tis not enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove, that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should write it afterward. It may be, he thinks it all one to say, I was free to write it, and, it was not necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear: and yet, if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say I can will if I will, I take it to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause upon this preface. [*Answer to J. D.'s Preface.*] [*Liberty to act does not imply liberty to will.*]

J. D.—Tacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, which evermore begin with a man's praise[f]. The crisis or the catastrophe of their discourse is when they come to their "*but.*" As, he is a good natured man, *but* he hath a [Reply.]

[f] [Vide Agric. c. 11.]

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naughty quality; or, he is a wise man, *but* he hath committed one of the greatest follies. So here,—"The preface is a handsome one, *but* it appears even in this, that he hath mistaken the question." This is to give an inch, that one may take away an ell without suspicion; to praise the handsomeness of the porch, that he may gain credit to the vilifying of the house. Whether of us hath mistaken the question, I refer to the judicious reader. Thus much I will maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he calls necessity, nor that liberty which he calls liberty, nor that the question which he makes the question.

1. [T. H. confounds liberty with spontaneity.]

First, for liberty, that which he calls liberty is no true liberty. For the clearing whereof it behoveth us to know the difference between these three, necessity, spontaneity, and liberty.

Necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet together, so may spontaneity and liberty, but real necessity and true liberty can never meet together. Some things are necessary and not voluntary or spontaneous, some things are both necessary and voluntary; some things are voluntary and not free, some things are both voluntary and free; but those things which are truly necessary can never be free, and those things which are truly free can never be necessary. Necessity consists in an antecedent determination to one; spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive, to the object; true liberty consists in the elective power of the rational will. That which is determined without my concurrence, may nevertheless agree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subsequent consent; but that which is determined without my concurrence or consent, cannot be the object of mine election. I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me by another; but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by extrinsecal causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo it or not. Reason is the root, the fountain, the original of true liberty; which judgeth and representeth to the will, whether this or that be convenient, whether this or that be more convenient. Judge, then, what a pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H. Such a liberty as is in little children, before they have the use of reason, before they can 652

consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a childish liberty? And such a liberty as is in brute beasts, as bees and spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades, by experience and consideration. This is a brutish liberty. Such a liberty as a bird hath to fly when her wings are clipped. Or (to use his own comparison[g]) such a liberty as a "lame" man who hath lost the use of his limbs hath to walk. Is not this a ridiculous liberty? Lastly (which is worse than all these), such a liberty as "a river" hath "to descend down the channel[g]." What? Will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures also, which have neither reason, nor spontaneity, nor so much as sensitive appetite? Such is T. H. his liberty.

[2. And hypothetical with antecedent necessity.]

His necessity is just such another; a necessity upon supposition, arising from the concourse of all the causes, including the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures. The adequate cause and the effect are together in time; and when all the concurrent causes are determined, the effect is determined also, and is become so necessary, that it is actually in being. But there is a great difference between determining, and being determined. If all the collateral causes concurring to the production of an effect, were antecedently determined, what they must of necessity produce, and when they must produce it, then there is no doubt but the effect is necessary. But if these causes did operate freely, or contingently, if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred after another manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but either free or contingent. This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of "casting ambs ace[h];" though it partake more of contingency than of freedom. Supposing "the posture of the party's hand" who did throw the dice, supposing the figure of the table and of the dice themselves, supposing "the measure of force applied," and supposing all other things which did concur to the production of that cast, to be the very same they were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary. But still this is but a necessity of supposition; for if all these concurrent causes or some of them were contingent or free, then the cast was not abso-

[g] [See below T. H. Numb. xxix. p. 715. fol. edit.]

[h] [See below T. H. Numb. xxxiv. p. 722. fol. edit.]

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lutely necessary. To begin with the caster;—he might have denied his concurrence, and not have cast at all; he might have suspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon; he might have doubled or diminished his force in casting, if it had pleased him; he might have thrown the dice into the other table. In all these cases what becomes of his "ambs ace?" The like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and for the keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, and I know not how many other circumstances. In such a mass of contingencies, it is impossible that the effect should be antecedently necessary. T. H. appeals to every man's experience. I am contented. Let every one reflect upon himself; and he shall find no convincing, much less constraining reason, to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another, but only his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. H. his necessity is no absolute, no antecedent, extrinsecal necessity, but merely a necessity upon supposition.

3. [True liberty includes liberty to will.]

Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the question. "The question is not," saith he, whether a man may "write" if he will, and "forbear" if he will, "but whether the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power." Here is a distinction without a difference. If his will do not "come upon him according to his will," then he is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary agent, which is T. H. his liberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of the will. If the will have no power over itself, the agent is no more free than a staff in a man's hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty show of a power in the will, either to write or not to write. If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what a man shall will and what he shall not will, what he shall write and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this power? God and nature never made anything in vain; but "vain and frustraneous is that power, which never was and never shall be deduced into act." Either the agent is determined before he acteth, what he shall will and what he shall not will, what he shall act and what he shall not act; and then he is no more free to act than he is to will: or else

he is not determined; and then there is no necessity. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the action be free, to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will or nill must of necessity be more free. "*Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale*[i]." If the will be determined, the writing or not writing is likewise determined; and then he should not say, he *may* write or he *may* forbear, but he *must* write, or he *must* forbear. Thirdly, this answer contradicts the sense of all the world;—that the will of man is determined without his "will," or without "any thing in his power." Why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? why do we represent reasons to them? why do we pray them? why do we entreat them? why do we blame them? if their will "come" not "upon them according to their will." "Wilt thou be made clean?" said our Saviour to the paralytic person; to what purpose, if his will was extrinsecally determined? Christ complains, "We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced." How could they help it, if their wills were determined without their wills to forbear? And, "I would have gathered your children together as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not." How easily might they answer, according to T. H. his doctrine,—Alas! blame not us; our wills are not in our own power or disposition; if they were, we would thankfully embrace so great a favour. Most truly said St. Austin, "Our will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power[j]." This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature. "We need not turn over any obscure books" to find out this truth. "The poets chant it in the theatres, the shepherds in the mountains; the pastors teach it in their churches, the doctors in the universities; the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world, do assent unto it[k];" except a handful of men, who have poisoned their intel-

John v. 6. ["made *whole*."]

Matt. xi. 17.

Matt. xxiii. 37.

[i] [Aristot., Analyt. Poster., lib. i. c. 2. § 15.—"Δι' ὃ ὑπάρχει ἕκαστον, ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει· οἷον, δι' ὃ φιλοῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον φίλον."]

[j] De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 3. [§ 8; Op. tom. i. p. 613. F.—"Voluntas nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostrâ potestate."]

[k] ["Etiamne hi libri obscuri mihi scrutandi erant, unde discerem, neminem vituperatione suppliciove dignum, qui aut id velit quod justitia velle non prohibet, aut id non faciat quod facere non potest? Nonne ista cantant et in montibus pastores et in theatris poetæ et indocti in circulis et docti in bi-

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lectuals with paradoxical principles. Fourthly, this necessity which T. H. hath devised, which is grounded upon the necessitation of a man's will without his will, is the worst of all others; and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoics, that it increaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable. No man blameth fire for burning whole cities; no man taxeth poison for destroying men; but those persons, who apply them to such wicked ends. If the will of man be not in his own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire or the poison. Three things are required to make an act or omission culpable: first, that it be in our power to perform it or forbear it; secondly, that we be obliged to perform it or forbear it respectively; thirdly, that we omit that which we ought to have done, or do that which we ought to have omitted. No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite to evil objects, which renders them culpable. It is true; but if this appetite be determined by another, not by themselves, or if they have not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a stone descending downward according to its natural appetite, or the brute beasts, who commit voluntary errors in following their sensitive appetites, yet sin not. The question then is not, whether a man be necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or forbear. But, leaving the ambiguous acceptions of the word "free," the question is plainly this—whether all agents, and all events, natural, civil, moral (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence in the determination; so as all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end, than they are; and all this, in respect of the Supreme Cause, or a concourse of extrinsecal causes, determining them to one.

So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was

bliotheeis et magistri in scholis et antistites in sacratis locis et in orbe terrarum genus humanum?" Aug., De Duabus Animabus contra Manichæos, c. xi. § 15; Op. tom. viii. pp. 85. F, G, 86. A.]

extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse, without any concurrence of mine in the determination, and without any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not to be blamed; for no man is justly blamed for doing that, which never was in his power to shun. If I was not so predetermined, then mine actions and my will to act are neither
654 compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecal causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or to forbear, according to mine own will, and by mine own power. And when I have resolved and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition, which may and doth consist with true liberty, not a real antecedent necessity. The two horns of this dilemma are so strait, that no mean can be given, nor room to pass between them. And the two consequences are so evident, that instead of answering he is forced to decline them.

[THE STATING OF THE QUESTION.]

NUMBER IV.

[True liberty, an universal immunity from all determination to one.]

J. D.—And so to fall in hand with the question, without any further proems or prefaces. By liberty, I do understand, neither a liberty from sin, nor a liberty from misery[1], nor a liberty from servitude, nor a liberty from violence, but I understand a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessitation, that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability and determination to one: whether it be of *exercise* only, which the Schools call a liberty of *contradiction*[1], and is found in God, and in the good and bad angels; that is, not a liberty to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of *specification and exercise* also, which the Schools call liberty of *contrariety*[1], and is found in men endowed with reason and understanding; that is, a liberty to do and not to do, good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared, &c.

[*Answer.*]

T. H.—In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and says, he means not "liberty from sin," nor

[1] ["Est namque libertas arbitrii triplex, scz. a necessitate, a peccato, et a miseriâ." Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. II. dist. xxv. qu. i. art. 5. For the distinction of liberty of exercise, &c., see Bellarm., De Gratiâ et Libero Arbitrio, lib. iii. c. 3; Op. tom. iii. pp. 651. C, 654. A.]

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"from servitude," nor "from violence," but "from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and determination to one." It had been better to define liberty than thus to distinguish; for I understand never the more what he means by liberty. And though he says, he means "liberty from necessitation," yet I understand not how such a liberty can be. And it is a taking of the question without proof; for what else is the question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other distinctions: as, a liberty of "exercise" only, which he calls "a liberty of contradiction" (namely, of doing, not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively), and a liberty of "specification and exercise also," which he calls "a liberty of contrariety" (namely, a liberty not only to do or not do, good or evil, but also to do or not do, this or that good or evil). And with these distinctions, he says, he "clears the coast;" whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of "exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety," but also with pretending distinction where none is; for how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist (as he says it doth in God and angels) without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

[Reply.]

J. D.—It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to be distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities but either sophisters or bunglers. '*Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus*'—'deceitful men do not love to descend to particulars;' and when bad archers shoot, the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes opposed to the slavery of sin and vicious habits, as Rom. vi. 22,—"Now being made free from sin;"—sometimes to misery and oppression,—Isai. lviii. 6,—"To let the oppressed go free;"—sometimes to servitude, as Levit. xxv. 10,—In the year of jubilee "ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the land;"—sometimes to violence, as Psalm cv. 20,—"The prince of his people let him go free." Yet none of all these are the liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity, that is, a determination to one, or rather from necessitation,

[Different senses of the word liberty explained.]

that is, a necessity imposed by another, or an extrinsecal determination. These distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which comes nearer the essence of it than T. H. his roving definition; as we shall see in due place. And though he say that he "understands never the more what" I "mean by liberty," yet it is plain by his own ingenuous confession, both that he doth understand it, and that this is the very question where "the water sticks" between us;—whether there be such a liberty, free from all necessitation and extrinsecal determination to one. Which being but the stating of the question, he calls it amiss the "taking of the question." It were too much weakness to beg this question, which is so copious and demonstrable. It is strange to see, with what confidence now-a-days particular men slight all the schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of former ages, as if they were "not worthy to unloose the [Mark i. 7. &c.]
655 shoe-strings" of some modern author, or did "sit in darkness [Ps. cvii. 10.]
and in the shadow of death," until some "third Cato dropped down from heaven[m]," to whom all men must repair, as to the altar of Prometheus, to light their torches. I did never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the pulpit declaim against school divinity to his equally ignorant auditors. It is but as the fox in the fable, who having lost his own tail by a mischance, would have persuaded all his fellows to cut off theirs and throw them away as unprofitable burdens. But it troubles me to see a scholar, one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to forget himself, as to style school-learning no better than a plain "jargon," that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian language, like the clattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreads, or delight in abstruse expressions; yet, certainly, this distinction of liberty into "liberty of contrariety" and "liberty of contradiction," or (which is all one) of "exercise only" or "exercise and specification jointly," which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he

[m] ["Tertius e cœlo cecidit Cato." Juv., ii. 40.]

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[Liberty of contradiction and of contrariety, of exercise and of specification.]

useth it. Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of things: therefore to be able to choose both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety or of specification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are contradictory, or (which is all one) an exercise or suspension of power; therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, to choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now man is not only able to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able both to do and to forbear to do, both good and evil; so he hath not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God, and the good angels, can do or not do this or that good, but they cannot do or not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty of God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal, the liberty of man comes short in the intension of the power. Man is not so free in respect of good only, as God, or the good angels; because (not to speak of God, Whose liberty is quite of another nature) the understandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is cleared from all darkness.

And where T. H. demands, "how it is possible for the liberty of doing, or not doing, this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil;" the answer is obvious and easy, '*referendo singula singulis*,' rendering every act to its right object respectively. God, and good angels, have a power to do or not to do this or that good; bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God, and good, and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.

NUMBER V.

J. D.—Thus the coast being cleared, the next thing to be done is to draw out our forces against the enemy. And because they are divided into two squadrons, the one of Christians, the other of heathen philosophers, it will be best to dispose ours also into two bodies, the former drawn from Scripture, the latter from reason. [Division of the argument.]

T. H.—The next thing he doth after the clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his "forces," as he calls them, "into two squadrons," one of places of Scripture, the other of reasons; which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way, and some of them do fight among themselves. [*Answer.*]

J. D.—If T. H. could divide my forces, and commit them together among themselves, it were his only way to conquer
656 them. But he will find, that those imaginary contradictions which he thinks he hath espied in my discourse, are but fancies; and my supposed impertinencies will prove his own real mistakings. [Reply.]

I. PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE.

NUMBER VI.

J. D.—First, whosoever have power of election have true liberty, for the proper act of liberty is election. A spontaneity may consist with determination to one: as we see in children, fools, madmen, brute beasts, whose fancies are determined to those things which they act spontaneously; as the bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of these have a liberty of election; which is an act of judgment and understanding, and cannot possibly consist with a determination to one. He that is determined by something before himself or without himself, cannot be said to choose or elect: unless it be as the junior of the mess chooseth in Cambridge, Argument 1.—[that men have power of election, and therefore true liberty.]

PART III. whether he will have the least part or nothing; and scarcely so much.—But men have liberty of election. This is plain, Numb. xxx. 14 [13],—If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice, either to "establish it," or to "make it void." And Josh. xxiv. 15,—"Choose you this day whom ye will serve," &c., "but I and my house will serve the Lord;" he makes his own choice, and leaves them to the liberty of their election. And 2 Sam. xxiv. 12,—"I offer thee three things, choose thee which of them I shall do;" if one of these three things was necessarily determined and the other two impossible, how was it left to him to choose what should be done?—Therefore we have true liberty.

[*Answer.*] T. H.—And the first place of Scripture, taken from Numb. xxx. 14 [13], is one of them that look another way. The words are, "If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice, either to establish it or make it void." For it proves no more but that the husband is a free or voluntary agent; but not that his choice therein is not necessitated, or not determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes.

[Reply.] J. D.—My first argument from Scripture is thus formed;—Whosoever have a liberty or power of election, are not determined to one by precedent necessary causes; but men have liberty of election. The assumption, or minor proposition, is proved by three places of Scripture; Numb. xxx. 14 [13], Josh. xxiv. 15, 2 Sam. xxiv. 12. I need not insist upon these; because T. H. acknowledgeth, that "it is clearly proved that there is election in man[n]." But he denieth the major proposition, because (saith he) man is "necessitated," or "determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes."

I take away this answer three ways.

1. [Election is only of alternatives conceived possible.] First, by reason. Election is evermore either of things possible, or at least of things conceived to be possible: that is, efficacious election, when a man hopeth or thinketh of obtaining the object. Whatsoever the will chooseth, it chooseth under the notion of good, either honest or delight-

[n] [Below, T. H. at the end of Numb. vii. p. 44.]

ful or profitable; but there can be no real goodness apprehended in that which is known to be impossible. It is true, there may be some wandering pendulous wishes of known impossibilities; as a man who hath committed an offence, may wish he had not committed it: but to choose efficaciously an impossibility, is as impossible as an impossibility itself. No man can think to obtain that, which he knows impossible to be obtained. But he who knows that all things are antecedently determined by necessary causes, knows that it is impossible for anything to be otherwise than it is. Therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election, to choose this or that indifferently, is to make the same thing to be determined to one, and to be not determined to one; which are contradictories. Again, whosoever hath an elective power, or a liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power to refuse. Isa. vii. 16,—"Before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good." He who chooseth this rather than that, refuseth that rather than this. As "Moses, choosing to suffer affliction with the people of God," did thereby refuse "the pleasures of sin." But no man hath any power to refuse that which is necessarily predetermined to be: unless it be as the fox refused the grapes, which were beyond his reach. When one thing of two or three is absolutely determined, the others are made thereby simply impossible.

Heb. xi. 24, [25.]

Secondly, I prove it by instances, and by that universal notion which the world hath of election. What is the difference between an elective and hereditary kingdom, but that in an elective kingdom they have power or liberty to choose
657 this or that man indifferently, but in an hereditary kingdom they have no such power nor liberty? Where the law makes a certain heir, there is a necessitation to one; where the law doth not name a certain heir, there is no necessitation to one, and there they have power or liberty to choose. An hereditary prince may be as grateful and acceptable to his subjects, and as willingly received by them (according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or violence), as he who is chosen; yet he is not therefore an elective prince. In Germany all the nobility and commons may assent to the choice of the emperor, or be well pleased

2. [Universal consent.]

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with it when it is concluded; yet none of them elect or choose the emperor, but only those six princes who have a consultative, deliberative, and determinative power in his election. And if their votes or suffrages be equally divided, three to three, then the king of Bohemia hath the casting voice°. So likewise in corporations or commonwealths, sometimes the people, sometimes the common council, have power to name so many persons for such an office, and the supreme magistrate, or senate, or lesser council respectively, to choose one of those. And all this is done with that caution and secrecy, by billets or other means, that no man knows which way any man gave his vote, or with whom to be offended. If it were necessarily and inevitably predetermined, that this individual person and no other shall and must be chosen, what needed all this circuit and caution, to do that which is not possible to be done otherwise, which one may do as well as a thousand, and for doing of which no rational man can be offended, if the electors were necessarily predetermined to elect this man and no other? And though T. H. was pleased to pass by my university instance, yet I may not, until I see what he is able to say unto it. The junior of the mess in Cambridge divides the meat into four parts. The senior chooseth first, then the second and third in their order. The junior is determined to one, and hath no choice left; unless it be to choose whether he will take that part which the rest have refused, or none at all. It may be, this part is more agreeable to his mind than any of the others would have been, but for all that he cannot be said to choose it, because he is determined to this one. Even such a liberty of election is that which is established by T. H.: or rather much worse, in two respects. The junior hath yet a liberty of contradiction left, to choose whether he will take that part or not take any part; but he who is precisely predetermined to the choice of this object, hath no liberty to refuse it. Secondly, the junior, by dividing carefully, may preserve to himself an equal share; but he who is wholly

° [This is the account given by Theodoric a Niem, as quoted by Schardius, De Elect. Imper., c. i. inter Goldast. Polit. Imper. p. 42. For a more correct account of the matter, see the tracts in the beginning of Goldastus as just quoted, and Robertson's Hist. of Charles V., Introd., Proofs and Illustrations, note xli. § 2.]

determined by extrinsecal causes, is left altogether to the mercy and disposition of another. Discourse I.

Thirdly, I prove it by the texts alleged. Numb. xxx. 13; "If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice, either to 'establish it' or 'make it void.'" But if it be predetermined that he shall "establish it," it is not in his power to "make it void." If it be predetermined that he shall "make it void," it is not in his power to "establish it." And howsoever it be determined, yet, being determined, it is not in his power, indifferently, either to "establish it" or to "make it void" at his pleasure. So Joshua xxiv. 15; "Choose you this day whom ye will serve, . . but I and my house will serve the Lord." It is too late to choose that "this day," which was determined otherwise yesterday. "Whom ye will serve, whether the gods whom your fathers served, or the gods of the Amorites:"—where there is an election of this or that, these gods or those gods, there must needs be either an indifferency to both objects, or at least a possibility of either. "I and my house will serve the Lord:"—if he were extrinsecally predetermined, he should not say, "I *will* serve," but, I *must* serve. And 2 Sam. xxiv. 12; "I offer thee three things, choose thee which of them I shall do." How doth God "offer three things" to David's choice, if He had predetermined him to one of the three by a concourse of necessary extrinsecal causes? If a sovereign prince should descend so far as to offer a delinquent his choice, whether he would be fined or imprisoned or banished, and had underhand signed the sentence of his banishment, what were it else but plain drollery, or mockery? This is the argument which in T. H. his opinion "looks another way." If it do, it is as the Parthians used to fight, flying[p]. His reason follows next to be considered. 3. [Holy Scripture.]

NUMBER VII.

T. H.—For if there come into the husband's mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily. And if the evil that will 658 follow thereon in the husband's opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow. And yet in this following [*That the last act of the reason necessitates the will.*]

[p] [Justin., in Trog. Pomp. Hist., lib. xli. c. 2.—&c.]

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of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature of election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this. And consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.

[Reply.]

J. D.—There is nothing said with more show of reason in this cause by the patrons of necessity and adversaries of true liberty than this, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last judgment of right reason. And in this, and this only, I confess T. H. hath good seconds[q]. Yet the common and approved opinion is contrary. And justly. For,—

1. [The last act of the reason is itself an act of the will.]

First, this very act of the understanding is an effect of the will, and a testimony of its power and liberty. It is the will, which, affecting some particular good, doth engage and command the understanding to consult and deliberate what means are convenient for attaining that end. And though the will itself be blind, yet its object is good in general, which is the end of all human actions. Therefore it belongs to the will, as to the general of an army, to move the other powers of the soul to their acts, and among the rest the understanding also, by applying it and reducing its power into act: so as, whatsoever obligation the understanding doth put upon the will, is by the consent of the will, and derived from the power of the will; which was not necessitated to move the understanding to consult. So the will is the lady and mistress of human actions; the understanding is her trusty counsellor, which gives no advice but when it is required by the will. And if the first consultation or deliberation be not sufficient, the will may move a review, and require the understanding to inform itself better, and take advice of others, from whence many times the judgment of the understanding doth receive alteration.

2. [It determines the will morally, not necessarily.]

Secondly, for the manner how the understanding doth determine the will, it is not naturally but morally. The will is moved by the understanding, not as by an efficient, having a causal influence into the effect, but only by proposing and representing the object. And therefore, as it were ridiculous

[q] [E. g. Bellarmine, De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 8; Op. tom. iii. p. 667. C, &c.—"Voluntatis electio pendet necessario ab ultimo judicio practicæ rationis."]

to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, so it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will is the cause of willing. And therefore the understanding hath no place in that concourse of causes which according to T. H. do necessitate the will.

Thirdly, the judgment of the understanding is not always *practicè practicum*[r], nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine the will to one. Sometimes the understanding proposeth two or three means equally available to the attaining of one and the same end. Sometimes it dictateth, that this or that particular good is eligible or fit to be chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it must be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means, but not the only means, to attain the desired end. In these cases, no man can doubt but that the will may choose or not choose, this or that, indifferently. Yea, though the understanding shall judge one of these means to be more expedient than another, yet, forasmuch as in the less expedient there is found the reason of good, the will in respect of that dominion which it hath over itself may accept that which the understanding judgeth to be less expedient, and refuse that which it judgeth to be more expedient.

3. [Nor yet to one course unalterably.]

Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so efficaciously, but that it may be, and often is, deterred from the prosecution of it by the difficulty of the means; and notwithstanding the judgment of the understanding, the will may still suspend its own act.

4. [Nor in such a way, that the will cannot suspend its own act.]

Fifthly, supposing but not granting, that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, yet this proves no antecedent necessity, but co-existent with the act; no extrinsecal necessity, the will and understanding being but two faculties of the same soul; no absolute necessity, but merely upon supposition. And therefore the same authors who maintain that the judgment of the understanding doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more earnestly oppugn T. H. his absolute necessity of all occurrences. Suppose the will shall apply the understanding to deliberate, and not require a review; suppose the dictate of

5. [Nor antecedently or extrinsecally.]

[r] [See below in the Castigations of Mr. Hobbes's Animadversions, Numb. vii. p. 768 (fol. edit.) Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]

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the understanding shall be absolute, not this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but this positively, not this freely, but this necessarily; and suppose the will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act; then here is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute, nor extrinsecal, nor antecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a necessity upon supposition, which we do readily grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth, whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension of a greater good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute necessity. 659

[6. T. H.'s affectation of new terms of art.]

Lastly, whereas he saith, that "the nature of election" doth "consist" in "following our hopes and fears," I cannot but observe, that there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers, nor out of a desire to take in sunder the whole frame of learning, and new mould it after his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would give us a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense. But because this is but touched here sparingly and upon the by, I will forbear it, until I meet with it again in its proper place. And for the present it shall suffice to say, that hopes and fears are common to brute beasts, but election is a rational act, and is proper only to man, who is

"Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ[s]."

[*Further answer of T. H.*]

T. H.—The second place of Scripture is Josh. xxiv. 15, the third is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12; whereby 'tis clearly proved, that there is election in man, but not proved, that such election was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if they were a thousand.

[Reply.]

J. D.—This answer being the very same with the former, word for word, which hath already been sufficiently shaken in pieces, doth require no new reply.

[s] [Ovid., Metam., i. 76.]

NUMBER VIII.

T. H.—Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have done, that necessity and election might stand together; and instance in the actions of children, fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined to one; before these his proofs out of Scripture he desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says, that the actions of "children, fools, madmen, and beasts," are indeed "determined," but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but from spontaneous agents; as, for example, that the bee when it maketh honey does it spontaneously, and when the spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, and not by election. Though I never meant to ground any answer upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and beasts do, yet, that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and shew, that it fighteth against its fellow arguments. Your Lordship is therefore to consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and said to be done by a man's own accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord; which in Latin is *sponte*, and therefore the action is spontaneous: though to give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary: for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and be therefore spontaneous, of which nevertheless as he thinks we never consulted, nor deliberated of in ourselves; as when, making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in anger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous but not voluntary nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions [*Further answer of T. H.*]

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he says necessitation may stand, but not with such as are voluntary, and proceed upon election and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to you, that even these actions which he says proceed from spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to "fools, children, madmen, and beasts," proceed from deliberation and election; and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are; then his argument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove. And, first, your Lordship's own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, 660 do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take. The horse retiring from some strange figure he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else does man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him? A child may be so young as to do all which it does without all deliberation; but that is but till it chance to be hurt by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall be deliberated on the second time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the images of things being by diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees, Aristotle says, their life is "civil[t]." He is deceived, if he think any spontaneous action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective; for even the setting of a man's foot in the posture of walking, and the action of ordinary eating, was once deliberated how and when it should be done; and though it afterward become easy and habitual, so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceeds from

[t] [Hist. Animal., lib. I. c. i. § 25.— "Πολιτικὰ δ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον· . . . ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπος, μέλιττα," κ. τ. λ.]

election. So also are the rashest actions of choleric persons voluntary and upon deliberation: for who is there but very young children, that has not considered, when and how far he ought or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then he agrees with me, that such actions are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do them is determined to the actions they do, it follows out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments fights against another. Discourse I.

J. D.—We have partly seen before, how T. H. hath coined a new kind of liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of election; and now, in this section, a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind of voluntary actions. Although he say, that here is nothing "new[u]" to him, yet I begin to suspect, that either here are many things new to him, or otherwise *his* election is not the result of a serious mature "deliberation." [Reply.]

The first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my meaning in this one section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one and the same; he saith I distinguish them, so as spontaneous actions may be necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, I distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith I confound them, and make them the same. Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to fools, children, madmen, and beasts; but I acknowledge spontaneity hath place in rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and as it is distinguished from liberty. [1. T. H. mistakes the author's words.]

Yet I have no reason to be offended at it; for he deals no otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he tells us, that "voluntary presupposeth deliberation." But, Numb. xxv, he tells us contrary;—"that whatsoever followeth the last appetite" is "voluntary, and where there is but one appetite, that is the last;" and that "no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden[v]." So, Numb. xxxiii, he tells us, that "by spon- [2. And contradicts himself.]

[u] [See above T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.] [v] [Below, p. 712. fol. edit.]

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taneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it[w]:" yet here he tells us, that "all voluntary actions" which proceed not from "fear," are "spontaneous;" whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth himself, to give "money for merchandise." Thirdly, when I said, that children before they have the use of reason, act spontaneously (as when they suck the breast), but do not act freely, because they have not judgment to deliberate or elect, here T. H. undertakes to prove, that they do deliberate and elect; and yet presently after confesseth again, that "a child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all deliberation."

3. [Actions which proceed from fear, may or may not be spontaneous.]

Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he hath other errors also in this section. As this, that no actions proceeding from "fear" are "spontaneous." He who throws his goods into the sea to avoid drowning, doth it not only "spontaneously" but even freely. He that wills the end, wills the means conducing to that end. It is true, that if the action be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man willingly or spontaneously casts his goods into the sea. But if we take the action as in this particular case invested with all the circumstances, and in order to the end, that is, the 661
saving of his own life, it is not only voluntary and spontaneous, but elective and chosen by him, as the most probable means for his own preservation. As there is an antecedent and a subsequent will, so there is an antecedent and a subsequent spontaneity. His grammatical argument, grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous from *sponte*, weighs nothing; we have learned in the rudiments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes in name only, and not in deed. He who casts his goods in the sea, may do it of his own accord in order to the end. Secondly, he errs in this also, that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but only "fear." Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action. As a man, thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots his friend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not kill his friend of his own accord.

[w] [Below, p. 719. fol. edit.]

For the clearer understanding of these things, and to know what spontaneity is, let us consult awhile with the Schools[x] about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions. Some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsecal cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol's temple. These are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an intrinsecal cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end; as the falling of a stone downwards. These are called natural acts. Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where there is an appetite to the object, but no deliberation nor election; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. These are called voluntary or spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsecal cause with a more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon deliberation. These are called free acts. So then the formal reason of liberty is election. The necessary requisite to election is deliberation. Deliberation implieth the actual use of reason. But deliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsecal predetermination to one. How should a man deliberate or choose which way to go, who knows that all ways are shut against him, and made impossible to him, but only one? This is the genuine sense of these words "voluntary" and "spontaneous" in this question. Though they were taken twenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically (as we say "spontaneous ulcers," where there is no appetite at all), yet it were nothing to this controversy; which is not about words, but about things, not what the words voluntary or free do or may signify, but whether all things be extrinsecally predetermined to one.

[4. [Definition of voluntary and involuntary acts.]

These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words, the next thing to be examined is that contradiction which he hath espied in my discourse, or how this argument "fights against its fellows." "If I," saith T. H., "make it appear," that the spontaneous actions of "fools, children, madmen, and beasts," do "proceed from election and deliberation," and that "inconsiderate" and indeliberate actions

[5. Necessity and election inconsistent in the same act.]

[x] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. vi. artt. 1, 2. And compare Aristot., Ethic., V. x. 6—9; Rhet., I. x. 7, 8.]

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are found in the wisest men, "then his argument concludes, that necessity and election may stand together; which is contrary" to his assertion. If this could be made appear as easily as it is spoken, it would concern himself much; who, when he should prove that rational men are not free from necessity, goes about to prove, that brute beasts do deliberate and elect, that is as much as to say, are free from necessity. But it concerns not me at all. It is neither my assertion, nor my opinion, that necessity and election may not meet together in the same subject. Violent, natural, spontaneous, and deliberative or elective acts, may all meet together in the same subject. But this I say, that necessity and election cannot consist together in the same act. He who is determined to one, is not free to choose out of more than one. To begin with his latter supposition,—that wise men may do "inconsiderate" and indeliberate actions. I do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a general conclusion from particular premisses? as thus,—because wise men do some indeliberate acts, therefore no act they do is free or elective. Secondly, for his former supposition, —"that fools, children, madmen, and beasts, do deliberate and elect." If he could make it good, it is not I who contradict myself, nor "fight against" mine own assertion; but it is he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny. He may well find a contradiction between him and me; otherwise to what end is this dispute? But he shall not be 662
able to find a difference between me and myself. But the truth is, he is not able to prove any such thing; and that brings me to my sixth consideration:—

6. [Irrational beings neither deliberate nor elect.]

That neither horses, nor bees, nor spiders, nor children, nor fools, nor madmen, do deliberate or elect. His first instance is in the horse or dog, but more especially the horse. He told me, that I divided my argument "into squadrons," to apply myself to your Lordship, being "a military man[y];" and I apprehend, that for the same reason he gives his first instance of the horse with a submission to your "own experience." So far well, but otherwise very disadvantageously to his cause. Men use to say of a dull fellow, that he hath no more brains than a horse. And the

[y] [See above T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]

Prophet David saith, "Be not like the horse and mule, which have no understanding." How do they "deliberate" without "understanding?" And Psalm xlix. 20, he saith the same of all brute beasts;—"Man being in honour had no understanding, but became like unto the beasts that perish." The horse "demurs upon his way." Why not? Outward objects or inward fancies may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgment either to deliberate or elect. He "retires from some strange figure which he sees, and comes on again to avoid the spur." So he may, and yet be far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear, which is "a perturbation arising from the expectation of some imminent evil[z]." But he urgeth, "what else doth man that deliberateth?" Yes, very much. The horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of those things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things which are in our power[z]; fear ariseth many times out of natural antipathies, but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no place at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, and 'betrayeth the succours of the soul.' If the horse did deliberate, he should consult with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not; he should represent to himself all the dangers both of going and staying, and compare the one with the other, and elect that which is less evil; he should consider, whether it were not better to endure a little hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty to his master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the horse doth not; neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for children, T. H. confesseth, that they may be so "young," that they "do not deliberate at all." Afterwards, as they attain to the use of reason by degrees, so by degrees they become free agents. Then they do deliberate; before, they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make them use their reason, when they have power to exercise it; but the rod cannot produce the power before they have it.

DISCOURSE I.

Ps. xxxii. 9.

["Fear is nothing else but a betraying of the succours which reason offereth." Wisd. xvii. 12.]

[z] ["Εστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ." Aristot., Rhet., lib. II. c. v. § 1.—"Οσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα." Id., Ethic., III. v. 8.]

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Thirdly, for fools and madmen:—it is not to be understood of such madmen as have their *lucida intervalla*, who are mad and discreet by fits; when they have the use of reason, they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well as others: nor yet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less wise than others; such may deliberate, though not so clearly nor so judiciously as others: but of mere madmen, and mere natural fools:—to say that they, who have not the use of reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies a contradiction. But his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders; of whose "actions" (he saith) if I had been "a spectator," I "would have confessed, not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near equal to that of mankind;" whose "life," as "Aristotle saith, is civil." Truly I have contemplated their actions many times, and have been much taken with their curious works; yet my thoughts did not reflect so much upon them, as upon their Maker, Who is "*sic magnus in magnis*," that He is not "*minor in parvis*"—"so great in great things, that He is not less in small things." Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures; and seeing their rare works, I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. I see them, but I praised the marvellous works of God, and admired that Great and First Intellect, Who had both adapted their organs and determined their fancies to these particular works. I was not so simple to ascribe those rarities to their own invention, which I knew to proceed from a mere instinct of nature. In all other things they are the dullest of creatures. Naturalists write of bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not distinct from their 663
common sense, spread over their whole body, and only perceiving things present. When Aristotle calls them "political" or sociable creatures[a], he did not intend it really that they lived a civil life, but according to an analogy,—because they do such things by instinct, as truly political creatures do out of judgment. Nor when I read in St. Ambrose of their "hexagonies" or sexangular cells[b], did I therefore conclude,

[a] ["Πολιτικά." Aristot., Hist. Animal., lib. I. c. i. § 25. Compare his Politics, I. ii. 10:—"Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῶου μᾶλλον, δῆλον." κ. τ. λ.]

[b] ["Hexagonia cellularum." Ambros., Hexaem., lib. v. c. 21. § 69; Op. tom. i. p. 107. C.]

that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in Crespet, that they invoke God to their aid, when they go out of their hives, bending their thighs in form of a cross and bowing themselves, did I therefore think, that this was an act of religious piety, or that they were capable of "theological virtues[c];" whom I see in all other things, in which their fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of creatures, strangers not only to right reason but to all resemblances of it.

7. [Habitual actions voluntary.] Seventhly, concerning those actions which are done upon precedent and past deliberations; they are not only spontaneous, but free acts. Habits contracted by use and experience do help the will to act with more facility, and more determinately; as the hand of the artificer is helped by his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and serious, and proved by experience to be profitable, do save the labour of subsequent consultations. "*Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora.*" Yet, nevertheless, the actions which are done by virtue of these formerly acquired habits are no less free, than if the deliberation were coexistent with this particular action. He that hath gained a habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new deliberation how to play, every time that he plays it over and over. Yet I am far from giving credit to him in this, that walking or eating universally considered are free actions, or proceed from true liberty; not so much because they want a particular deliberation before every individual act, as because they are animal motions, and need no deliberation of reason; as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the same actions, as they are considered individually, and invested with their due circumstances, may be, and often are, free actions subjected to the liberty of the agent.

8. [How they differ from actions done in passion.] Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or rash attempts of "choleric persons" with such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those rash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by acquired habits:

[c] ["Virtutes Theologicæ dicuntur, quæ ordinant nos ad Deum;" scz. "Fides, Spes, Caritas:" as distinguished from "moral" and "intellectual" virtues. Thom. Aquin., Summ. Prima Secund., Qu. lxii. art. 2. § 2. —Father Peter Crespet, a monk of the order of the Celestines at Paris, who died in 1594, was author of a Summa Fidei Catholicæ, and of several mystical religious works, from one of which latter class the account in the text is probably taken. See Moreri, and the Biogr. Univ.]

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but yet, forasmuch as actions are often altered and varied by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act which at one time is morally good, at another time may be morally evil; and forasmuch as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind of action is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good or expedient, which being in itself good, yet particular circumstances may render inconvenient or unprofitable, to some persons, at some times, in some places; therefore a precedent general deliberation how to do any act (as, for instance, how to write), is not sufficient to make a particular act (as my writing this individual reply) to be freely done, without a particular and subsequent deliberation. A man learns French advisedly, that is a free act. The same man in his choler and passion reviles his friend in French without any deliberation; this is a spontaneous act, but it is not a free act. If he had taken time to advise, he would not have reviled his friend. Yet, as it is not free, so neither is it so necessary, as the bees making honey; whose fancy is not only inclined but determined by nature to that act. So every way he fails. And his conclusion—"that the liberty of election doth not take away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing"—is no consequent from my doctrine, but from his own. Neither do my arguments "fight one against another," but his private opinions fight both against me and against an undoubted truth. A free agent endowed with liberty of election, or with an elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in some individual acts; but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do not flow from his elective power, neither are those acts which flow from his elective power necessitated.

NUMBER IX.

Argument 2.—[That men may do many things and do them not, and therefore have true liberty.]

J. D.—Secondly, they who might have done, and may do, many things which they leave undone, and they who leave undone many things which they might do, are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true liberty. But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone; as is 664
plain, 1 Kings iii. 11,—"Because thou hast asked this thing,

and hast not asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies," &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He might have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did ask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did not ask. And Acts v. 4,—"After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?" It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power to retain it; yet if he did give it, he could not retain it; and if he did retain it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do not; and we do not, what we might do: that is, we have true liberty from necessity.

T. H.—The second argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of men, that did one thing, when if they would they might have done another. The places are two: one is in the 1 Kings iii. 11; where the history says, God was pleased, that Solomon, who might if he would have asked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God's hands: the other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4,—"After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?" [*Answer.*]

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places;—that they prove there is election, but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what they so elect.

J. D.—We have had the very same answer twice before[d]. It seemeth, that he is well pleased with it; or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a panchreston—a salve for all sores, or "*dictamnum*"—sovereign "dittany[e]," to make all his adversary's weapons drop out of the wounds of his cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will not waste the time to shew any further, how the members of his distinction do cross one another and one take away another. To make every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of another thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no election at all. But I forbear to press that in present. If I may be bold to use his own phrase, [Reply.]

[d] [*Thrice*; see above T. H., Numbers iii, vi, vii. pp. 27, 38, 41.]

[e] [See Virg., Æn., xii. 411—419;—Plin., Nat. Hist., viii. 27. xxv. 8.]

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his answer "looks" quite "another way[f]" from mine argument. My second reason was this;—"They who may do, and might have done, many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many things which they might do, are not necessitated," nor precisely and antecedently determined, to do what they do; "but we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone;" as appears evidently by the texts alleged; therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined nor necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of "election" in this argument? To what proposition, to what term, doth T. H. apply his answer? He neither affirms, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of anything contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a more pertinent answer.

NUMBER X.

Argument 3.—[That the interrogatories, expostulations, and the like, in Scripture, prove men to have true liberty.]

J. D.—Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those interrogations, and objurgations, and reprehensions, and expostulations, which we find so frequently in Holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect) but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations? "Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldest not eat?" Gen. iii. 11; and verse 13, He saith to Eve, "Why hast thou done this?" and to Cain, "Why art thou wrath, and why is thy countenance cast down?" And, "Why will ye die, O house of Israel?" Doth God command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by Himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat? Doth He reprehend him for doing that, which He hath antecedently determined that he must do? Doth He propose things under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and derision? Doth a loving master chide his servant, because he doth not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot move, by the master's own order, without the servant's default or consent? They who talk here of a twofold will of God, "secret" and "revealed," and the one opposite to the other, understand not what they say. These two wills concern several persons.

["What is this thou hast done?"] [Gen. iv. 6.—Ezek. xviii. 31; xxxiii. 11.]

[f] [See above T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]

The secret will of God is what He will do Himself; the revealed will of God is what He would have us to do. It may
665 be the secret will of God to take away the life of the father; yet it is God's revealed will, that his son should wish his life, and pray for his life[g]. Here is no contradiction, where the agents are distinct. But for the same person to command one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do another thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he must do; this were (I am afraid to utter what they are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. God's chiding proves man's liberty.

T. H.—To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but one answer. [*The answer deferred.*]

J. D.—Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, the one drawn from the truth of God, the other drawn from the justice of God, the one from His objurgations and reprehensions, the other from His judgments after life, did require distinct answers. But the plain truth is, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in this whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is contained Numb. xii:—"That which He does, is made just by His doing; just, I say, in Him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is unjust[h]." I dare not insist upon it. I hope his meaning is not so bad as the words intimate, and as I apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is Truth itself, and to justify feigning and dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of His power and the absoluteness of His dominion. And, therefore, by his leave, I must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this argument also. He tells us, that he was "not surprised[i]." Whether he were or not, is more than I know. But this I [Reply.]

[g] [From Anselm., Lib. de Volunt. Dei, Opusc. p. 85. M. fol. Paris. 1544.]

[h] [Below, T. H. Numb. xii. p. 65.]

[i] [Above, in Numb. ii. p. 26.]

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see plainly, that either he is not provided, or that his cause admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingenuously, when they met with a difficult knot which they could not untie, to put it upon Elias;—"Elias will answer it when he comes."

NUMBER XI.

Argument 4.—[That every theory of necessity proves too much, in proving Adam a necessary agent; which yet Necessitarians deny.]

J. D.—Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the same objects, the same dictates of the understanding. But,

"Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi."

The greatest opposers of our liberty are as earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these supposed impediments take away true liberty.

[*Answer.*]

T. H.—The fourth argument is to this effect:—"If the decree of God, or His foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of" causes, "or the last dictate of the understanding," or whatsoever it be, "do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty.

'Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi.'"

[*T. H.'s own theory of necessity.*]

That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action, —that he may no longer doubt of my meaning,—is the sum of all those things, which, being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God.

[*Of the theories of*

But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of

[Horat., A. P., 188.—"*Quodcunque ostendis* mihi sic," &c. And for the doctrine, Calvin., Instit., lib. I. c. xv. § 8; Op. tom. viii. p. 44.]

anything, cannot be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they on it. [Discourse I. — *necessity held by others.*]

The influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.

Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link, God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event does not always depend upon one single chain, but on many together.

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents, and necessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for "moral efficacy," I understand not what he means by it. The last dictate of the judgment concerning the good or bad
666 that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole cause, but the last part of it; and yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse's back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it.

Now for his argument,—that if the concourse of all the causes necessitate that effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty. I deny the consequence: for I make not only the effect, but also the election of that particular effect, to be necessary; inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as anything else whatsoever. As, for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have election, that is, liberty to do what he has a fancy to, though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his election or will. [*Election as well as action necessary.*]

This doctrine, because he says he "hates," I doubt had better been suppressed; as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

J. D.—This argument was sent forth only as an espy, to make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed necessity; which errand being done, and the foundation whereupon he builds being found out, which [Reply.]

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is, as I called it, "a concatenation of causes," and as he calls it, "a concourse of necessary causes," it would now be a superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake the refutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not undertake to defend. And therefore I shall wave them for the present, with these short animadversions.

[The decrees and foreknowledge of God.]

Concerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the decree itself with the execution of His decree. And concerning the foreknowledge of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, which is called the "knowledge of vision[k]," which doth not produce the intellective objects, no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects, with that other knowledge of God, which is called the "knowledge of approbation[k]," or a practical knowledge, that is, knowledge joined with an act of the will; of which divines do truly say, that it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist is the cause of his work. God made all things "by His Word," that is, by His wisdom.

John i. [3.—Heb. i. 2.]

[The influences of the stars.]

Concerning the influences of the stars, I wish he had expressed himself more clearly. For as I do willingly grant, that those heavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence, as we see by manifold experience, in the loadstone, and shell-fish, &c.; so, if he intend, that by these influences they do naturally or physically determine the will, or have any direct dominion over human counsels, either in whole or in part, either more or less, he is in an error.

[The concatenation of causes.]

Concerning the concatenation of causes, whereas he makes not one chain, but "an innumerable number of chains" (I hope he speaks hyperbolically, and doth not intend that they are actually infinite), the difference is not material whether one or many, so long as they are all joined together, both in the first link, and likewise in the effect. It serves to no end, but to shew what a shadow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or rather what a dream of a shadow. As if one chain were not sufficient to load poor man, but he must be clogged with innumerable chains. This is just such another freedom as the Turkish galley slaves do enjoy.

[k] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xiv. artt. 8, 9.]

[Physical and moral efficacy of objects.]

But I admire, that T. H., who is so versed in this question, should here confess, that he understands not the difference between physical or natural, and moral efficacy. And much more, that he should affirm, that outward objects do "determine voluntary agents" by a "natural efficacy." No object, no second agent, angel or devil, can determine the will of man naturally; but God alone, in respect of His supreme dominion over all things. Then the will is determined naturally, when God Almighty, besides His general influence, whereupon all second causes do depend as well for their being as for their acting, doth moreover, at some times, when it pleaseth Him, in cases extraordinary, concur by a special influence, and infuse something into the will in the nature of an act or a habit, whereby the will is moved and excited and applied to will or choose this or that. Then the will is determined morally, when some object is proposed to it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will. Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will; but not so, where the determination is moral. In the former case, the will is
667 determined extrinsecally, in the latter case, intrinsecally; the former produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a necessity of supposition. If the will do not suspend but assent, then the act is necessary; but because the will may suspend and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely necessary. In the former case the will is moved necessarily and determinately; in the latter, freely and indeterminately. The former excitation is immediate; the latter is mediate *mediante intellectu*, and requires the help of the understanding. In a word, so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question.

[The last dictate of the understanding.]

There remains only the last dictate of the understanding, which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the will, and to the necessary production of the act; "as the last feather may be said to break a horse's back, when there were so many laid on before that there wanted but that to do it." I have shewed (Numb. vii.[1]), that the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute

[1] [Above, pp. 42, 43.]

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in itself, nor conclusive to the will; and when it is conclusive, yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsecal necessity. I shall only add one thing more in present,—that by making the last judgment of right reason to be of no more weight than a single feather, he wrongs the understanding as well as he doth the will; he endeavours to deprive the will of its supreme power of application, and to deprive the understanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition. Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive appetite itself, being an inferior faculty, and affixed to the organ of the body, have any direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational will. It is without the sphere of their activity. All the access which they have unto the will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes clear and sometimes disturbed, and of reason either right or misinformed. Without the help of the understanding, all his second causes were not able of themselves to load the horse's back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth amount unto. But we shall meet with his horse-load of feathers again Numb. xxiii.[m]

[Adam was a necessary agent if other men are.]

These things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to his answer. My argument was this;—If any of these or all of these causes formerly recited do take away true liberty (that is still intended, from necessity), then Adam before his fall had no true liberty; but Adam before his fall had true liberty. He mis-recites the argument, and denies the consequence; which is so clearly proved that no man living can doubt of it,—because Adam was subjected to all the same causes as well as we, the same decree, the same prescience, the same influences, the same concourse of causes, the same efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. But it is only a mistake; for it appears plainly by his following discourse, that he intended to deny, not the consequence, but the assumption. For he makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall; yea, he proceeds so far as to affirm, that all human wills, his and ours, and "each propension" of our wills, even "during" our "deliberation," are "as much necessitated as any thing else whatsoever;" that we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do,

[m] [Below, p. 707. fol. edit.]

than the "fire" hath power not to "burn." Though I honour T. H. for his person and for his learning, yet I must confess ingenuously, I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I believe both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it. It destroys liberty, and dishonours the nature of man. It makes the second causes and outward objects to be the rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls, of destiny. It makes the First Cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as man; yea, more than man, by as much as the motion of the watch is more from the artificer, who did make it and wind it up, than either from the spring, or the wheels, or the thread. If God by His special influence into the second causes did necessitate them to operate as they did; and if they, being thus determined, did necessitate Adam inevitably, irresistibly, not by an accidental but by an essential subordination of causes, to whatsoever he did; then one of these two absurdities must needs follow;—either that Adam did not sin, and that there is no such thing as sin in the world, because
668 it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially from God; or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of evil, than man, because man is extrinsecally, inevitably determined, but so is not God; and in causes essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect. What tyrant did ever impose laws that were impossible for those to keep upon whom they were imposed, and punish them for breaking those laws which he himself had necessitated them to break, which it was no more in their power not to break, than it is in the power of the "fire" not to "burn?" Excuse me if I "hate" this doctrine "with a perfect hatred;" [Ps. cxxxix. 22.] which is so dishonourable both to God and man, which makes men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of necessity, to be hanged of necessity, and to be damned of necessity. And therefore I must say, and say again,

[Horrid consequences of the doctrine of necessity.]

"Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi."

It were better to be an atheist, to believe no God; or to be a Manichee, to believe two Gods, a God of good, and a God of evil; or with the heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods; than thus to charge the true God to be the proper

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cause and the true author of all the sins and evils which are in the world.

NUMBER XII.

Argument 5.—[That the theory of necessity leaves no room for reward or punishment.]

J. D.—Fifthly, if there be no liberty, there shall be no Day of Doom, no Last Judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death. A man can never make himself a criminal, if he be not left at liberty to commit a crime. No man can be justly punished for doing that, which was not in his power to shun. To take away liberty, hazards Heaven; but undoubtedly it leaves no Hell.

[*Answer.*]

T. H.—The arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fifth, and fall both into one: namely, if there be a necessity of all events, that it will follow, that praise and reprehension, reward and punishment, are all vain and unjust; and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate, the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of Heaven or Hell.

[*St. Paul's argument in the Epistle to the Romans.*]

To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. ix. vers. 11. From the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth is laid down the very same objection in these words.—"When they" (meaning Esau and Jacob) "were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by works but by Him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said to her" (viz. to Rebekah), "that the elder shall serve the younger[n]. . . And what then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. . . It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God, that sheweth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up, that I may shew My power in thee, and that My name may be set forth in all the earth. Therefore, whom God willeth, He hath mercy on, and whom He willeth He hardeneth." Thus you see, the case put by St. Paul is the same with that of J. D.; and the same objection in these words following,—"Thou wilt ask me then, why will God yet

[Rom. xi. 19.]

[n] [Hobbes has omitted here v. 13.— and Esau have I hated."] "As it is written, Jacob have I loved

complain, for who hath resisted His will?" To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God's will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did, but thus,—"Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff, to make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour?" According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I answer J. D.'s objection, and say, the power of God alone, without other help, is sufficient justification of any action He doth. That which men make among themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are counted and termed rightly just and unjust, is not that by which God Almighty's actions are to be measured or called just; no more than His counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which He does is made just by His doing; just, I say, in Him, not always just in us, by the example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is unjust. So also His counsels. They be therefore not in vain, because they be His; whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, He did object no sin to him, but justified that afflicting him by telling him of His power. "Hast thou" (says God) "an arm like Mine?"—"Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?"—and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man that was born blind, said, 'it was not for his sin, nor his parents' sin, but that the power of God might be shewn in him.' Beasts are subject to death and torment, yet they cannot sin. It was God's will it should be so. Power irresistible justifieth all actions really
669 and properly, in whomsoever it be found. Less power does not. And because such power is in God only, He must needs be just in all His actions. And we, that not comprehending His counsels call Him to the bar, commit injustice in it.

Discourse I.

[Rom. xi. 20, 21.]

[*The power of God alone is sufficient to justify any action He doth.*]

[Job x. 9; xxxviii. 4, &c.]

[John ix. 3.]

I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by distinguishing between will and permission: as, that God Almighty does indeed permit sin sometimes, and that He also foreknoweth that the sin He permitteth shall be com-

[*There is no difference between a will active and a will permissive, or*

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a will causing the act and a will causing the sin.]

mitted, but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, God Almighty does indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between the action and the law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing done, and the permission to do it, when He that permitteth it can hinder it, and knows it will be done unless He hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an action that is against the law, and the sin of that action; as, for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah: nor when one is cause both of the action and of the law, how another can be cause of the disagreement between them; no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot sin, because His doing a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin; and because whatsoever can sin, is subject to another's law, which God is not. And therefore 'tis blasphemy to say, God can sin. But to say, that God can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to Him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau's or Pharaoh's actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, or that, proceeding from His will, [they] could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto J. D.'s opinion. For I now hold nothing in all this question between us, but what seemeth to me (not obscurely but) most expressly said in this place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.

[2 Sam. xi.]

[Reply.] J. D.—T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and satisfy two arguments with one answer; whereas in truth he satisfieth neither. First, for my third reason. Though all he say here, were as true as an oracle; though punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice, in God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny His own act; or why He should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which He Himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof He

was the actor more than they, they being but as the stone, but He the hand that threw it. Notwithstanding anything which is pleaded here, this Stoical opinion doth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation close to God, Who is the Truth itself. DISCOURSE I.

And to my fifth argument, which he changeth and relateth amiss, as by comparing mine with his may appear, his chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of St. Paul, Rom. ix. 11. Hath he never heard, that to propose a doubt is not to answer an argument? [The passage in St. Paul explained, as to its general scope.]

'Nec benè respondet qui litem lite resolvit[o].'

But I will not pay him in his own coin. Wherefore to this place alleged by him I answer, the case is not the same. The question moved there is, how God did keep His promise made to Abraham, to be "the God of him and of his seed," if the Jews, who were the legitimate progeny of Abraham, were deserted. To which the Apostle answers, that that promise was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham, that is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which were the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing Christians; which answer he explicateth, first by the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael, and after, in the place cited, of Esau and of Jacob. Yet neither doth he speak there so much of their persons as of their posterities. And though some words may be accommodated to God's predestination, which are there uttered, yet it is not the scope of that text to treat of the reprobation of any man to Hell-fire. All the posterity of Esau were not eternally reprobated; as holy Job, and many others. But this question which is now agitated between us, is quite of another nature; —how a man can be a criminal, who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsecally necessitated to do; or how God in justice can punish a man with eternal torments, for doing that, which it was never in his power to leave undone; that He who did impress the motion in the heart of man, should punish man, who did only receive the impression from Him. So his answer "looks another way[p]." [Gen. xvii. 7.] verses 6, 7, 8.

But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine all those passages which may seem to favour his cause. [In its particular passages.]

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[o] ["Nil agit exemplum litem quod lite resolvit." Horat., Sat., II. iii. 103.]

[p] [See above, T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]

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[1. How Jacob was loved and Esau hated.]

First, these words, vers. 11,—"Being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,"—upon which the whole weight of his argument doth depend, have no reference at all to those words, vers. 13, "Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated;" for those words were first uttered by the prophet Malachi, many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead; and intended of the posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed from captivity, as the Israelites were: but they are referred to those other words, vers. 12, "The elder shall serve the younger;" which indeed were spoken before Jacob or Esau were born. And though those words of Malachi had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were born, yet it had advantaged his cause nothing; for "hatred" in that text doth not signify any reprobation to the flames of Hell, much less the execution of that decree, or the actual imposition of punishment, nor any act contrary to love. "God saw all that He made, and it was very good." Goodness itself cannot hate that which is good. But 'hatred' there signifies comparative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a negation of love. As Gen. xxix. 31,—"When the Lord saw that Leah was *hated*;"—we may not conclude thence, that Jacob hated his wife. The precedent verse doth fully expound the sense;—"Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah." So Matt. vi. 24,—"No man can serve two masters, for either he will *hate* the one and love the other." So Luke xiv. 26,—"If any man *hate* not his father and mother," &c., "he cannot be My disciple." St. Matthew tells us the sense of it;—"He that loveth father or mother more than Me, is not worthy of Me."

Mal. i. 2, [3.]

Gen. xxv. 23.

[Gen. i. 31.]

vers. 30.

Matt. x. 37.

2. [Of the freedom of God's mercy.]

Secondly, those words, vers. 15,—"I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,"—do prove no more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before Esau, and of the Christians before the Jews, was not a debt from God, either to the one or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of this? All men confess, that God's mercies do exceed man's deserts; but God's punishments do never exceed man's misdeeds. As we see in the parable of the labourers;—"Friend, I do thee no wrong; did not I agree with thee for a penny? .. Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as I will? Is thy eye evil, because I am good?" Acts of mercy are free, but acts of justice are due.

Matt. xx. [13, 15.]

That which follows, vers. 17, comes something nearer the cause;—"The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, For this same purpose I have raised thee up" (that is, I have made thee a king, or I have preserved thee), "that I might shew My power in thee." But this particle—"that"—doth not always signify the main end of an action, but sometimes only a consequent of it. As Matt. ii. [14,] 15;—"He departed into Egypt, *that* it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet, 'Out of Egypt have I called My son;'" without doubt Joseph's aim or end of his journey was not to fulfil prophecies, but to save the life of the Child; yet, because the fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of Joseph's journey, he saith, "*that* it might be fulfilled." So here,—"I have raised thee up, *that* I might shew My power." Again, though it should be granted, that this particle—"that"—did denote the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh in the Red Sea, yet it was not the antecedent intention of God, which evermore respects the good and benefit of the creature, but God's consequent intention upon the prevision of Pharaoh's obstinacy,—that since he would not glorify God in obeying His word, he should glorify God [in] undergoing His judgments. Hitherto we find no eternal punishments, nor no temporal punishments, without just deserts.

3. [In what sense God's glory is either the end or the consequence of man's sin.]

It follows, vers. 18, "Whom He will He hardeneth." Indeed hardness of heart is the greatest judgment that God lays upon a sinner in this life, worse than all the plagues of Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart? Not by a natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor by inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and rebellion; for "God tempteth no man, but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." Then God is said to harden the heart three ways.—1. First, negatively, and not positively; "not by imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace[q]:" as the sun, descending to the tropic of Capricorn, is said with us to be the cause of winter, that is, not by imparting cold, but by not imparting heat.

4. [In what sense God is said to harden men's hearts.]

James i. 13, [14.]

q ["Nec obdurat Deus impartiendo malitiam sed non impartiendo misericordiam." Aug., Epist. cxiii, Ad Sixtum, c. 3. § 4; Op. tom. ii. p. 719. D. —"Respondeo, ex communi sanctorum Patrum sententiâ, Deum non esse causam excæcationis et indurationis *positive* (ut sic loquar), *sed negative*; viz. permittendo, deserendo, non miserendo." Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c. 14; Op. tom. iii. p. 177. C.]

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It is an act of mercy in God to give His grace freely, but to detain it is no act of injustice. So the Apostle opposeth "hardening" to "shewing of mercy." To harden is as much as not to shew mercy[r].—2. Secondly, God is said to harden the 671 heart occasionally and not causally; by doing good, which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of growing worse and worse, and doing evil: as a master, by often correcting an untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he grows even to despise the rod; or as an indulgent parent by his patience and gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious. So, whether we look upon God's frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God's iterated favours in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon Pharaoh's request, both of them in their several kinds were occasions of hardening Pharaoh's heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the other more desperately rebellious. So that which was good in it, was God's; that which was evil, was Pharaoh's. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly confirmed, Exod. viii. 15,—"When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardened his heart;"—and Exod. ix. 34,—"When Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants." So Psalm cv. 25,—"He turned their hearts, so that they hated His people, and dealt subtilly with them;" that is, God blessed the children of Israel, whereupon the Egyptians did take occasion to hate them; as is plain, Exod. i. verses 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardened Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as He did to Nebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he; or God hardened it occasionally: but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration, by determining his own will to evil, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. So are all presumptuous sinners. "Harden not your hearts, as in the provocation, as in the day of temptation in the wilderness."

[Dan. iv. 34—37]

Ps. xcv. 8.

—3. Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but

[r] ["Obduratio Dei est nolle misereri." Aug., De Divers. Quæst. Ad Simplicianum, lib. i. qu. 2. § 15; Op. tom. vi. p. 96. E.]

not operatively, nor effectively; as he who only lets loose a greyhound out of the slip, is said to hound him at the hare. Will you see plainly what St. Paul intends by "hardening?" Read vers. 22;—"What if God, willing to shew His wrath and to make His power known" (that is, by a consequent will, which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin), "endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy," &c. There is much difference between "enduring" and impelling, or inciting, "the vessels of wrath." He saith of "the vessels of mercy," that God "prepared them unto glory;" but of "the vessels of wrath," he saith only, that they were "fitted to destruction," that is, not by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth "endure the vessels of wrath with much long-suffering." T. H. saith, that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions, good and bad; that He necessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts which He condemneth as evil, and for which He punisheth them. If doing willingly, and "enduring," if "much long-suffering" and necessitating, imply not a contrariety one to another, "*reddat mihi minam Diogenes*"—let him that taught me logic "give me my money again[s]."

[Rom. ix. 23.]

But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the *operative* and *permissive* will of God, and that other between the action and the irregularity, do "dazzle his understanding." Though he can find no difference between these two, yet others do[t]. St. Paul himself did: Acts xiii. 18, "About the time of forty years suffered He their manners in the wilderness;" and Acts xiv. 16, "Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways:"—T. H. would make "suffering" to be inciting, "their manners" to be God's manners, "their ways" to be God's ways:—and Acts xvii. 30, "The times of this ignorance God winked at;"—it was never heard that one was said to "wink" or connive at that which was his own act:—and 1 Cor. x. 13, "God is faithful, Who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are

[There is a real difference between an operative and a permissive will.]

[s] [Cic., Lucull., xxx.]

[t] [See Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. i. dist. xlv. qu. 1. art. 3; and Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xx. art. 12: from Aug., Enchirid., c. xcv. § 24, Op. tom. vi. p. 231. E.]

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able;"—to tempt is the devil's act, therefore he is called the Tempter; God tempts no man to sin, but He suffers them to be tempted; and so suffers, that He could hinder Satan, if He would; but by T. H. his doctrine, to tempt to sin, and to suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to hinder it, is all one; and so he transforms God (I write it with horror) into the devil, and makes tempting to be God's own work, and the devil to be but His instrument:—and in that noted place, Rom. ii. 4, [5], "Despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance, but 672
after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of God;"—here are as many convincing arguments in this one text against the opinion of T. H. almost as there are words; here we learn, that God is "rich in goodness," and will not punish His creatures for that which is His own act; secondly, that He "suffers" and "forbears sinners long," and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve; thirdly, that the reason of God's forbearance is to 'bring men to repentance;' fourthly, that "hardness" of heart and "impenitency" is not causally from God, but from ourselves; fifthly, that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means of their conversion on God's part, which is the cause of men's perdition, but their own contempt and 'despising' of these means; sixthly, that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but an act of "righteous judgment," whereby God renders to every man according to his own deeds, "wrath" to them and only to them who "treasure up wrath unto themselves," and "eternal life" to those who "continue patiently in well-doing." If they deserve such punishment, who only neglect the goodness and long-suffering of God, what do they who utterly deny it, and make God's doing and His suffering to be all one? I do beseech T. H. to consider, what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood, to contradict the clear current of the whole Scripture. Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter:—"The long-suffering of God waited once in the days of Noah;" and, "Account that the long-suffering of the Lord is salvation."

1 Pet. iii. 20.

2 Pet. iii. 15.

This is the name God gives Himself;—"The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering," &c. Exod. xxxiv. 6. Discourse I.

Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true,—that he who doth permit anything to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say, in some sort; that is, either by an antecedent will or by a consequent will, either by an operative will or by a permissive will, or he is willing to let it be done but not willing to do it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the lions' den, to make good his rash decree: so Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath; how much more may the immutable rule of justice in God, and His fidelity in keeping His word, draw from Him the punishment of obstinate sinners, though antecedently He willeth their conversion? He loveth all His creatures well, but His own justice better. Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in itself, but indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some greater good; as a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to save the life of the whole; or as a judge, being desirous to save a malefactor's life, and having power to reprieve him, doth yet condemn him for example's sake, that by the death of one he may save the lives of many. Marvel not, then, if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of His glory, and for the greater benefit of His faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would not suffer evil to be in the world, unless He knew how to draw good out of evil[u]. Yet this ought not to be so understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same,

[Dan. vi. 14—17.] [Matt. xiv. 9.]

[u] ["Neque enim Deus omnipotens, . . cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo sineret mali aliquid esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut benefaceret et de malo." Aug., Enchirid., c. xi. § 3; Op. tom. vi. p. 199. A.]

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but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God; for they are the same with the Divine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission. God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good and evil.

[How God is the cause of the act, yet not of the sin of the act.]

T. H. demands, how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because He concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special influence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat, but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the 673 root: even so the general power to act is from God,—"In Him we live and move and have our being;"—this is good; but the specification and determination of this general power to the doing of any evil is from ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of man; this is bad. And to speak properly, the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or being in it, as poison hath; but rather the *de*ficient cause. Now no defect can flow from Him, Who is the highest perfection[v]. Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God; but the specification of this general and good power to murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man. So T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that

[Acts xvii. 28.]

[v] ["Nemo quærat efficientem causam malæ voluntatis; non enim est *efficiens* sed *deficiens*, quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio." Aug., De Civ. Dei, lib. xii. c. 7; Op. tom. vii. p. 306, C.—"Ex his apertissima erit ratio cur Deus non peccet neque peccati causa jure dici possit, quamvis concurrat ad illam actionem efficiendam quæ homini sit peccatum;" viz. "quia Deus non efficit actionem illam ut caussa particularis sed ut caussa universalis, præbens vim et influxum quendam indifferentem," &c. Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c. 17; Op. tom. iii. p. 207. B.—"Non est enim injustitia qualitas aut actio aut aliqua essentia, sed tantum absentia debitæ justitiæ; nec est nisi in voluntate, ubi debet esse justitia." Anselm., De Concord. Præscient. &c. cum Lib. Arb., c. i. p. 88. B. Opusc. fol. Paris. 1544—"Peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines cum peccant." Aug., In Joh. Evang. Tract. i. § 13; Op. tom. iii. P. 2. p. 294. D.]

is, by general influence, and yet another cause, concurring by special influence and determining this general and good power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy or the irregularity. And therefore he may keep his "longer and shorter garments" for some other occasion. Certainly they will not fit this subject, unless he could make general and special influence to be all one.

[God's justice not measured by His power but by His will, and that the will of One Who is perfect.]

But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, and the objection used by the Jews, vers. 19,—"Why doth He yet find fault? who hath resisted His will?"—is the very same with my argument; and St. Paul's answer, vers. 20,—"O man, who art thou that repliest against God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? hath not the potter power over his clay?" &c.—is the very same with his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all His actions; and that the Apostle in his answer doth not deny, that it was God's will, nor that God's decree was before Esau's sin. To which I reply:—

1. First, that the case is not at all the same, but quite different; as may appear by these particulars. First, those words—"Before they had done either good or evil"—are not, cannot be, referred to those other words—"Esau have I hated." Secondly, if they could, yet it is less than nothing; because, before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were known to God. Thirdly, by "the potter's clay" here is not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass, of mankind. Fourthly, the "hating" here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that is, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the "hardening" which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive, but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of grace. Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to eternal punishment; much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of punishment without sin; which is the question between us, and wherein T. H. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge that punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin[w]. If the question

[w] ["Omnis pœna, si justa est, peccati pœna est." Aug., De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 18. § 51; and Retract., lib. i. c. 9. § 5: Op. tom. i. pp. 631. B, 14. E.]

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be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer is just and fit,—because it is His pleasure, and it is sauciness in a creature in this case to reply. "May not God do what He will with His own?" No man doubteth but God imparteth grace beyond man's desert. But if the case be put, why God doth punish one more than another, or why He throws one into Hell-fire and not another, which is the present case agitated between us; to say with T. H., that it is because God is omnipotent, or because His power is irresistible, or merely because it is His pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned, by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there are between those two cases. It is not therefore "against God" that I "reply," but against T. H. I do not "call my Creator to the bar," but my fellow creature. I ask no account of God's counsels, but of man's presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their own fancies upon God, and when they cannot justify them by reason, to plead His omnipotence, or to cry, "*O altitudo!*" that "the ways of God" are "unsearchable." If they may justify their drowsy dreams because God's power and dominion is absolute, much more may we reject such fantastical devices, which are inconsistent with the truth, and goodness, and justice of God, and make Him to be a tyrant, who is "the Father of mercies," and "the God of" all "consolation." The unsearchableness of God's ways should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for spirits of error.

Matt. xx. 15.

[Rom. xi. 33.]

[2 Cor. i. 3. —Rom. xv. 5.]

2. Secondly, this objection contained vers. 19, to which the Apostle answers vers. 20, is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews; who thought much at that grace and favour which God was pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them for His people, which honour they would have appropriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the Apostle's answer is not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to impart His grace to whom He pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the Jews; as appeareth vers. 22,—"What if God, willing" (that is, by a consequent will) "to shew His wrath, and to make

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His power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." They acted, God "endured;" they were tolerated by God, but "fitted to destruction" by themselves; for their much wrong doing, here is God's "much long-suffering." And more plainly vers. 31, [32;]—"Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness; wherefore? because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law." This reason is set down yet more emphatically in the next chapter, vers. 3;—"They" (that is, the Israelites), "being ignorant of God's righteousness" (that is, by faith in Christ), "and going about to establish their own righteousness" (that is, by the works of the law), "have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God;"—and yet most expressly chap. xi. vers. 20,—"Because of unbelief they were broken off, but thou standest by faith." Neither was there any precedent binding decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and consequently to punishment. It was in their own power, by their concurrence with God's grace, to prevent these judgments, and to recover their former estate;—vers. 23, "If they" (that is, the unbelieving Jews) "abide not still in unbelief, they shall be graffed in." The crown and the sword are immoveable' (to use St. Anselm's comparison), but it is we that move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the crown, and the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the Jews under the sword, and the Gentiles under the crown.

3. Thirdly, though I confess, that human "pacts" are not the measure of God's justice, but His justice is His own immutable will, whereby He is ready to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad; so, nevertheless, God may oblige Himself freely to His creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and therefore He punisheth not man contrary to His own covenant, but for the transgression of his duty. And Divine justice is not measured by omnipotence, or by "irresistible power," but by God's will. God can do many things according to His absolute power which He doth not; He "could raise up children to Abraham of stones," but He never did so. It is a rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any wickedness or imperfection; as, God "cannot

[Matt. iii. 9.]

2 Tim. ii. 13.

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deny Himself,"—He "cannot lie." These and the like are fruits of impotence, not of power. So God cannot "destroy the righteous with the wicked;" He "could not" destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in it: not for want of dominion or power, but because it was not agreeable to His justice, nor to that law which Himself had constituted. The Apostle saith, "God is not unrighteous to forget your work." As it is a good consequence to say, This is from God, therefore it is righteous; so is this also, This thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all creatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her chickens; how they will expose themselves to death for them: and yet all these are but shadows of that love which is in God towards His creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God did create so many millions of souls to be tormented eternally in Hell without any fault of theirs, except such as He Himself did necessitate them unto, merely to shew His dominion, and because His power is irresistible! The same privilege which T. H. appropriates here to "power absolutely irresistible," a friend of his, in his book *De Cive* (cap. vi. p. 70)[x], ascribes to power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates; whose power he makes to be "as absolute as a man's power is over himself, not to be limited by any thing but only by their strength." The greatest propugners of sovereign power think it enough for princes to challenge an immunity from coercive power, but acknowledge, that the law hath a directive power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly.

Tit. i. 2.
Gen. xviii. 25.
Gen. xix. 22.
Heb. vi. 10.

[The case of Job.]

But, saith he, "God objected no sin to Job, but justified His afflicting him by His power." First, this is an argument from authority negatively, that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions of Job were no vindicatory punishments, to take vengeance of his sins (whereof we dispute), but probatory chastisements, to make trial of his graces. Thirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might justly have laid greater punishments upon him, than those afflictions which he suffered. Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of his nativity. Indeed God said to Job, "Where wast

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Job iii. 3.
Job xxxviii. 4.

[x] [Elementorum Philosophiæ Sectio Tertia de Cive, c. vi. § 18. p. 70. first ed. Paris, 4to. 1642.]

thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" that is, how canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou wast born, or comprehend the secret causes of My judgments? —and, "Hast thou an arm like God?"—as if He should say, Why art thou impatient? dost thou think thyself able to strive with God? But that God should punish Job without desert, here is not a word. Discourse I. Job xl. 9.

Concerning the blind man, mentioned John ix, his blindness was rather a blessing to him than a punishment, being the means to have his soul illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight of the soul with the blessed angels. We read of some, who have put out their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the soul. Again, neither he nor his parents were innocent, being "conceived and born in sin and iniquity;" and, "In many things we offend all." But our Saviour's meaning is evident by the disciples' question, vers. 2. They had not so sinned, that he should be born blind; or, they were not more grievous sinners than other men, to deserve an exemplary judgment more than they; but this corporal blindness befell him principally by the extraordinary providence of God, for the manifestation of His own glory in restoring him to his sight. So his instance halts on both sides; neither was this a punishment, nor the blind man free from sin. [And of the blind man mentioned in St. John's Gospel.] Psal. li. 5. Jam. iii. 2.

His third instance, of the death and torments of beasts, is of no more weight than the two former. The death of brute beasts is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though they be often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and endless pains of Hell; between the mere depriving of a creature of temporal life, and the subjecting of it to eternal death. I know the philosophical speculations of some, who affirm, that entity is better than non-entity; that it is better to be miserable, and suffer the torments of the damned, than to be annihilated, and cease to be altogether. This entity which they speak of, is a metaphysical entity, abstracted from the matter; which is better than non-entity, in respect of some goodness, not moral nor natural, but transcendental, which accompanies every being. [And of the brute beasts.]

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But in the concrete it is far otherwise; where that of our Saviour often takes place,—"Woe unto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed; it had been good for that man, that he had not been born." I add, that there is an analogical justice and mercy, due even to the brute beasts. "Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn;" and, 'A just man is merciful to his beast[y].'

Matt. xxvi. 24.

[Deut. xxv. 4.]

[Power to be regulated by justice, not justice by power.]

But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make justice to be the proper result of power. Power doth not measure and regulate justice, but justice measures and regulates power. The will of God, and the eternal law which is in God Himself, is properly the rule and measure of justice. As all goodness, whether natural or moral, is a participation of Divine goodness, and all created rectitude is but a participation of Divine rectitude; so all laws are but participations of the eternal law, from whence they derive their power. The rule of justice then is the same both in God and us; but it is in God, as in Him that doth regulate and measure; in us, as in those who are regulated and measured. As the will of God is immutable, always willing what is just and right and good, so His justice likewise is immutable. And that individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us, cannot possibly proceed from the special influence and determinative power of a just cause. See then how grossly T. H. doth understand that old and true principle, that "the will of God is the rule of justice;" as if, by willing things in themselves unjust, He did render them just, by reason of His absolute dominion and irresistible power: as 676
fire doth assimilate other things to itself, and convert them into the nature of fire. This were to make the eternal law a Lesbian rule[z]. Sin is defined to be "that, which is done, or said, or thought, contrary to the eternal law[a]." But by this doctrine nothing is done nor said nor thought contrary to the will of God. St. Anselm said most truly, "Then the will of man is good and just and right, when he wills that which God would have him to will[b]." But according to this doc-

[y "A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast." Prov. xii. 10.]

[z [Aristot., Eth. Nic. V. xiv. 7;—see above, in vol. iii. p. 303, note l.]

[a ["Peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum aliquid contra legem æternam." Aug., Cont. Faustum, lib. xxii. c. 27; Op. tom. viii. p. 378. F.]

[b [Lib. de Voluntate Dei, Opusc. pp. 85. K, 86. A. ed. 1544.]

trine, every man always "wills that which God would have him to will." If this be true, we need not pray, "Thy will be done in earth as it is in Heaven." T. H. hath devised a new kind of Heaven upon earth. The worst is, it is a Heaven without justice. Justice is a "constant and perpetual act of the will to give every one his own[c];" but to inflict punishment for those things which the Judge Himself did determine and necessitate to be done, is not to give every one his own. Right punitive justice is a relation of equality and proportion between the demerit and the punishment[d]; but supposing this opinion of absolute and universal necessity, there is no demerit in the world. We use to say, that right springs from law and fact: as in this syllogism;—Every thief ought to be punished, there's the law; but such an one is a thief, there's the fact; therefore he ought to be punished, there's the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be punished, neither upon law, nor upon fact, but upon the "irresistible power" of God. Yea, it overturneth as much as in it lies all law: first, the eternal law; which is the ordination of Divine wisdom, by which all creatures are directed to that end which is convenient for them[e]; that is not, to necessitate them to eternal flames: then, the law participated; which is the ordination of right reason, instituted for the common good, to shew unto man what he ought to do and what he ought not to do[e]; to what purpose is it to shew the right way to him, who is drawn and haled a contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable necessity?

[T. H.'s theory makes God inevitably the cause of sin.]

Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes Him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin. For he makes Him to be the cause not only of the law, and of the action, but even of the irregularity itself, and the difference between the action and the law; wherein the essence of sin doth consist. He makes God to determine David's will, and necessitate him to kill Uriah. In causes physically and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is evermore the cause of the effect. These are those deadly fruits which spring from the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all things; which T. H. seeing, and that neither

[c] ["Perpetua et constans voluntas jus suum unicuique tribuens." Thom. Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. lviii. art. 1; from the Digest, lib. I. tit. i. lex 10.]

[d] [Vide Aristot., Ethic., lib. V. c. iv.]

[e] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prima Secund., Qu. xci. art. 3, xciii. art. 1.]

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II. PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON.

NUMBER XIII.

Argument I.—[Story of Zeno;—necessity of sin implies necessity of punishment.] J. D.—The first argument is *Herculeum* or *baculinum*, drawn from that pleasant passage between Zeno and his man. The servant had committed some petty larceny, and the master was cudgelling him well for it; the servant thinks to creep under his master's blind side, and pleads for himself, that "the necessity of destiny did compel him to steal." The master answers, The same necessity of destiny compels me to beat thee[f]. He that denies liberty, is fitter to be refuted with rods than with arguments, until he confess, that it is free for him that beats him either to continue striking or to give over; that is, to have true liberty.

[*Answer.*] T. H.—Of the arguments from reason, the first is that, which he saith "is drawn" from Zeno's beating of his man, which is therefore called *argumentum "baculinum,"* that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is this:—Zeno held, that all actions were necessary; his man, therefore, being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it; to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that, not he that maintained, but he that derided, the necessity of things, was beaten; contrary to that he would infer: and the argument was rather *with*-drawn than "drawn" from the story.

[Reply.] J. D.—Whether the argument be "withdrawn from the story," or the answer withdrawn from the argument, let the reader judge. T. H. mistakes the scope of the reason; the strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the authority of Zeno, a rigid Stoic, which is not worth a button in this cause; nor in the servant's being an adversary to Stoical necessity, for it appears not out of the story that the servant did "deride neces- 677
sity," but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own

[f] [Diog. Laert., vii. 23.]

justification; nor in the success of the fray; we were told even now that no power doth justify an action but only that which is "irresistible[g]," such was not Zeno's; and therefore it advantageth neither of their causes, neither that of Zeno, nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the staff out of his master's hand and beaten him soundly; would not the same argument have served the man as well as it did the master?—that the necessity of destiny did compel him to strike again. Had not Zeno smarted justly for his paradox? And might not the spectators well have taken up the judges' apophthegm, concerning the dispute between Corax and his scholar, "an ill egg of an ill bird[h]?" But the strength of this argument lies partly in the ignorance of Zeno, that great champion of necessity, and the beggarliness of his cause, which admitted no defence but with a cudgel. No man (saith the servant) ought to be beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do, but I am compelled inevitably to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied. If a strong man shall take a weak man's hand perforce, and do violence with it to a third person, he whose hand is forced is innocent, and he only culpable who compelled him. The minor was Zeno's own doctrine. What answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant? Very learnedly he denied the conclusion, and cudgelled his servant; telling him in effect, that though there was no reason why he should be beaten, yet there was a necessity why he must be beaten. And partly in the evident absurdity of such an opinion, which deserves not to be confuted with reasons but with rods. There are four things, said the philosopher, which ought not to be called into question: first, such things whereof it is wickedness to doubt; as, whether the soul be immortal, whether there be a God; such an one should not be confuted with reasons, but 'cast into the sea with a mill-stone about his neck,' as unworthy to breathe the air or to behold the light: secondly, such things as are above the capacity of reason; as, among Christians, the mystery of the Holy Trinity: thirdly, such principles as are evidently true; as, that two and two are four, in arithmetic, that the whole is greater than the part, in logic: fourthly,

[Matt. xviii. 6, &c.]

[g] [Above T. H. Numb. xii. p. 66.] Sext. Empir., Adv. Mathem., lib. ii.

[h] ["Εκ κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ὠόν." p. 81. C. fol. Colon. Allob. 1621.]

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such things as are obvious to the senses; as, whether the snow be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was justly sentenced to be scorched with fire; and he that denied motion, to be beaten until he recanted. So he who denies all liberty from necessitation, should be scourged until he become a humble suppliant to him that whips him, and confess that he hath power either to strike or to hold his hand.

NUMBER XIV.

Argument 2.—[The doctrine of necessity overthrows the frame-work of all human society.]

J. D.—Secondly, this very persuasion—that there is no true liberty—is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world. The laws are unjust, which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun. All consultations are vain, if every thing be either necessary or impossible. Who ever deliberated, whether the sun should rise to-morrow, or whether he should sail over mountains? It is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or madmen, if all things be necessary. Praises and dispraises, rewards and punishments, are as vain as they are undeserved, if there be no liberty[1]. All counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, are superfluous and foolish, if there be no liberty. In vain we labour, in vain we study, in vain we take physic, in vain we have tutors to instruct us, if all things come to pass alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we be idle or industrious, by unalterable necessity. But it is said, that though future events be certain, yet they are unknown to us; and therefore we prohibit, deliberate, admonish, praise, dispraise, reward, punish, study, labour, and use means. Alas! how should our not knowing of the event be a sufficient motive to us to use the means, so long as we believe the event is already certainly determined, and can no more be changed by all our endeavours, than we can stay the course of heaven with our finger, or add a cubit to our stature! Suppose it be unknown, yet it is certain; we cannot hope to alter the course of things by our labours. Let the necessary causes do their work; we have no remedy but patience, and shrug up the shoulders. Either allow liberty, or destroy all societies.

[1] ["Οὔτε δὲ οἱ ἔπαινοι οὔτε οἱ ψόγοι οὔθ' αἱ τιμαὶ οὔθ' αἱ κολάσεις δίκαιαι, μὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῆς ὁρμῆς καὶ ἀφορμῆς ἀλλ' ἀκουσίου τῆς κακιάς οὔσης." Clem. Alex., Strom., lib. i. c. 17; Op. tom. i. p. 368. fol. Oxon. 1715.]

T. H.—The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences, which he thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true, that ill use may be made of it; and therefore your 378 Lordship and J. D. ought at my request to keep private that I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none: and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth; and now the question is not what is fit to be preached, but what is true. The first inconvenience, he says, is this, that "laws which prohibit" any action are then "unjust." The second, that "all consultations are vain." The third, that admonitions to "men of understanding" are of no more use than to "fools, children, and madmen." The fourth, that "praise, dispraise, reward and punishment," are in vain. The fifth, that "counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, study, tutors," medicines, are "in vain." To which argument expecting I should answer by saying, that the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words,—"Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means!" wherein he saith right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth. I answer,— Discourse I. [Answer.]

First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the law which prohibits it unjust. To let pass, that not the necessity, but the will to break the law, maketh the action unjust, because the law regardeth the will, and no other precedent causes of action; and to let pass, that no law can be possibly unjust, inasmuch as every man makes by his consent the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself; I say, what necessary cause soever precedes an action, yet, if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and there be a man who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death: does not this punishment deter others from theft? is it not a cause that others steal not? doth it not frame and make their will to justice? To make the law is therefore to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice, and consequently it is no injustice to make such a law. The institution of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for that [*The law not unjust because the violation of it is necessary.*]

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which is passed, and not to be undone, but to make him and others just, that else would not be so; and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come: insomuch as without this good intention of future, no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated, but that they are spared and preserved, because they are not noxious: for where there is no law, there no killing nor any thing else can be unjust; and by the right of nature we destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men. And for beasts, we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation; and yet J. D. confesseth, that their actions, as being only spontaneous and not free, are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do. For men, when we make societies or commonwealths, we lay down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft, or other offensive actions: so that the right which the commonwealth hath to put a man to death for crimes, is not created by the law, but remains from the first right of nature, which every man hath, to preserve himself; for that the law doth not take that right away in case of criminals, who were by law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished, for that their theft proceedeth from election; but because it was noxious, and contrary to men's preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest: inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh men's wills such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from necessity of a voluntary action cannot be inferred the injustice of the law that forbiddeth it, or of the magistrate that punisheth it.

[*Necessity does not supersede consultation.*]

Secondly, I deny, that it makes consultations to be in vain. It is the consultation that causeth a man and necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another; so that, unless a man say that cause to be in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seems he reasons thus,—If I must needs do

this rather than that, then I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all;—which is a false proposition, a false consequence, and no better than this,—If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass. And therefore, when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, 'tis determined also for what cause
679 it shall be chosen; which cause for the most part is deliberation or consultation. And therefore consultation is not in vain: and indeed the less in vain, by how much the election is more necessitated.

The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconveniency, namely, that admonitions are in vain; for admonitions are parts of consultations, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished. [*Nor admonition.*]

The fourth pretended inconveniency is, that praise and dispraise, reward and punishment, will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and commonwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state, that is to say, according to law? Does J. D. think, that no action can please me or him or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity? Things may be therefore necessary and yet praiseworthy, as also necessary and yet dispraised; and neither of both in vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good or evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he was good by nature, '*et quia aliter esse non potuit*[k].' [*Nor praise or dispraise.*]

The fifth and sixth inconvenience, that "counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments," study, medicines, and the like, [*Nor the use of means.*]

[k] ["Qui nunquam recte fecit ut facere videretur, sed *quia aliter facere non poterat.*" Vell. Paterc., Histor., lib. ii. c. 35.]

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would be "superfluous," the same answer serves that to the former; that is to say, that this consequence—if the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its cause—is a false one. And those things named, "counsels, arts, arms," &c., are the causes of those effects.

[Reply.] J. D.—Nothing is more familiar with T. H. than to decline an argument. But I will put it into form for him. The first inconvenience is thus pressed;—those laws are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them; but, supposing T. H. his opinion of the necessity of all things to be true, all laws do prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done, and punish men for not doing of them. The former proposition is so clear, that it cannot be denied. Just laws are the ordinances of right reason; but those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, are not the ordinances of right reason. Just laws are instituted for the public good; but those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, are not instituted for the public good. Just laws do shew unto a man what is to be done, and what is to be shunned; but those laws which prescribe impossibilities, do not direct a man what he is to do, and what he is to shun. The minor is as evident. For if his opinion be true, all actions, all transgressions, are determined antecedently inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of extrinsecal causes; yea, even the will of man, and the reason itself, is thus determined: and therefore, whatsoever laws do prescribe any thing to be done which is not done, or to be left undone which is done, do prescribe absolute impossibilities, and punish men for not doing of impossibilities. In all his answer there is not one word to this argument, but only to the conclusion. He saith, that "not the necessity, but the will to break the law, makes the action unjust." I ask, what makes "the will to break the law?" Is it not his "necessity?" What gets he by this? A perverse will causeth injustice, and necessity causeth a perverse will. He saith, "The law regardeth the will, but not the precedent causes of action." To what proposition, to what term, is this answer?

[T. H.'s answer both irrelevant and untrue.]

He neither denies, nor distinguisheth. First, the question here is not what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes laws to be unjust. So his answer is impertinent. It is likewise untrue. For, first, that will which the law regards, is not such a will as T. H. imagineth. It is a free will, not a determined, necessitated will; a rational will, not a brutish will. Secondly, the law doth look upon "precedent causes" as well as the voluntariness of the action. If a child, before he be seven years old, or have the use of reason, in some childish quarrel do willingly stab another, whereof we have seen experience, yet the law looks not upon it as an act of murder, because there wanted a power to deliberate, and consequently true liberty. Man-slaughter may be as voluntary as murder; and commonly more voluntary, because, being done in hot blood, there is the less reluctation. Yet the law considers, that the former is done out of some sudden passion
680 without serious deliberation, and the other out of prepensed malice and desire of revenge, and therefore condemns murder as more wilful and more punishable than man-slaughter.

He saith, that "no law can possibly be unjust;" and I say, that this is to deny the conclusion, which deserves no reply. But to give him satisfaction, I will follow him in this also. If he intended no more, but that unjust laws are not genuine laws, nor bind to active obedience, because they are not the ordinations of right reason, nor instituted for the common good, nor prescribe that which ought to be done, he said truly, but nothing at all to his purpose. But if he intend (as he doth), that there are no laws *de facto*, which are the ordinances of reason erring, instituted for the common hurt, and prescribing that which ought not to be done, he is much mistaken. Pharaoh's law to drown the male children of the Israelites,—Nebuchadnezzar's law, that whosoever did not fall down and worship the golden image which he had set up, should be cast into the fiery furnace,—Darius his law, that whosoever should ask a petition of any God or man for thirty days, save of the king, should be cast into the den of lions,—Ahasuerosh his law, to destroy the Jewish nation, root and branch,—the Pharisees' law, that whosoever confessed Christ should be excommunicated,—were all unjust laws.

[Laws *de facto* may be unjust.]

Exod. i. 22.

Dan. iii. 4-[6.]

Dan. vi. 7.

Esther iii. 13.

John ix. 22.

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[Not all laws made by consent of those subject to them.]

The ground of this error is as great an error itself (such an art he hath learned of repacking paradoxes); which is this,—that "every man makes by his consent the law which he is bound to keep." If this were true, it would preserve them, if not from being unjust, yet from being injurious; but it is not true. The positive law of God, contained in the Old and New Testament; the law of nature, written in our hearts by the finger of God; the laws of conquerors, who come in by the power of the sword; the laws of our ancestors, which were made before we were born;—do all oblige us to the observation of them: yet to none of all these did we give our actual consent. Over and above all these exceptions, he builds upon a wrong foundation,—that all magistrates at first were elective. The first governors were fathers of families; and when those petty princes could not afford competent protection and security to their subjects, many of them did resign their several and respective interests into the hands of one joint father of the country. And though his ground had been true,—that all first legislators were elective,—which is false, yet his superstructure fails; for it was done in hope and trust, that they would make just laws. If magistrates abuse this trust and deceive the hopes of the people by making tyrannical laws, yet it is without their consent. A precedent trust doth not justify the subsequent errors and abuses of a trustee. He who is duly elected a legislator, may exercise his legislative power unduly. The people's implicit consent doth not render the tyrannical laws of their legislators to be just.

But his chiefest answer is, that "an action forbidden," though it proceed from "necessary causes," yet, if it were "done willingly, it may be justly punished;" which according to his custom he proves by an instance,—"A man necessitated to steal by the strength of temptation," yet, if he steal "willingly," is justly "put to death." Here are two things, and both of them untrue.

[1. Punishment unjust for sin committed through antecedent necessity.]

First, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we suffer justly for those necessities which we ourselves have contracted by our own fault, but not for extrinsecal, antecedent necessities, which were imposed upon us without our fault. If that law do not oblige to punishment which is not intimated, because

the subject is invincibly ignorant of it; how much less that law which prescribes absolute impossibilities! unless perhaps invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ignorance. That which he adds,—if it were done "willingly," —though it be of great moment if it be rightly understood, yet, in his sense, that is, if a man's will be not in his own disposition, and if his willing do not "come upon him according to his will, nor according to anything else in his power[l]," it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his horse-load. For if that law be unjust and tyrannical, which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do, then that law is likewise unjust and tyrannical, which commands him to will that which is impossible for him to will.

2. [Temptation does not involve an antecedent necessity of sin.]

Secondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, and is a plain
681 begging of the question. No man is extrinsecally, antecedently, and irresistibly "necessitated by temptation to steal." The devil may solicit us, but he cannot necessitate us. He hath a faculty of persuading, but not a power of compelling. "*Nos ignem habemus, spiritus flammam ciet,*" as Nazianzen[m];—"he blows the coals, but the fire is our own." '*Mordet duntaxat sese in fauces illius objicientem,*' as St. Austin[n];—'he bites not until we thrust ourselves into his mouth.' He may propose, he may suggest, but he cannot move the will effectively. "Resist the devil and he will fly from you." By "faith" we are "able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked." And if Satan, who can both propose the object, and choose out the fittest times and places to work upon our frailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot necessitate the will (which is most certain), then much less can outward objects do it alone. They have no natural efficacy to determine the will. Well may they be occasions, but they cannot be causes, of evil. The sensitive appetite may engender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal. And if it should produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but moral, not natural; hypothetical, not absolute; coexistent,

Jam. iv. 7. Eph. vi. 16.

[l] [See above, T. H. Numb. iii. p. 27, and Numb. xi. p. 59.]

[m] ["Τὸ πῦρ παρ' ἡμῶν ἡ δὲ φλὸξ τοῦ πνεύματος." Greg. Naz., Carm. xxxiii., Γνωμολ. Τετράστιχοι, v. 208; Op. tom. ii. p. 608. ed. Bened.]

[n] ["Neminem potest mordere" (Diabolus) "nisi eum qui se ad illum ultro mortiferâ securitate conjunxerit; . . latrare potest, sollicitare potest, mordere non potest, nisi volentem." Pseudo-Aug., Serm. xxxvii., De David et Golia, § 6; Op. tom. v. Append. p. 74. F.]

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not antecedent; from ourselves, not extrinsecal. This necessity, or rather proclivity, was free in its causes. We ourselves, by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might, have freely given it a kind of dominion over us. Admit, that some sudden passions may and do extraordinarily surprise us; and therefore we say, "*motus primo primi*[o]"—"the first motions" are not always in our power, neither are they free: yet this is but very rarely; and it is our own fault, that they do surprise us. Neither doth the law punish the first motion to theft, but the advised act of stealing. The intention makes the thief. But of this more largely Numb. xxv.[p]

[Law useless on the theory of necessity.]

He pleads, moreover, that the law is "a cause of justice," that it "frames the wills" of men "to justice," and that "the punishment" of one doth "conduce to the preservation" of many. All this is most true of a just law justly executed. But this is no God-a-mercy to T. H. his opinion of absolute necessity. If all actions and all events be predetermined naturally, necessarily, extrinsecally, how should the law frame men morally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the law to do, but either that which is done already, or that which is impossible to be done. If a man be chained to every individual act which he doth, and from every act which he doth not, by indissolvible bonds of inevitable necessity, how should the law either "deter" him or "frame" him? If a dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand laws that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men do, (according to T. H.) they do it as necessarily, as "the fire burneth[q]." Hang up a thousand thieves; and if a man be determined inevitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.

[Punishment vindicatory, not corrective only.]

He adds, that the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents, "respect not the evil act past, but the good to come," and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example. The truth is, the punishing delinquents by

[o] [See below in the Castigations, Numb. vii., p. 768. (fol. edit.); Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]

[p] [Below, p. 714 (fol. edit.).]

[q] [Above, T. H. Numb. xi., p. 59.]

law respecteth both "the evil act past" and "the good to come." The ground of it is "the evil act past;" the scope or end of it is "the good to come." The end without the ground cannot justify the act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to "do evil, that good may come" of it; nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others: that is, to 'fall into a certain crime, for fear of an uncertain.' Again, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted, neither probatory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to satisfy the law, out of a zeal of justice, by giving to every one his own, yet the action is just and warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in itself without all undue circumstances, was never prohibited to the lawful magistrate, who is the vicegerent or lieutenant of God, from Whom he derives his power of life and death.

[Rom. iii. 8.]

T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth at every bulrush, so he lays hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause. But, first, it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular. First, he told us, that it was the "irresistible power" of God that "justifies all His actions," though He command one thing openly and plot another thing secretly, though He be the cause, not only of the action, but also of the irregularity, though He both give man power to act and determine this power to evil as well as good, though He punish the creatures for doing that, which He Himself did necessitate them to do[r]. But, being pressed with reason,—that this is tyrannical, first to necessitate a man to do His will, and then to punish him for doing of it,—he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a second;—that therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was necessitated to do, because the act was voluntary on his part[s]. This hath more show of reason than the former, if he did make the will of man to be in his own disposition; but, maintaining, that the will is irresistibly determined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and absurdity is the same:—first, to necessitate a man to will, and then to punish him for willing. The dog only bites the stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand; but they

[T. H.'s inconsistencies.]

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[r] [See T. H. Numb. xii., above p. 66.]

[s] [See above, p. 85.]

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make the First Cause to punish the instrument for that which is His own proper act. Wherefore, not being satisfied with this, he casts it off, and flies to his third shift. "Men are not punished" (saith he) "therefore, because their theft proceeded from election" (that is, because it was willingly done, for "to elect and will," saith he, "are both one[t]"—is not this to blow hot and cold with the same breath?), "but because it was noxious, and contrary to men's preservation." Thus far he saith true, that every creature, by the instinct of nature, seeks to preserve itself. Cast water into a dusty place, and it contracts itself into little globes; that is, to preserve itself. And those who are "noxious" in the eye of the law, are justly punished by them to whom the execution of the law is committed; but the law accounts no persons "noxious" but those who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature of the thorn, and it can do no otherwise; nor a child before it have the use of reason. If one should take mine hand perforce and give another a box on the ear with it, my hand is "noxious," but the law punisheth the other who is faulty. And therefore he hath reason to propose the question, "how it is just to kill one man to amend another," if he who killed did nothing but what he was "necessitated" to do. He might as well demand, how it is lawful to murder a company of innocent infants, to make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the leprosy. It had been a more rational way, first, to have demonstrated that it is so, and then to have questioned why it is so. His assertion itself is but a dream; and the reason which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream.

[Right and wrong antecedent to human pacts.]

The sum of it is this,—that "where there is no law, there no killing or anything else can be unjust;" that before the constitution of commonwealths every man had power to kill another, if he conceived him to be hurtful to him; that at the constitution of commonwealths particular men "lay down" this right in part, and in part reserve it to themselves, "as in case of theft, or murder;" that "the right which the commonwealth hath to put" a malefactor "to death, is not created by the law, but remaineth from the first right of nature, which every man hath, to preserve himself;"

[t] [See below, T. H. Numb. xx. p. 700 (fol. edit.).]

that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts "in order to our own preservation." This may well be called stringing of paradoxes.

1. But, first, there never was any such time when mankind was without governors and laws and "societies." Paternal government was in the world from the beginning, and the law of nature. There might be sometimes a root of such barbarous thievish brigands, in some rocks, or deserts, or odd corners of the world; but it was an abuse, and a degeneration from the nature of man, who is a political creature. This savage opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind.

2. Secondly, there never was a time when it was lawful ordinarily for private men to kill one another for their own preservation. If God would have had men live like wild beasts, as lions, bears, or tigers, He would have armed them with horns, or tusks, or talons, or pricks; but of all creatures man is born most naked, without any weapon to defend himself, because God had provided a better means of security for him, that is, the magistrate.

3. Thirdly, that right which private men have, to preserve themselves, though it be with the killing of another, when they are set upon to be murdered or robbed, is not a remainder or a reserve of some greater power which they have
683 resigned, but a privilege which God hath given them, in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity, that when they cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that is, the magistrate, every man becomes a magistrate to himself.

4. Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never had. The people, whilst they were a dispersed rabble (which in some odd cases might happen to be), never had justly the power of life and death, and therefore they could not give it by their election. All that they do is to prepare the matter; but it is God Almighty, that infuseth the soul of power.

5. Fifthly, and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to compare the murdering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The elements are for the plants, the plants for the brute beasts, the brute beasts for man. When God enlarged His former grant to man, and gave him liberty to eat the flesh of the creatures for his sus- Gen. ix. 3.

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tenance, yet man is expressly excepted,—"Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed;"—and the reason is assigned,—"For in the image of God made He man." Before "sin entered into the world," or before any creatures were hurtful or "noxious" to man, he had dominion over them, as their lord and master. And though the possession of this sovereignty be lost in part for the sin of man, which made not only the creatures to rebel, but also the inferior faculties to rebel against the superior (from whence it comes, that one man is hurtful to another), yet the dominion still remains: wherein we may observe, how sweetly the providence of God doth temper this cross; that though the strongest creatures have withdrawn their obedience, as lions and bears, to shew that man hath lost the excellency of his dominion, and the weakest creatures, as flies and gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he is fallen, yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep and oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.

Gen. ix. 6.

[Rom. v. 12.]

[Consultation does imply liberty, and does not necessitate determination.]

The next branch of his answer concerns "consultations;" which (saith he) are not superfluous, though all things come to pass necessarily, because they are "the cause which doth necessitate the effect," and the "means to bring it to pass." We were told Numb. xi.[u], that the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which breaks the horse's back. It is well; yet that reason hath gained some command again, and is become at least a quarter-master. Certainly, if anything under God have power to determine the will, it is right reason. But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will physically nor absolutely, much less extrinsecally and antecedently; and therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken to prove. He adds further, that as the end is necessary, so are the means; and "when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen." All which is truth, but not the whole truth. For, as God ordains means for all ends, so He adapts and fits the means to their respective ends; free means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends: whereas T. H. would have all

[u] [Above p. 59.]

means, all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered the world, that a man ought to use and may freely use those means of good, which he doth neglect, not by virtue of God's decree but by his own fault; if a man use those means of evil, which he ought not to use, and which by God's decree he had power to forbear; if God have left to man in part the free managery of human affairs, and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding; then consultations are of use, then provident care is needful, then it concerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world, that a man cannot if he would neglect any means of good, which by virtue of God's decree it is possible for him to use, and that he cannot possibly use any means of evil but those which are irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree; then not only consultations are vain, but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain. Do we think, that we can help God Almighty to do His proper work? In vain we trouble ourselves; in vain we take care to use those means, which are not in our power to use or not to use. And this is that which was contained in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer, though he be pleased both to disorder it and to silence it. We cannot hope by our labours to alter the course of things set down by God. Let Him perform His
684 decree. Let the necessary causes do their work. If we be those causes, yet we are not in our own disposition; we must do what we are ordained to do, and more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but patience, and shrug up the shoulders. This is the doctrine [which] flows from this opinion of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the clock, which sets all the little wheels a going, to be as the decree of God; and that the motion of it were perpetual, infallible, from an intrinsecal principle, even as God's decree is infallible, eternal, all-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second causes; and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great wheel, without missing or swerving in the least degree, as the second causes do pursue the determination of the first cause. I desire to know in this case, what cause there is to call a council of smiths, to consult and order the motion of that which was ordered and determined before their hands? Are men wiser than God?

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Yet all men know, that the motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means to make the clock strike.

But he tells me in great sadness, that my argument is just like this other,—"If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day;"—which, saith he, is "a false consequence," and "a false proposition." Truly, if by "running through" he understands killing, it is a "false," or rather a foolish proposition, and implies a contradiction. To live till to-morrow, and to-day to die, are inconsistent. But, by his favour, this is not my "consequence," but this is his own opinion. He would persuade us, that it is absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, and yet that it is possible that he may kill himself to-day. My argument is this;—If there be a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself to-day, then it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till to-morrow; but there is such a liberty; therefore no such necessity. And the "consequence" which I make here is this;—If it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate, whether he should die to-day or not. And this is a true consequence. The ground of his mistake is this,—that though it be true that a man may kill himself to-day, yet, upon the supposition of his absolute necessity, it is impossible. Such heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth; which are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half upon his false grounds.

[Admonitions do imply liberty, because they are addressed to those only who are conceived to be free.]

The next branch of my argument concerns admonitions; to which he gives no new answer, and therefore I need not make any new reply; saving only to tell him, that he mistakes my argument. I say not only,—If all things be necessary, then admonitions are in vain,—but,—If all things be necessary, then "it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or madmen." That they do admonish the one and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this,—that the former have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen, have not.

[Praise moral, al-

Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth himself.

The scope of his discourse is, that "things necessary" may be "praiseworthy." There is no doubt of it. But withal their praise reflects upon the free agent, as the praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it. "To praise a thing" (saith he) is "to say, it is good." True: but this goodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good:—nor a natural goodness; the praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of nature; "God saw all that He had made, and it was very good:"—but a moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action is the deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that "to say a thing is good, is to say, 685 it is as I would wish, or as another would" wish, or as "the state" would have it, or "according to the law" of the land, he mistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may all wish that which is not really good but only in appearance. We do often wish what is profitable or delightful, without regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though "the will of the state" where we live, or the law of the land, do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule of moral goodness. And therefore to his question,—whether nothing "that proceeds from necessity can please" me,—I answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaseth me when I am cold; and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by God for my use and for my good: yet I do not mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to it; as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to communicate its heat or to suspend it: but I praise first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for the praise "which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato,"—that

[though not praise metaphysical, does imply liberty.]

[Gen. i. 31.]

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"he was good by nature, *et quia aliter esse non potuit*[x]," — it hath more of the orator than either of the theologian or philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and become evil; what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave,

"Narratur et dii Catonis
Sæpè mero caluisse virtus[y]."

But the true meaning,—that he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of vices as others were,—this is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, yet proved as good a man[z]. The more his praise; by how much the difficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right reason.

[Of rewards and punishments;—the parallel of brute beasts not relevant.]

Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but only that they frame "and conform the will to good;" which hath been sufficiently answered. They do so indeed; but if his opinion were true, they could not do so. But (because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to satisfy myself) though it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge, that I find some improper and analogical rewards and punishments used to brute beasts; as the hunter rewards his dog, the master of the coy-duck whips her, when she returns without company. And if it be true, which he affirmeth a little before, that I have confessed, that "the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do[a]," the difficulty is increased.

1. [All the actions of brute beasts not necessary.]

But, first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some kinds of actions, which are most excellent in brute beasts and make the greatest show of reason, as the bees working their honey and the spiders weaving their webs, are yet done without any consultation or deliberation, by a mere instinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these only kinds of works[b]. But I did never say, I could not say, that all their individual actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in their causes; as what days the bees shall fly abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall keep

[x] [See above, p. 87. note c.]
[y] [Horat., Carm., III. xxi. 11, 12. "Narratur et *prisci* Catonis," &c.]
[z] [Cic., Tusc. Quæst., iv. 37; De Fato, c. 5.]
[a] [See above, T. H. Numb. viii., p. 47.]
[b] [See in Numb. vi., above p. 37.]

in the hive, how often they shall fetch in thyme on a day, and from whence. These actions and the like, though they be not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are contingent, and therefore not necessary.

Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some brute creatures are determined by nature to some rare and exquisite works, so in others, where it finds a natural propension, art, which is the imitator of nature, may frame and form them according to the will of the artist to some particular actions and ends; as we see in setting-dogs, and coy-ducks, and parrots: and the principal means whereby they effect this, is by their backs or by their bellies, by the rod or by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and punishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by vulgar people, but as it is used by divines and philosophers, for that recompense which is due to honest and dishonest actions. Where there is no moral liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true reward nor punishment.

2. [The terms reward and punishment applied to them by analogy only.]

Thirdly, when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing from another (which they are not capable of, neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do), but merely out of memory, or out of a sensi-
686 tive fear, or hope. They remember, that when they did after one manner they were beaten, and when they did after another manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply themselves. But if their individual actions were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter them. Most certainly, if there be any desert in it, or any praises due unto it, it is to them who did instruct them.

3. [They act in such cases, not from reason, but from sense of present or memory of past joy or pain.]

Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, study, physic, and the like, he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied. And therefore I am silent.

NUMBER XV.

J. D.—Thirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the minds of men, that there is no true liberty, and that all

Argument 3. [The opinion of

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necessity inconsistent with piety.] [2 Cor. vii. 11.]

things come to pass inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. Who will bewail his sins with tears? what will become of that "grief," that "zeal," that "indignation," that holy "revenge," which the Apostle speaks of? if men be once throughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did. A man may grieve for that which he could not help; but he will never be brought to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own error, but from an antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable? or to confer those favours which are impossible? We indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us; but this we know, that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason, why those persons who tread in this path of fatal destiny do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of nature and the strength of reason and the evidence of Scripture do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen grounds, and expel those Stoical fancies out of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither pray nor repent nor serve God to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as commonwealth, religion as well as policy.

[*Answer.*] T. H.—His third argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow; namely, impiety, and negligence of religious duties, repentance and zeal to God's service. To which I answer, as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider far the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are; that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferments, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things; that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer, I would not have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your Lordship and he will keep it in private. Neverthe-

less, in very truth, the necessity of events does not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth only in two things: one, that we honour God in our hearts; which is, that we think of His power as highly as we can; for to honour anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great power: the other, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions; which is called "*cultus*," or worship of God. He therefore that thinketh, that all things proceed from God's eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God omnipotent? does he not esteem of His power as highly as possible? which is to honour God as much as can be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? Yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call worship. So this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally, internally; and therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, which is nothing but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way, though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remains still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance, grief for the error, nor joy for the returning. And for prayer, whereas he saith, that the necessity of things destroys prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the causes that move God's will, His will being unchangeable, yet, since we find in God's word, He will not give His blessings but to those that ask them, the motive to prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessings. And the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. 'Tis manifest, that thanksgiving
687 is no cause of the blessing past; and that which is past is sure, and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks is in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for His blessings in general. And though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect

[*The opinion of necessity doth not involve impiety in right-minded men.*]

[*Nor exclude repentance.*]

[*Nor prayer.*]

[Matt. vii. 7. &c.]

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nothing but from God, in such manner as He, not as we, will. And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, "Thy will," not our will, "be done;" and by example teaches us the same, for He prayed thus, "Father, if it be Thy will, let this cup pass," &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by Him only.

[Matt. vi. 10.—Luke xi. 2.]

[Luke xxii. 42.]

[Reply.]

J. D.—I hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, that it is not the covetousness, or ambition, or sensuality, or sloth, or prejudice of his readers, which renders this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous; but that it is in its own nature destructive to true godliness. And though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. First, he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the estimation of the judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the devils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians? for they esteem God's power to be infinite "and tremble." Though inward piety do suppose the act of the understanding, yet it consisteth properly in the act of the will; being that branch of justice, which gives to God the honour which is due unto Him[c]. Is there no love due to God, no faith, no hope? Secondly, he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to God but only the glory of His power or omnipotence. What shall become of all other the Divine attributes? and particularly of His goodness, of His truth, of His justice, of His mercy? which beget a more true and sincere honour in the heart than greatness itself. "*Magnos facilè laudamus, bonos lubenter.*" Thirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the truth of God; making Him to command one thing openly and to necessitate another privately, to chide a man for doing that which it hath determined him to do, to profess one thing and to intend another. It destroys the goodness of God; making Him to be a hater of mankind, and to delight in the torments of His creatures, whereas the very dogs licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and commiseration of him. It destroys the justice of God; making Him to punish the creatures for that which was His

[T. H. mistaketh piety to be an act of the judgment.]

[James ii. 19.]

[And to respect God's power only.]

[His opinion destroys the moral attributes of God.]

[Luke xvi. 21.]

[c] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. lxxxi. art. 5.]

own act, which they had no more power to shun than the fire hath power not to burn[d]. It destroys the very power of God; making Him to be the true Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world. These are the fruits of impotence, not of omnipotence. He who is the effective cause of sin, either in himself or in the creature, is not almighty. There needs no other devil in the world, to raise jealousies and suspicions between God and His creatures, or to poison mankind with an apprehension that God doth not love them, but only this opinion; which was the office of the serpent. Gen. iii. 5.

[And the outward worship of God.]

Fourthly, for the outward worship of God. How shall a man praise God for His goodness, who believes Him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the world, Who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault, to express His power? How shall a man hear the word of God with that reverence and devotion and faith which is requisite, who believeth, that God causeth His Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Christians, not with any intention that they should be converted and saved, but merely to harden their hearts, and to make them inexcusable? How shall a man receive the blessed Sacrament with comfort and confidence, as a seal of God's love in Christ, who believeth, that so many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the Passions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil? How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who apprehendeth, that "eating and drinking unworthily" is not the cause of damnation, but because God would damn a man, therefore He necessitates him to "eat and drink unworthily?" How shall a man make a free vow to God, without gross ridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able to perform nothing but as he is extrinsecally necessitated? Fifthly, for repentance, how shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a watch which is wound up by God, and that he can go neither longer nor shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he is ordered by God? If God sets him right, he goes right. If
688 God set him wrong, he goes wrong. How can a man be said to "return into the right way," who never was in any other way but that which God Himself had chalked out for

[See 1 Cor. xi. 29.]

[And repentance.]

[d] [See above, T. H. Numb. xi., p. 59.]

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him? What is his purpose to amend, who is destitute of all power, but as if a man should purpose to fly without wings, or a beggar who hath not a groat in his purse purpose to build hospitals? We use to say, "Admit one absurdity, and a thousand will follow[e]." To maintain this unreasonable opinion of absolute necessity, he is necessitated (but it is hypothetically, —he might change his opinion if he would) to deal with all ancient writers, as the Goths did with the Romans; who destroyed all their magnificent works, that there might remain no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth. Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions, nor one of their definitions, nay, not one of their terms of art standing. Observe what a description he hath given us here of repentance:—"It is a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way." It amazed me to find 'gladness' to be the first word in the description of repentance. His repentance is not that repentance, nor his piety that piety, nor his prayer that kind of prayer, which the Church of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, and sackcloth, and ashes, and tears, and humicubations[f], used to be companions of repentance. Joy may be a consequent of it, not a part of it. It is a "returning," but whose act is this returning? Is it God's alone, or doth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of God? If it be God's alone, then it is His repentance, not man's repentance. What need the penitent person trouble himself about it? God will take care of His own work. The Scriptures teach us otherwise,—that God expects our concurrence:—"Be zealous and repent; behold, I stand at the door, and knock; if any man hear My voice, and open the door, I will come in to him." It is "a glad returning into the right way;"—who dare any more call that a wrong way, which God Himself hath determined? He that willeth and doth that which God would have him to will and to do, is never out of his "right way." It follows in his description,—"after the grief," &c. It is true, a man may grieve for that which is necessarily imposed upon him; but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of

Rev. iii. 19, [20.]

[e] ["Posito uno absurdo sequuntur mille."]

[f] ["Δάκρυα, στεναγμοὺς, ἀνακλήσεις, χαμευνίας, ἀγρυπνίας, τῆξιν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, τὴν δι' ἐξαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀτιμοτέρας ἀγωγῆς ἐπανόρθωσιν." Greg. Naz., Orat. xl. in Sanct. Baptisma, Op. tom. i. p. 642. B. fol. Paris. 1609.]

his own, if it never was in his power to shun it. Suppose a writing-master shall hold his scholar's hand in his, and write with it: the scholar's part is only to hold still his hand, whether the master write well or ill; the scholar hath no ground, either of joy or sorrow, as for himself; no man will interpret it to be his act, but his master's. It is no fault to be out of the "right way," if a man had not liberty to have kept himself in the way.

[T. H. denieth prayer to be either a cause or a means of God's blessings.]

And so from repentance he skips quite over new obedience, to come to prayer, which is the last religious duty insisted upon by me here; but according to his use, without either answering or mentioning what I say: which would have shewed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend,—not contemplative prayer in general, as it includes thanksgiving, but that most proper kind of prayer which we call *petition*, which used to be thus defined,—to be "an act of religion, by which we desire of God something which we have not, and hope that we shall obtain it by Him[8]." Quite contrary to this T. H. tells us, that prayer "is not a cause nor a means" of God's blessing, but only "a signification that we expect" it from Him. If he had told us only, that prayer is not a meritorious cause of God's blessings, as the poor man by begging an alms doth not deserve it, I should have gone along with him. But to tell us, that it is not so much as "a means" to procure God's blessing, and yet with the same breath, that God "will not give His blessings but to those" who pray;—who shall reconcile him to himself? The Scriptures teach us otherwise:—"Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My name, He will give it you;"—"Ask, and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened unto you." St. Paul tells the Corinthians, that he was "helped" by their "prayers;"—that's not all;—that "the gift was bestowed upon him by their means:" so prayer is a "means." And St. James saith, "The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much:" if it be "effectual," then it is "a cause." To shew this efficacy of prayer, our Saviour useth the comparison of a father towards his child, of a neighbour towards his neighbour; yea, of an unjust judge, to shame those who think, that God hath not

John xvi. 23. Matt. vii. 7. 2 Cor. i. 11. [James] v. 16. [Matt. vii. 9—11.—Luke xi. 11—13.] [Luke xi. 5—8.] [Luke xviii. 1—8.]

[8] [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. lxxxiii. art. 3.]

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Jacob's wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer is like
[Gen. xxxii. 24—30.] the tradesman's tools, wherewithal he gets his living for himself and his family. But, saith he, God's "will" is "unchangeable." What then? He might as well use this against study, physic, and all second causes, as against prayer. He shews even in this, how little they attribute to the endeavours of men. There is a great difference between these two; "*mutare voluntatem*"—"to change the will[h]"—
[James i. 17.] (which God never doth, in Whom there is not the least shadow of turning by change; His will to love and hate was the same from eternity, which it now is, and ever shall be; His love and hatred are immoveable, but we are removed;—

"Non tellus cymbam tellurem cymba reliquit;")—

and "*velle mutationem*"—"to will a change[h];" which God often doth. To change the will argues a change in the agent, but to will a change only argues a change in the object. It is no inconstancy in a man, to love, or to hate, as the object is changed. "*Præsta mihi omnia eadem et idem sum.*" Prayer works not upon God but us. It renders not Him more propitious in Himself, but us more capable of mercy. He saith, this—that God doth not bless us, except we pray—is "a motive to prayer." Why talks he of "motives," who acknowledgeth no liberty, nor admits any cause, but absolutely necessary? He saith, "Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing" which we pray for, and contained "in the same decree" with "the blessing." It is true, the spirit of prayer is the gift of God; will he conclude from thence, that the good employment of one talent, or of one gift of God, may not procure another? Our Saviour teach-
[Matt. xxv. 21.] eth us otherwise;—"Come, thou good and faithful servant; thou hast been faithful in little, I will make thee ruler over much." Too much light is an enemy to the light, and too much law is an enemy to justice. I could wish we wrangled less about God's decrees, until we understood them better. But, saith he, "thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past," and "prayer is but a thanksgiving." He might even as well tell me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when

[h] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xix. art. 7.]

he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanksgiving is a kind of prayer; but every prayer, and namely petition, is not a thanksgiving. In the last place he urgeth, that in our prayers we are bound to submit our wills to God's will. Who ever made any doubt of this? We must submit to the preceptive will of God, or His commandments; we must submit to the effective will of God, when He declares His good pleasure by the event or otherwise. But we deny, and deny again, either that God wills things "*ad extra*"—"without Himself" necessarily, or that it is His pleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times; which is the question, and that which he allegeth to the contrary comes not near it.

NUMBER XVI.

Argument 4.—[The opinion of necessity destroys the variety and perfection of the universe.]

J. D.—Fourthly, the order, beauty, and perfection of the world doth require, that in the universe should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make either all things necessary, guided by destiny, or all things free, governed by election, or all things contingent, happening by chance, doth overthrow the beauty and the perfection of the world.

[*Answer.*]

T. H.—The fourth argument from reason is this, "The order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth, that in the universe should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent; he that shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world." In which argument I observe, first, a contradiction. For, seeing he that maketh anything, in that he maketh it, he maketh it to be necessary, it followeth, that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessary to be. As, if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so, if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth (though we know it not), that some agents should work without deliberation,

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which he calls necessary agents; and some agents with deliberation, and those both he and I call free agents; and that some agents should work and we not know how, and their effects we both call contingent. But this hinders not, but that he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes; and that which is contingent and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary, and depend on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but which hath not for cause anything which we perceive. As, for example, when a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause, sufficient enough to produce it, but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say, they were contingent one to another. And thus, you see, though there be three sorts of events, neces- 690
sary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.

[Reply.] J. D.—The first thing he observes in mine argument is "contradiction," as he calls it, but in truth it is but a deception of the sight; as one candle sometimes seems to be two, or a rod in the water shews to be two rods. "*Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis.*" But what is this "contradiction?" Because I say, "he who maketh all things, doth not make them necessary." What? A "contradiction," and but one proposition? That were strange. I say, God hath not made all agents necessary; he saith, God hath made all agents necessary. Here is a "contradiction" indeed, but it is between him and me, not between me and myself. But yet though it be not a formal "contradiction," yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction *in adjecto*. Wherefore, to clear the matter, and dispel the mist which he hath raised. It is true, that every thing when it is made, it is necessary that it be made so as it is; that is, by a necessity of infallibility, or supposition—supposing, that it be so made; but this is not that absolute, antecedent necessity, whereof the question is between him and me. As, to use his own instance, before the garment be made, the tailor is free to

[Hypothetical, distinct from antecedent, necessity.]

make it either of the Italian, Spanish, or French fashion indifferently; but after it is made, it is necessary that it be of that fashion whereof he hath made it; that is, by a necessity of supposition. But this doth neither hinder the cause from being a free cause, nor the effect from being a free effect; but the one did produce freely, and the other was freely produced. So the "contradiction" is vanished.

[Contingent events.]

In the second part of his answer he grants, that there are some free agents, and some contingent agents; and that "perhaps the beauty of the world" doth "require" it; but, like a shrewd cow, which after she hath given her milk casts it down with her foot, in the conclusion he tells us, that nevertheless they are "all necessary." This part of his answer is a mere logomachy (as a great part of the controversies in the world are), or a contention about words;—what is the meaning of necessary, and free, and contingent actions. I have shewed before, what free and necessary do properly signify; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all agents which want "deliberation" to be "necessary;" but I acknowledge, that many of them are contingent. Neither do I approve his definition of contingents, though he say, I concur with him;—that they are such agents as "work we know not how." For, according to this description, many necessary actions should be contingent, and many contingent actions should be necessary. The loadstone draweth iron, the jet chaff, we "know not how;" and yet the effect is necessary: and so it is in all sympathies and antipathies or occult qualities. Again, a man walking in the streets, a tile falls down from a house, and breaks his head. We know all the causes, we know how this came to pass. The man walked that way, the pin failed, the tile fell just when he was under it. And yet this is a contingent effect. The man might not have walked that way, and then the tile had not fallen upon him. Neither yet do I understand here in this place by contingents, such events as happen besides the scope or intention of the agents; as when a man, digging to make a grave, finds a treasure; though the word be sometimes so taken. But by contingents, I understand all things, which may be done and may not be done, may happen or may not happen, by reason of the indetermination, or acci-

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dental concurrence, of the causes. And those same things which are absolutely contingent, are yet hypothetically necessary; as, supposing the passenger did walk just that way, just at that time, and that the pin did fail just then, and the tile fall, it was necessary that it should fall upon the passenger's head. The same defence will keep out his "shower of rain." But we shall meet with his "shower of rain" again, Numb. xxxiv[1]; whither I refer the further explication of this point.

NUMBER XVII.

Argument 5.—[If there be no true liberty, there is no formal sin.]

J. D.—Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the very nature of evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the hand of the painter were the law of painting, or the hand of the writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing therefore, that the First Cause is the rule and law of goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by itself immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this, that one commit that which he might avoid. If there be no 691
liberty to produce sin, there is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it appears, both from Scripture and reason, that there is true liberty.

[*Answer.*] T. H.—To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away, I answer by denying the consequence. The nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceed from our will, and be against the law. A judge, in judging whether it be sin or not which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will of the doer, but with his will; and so necessarily, because man's will, that is, every act of the

[1] [Below, pp. 724, 725 (fol. edit.).]

will, and purpose of man, had a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause; and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And because God may afflict by right derived from His omnipotency, though sin were not; and the example of punishment on voluntary sinners is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed before[k], is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his objections, both out of Scripture and reason.

[Reply.] J. D.—"*Scis tu simulare cupressum, quid hoc*[l]*?*" It was shrewd counsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about his accounts to the state, that he should rather study how to make no accounts[m]. So, it seems, T. H. thinks it a more compendious way to baulk an argument, than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against an Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath quitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as those who have a politic deafness, to hear nothing but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine argument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer or rather in opposition to it. That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin, and by consequence sin itself, is not to be approved.—This is clear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture, do prove, and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin.—But this opinion of the necessity of all things, by reason of a conflux of second causes ordered and determined by the First Cause, doth take away the very formal reason of sin.—This is proved thus. That which makes sin itself to be good and just and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and destroys the essence, of sin; for if sin be good and just and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all things makes sin to be very good and just and lawful: for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical determination from the First Cause, which is the law

[k] [Above T. H. Numb. xiv. p. 85.]
[l] [Horat., A.P., 19, 20.]
[m] [Plut., in Vitâ Alcib., tom. ii. pp. 11, 12. ed. Bryant.]

PART III.

and rule of goodness and justice, but that which is good and just and lawful; but this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical determination from the First Cause, as appears in T. H. his whole discourse. Neither is it material at all, whether it proceed immediately from the First Cause, or mediately; so as it be by a necessary flux of second and determinate causes, which produce it inevitably. To these proofs he answers nothing, but only by denying the first "consequence," as he calls it; and then sings over his old song, that "the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action proceeds from our will, and be against the law:" which in our sense is most true, if he understand a just law, and a free rational will; but supposing (as he doth), that the law enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, then it is an unjust and tyrannical law, and the transgression of it is no sin, not to do that which never was in our power to do; and supposing likewise (as he doth), that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the First Cause, then it is not man's will, but God's will, and flows essentially from the law of goodness.

[Sin, to be sin, must be the act of a *free* will against a *just* law.]

That which he adds of a "judge," is altogether impertinent as to his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of the land the proper rule, of sin. But it makes strongly against him. For the judge goes upon a good ground. And even this which he confesseth,—that the judge "looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer,"—proves, that the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would. Certainly, a judge ought to look at all material circumstances, and much more at all essential causes. Whether every "sufficient cause" be a necessary cause, will come to be examined more properly Numb. xxxi.[b] For the present it 692
shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility, of the cause. Nature never intends the generation of a monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by reason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aberration of some of the causes, sometimes a monster is produced. Yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the

[b] [Below pp. 171—173.]

production of that which was produced, that is, a monster; otherwise a monster had not been produced. What is it then? A monster is not produced by virtue of that order which is set in nature, but by the contingent aberration of some of the natural causes in their concurrence. The order set in nature is, that every like should beget its like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is in the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is necessary; as all the events in the world are, when they are; that is, by a hypothetical necessity. Then he betakes himself to his old help,—that God may punish "by right of omnipotence, though there were no sin." The question is not now, what God *may* do, but what God *will* do, according to that covenant which He hath made with man,—"*Fac hoc et vives*"—"Do this and thou shalt live;"—whether God doth punish any man contrary to this covenant. "O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in Me is thy help." He that "wills not the death of a sinner," doth much less will the death of an innocent creature. By death or destruction in this discourse, the only separation of soul and body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as lord of life and death, may justly do, and make it not a punishment but a blessing to the party; but we understand the subjecting of the creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of that benefit which redounds to others from exemplary justice: which is most true, but not according to his own grounds; for neither is it justice to punish a man for doing that which it was impossible always for him not to do, neither is it lawful to punish an innocent person "that good may come" of it: and if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true, the destinies of men could not be altered, either by examples or fear of punishment.

Discourse I.

[Lev. xviii. 5.—Rom. x. 5.]

Hosea xiii. 9.

[Rom. iii. 8.]

[DISTINCTIONS MADE BY NECESSITARIANS.]

NUMBER XVIII.

J. D.—But the patrons of necessity being driven out of the plain field with reason, have certain retreats or distinctions, which they fly unto for refuge.

PART III.

[Distinction I.—Between Stoical and Christian necessity.]

1. First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold difference[c].

1. [That the Stoics subject God to destiny, they subject destiny to God.]

First, say they, the Stoics did "subject Jupiter to destiny," but we "subject destiny to God." I answer, that the Stoical and Christian destiny are one and the same;—"*fatum quasi effatum Jovis.*" Hear Seneca;—"Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions, depending upon the disposition of Jupiter[d]," &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these Stoical Christians do to God over His decrees; either for the beginnings of things, as Euripides[e], or for the progress of them, as Chrysippus[f], or at least of the circumstances of time and place, as all of them generally. So Virgil,—"*Sed trahere et moras ducere*[g]," &c. So Osiris, in Apuleius, promiseth him to prolong his life "*ultra fato constituta tempora*"—"beyond the times set down by the destinies[h]."

2. [That the Stoics hold a necessary connexion of causes, they hold God to be the one pervading cause.]

Next, they say, that the Stoics did "hold an eternal flux and necessary connexion of causes," but they believe that God doth act "*præter et contra naturam*"—"besides and against nature." I answer, that it is not much material, whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity, but much more necessity itself, upon what ground soever. Either they must run into this absurdity,—that the effect is determined, the cause remaining undetermined,—or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the Stoics did.

3. [That the Stoics deny contingents, they admit them.]

Lastly, they say, the Stoics did "take away liberty and contingence," but they "admit" it. I answer, what liberty or

[c] [From Lipsius, De Constantiâ, lib. i. c. 20, Op. tom. ii. p. 12. fol. Lugd. 1613: from whom what follows in the text is taken.]

[d] ["Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat." Senec., Nat. Quæst., lib. ii. c. 36;—"Hunc eundem" (Jovem) "et fatum si dixeris non mentieris; nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex quâ cæteræ pendent." Id., De Benef., lib. iv. c. 7.]

[e] [See e. g. his Supplices, vv. 734—736. ed. Barnes; &c.]

[f] [See Aul. Gell., vi. 2; and Euseb., Præp. Evang., lib. vi. c. 7. pp. 255, B, C, 257. C. fol. Paris, 1628; and Plut., De Placit. Philos., § 28, Op. Moral. tom. iv. p. 376. ed. Wyttenb.]

[g] ["At trahere atque moras tantis licet addere rebus." Virg., Æn., vii. 315.]

[h] ["Scies ultra statuta fato tuo spatia vitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi tantum licere." L. Apul., Metam., lib. xi. p. 367. in usum Delph.—"Osiris" in the text is a mistake for "Isis."]

contingence was it they admit, but a titular liberty, and an empty shadow of contingence? who do profess stiffly, that all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any other place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end,
693 than they are; and that in respect of God, determining them to one. What a poor ridiculous liberty or contingence is this!

[Distinction ii.—Between the First Cause, which necessitates all things, and second causes, which do not.]

2. Secondly, they distinguish between the First Cause and the second causes. They say, that in respect of the second causes many things are free, but in respect of the First Cause all things are necessary[1]. This answer may be taken away two ways.

First, so contraries shall be true together: the same thing at the same time shall be determined to one, and not determined to one; the same thing at the same time must necessarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the root of this question is this;—if all the causes were only collateral, this exception might have some colour; but where all the causes, being joined together and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.

[1. [The two parts of this distinction contradict each other.]

Secondly, I would have them tell me, whether the second causes be predetermined by the First Cause or not. If they be determined, then the effect is necessary, even in respect of the second causes. If the second cause be not determined, how is the effect determined, the second cause remaining undetermined? Nothing can give that to another which it hath not itself. But, say they, nevertheless, the power or faculty remaineth free. True, but not in order to the act, if it be once determined. It is free '*in sensu diviso*,' but not '*in sensu composito*.' When a man holds a bird fast in his hand, is she therefore free to fly where she will, because she hath wings? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he therefore free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and

[2. [The First Cause being necessary, second causes must be so likewise.]

[1] [Lipsius, De Const., lib. i. c. 19; Op. tom. ii. p. 11.]

PART III.

a locomotive faculty? Judge without prejudice, what a miserable subterfuge is this, which many men confide so much in.

CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT TO HIS ARGUMENTS ARE BY HIM REMOVED.

[*Answer.—T. H. disavows both distinctions.*]

T. H.—He saith, a man may perhaps answer, that the necessity of things held by him is not a Stoical necessity, but a Christian necessity, &c. But this distinction I have not used, nor indeed have ever heard before. Nor do I think any man could make "Stoical" and "Christian" two kinds of necessities, though they may be two kinds of doctrine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place, as making against his own tenet. "Where all the causes," saith he, "being joined together and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary." For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any one of those, saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined, and the effect also necessary. Now it is manifest, that the First Cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it; and therefore, by his own reason, all effects are necessary. Nor is that distinction, of necessary in respect of the First Cause, and necessary in respect of second causes, mine. It does (as he well noteth) imply a contradiction.

[Reply.]

[Christian necessity (so called) only disguised Stoical necessity.]

J. D.—Because T. H. disavows these two distinctions, I have joined them together in one paragraph. He likes not the distinction of necessity or destiny into Stoical and Christian; no more do I. We agree in the conclusion, but our motives are diverse. My reason is, because I acknowledge no such necessity either as the one or as the other; and because I conceive, that those Christian writers, who do justly

detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from thence, do yet privily (though perhaps unwittingly), under another form of expression, introduce it again at the back door after they had openly cast it out at the fore door. But T. H. rusheth boldly, without distinctions (which he accounts but "jargon") and without foresight, upon the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics. He confesseth, that "they may be two kinds of doctrine." "May be?" Nay, they are, without all peradventure. And he himself is the first who bears the name of a Christian that
694 I have read, that hath raised this sleeping ghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he likes not the names of "Stoical" and "Christian" destiny (do not blame him), though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoic. To admit the thing, and quarrel about the name, is to make ourselves ridiculous. Why might not I first call that kind of destiny, which is maintained by Christians, Christian destiny, and that other maintained by Stoics, Stoical destiny? But I am not the inventor of the term. If he had been as careful in reading other men's opinions as he is confident in setting down his own, he might have found not only the thing but the name itself often used. But if the name of "*fatum Christianum*" do offend him, let him call it with Lipsius, "*fatum verum:*" who divides destiny into four kinds; 1. "mathematical" or astrological destiny, 2. "natural" destiny, 3. "Stoical" or "violent" destiny, and 4. "true destiny;" which he calls ordinarily "*nostrum*"—"our" destiny, that is, of Christians, and "*fatum pium*," that is, godly destiny, and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny, to be a "series or order of causes depending upon the Divine counsel[k]." Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwreck upon, yet the divines thought he came too near them; as appears by his Epistle to the reader in a later edition[l], and by that note in the margent of his twentieth chapter,—"Whatsoever I dispute

[The terms are employed by Lipsius.]

[k] [Lipsius,] De Const., lib. i. cc. 17, 18, 19. [Op. tom. ii. pp. 10, 11. fol. Lugd. 1613.]

[l] [In the 3rd edition, 8vo. Antwerp. 1586, headed "Ad Lectorem pro Constantiâ meâ Præscriptio." He begins with a complaint, that—"Negant satis pie hoc argumentum a me tractatum, negant locis aliquot satis vere."]

PART III.

here, I submit to the judgment of the wise, and being admonished, I will correct it; one may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy[m]." So fearful was he to overshoot himself; and yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency. T. H. saith, he hath not sucked his answer from any "sect." And I say, so much the worse. It is better to be the disciple of an old sect, than the ringleader of a new.

[The First Cause not a necessary cause of all effects.]

Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the First Cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes,—though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer, like those old Lamiæ, which could put out their eyes when they list; as, namely, that the faculty of willing, when it is determined in order to the act (which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth), is but like the freedom of a bird, when she is fast in a man's hand, &c.,—yet he hath espied another thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm, that "if any one cause in the whole series of causes, much more the First Cause, be necessary, it determineth the rest;" but, saith he, "it is manifest, that the First Cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next." I am glad; yet it is not I who contradict myself, but it is one of his "manifest" truths which I contradict,—that "the First Cause is a necessary cause of all effects;"—which I say is a "manifest" falsehood. Those things which God wills without Himself, He wills freely, not necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, doth act or work all that it can do, or all that is in its power. But it is evident, that God doth not all things without Himself which He can do, or which He hath power to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan, but He did not. He could have sent twelve legions of angels to the succour of Christ, but He did not. God can make T. H. live the years of Methuselah; but it is not necessary that He shall do so, nor probable that He will do so. The productive power of God is infinite, but the whole created world is finite; and therefore God might still produce more if it pleased Him[n]. But this it is, when men go on in a confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had considered the

Luke iii. 8.

Matt. xxvi. 53.

[m] [p. 12. B. in marg. ed. 1613.]

[n] [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xxv. art. 5.]

difference between a necessary being and a necessary cause, or between those actions of God, which are immanent within Himself, and the transient works of God, which are extrinsecal without Himself[o], he would never have proposed such an evident error for a manifest truth. "*Qui pauca considerat, facilè pronuntiat.*"

NUMBER XIX.

J. D.—3. Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty from compulsion, and liberty from necessitation. The will, say they, is free from compulsion, but not free from necessitation. And this they fortify with two reasons: first, because it is granted by all divines, that hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty; secondly, because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. [Distinction iii.—Between liberty from compulsion and liberty from necessitation.]

To the first reason, I confess, that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty; as when it signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding
695 in that which it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the supposition be not in the agent's power, nor depend upon any thing that is in his power; if there be an exterior antecedent cause, which doth necessitate the effect; to call this free, is to be "mad with reason[p]." [Antecedent necessity involves compulsion.]

To the second reason, I confess, that God and the good angels are more free than we are; that is, intensively, in the degree of freedom, but not extensively, in the latitude of the object; according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specification. A liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do, may consist well with a necessity of specification, or a determination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise and a necessity of exercise, a liberty of specification and a necessity of specification, are not compatible, nor can consist together. He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all to the purpose. [Of the freedom of God, and of the good angels.]

[o] [See Cajetan's Comment. in Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xxvii. art. 1.]

[p] ["Ut cum ratione insanias." Terent., Eun., I. i. 18.]

PART III. [*Answer.*] T. H.—But the distinction of free into free from compulsion and free from necessitation, I acknowledge. For to be free from compulsion, is to do a thing so, as terror be not the cause of his will to do it. For a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it; as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do any thing from love, or revenge, or lust, are free from compulsion: and yet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon compulsion; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But free from necessitation I say nothing can be; and 'tis that which he undertook to disprove.

[*Hypothetical necessity.*] This distinction, he says, useth to be "fortified" by "two reasons;" but they are not mine. The first, he says, is, that "it is granted by all divines, that a hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon supposition, may stand with liberty." That you may understand this, I will give you an example of hypothetical necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat,—this is a hypothetical necessity. Indeed it is a necessary proposition; that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true, whensoever uttered: but 'tis not the necessity of the thing; nor is it therefore necessary, that the man shall live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use to "fortify" *my* distinctions with such reasons. Let him confute them as he will, it contents me. But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an easy and plain thing, but withal false, may be, with the grave usage of such terms as hypothetical necessity and necessity upon supposition, and such like terms of schoolmen, obscured and made to seem profound learning.

[*Of God, and of the good angels.*] The second reason, that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion and free from necessitation, he says, is, that "God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we." The reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true, that "God and good angels do good necessarily," and yet are "free;" but because I find not in the articles of our faith nor in the decrees of our Church set down, in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point; and am

content, that there may be a freedom from compulsion and yet no freedom from necessitation; as hath been proved in that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and without fear of danger. But how he can avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessity, supposing God and good angels are freer than men and yet do good necessarily, that we must now examine. DISCOURSE I.

"I confess" (saith he), "that God and good angels are more free than we; that is, intensively, in degree of freedom, not extensively, in the latitude of the object; according to a liberty of exercise, not of specification." Again, we have here two distinctions, that are no distinctions; but made to seem so by terms, invented by I know not whom to cover ignorance and blind the understanding of the reader. For it cannot be conceived, that there is any liberty greater than for a man to do what he will, and to forbear what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another. He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at all. [*Degrees of liberty impossible.*]

Also liberty (as he says the Schools call it) of "exercise," which is (as I have said before[q]) a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a liberty (which they call) of "specification," that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular; for how can a man conceive, that he has liberty to do anything, that hath not liberty to do this or that or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this and that and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? [*Liberty of exercise and liberty of specification cannot exist apart.*]

696 You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools. And I do not doubt, but that the imposing of them by authority of doctors in the Church hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off: for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man's reason and understanding; especially when it is done, not by the Scripture, but by pretence of learning and more judgment than that of other men.

[q] [See above T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.]

PART III. [Reply.]

J. D.—He who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to learn a new language (I dare not call it "jargon[r]" or canting), lately devised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must learn a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a new kind of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and, in conclusion, a new nothing. This proposition,—'The will is free,'—may be understood in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated: for if it be ordinarily or at any time free from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from necessity. The former sense—that the will is not compelled—is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable. "*Voluntas non cogitur.*" For, if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and not will the same thing at the same time under the same notion; but this implies a contradiction. Yet this author (like the good woman whom her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned, upon pretence that when she was living, she used to go contrary courses to all other people),—he holds, that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will, that is, in his sense, may compel the will; "as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed." I answer, that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse.

1. [Actions proceeding from fear are not compulsory actions.]

First, he erreth in this,—to think, that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions[s]; which in truth are not only voluntary but free actions, neither compelled, nor so much as physically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same ship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man otherwise advised might choose, not to throw his goods overboard. It is the man himself, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the casting of his goods into the sea nor the submitting to his enemy. But considering the present exigence of

[r] [See above T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.] Secund., Qu. vi. art. 6.]
[s] [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim.

his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a comparative good. Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear doth in these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c., may do in other cases; that is, may occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which otherwise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven years more, rather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel; the merchant, to hazard himself upon the rough seas, in hope of profit. Passions may be so violent, that they may necessitate the will; that is, when they prevent deliberations; but this is rarely, and then the will is not free: but they never properly compel it. That which is compelled, is against the will; and that which is against the will, is not willed.

Discourse I.

[Gen. xxix. 28.]

Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that "a man is then only said to be compelled when fear makes him willing to" an action. As if force were not more prevalent with a man than fear. We must know therefore, that this word "compelled" is taken two ways: sometimes improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by threats or fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have done, if those threats or that passion had not been: sometimes it is taken properly, when we do anything against our own inclination, moved by an external cause, the will not consenting nor concurring but resisting as much as it can; as in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol's temple, or as in the case of St. Peter—"Another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldst not." This is that compulsion which is understood when we say, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated; or that the im-
697 perate actions of the will (that is, the actions of the inferior faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will[t]) may be compelled, but that the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose, cannot be compelled, because it is the nature of an action properly compelled to be done by an extrinsecal cause without the concurrence of the will[u].

2. [Proper compulsion extrinsecal.]

John xxi. 18.

Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some

3. [Men ordinarily, not always, free.]

[t] [See below Numb. xx. pp. 130, 131.]

[u] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4.]

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passions are so sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, and "betray the succours" of the soul, and prevent deliberation; as we see in some "*motus primo primi*," or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not ordinary, so they are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election. But where deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods overboard to save the ship, or submits to his enemy to save his life, there is always true liberty.

[Wisdom xvii. 12.]

[Hypothetical necessity.]

Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in favour of his cause, yet they who urged them, deserved not to be slighted, unless it were because they were Schoolmen. The former reason is thus framed;—a necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty, but that necessity which flows from the natural and extrinsecal determination of the will is a necessity of supposition. To this my answer is in effect,—that a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do or not to do: as for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon supposition that he be a Romish priest, is necessary, but because it was in his power to be a priest or not to be a priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So, supposing a man to have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at home; yet, because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take it, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing supposed is not in the power of the agent to do or not to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary that he keep at home; or supposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat, he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees her. Because this antipathy and this sickness are not in the power of the party affected, therefore these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons; Balaam blessed Israel; these two acts, being done, are both necessary upon supposition: but it was in Jacob's power not to have blessed his sons; so was it not in Balaam's power not to have blessed Israel. Jacob's will was determined by himself; Balaam's will was physically determined by God. Therefore Jacob's benediction proceeded from his own free election; and Balaam's from God's determination. So was Caiaphas his

[Gen. xlix.] [Numb. xxiii, xxiv.]

Numb. xxii. 38.

prophecy. Therefore the text saith, "He spake not of himself." To this T. H. saith nothing: but only declareth by an impertinent instance, what "hypothetical" signifies; and then adviseth your Lordship to take notice, how errors and ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic terms. And I do likewise entreat your Lordship to take notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under the pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up their sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, before they begin to play their tricks. Discourse I. John xi. 51.

Concerning the second argument, drawn from the liberty of God and the good angels, as I cannot but approve his modesty in suspending his judgment concerning the manner how God and the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because he "finds it not set down in the articles of our faith, or the decrees of our Church;" especially in this age, which is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter prophesied of, who neither believe that there is God or angels, or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies from putrefaction; so I can by no means assent unto him in that which follows: that is to say, that he hath "proved" that liberty and necessity of the same kind may "consist together," that is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of exercise, or a liberty of specification with a necessity of specification. Those actions, which he saith are necessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, either truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself. But it troubles him that I say, that "God and the good angels are more free than men intensively, in the degree of freedom, but not extensively, in the latitude of the object, 698 according to a liberty of exercise but not of specification;" which, he saith, "are no distinctions," but "terms invented to cover ignorance." Good words. Doth he only see? Are all other men stark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distinctions. And if he alone do not conceive them, it is because distinctions, as all other things, have their fates according to the capacities or prejudices of their readers. [Of God, and of good angels.] 2 Pet. iii. 3.

But he urgeth two reasons. "One heat," saith he, "may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than [Degrees of liberty possible.]

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another." Why not, I wonder. Nothing is more proper to a man than reason, yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more rational than another; that is, in respect of the use and exercise of reason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty. The good angels have clearer understandings than we, and they are not hindered with passions as we; and, by consequence, they have more use of liberty than we. His second reason is,—"He that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot" do what he will, "hath no" liberty. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty;—to do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot or not to shoot, although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We do good freely, but with more difficulty and reluctation than the good spirits. The more rational and the less sensual the will is, the greater is the degree of liberty.

[Liberty of exercise not necessarily accompanied by liberty of specification.]

His other exception, against liberty of exercise and liberty of specification, is a mere mistake; which grows merely from not rightly understanding what liberty of specification or contrariety is. A liberty of specification, saith he, is "a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular." Upon better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so likewise to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary objects, or to diverse kinds of things. So his reason to prove, that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the ground; and he may lay aside his "Lenten licence" for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these things; which are so evident, that no man can question them who doth understand them.

[T. H.'s presumptuous censure of the doctors of the Church.]

And here he falls into another invective against distinctions, and scholastical expressions, and the "doctors of the Church," who by this means "tyrannised over the understandings" of other men. What a presumption is this! for one private man, who will not allow human liberty to others, to assume to himself such

a licence, to control so magistrally, and to censure of gross "ignorance" and "tyrannising over men's judgments," yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the world, the "doctors of the Church" in general, who have flourished in all ages and in all places, only for a few necessary and innocent distinctions. Truly said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the light of the sun[u]. What then? Must the logicians lay aside their "first and second intentions," their "abstracts" and "concretes," their "subjects" and "predicates," their "modes" and "figures," their "method synthetic" and "analytic," their "fallacies of composition and division," &c.? Must the moral philosopher quit his "means" and "extremes," his "*principia congenita*" and "*acquisita*," his "liberty of contradiction" and "contrariety," his "necessity absolute" and "hypothetical," &c.? Must the natural philosopher give over his "intentional species," his "understanding agent" and "patient," his "receptive and eductive power of the matter," his "qualities," "*infinitæ*" or "*influxæ*," "*symbolæ*" or "*dissymbolæ*," his "temperament *ad pondus*" and "*ad justitiam*," his parts "homogeneous" and "heterogeneous," his "sympathies" and "antipathies," his "antiperistasis," &c.? Must the astrologer and the geographer leave their "apogæum" and "perigæum," their "arctic" and "antarctic poles," their "equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones," &c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, and the divine, relinquish all their terms of art, and proper idiotisms, because they do not relish with T. H. his palate? But he will say, they are "obscure" expressions. What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more obscure? Let him put them into as "plain English[x]" as he can, and they shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration; yet
699 let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he will hold it to be, as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain fustian or "jargon[y]." Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the sons

[u] [See the De Adulat. et Amici Discrim., c. 28; Op. Moral., tom. i. p. 181. ed. Wyttenb.]

[x] [See below T. H. Numb. xxiv. in fin., p. 155.]

[y] [See above, T. II. Numb. iv. p. 34.]

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of art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with navigators, and he shall find this true by experience; let him go on shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their "starboard" and "larboard," because they please not him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no; it is not the School divines, but innovators and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe. T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book *De Cive* cap. xii,—that it is "a seditious opinion," to teach, that "the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons[z];"—and cap. 17,—that in "questions of faith" the civil magistrates ought to consult with "the ecclesiastical doctors," to whom "God's blessing is derived by imposition of hands," so as "not to be deceived in necessary truths," to whom "our Saviour hath promised infallibility[a]." These are the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes "infallibility" to them; here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he "takes too much upon" him. "The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets."

[Numb. xvi. 3, 7.] 1 Cor. xiv. 32.

NUMBER XX.

[Election opposed to coarctation as well as to coaction.]

J. D.—Now, to the distinction itself, I say first, that the proper act of liberty is election, and election is opposed (not only to coaction but also) to coarctation or determination to one. Necessitation or determination to one may consist with spontaneity, but not with election or liberty; as hath been shewed. The very Stoics did acknowledge a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of the Stoics.

[Elicit acts of the will cannot be necessitated.]

Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business. This I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools.—There is a double act of the will: the one more remote, called "*imperatus*," that is, in truth, the act of some inferior faculty, subject to the command of the will; as to open or shut one's eyes. Without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act is nearer, called "*actus elicitus*," an "act drawn out"

[z] [De Cive, c. xii. § 1. title, p. 125. ed. 1642.]

[a] [Ibid., c. xvii. § 28. p. 256.]

of the will; as to will, to choose, to elect[b]. This may be stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind of omnipotence: but the will cannot be compelled to an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air; for that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the same time, which implies a contradiction. Therefore, to say the will is necessitated, is to say the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of compulsion. If a strong man, holding the hand of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, "*hæc quidem vis est*"—"this is violence;" the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he was compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not only incline but determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act, is not the case the same? Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her but necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effectually and draw her inevitably and irresistibly to follow him spontaneously; Lucretia, in both these conditions, is to be pitied, but the latter person is more guilty and deserves greater punishment, who endeavours also so much as in him lies to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare not apply it, but thus only;—take heed, how we defend those secret and invincible necessitations to evil, though spontaneous and free from coaction.

These are their fastnesses.

[*Answer.*]

T. H.—In the next place, he bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between being free from compulsion and free from necessitation. The first is, that "election is opposite, not only to coaction" or compulsion, "but also to necessitation or determination to one." This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it. And to those brought formerly, I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that

[*Election not inconsistent with necessity.*]

[b] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Ductor Dubit., bk. II. c. iii. contin. Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4. And see Taylor, § 1; Works, vol. xiii. pp. 1, 5.]

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election is opposite to either. For when a man is compelled (for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die), he hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his feet. Likewise, when there is no compulsion, but the 700
strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily determine him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates; whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him; and, consequently, he electeth which he will. But commonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none; and that it is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is, that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooseth it; but they might as well say, fire does not burn, because it burns of neccssity.

[*The distinction vain, between imperate and elicit acts of the will.*]

The second argument is not so much an argument, as a distinction; to shew in what sense it may be said, that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in what sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as from the authority of "the Schools" and that which "rippeth up the bottom" of the question, that "there is a double act of the will." The one, he says, "is '*actus imperatus*,' an act done at the command of the will by some inferior faculty of the soul, as to open or shut one's eyes; and this act may be compelled." The other, he says, "is '*actus elicitus*,' an act allured, or an act 'drawn forth' by allurement, out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect; this," he says, "cannot be compelled." Wherein,—letting pass that metaphorical speech, of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the question,—you may observe, first, that to compel a voluntary act is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes. So that "*actus imperatus*" here, might as easily have been

said in English, a voluntary action; but that they that invented the term, understood not anything it signified. Secondly, you may observe, that "*actus elicitus*" is exemplified by these words, "to will, to elect, to choose," which are all one; and so to will is here made an act of the will. And indeed, as the will is a faculty or power in a man's soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or "drawn" by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is also to say, that to will is an act allured or "drawn out" of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as necessarily as threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will may be made as necessary as anything that is done by compulsion. So that the distinction of "*actus imperatus*," and "*actus elicitus*" are but words, and of no effect against necessity.

[Reply.] J. D.—In the next place follow two reasons of mine own against the same distinction; the one taken from the former grounds, that election cannot consist with determination to one. To this (he saith) he hath "answered already." No, truth is founded upon a rock; he hath been so far from prevailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it. Now again he tells us, that "election is not opposite to either" (necessitation or compulsion). He might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally; or that a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent takes away the rape. This is the strangest liberty that ever was heard of;—that a man is compelled to do what he would not, and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us upon the old score, that he "who submits to his enemy for fear of death, chooseth to submit." But we have seen formerly[c], that this, which he calls compulsion, is not compulsion properly, nor that natural determination of the will to one, which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits to

[Compulsion and necessitation both opposite to liberty.]

[c] [Above T. II. Numb. xix. pp. 124, &c.]

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an enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit;—and then there is no will to submit; this disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid a present blow;—or else he doth sincerely will a submission, and then the will is changed. There is a vast difference between compelling and changing the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise; but compelled it cannot be: that is, it cannot both will this and not nill this, as it is invested with the same circumstances, though, if the act were otherwise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely which now it wills freely. Wherefore these kind of actions are called mixed 701 actions[d], that is, partly voluntary, partly unvoluntary. That which is compelled, is a man's present condition or distress; that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, is the remedy of [his[e]] distress; that is voluntary. So, hypothetically, supposing a man were not in that distress, they are involuntary; but absolutely, without any supposition at all, taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. His other instance, of "a man forced to prison," that he "may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet," is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power. If they will drag him, he is not free to walk; and if they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be dragged. Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it;—that "other passions do necessitate as much as fear." But he errs doubly; first, in his foundation. Fear doth not determine the rational will naturally and necessarily. The last and greatest of the five terrible things[f] is death; yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than death. The fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship an idol; nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty to God. It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of empty shadows than of substantial dangers, because they are nearer our senses; as little children fear a mouse or a vizard,

[Of mixed actions.]

[Of fear, and other passions.]

[Dan. iii. 16—18.]

[Dan. vi. 10.]

[d] ["Ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τε, . . . μικταὶ εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, Ἔοικασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις." Aristot., Ethic., III. i. 4, 6.]

[e] [" its" in the original edition.]

[f] [Scil. "Ἀδυξία, πενία, νόσος, ἀφιλία, θάνατος." Aristot., Ethic., III. vi. 3.]

more than fire or weather. But as a fit of the stone takes away the sense of the gout for the present, so the greater passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of God's wrath and eternal torments, doth expel corporal fear. "Fear not them who kill the body, but fear Him who is able to cast both body and soul into Hell."—"*Da veniam imperator, tu carcerem, Ille gehennam minatur*"—"Excuse me, O emperor, thou threatenest men with prison, but He threatens me with hell[s]." Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action, between force, and fear and other passions. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away. He who forced a betrothed damsel was to die; "but unto the damsel" (saith He) "thou shalt do nothing, there is in her no fault worthy of death." Tamar's beauty, or Amnon's love, did not render him innocent; but Amnon's force rendered Tamar innocent. But fear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed, if fear be great and justly grounded, such as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense with the transgression of the negative precepts of God or nature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the offence, even against them, and pleads for pardon. But it dispenseth in many cases with the transgression of the positive law, either Divine or human; because it is not probable, that God or the law would oblige man to the observation of all positive precepts with so great damage as the loss of his life. The omission of circumcision was no sin, whilst the Israelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H. his permission, I will propose a case to him. A gentleman sends his servant with money to buy his dinner; some ruffians meet him by the way, and take it from him by force; the servant cried for help, and did what he could to defend himself, but all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if he was to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or suppose the ruffians did not take it from him by force, but drew their swords and threatened to kill him, except he delivered it himself; no wise man will conceive, that it was either the master's intention, or the servant's duty, to hazard his life, or his limbs, for saving of such a trifling sum. But, on the

Luke [xii.] 4, [5.]

Deut. xxii. 26.

[2 Sam. xiii.]

[Josh. v. 2—7.]

[s] [Aug., De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxii; Op. tom. v. p. 362. F.]

other side, suppose this servant, passing by some cabaret or
— tennis-court, where his comrades were drinking or playing,
should stay with them, and drink or play away his money,
and afterwards plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was over-
come by the mere strength of temptation: I trow, neither
T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, but
punish him for it; because neither was he necessitated by
the temptation, and what strength it had, was by his own
fault, in respect of that vicious habit which he had con-
4. tracted of drinking or gaming. "Every man is tempted

the means be superfluous, they are vain. What needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, when it is already determined extrinsecally what must be done?

[Liberty not ignorance of necessitation.]

He saith, that the ignorance of the true causes and their power is the reason, why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity. No such thing, but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of our own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration, nor use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by reason that their exterior senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their sleep. Suppose such an one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs, or from a bridge, and break his neck, or drown himself, it were a mad jury that would find this man accessary to his own death. Why? Because it was not freely done; he had not then the use of reason.

[T. H.'s impertinent instance of fire burning.]

Lastly, he tells us, that "the will doth choose of necessity," as well as "the fire burns of necessity." If he intend no more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as the ustive in the fire; he speaks truly, but most impertinently. For the question is not now of the elective power "*in actu primo*," whether it be an essential faculty of the soul; but whether the act of electing this or that particular object be free, and undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsecal causes. But if he intend it in this other sense,—that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between those combustible matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is put unto it necessarily if it be combustible, so the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own appetite,—he errs grossly. The will hath power either to will, or nill, or to suspend, that is, neither to will nor nill the same object. Yet even the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth.

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Two things are required to make an effect necessary: first, that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is; secondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an atheist, began his book thus,—"Concerning the Gods, I have nothing to say, whether they be, or they be not;"—for which his book was condemned by the Athenians to be burned[h]. The fire was a necessary agent; but the sentence or the application of the fire to the book, was a free act; and therefore the burning of his book was free. Much more the rational will is free; which is both a voluntary agent, and acts voluntarily.

[Distinction of imperate and elicit acts not improper.]

My second reason against this distinction of liberty, from compulsion but not from necessitation, is new; and demonstrates clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he, who doth necessitate the will to evil, after that manner is the true cause of evil, and ought 703
rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for all he saith he is "not surprised[i]," can be contented upon better advice to steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the reader, he makes an empty show of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the 'elicit' and 'imperate' acts of the will: first, because the terms are 'improper;' secondly, because they are 'obscure.' What trivial and grammatical objections are these, to be used against the universal current of divines and philosophers! "*Verborum ut nummorum*"—it is "in words, as it is in money:" use makes them proper and current. A "tyrant" at first signified a lawful and just prince; now use hath quite changed the sense of it, to denote either an usurper or an oppressor. The word "*præmunire*" is now grown a good word in our English laws by use and tract of time; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a "*præmonere*." The names of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, were derived at first from those heathenish deities, the sun, the moon, and the warlike god of the Germans; now we use them for distinction' sake only, without any relation to their first original. He is too froward, that will refuse a piece of

[h] [Cic., De Nat. Deorum, lib. i. c. 23; —Sext. Empir., Adv. Mathem., lib. viii. p. 319. B.;—Diog. Laert., lib. ix. § 51.]

[i] [See above, T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.]

coin that is current throughout the world, because it is not stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good word, because he understands not the derivation of it. We see foreign words are daily naturalized, and made free denizens in every country. But why are the terms improper? Because, saith he, it "attributes command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another." Therefore he saith, "they who invented this term of '*actus imperatus*,' understood not any thing what it signified." No? Why not? It seemeth to me they understood it better than those who except against it. They knew there are 'mental terms,' which are only conceived in the mind, as well as 'vocal terms,' which are expressed with the tongue. They knew, that howsoever a superior do intimate a direction to his inferior, it is still a command. Tarquin commanded his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, and was by him both understood and obeyed[k]. Though there be no formal "commonwealth" or "family," either in the body or in the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in the body of the inferior members to the head, there is a subordination in the soul of the inferior faculties to the rational will. Far be it from a reasonable man, so far to dishonour his own nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or the sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command there is without all question, though there be some doubt in what faculty this command doth principally reside, whether in the will or in the understanding. The true resolution is, that the directive command for counsel is in the understanding, and the applicative command, or empire, for putting in execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same answer serves for his second impropriety, about the word 'elicit.' For, saith he, "as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is absurdly said, that to will or choose is an act drawn out of the power to will." His objection is yet more improper than their expression. The art of dancing rather resembles the understanding, than the will. That "drawing," which the schools intend, is clearly of another nature

[k] [Tit. Liv., i. 54.]

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from that which he conceives. By "elicitation," he understands a persuading or enticing with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or that. But that "elicitation," which the Schools intend, is a deducing of the power of the will into act; that "drawing," which they mention, is merely from the appetibility of the object, or of the end; as a man "draws" a child after him with the sight of a fair apple, or a shepherd "draws" his sheep after him with the sight of a green bough; so the end "draws" the will to it by a metaphorical motion. What he understands here by an "ability to dance," is more than I know, or any man else, until he express himself in more proper terms, whether he understand the locomotive faculty alone, or the art or acquired habit of dancing alone, or both of these jointly. It may be said aptly without any absurdity, that the act of dancing is "drawn out" ("*elicitur*") of the locomotive faculty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous about the received phrases of the Schools, should not have let so many improper expressions have dropped from his pen; as, in this very passage, he confounds the "compelling of a voluntary action" with the commanding of a voluntary action, and "willing" with "electing," which he saith, 704
"are all one." Yet to will properly respects the end; to elect, the means.

[Nor unnecessarily obscure.]

His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into elicit and imperate, is "obscurity:"—"Might it not" (saith he) "have been as easily said in English a voluntary action." Yes, it might have been said "as easily," but not as truly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original from the will, whether immediately or mediately, whether it be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect, or an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the inferior faculties, or of the members, is a voluntary action; but neither the act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts of the will, nor drawn immediately out of the will itself; but the members and faculties are applied to their proper and respective acts by the power of the will.

[T. H. entirely mistakes the author's

And so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second reason, with the same faith that the unjust steward did make

his accounts. "The sum of J. D.'s distinction is" (saith he), "that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion" (just contrary to what I have maintained), "that is to say, by foul means; but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means." I confess the distinction is mine, because I use it; as the sun is mine or the air is mine; that is, common to me with all who treat of this subject. But his mistakes are so thick, both in relating my mind and his own, that the reader may conclude he is wandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no acts, which are properly said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror (which he calls "foul means"), which are sometimes in a large improper sense called compulsory actions, may be, and for the most part are, consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasions (which he calls "fair means"), if they be indeliberated (as in children, who want the use of reason), are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor excuse from punishment; as just fears of extreme and imminent dangers threatened by extrinsecal agents often do: because the strength of the former proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected in the causes of it; but neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will.

Discourse I. — words.] Luke xvi. [5—7.]

[IV. THEORIES CONCERNING THE CAUSE OF A SUPPOSED NECESSITY.]

NUMBER XXI.

J. D.—The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, the astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty to the motions of heaven, to the aspects and ascensions of the stars.

[i. Astrology.]

... "Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni,
"Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti[1]."

I stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes

[1] [Juv., xvi. 4, 5.]

PART III. swimming besides them in the rivers, yet believe they see those which are in heaven; who promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat for themselves. The stars, at the most, do but incline, they cannot necessitate.

[ii. The complexion and temperature of the body.] Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion and temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home to a necessity. Socrates[m], and many others, by assiduous care have corrected the pernicious propensions, which flowed from their temperatures.

[*Answer.*] T. H.—In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of certain professions of men, touching the causes, wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And, first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any effect without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is "*in rerum naturâ.*" Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.

[Reply.] J. D.—Towards the latter end of my discourse I answered some specious pretences against liberty. The two first were of the astrologer and the physician; the one subjecting liberty to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies, the other to the complexions of men. The sum of my answer was, that the stars and complexions do "incline," but not at 705
all "necessitate" the will. To which all judicious astronomers and physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not dissent from it. So as to this part there needs no reply.

But whereas he mentions a "great paradox" of his own,—that "there is hardly any one action, to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is '*in rerum naturâ,*'"—I can but smile to see, with what ambition our great undertakers do

[m] [See above, p. 100, note p.]

affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions; as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as great an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of the new world. And to this paradox in particular:—I meddle not with natural actions, because the subject of my discourse is moral liberty; but if he intend not only the kinds of things, but every individual creature, and not only in natural but voluntary actions, I desire to know, how Prester John, or the Great Mogul, or the King of China, or any one of so many millions of their subjects, do concur to my writing of this reply. If they do not, among his other speculations concerning this matter, I hope he will give us some restrictions. It were hard to make all the negroes accessary to all the murders that are committed in Europe.

NUMBER XXII.

J. D.—Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us, how we are haled hither and thither with outward objects. To this I answer,— [iii. The moral efficacy of outward objects.]

First, that the power which outward objects have over us, is for the most part by our own default; because of those vicious habits which we have contracted. Therefore, though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them, yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a paralytic man, to use Aristotle's comparison, shedding the liquor deserves to be punished; for though his act be unwilling, yet his intemperance was willing, whereby he contracted this infirmity[n]. [Such efficacy partly our own fault.]

Secondly, I answer, that concupiscence, and custom, and bad company, and outward objects, do indeed make a proclivity, but not a necessity. By prayers, tears, meditations, vows, watchings, fastings, humi-cubations, a man may get a contrary habit; and gain the victory, not only over outward objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become the king of the little world of himself. [Not irresistible.]

[n] [Vide Aristot., Ethic., III. vii. 15.]

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" Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irâ,
" Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas
" Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis,
" Cum poteris rex esse tui[o]."

[May be overcome by a settled resolution.]

Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously, and provides for all occurrences, is not so easily surprised with outward objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife and son[p]. "I would beat thee" (said the philosopher), "but that I am angry[q]." One spake lowest when he was most moved. Another poured out the water when he was thirsty. Another "made a covenant with" his "eyes." Neither opportunity nor enticement could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire with the three children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the lightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical, necessity; they may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty.

[2 Sam. xxiii. 15, 16.] [Job xxxi. 1.] [Gen. xxxix. 7—12.] [Dan. iii. 13—18.]

[*Answer.*] T. H.—Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, external objects presented to men of such and such temperatures do make their actions necessary; and says, the power that such objects have over us proceeds from our own fault. But that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power. And therefore that opinion may hold true for all this answer. Further he saith, "Prayer, fasting," &c. may alter our habits. 'Tis true; but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and make it necessary; as the former habit had been necessary, if prayer, fasting, &c., had not been. Besides, we are not moved nor disposed to prayer, or any other action, but by outward objects; as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent. Thirdly, he saith, "a resolved mind is not easily surprised:" as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, he alone wept not; and of the philosopher that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty; and the like. Such things, I confess, have or may have been

[2 Sam. xxiii. 15, 16.]

[o] [Claudian., De IV. Consul. Honorii, Carm. viii. vv. 258—261.]

[p] [See the Odyss., xix. 204—212.]

[q] [An anecdote told of Plato; see Diog. Laert., iii. 39.]

done; and do prove only, that it was not necessary for Discourse
706 Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor I.
for that other man to drink; but it does not prove, that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain as he did from weeping, nor the philosopher to abstain as he did from striking, nor the other man to forbear drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought to have proved.

Lastly, he confesseth, that the disposition of objects "may be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be destructive." To which I answer, 'tis impossible: for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, I may infer it can be in no danger at all.

J. D.—The third pretence was out of moral philosophy [Reply.]
misunderstood,—that outward objects do necessitate the will. I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his exceptions. The first is, that it is not material, though the power of outward objects do "proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power." Well, but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do? Then his answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed from causes that are not and were not in our own power, then they are not our faults at all; it is not a fault in us, not to do those things which never were in our power to do; but they are the faults of these causes from whence they do proceed. Next, he confesseth, that it is in our power by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted, and to get the contrary habit. "True" (saith he), 'but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the former habit did the other way.' By which very consideration it appears, that that which he calls a 'necessity' is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the faculty, but they do not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to himself a habit of temperance, may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act; and so on the contrary. Acts are not opposed to habits, but other habits. He adds, that "we are not moved to prayer or any other action but by outward

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objects; as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent." Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make "godly preachers," and "pious company," to be "outward objects," which are outward agents; secondly, to affirm, that the will "is not moved but by outward objects." The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive passions, by angels good and bad, by men, and most effectually, by acts or habits infused by God, whereby the will is excited (extraordinarily indeed but) efficaciously and determinately. This is more than "equivalent" with "outward objects."

Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both the appetibility of objects and the unruliness of passions; as I shewed by examples. He answers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I am not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove that which I intend;—that the rational will hath power, both to slight the most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions. When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have produced, then it will be time for him to cry for more work.

Lastly, whereas I say, that "outward objects may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty;" he catcheth at it, and objects, that "liberty is in no danger, but to be lost, but" I "say, it cannot be lost, therefore" he infers, that it is "in no danger at all." I answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost;—many more men do abuse their wits than lose them;—secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished, as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet it is not totally lost; thirdly, though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty; and though nothing be more natural to a man than reason, yet many, by excess of study, or by continual gormandizing, or by some extravagant passion, which they have cherished in themselves, or by doting too much upon some affected object, do become very sots, and

deprive themselves of the use of reason, and consequently of liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or that particular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath lost his former liberty to choose a good one. Discourse I.

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NUMBER XXIII.

J. D.—Fourthly, the natural philosopher doth teach, that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding. It is true, indeed, the will should follow the direction of the understanding, but I am not satisfied that it doth evermore follow it. Sometimes this saying hath place, "*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*[r]." As that great Roman said of two suitors, that the one produced the better reasons, but the other must have the office[s]; so reason often lies dejected at the feet of affection. Things nearer to the senses move more powerfully. Do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his child than for "the sin of his soul;" yet appreciatively, in the estimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of God a greater evil than any temporal loss. [iv. The natural efficacy of the last dictate of the understanding.] [The case otherwise in point of fact.] [See Micah vi. 7.]

Next, I do not believe, that a man is bound to weigh the expedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the balance of his understanding, or to run up into his watch-tower with his perspective to take notice of every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of some hidden danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to petite observations; as concerning every rag that a man wears, each drop of drink, each morsel of bread that he eats, each pace that he walks. Thus many steps must he go, not one more, nor one less, under pain of mortal sin. What is this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience? But God leaves many things indifferent, though man be so curious he will not. A good architect will be sure to provide sufficient materials for his building; but what particular number of stones, or trees, he troubles not his head. And suppose he [Such a cause neither extrinsecal nor antecedent.]

[r] [Ovid., Metam., vii. 20, 21.] p. 165. ed. Bryant.]
[s] [Plut., in Vitâ Jul. Cæsar., tom. iv.

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should weigh each action thus, yet he doth not; so still there is liberty.

[The understanding may be equally balanced between two alternatives.]

Thirdly, I conceive it is possible, in this mist and weakness of human apprehension, for two actions to be so equally circumstantiated, that no discernible difference can appear between them upon discussion. As suppose a chirurgeon should give two plasters to his patient, and bid him apply either of them to his wound; what can induce his reason more to the one than to the other, but that he may refer it to chance, whether he will use?

But leaving these probable speculations, which I submit to better judgments, I answer the philosopher briefly thus:—admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, as certainly in many things it doth; yet, first, this is no extrinsecal determination from without, and a man's own resolution is not destructive to his own liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is still free. Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joined with the action. The understanding and the will are not different agents, but distinct faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, or a hypothetical necessity; as we say, "*Quicquid est, quando est, necesse est esse*[t]:" a necessity of consequence, but not a necessity of consequent. Though an agent have certainly determined, and so the action be become infallible, yet, if the agent did determine freely, the action likewise is free.

[*Answer.*] T. H.—The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding. But it seems he understands that tenet in another sense than I do. For he speaketh, as if they that held it did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain; which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the will follows the last opinion or judgment immediately preceding the action, concerning whether it be good to do it or not; whether he hath weighed it long before or not at all. And that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As, for example,

[t] [See above, p. 25. note c.]

when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke immediately before the lifting of his hand. Now, if it be understood in that sense, the last dictate of the understanding does certainly necessitate the action; though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause; as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horse's back, when there are so many laid on before as there needeth but the addition of that one to make the weight sufficient. That which he allegeth against this, is, first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says, "*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*" But the saying (as pretty as it is) is not true; for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge of her husband outweighed them all. And thereupon that wicked action followed necessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of
708 two competitors said, one had the better reasons, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against him; for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that "things nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason." What followeth thence but this, that the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequents to come? Fourthly, whereas he says, that "do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son than for the sin of his soul;" it makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding, but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary: and, by consequence, repentance proceedeth from causes.

[Reply.] J. D.—The fourth pretence alleged against liberty was, that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding. This objection is largely answered before in several places of this reply; and particularly, Numb. vii.[u] In my former discourse, I gave two answers to it: the one certain and undoubted, that supposing the last dictate of the understanding did always determine the will, yet this determination being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from

[u] [Above pp. 42—44.]

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extrinsecal causes, but from the proper resolution of the agent, who had now freely determined himself, it makes no absolute necessity, but only hypothetical,—upon supposition that the agent hath determined his own will after this or that manner. Which being the main answer, T. H. is so far from taking it away, that he takes no notice of it. The other part of mine answer was probable: that it is not always certain, that the will doth always actually follow the last dictate of the understanding, though it always ought to follow it. Of which I gave then three reasons. One was, that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers not a word. Another of my reasons was, because reason doth not weigh, nor is bound to weigh, the convenience or inconvenience of every individual action to the uttermost grain in the balance of true judgment. The truth of this reason is confessed by T. H.; though he might have had more abettors in this than in the most part of his discourse—that nothing is indifferent, that a man cannot stroke his beard on one side, but it was either necessary to do it, or sinful to omit it: —from which confession of his it follows, that in all those actions, wherein reason doth not define what is most convenient, there the will is free from the determination of the understanding, and by consequence the "last feather" is wanting, "to break the horse's back." A third reason was, because passions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment, as I proved by the example of Medea and Cæsar, by the nearness of the objects to the senses, and by the estimation of a temporal loss more than sin. Against this reason his whole answer is addressed.

[The last feather breaketh the horse's back.]

And, first, he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the "last feather," wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now the second time[x]. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for three reasons. First, the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight, but is the sentence of the trier. The understanding weigheth all things, objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but itself is not weighed. Secondly, the sensitive

[x] [See above, Numb. xi. p. 62; and T. H. Numb. xi. p. 59.]

passion in some extraordinary cases may give a counterfeit weight to the object, if it can detain or divert reason from the balance; but ordinarily the means, circumstances, and causes concurrent,—they have their whole weight from the understanding; so as they do not press "the horse's back" at all until reason lay them on. Thirdly, he conceives, that as each feather hath a certain natural weight, whereby it concurs not arbitrarily but necessarily towards the overcharging of the horse, so all objects and causes have a natural efficiency, whereby they do physically determine the will; which is a great mistake. His objects, his agents, his motives, his passions, and all his concurrent causes, ordinarily do only move the will morally, not determine it naturally; so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over itself. Discourse I.

His other example,—of a man that strikes, "whose will to strike followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke immediately before the lifting up of his hand," —as it confounds passionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the dictates of right reason, so it is very uncertain; for between the cup and the lips, between the lifting up of the hand and the blow, the will may alter, and the judgment also: and, lastly, it is impertinent; for that necessity of striking proceeds from the free determination of the agent, and not from the special influence of any outward determining causes. And so it is only a necessity upon supposition. [T. H.'s example of a man that strikes.]

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Concerning Medea's choice, the strength of the argument doth not lie either in the fact of Medea, which is but a fiction, or in the authority of the poet, who writes things rather to be admired than believed, but in the experience of all men, who find it to be true in themselves:—that sometimes reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion, that what he desires is but a pleasant good, that what he loseth by such a choice is an honest good, that that which is honest is to be preferred before that which is pleasant; yet the will pursues that which is pleasant, and neglects that which is honest. St. Paul saith as much in earnest as is feigned of Medea;—that he "approved not that which" he "did," and that he "did that which" he "hated." The Roman story is mistaken; there was no bribe in the case but affection. [Of Medea's choice.] Rom. vii. 15. [And Cæsar's.]

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Whereas I urge, that those things which are "nearer to the senses," do "move more powerfully," he lays hold on it; and without answering to that for which I produced it, infers, "that the sense of present good is more immediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents:" which is true, but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity. Let a man do what he may do, and what he ought to do; and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by his own fault and neglect. Antecedent or indeliberate concupiscence doth sometimes (but rarely) surprise a man, and render the action not free. But consequent and deliberated concupiscence, which proceeds from the rational will, doth render the action more free, not less free; and introduceth only a necessity upon supposition.

[Affection sometimes prevails against reason.]

Lastly, he saith, that a man's mourning "more for the loss of his child than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding." Yes, very much. Reason dictates, that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a child, and ought more to be lamented for; yet we see daily, how affection prevails against the dictate of reason. That which he infers from hence,—that "sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes," —is true, as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense. The "causes" from whence repentance doth proceed, are God's grace preventing, and man's will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those inferior agents, which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace of God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And therefore the former part of his inference,—that "sorrow for sin is not voluntary,"—is untrue, and altogether groundless. That is much more truly and much more properly said to be voluntary, which proceeds from judgment, and from the rational will, than that which proceeds from passion, and from the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all T. H. his errors in this question is, that he acknowledgeth no efficacy but that which is natural. Hence is this wild consequence—"repentance hath causes," and therefore it "is not voluntary." Free effects have free causes; necessary effects necessary causes; voluntary effects have sometimes free, sometimes necessary causes.

NUMBER XXIV.

J. D.—Fifthly, and lastly, the divine labours to find out a way, how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God. But of this I had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, in answer to a treatise against the prescience of things contingent. I shall for the present only repeat these two things. [v. The prescience and decrees of God.]

First, we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to comprehend all His actions and attributes. [Our ignorance a sufficient answer.]

Secondly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do and ever shall submit to better, the readiest way to reconcile contingence and liberty with the decrees and prescience of God, and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to that presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that things future, which are not yet existent, are co-existent with God: but because the infinite knowledge of God, encircling all times in the point of eternity, doth attain to their future being; from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible being[y]. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to this way is, because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that "whatsoever is in God is God," that there are no accidents in Him, for that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected; that as God is not wise but wisdom itself, not just but justice itself, so He is not eternal but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that therefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisible: and therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite point, comprehending all times within itself. [Futurity ever present to God.]

T. H.—The last part of this discourse containeth his opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, otherwise than some divines have done, against whom he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he only "repeateth two things." One is, that "we ought not to desert [*Answer.*]

[y] [So Boethius, De Consolat., lib. v. Prosa 6.]

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a certain truth for not being able to comprehend the certain manner" of it. And I say the same; as, for example, that he ought not to desert this certain truth,—that there are certain and necessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth,—though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet, I think, the manner of it is not very hard to conceive; seeing that we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evil, sequels of men's actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses; and sense from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary.

[*Events necessarily determined by antecedent and extrinsecal causes.*]

The other thing he repeateth is, that the best way "to reconcile contingency and liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God." The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove; for hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God, irreconcileable: unless "the aspect of God" (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else besides God's will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds, that we must subject them "according to that presentiality which they have in eternity;" which he says cannot be done by them that "conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession," but only by them that conceive it an "indivisible point." To this I answer, that as soon as I can conceive eternity "an indivisible point," or any thing but "an everlasting succession," I will renounce all I have written in this subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity "*nunc stans*"—"an ever abiding now[z];" which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I never could conceive it. They that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a "*nunc stans*," which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true, that "God is not just but

[*Eternity not an indivisible point but a succession.*]

[z] [Summ., P. Prima, Qu. x. art. 2.]

justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eternity itself;" nor how he concludes thence, that eternity is a point indivisible, and not a succession; nor in what sense it can be said, that an infinite point, &c., wherein is no succession, can comprehend all times though time be successive. Discourse I.

These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore, what was the design of the School-men, to bring them up; unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings.

And thus much in answer to his discourse, wherein I think not only his "squadrons[a]," but also his reserves of distinctions, are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my reasons for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of art, in plain English.

J. D.—That poor discourse which I mention was not written against any "divines," but in way of examination of a French treatise, which your Lordship's brother[b] did me the honour to shew me at York. My assertion is most true, that "we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner." Such a truth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsecal determination; a truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world. And therefore, though I be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists together with God's eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. But T. H. his opinion of the absolute necessity of all events, by reason of their antecedent determination in their extrinsecal and necessary causes, is no such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without probable grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world. Neither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so obscure, or so transcendent above the reach of reason, as the

[Reply.]

[A certain and received truth not to be deserted because it is hard to be understood.]

[a] [See above, Numb. v. p. 37.]

[b] [Sir Charles Cavendish of Wallington, the brother of the Marquis (afterwards Duke) of Newcastle, died Feb. 4, 1653, and was buried at Bolsover (Collins' Peerage by Sir E. Brydges, vol. i. p. 317). Bramhall was at York with the Marquis from 1642 to 1644.]

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eternal decrees of God are. And therefore in both these respects he cannot challenge the same privilege. I am in possession of an old truth derived by inheritance or succession from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not able to clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my possession until a better title were shewed for another. He is no old possessor, but a new pretender; and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs, not by weak and inconsequent suppositions, or inducements, such as those are which he useth here, of "praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the memory of good and evil sequels, and events;" which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessitate the will; nor by uncertain and accidental inferences, such as this,—"the memory of praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us" (he should say, dispose us) "to elect what we elect, but the memory of these things is from the sense, and the sense from the operation of the external objects, and the agency of external objects is only from God, therefore all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary." To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this sorites, it is just like that old sophistical piece,—he that drinks well sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt lives well, therefore he that drinks well lives well. 711

[How contingent events are reconcileable with God's prescience and decrees.]

In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the eternal prescience and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency. And this I set down in as plain terms as I could, or as so profound a speculation would permit; which is almost wholly misunderstood by T. H., and many of my words wrested to a wrong sense. As, first, where I speak of "the aspect of God," that is, His view, His knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest to Him from eternity,—"All things are naked and open to His eyes;"—and this not discursively, but intuitively, not by external species, but by His internal essence[c]; he confounds this with the will and the decrees of God. Though he "found not the word 'aspect' before in this discourse," he might have found prescience. Secondly, he

[The aspect of God.] ["*Intuitus Dei.*"]

Heb. iv. 13.

[Necessity not identi-

[c] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xiv. art. 13; and see also art. 7.]

chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained, that "liberty and the decrees of God are irreconcileable." If I have said any such thing, my heart never went along with my pen. No; but his reason why he chargeth me on this manner, is because I have maintained, that "liberty and the absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable." That is true indeed. What then? "Why" (saith he), "necessity and God's decrees are all one." How? "All one?" That were strange indeed. Necessity may be a consequent of God's decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. But to cut his argument short. God hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time; yet not all after the same manner, but according to the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of His creatures, which He doth not destroy by His decree: some He acteth, with some he co-operateth by special influence, and some He only permitteth. Yet this is no idle or bare permission; seeing He doth concur, both by way of general influence, giving power to act, and also by disposing all events, necessary, free, and contingent, to His own glory. Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I "allow all men to be of" his "opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a '*nunc stans*,'" or how eternity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting succession. But I have given no such allowance. I know there are many other ways proposed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of God with the liberty and contingency of second causes; some of which may please other judgments better than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could comprehend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that "a certain truth ought not to be rejected," because we are not able, in respect of our weakness, to understand "the certain manner," or reason of it. I know the load-stone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it; and yet I know not how it comes to have such a power.

[cal with God's decrees.]

[Other explanations have been offered of the subject besides the author's.]

But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section is, whether eternity be "an indivisible point" (as I maintain it) or "an everlasting succession" (as he would have it). According to his constant use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, but pleads against it from his own incapacity;—"I never could conceive," saith he, "how eternity

[That eternity is not a succession but an indivisible point.]

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should be an indivisible point." I believe, that neither we nor any man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do these inferior things. The nearer that any thing comes to 712
the essence of God, the more remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make potentialities, and successive duration, and former and latter, or a part without a part (as they say), to be in God? Because we are not able to understand clearly the Divine perfection, we must not therefore attribute any imperfection to Him.

He saith moreover, that he "understands as little how it can be true which" I "say, that God is not just but justice itself, not eternal but eternity itself." It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading School-divines, or metaphysicians; if he make faculties or qualities to be in God really distinct from His essence. God is a most simple or pure act, which can admit no composition of substance and accidents. Doth he think, that the most perfect essence of God cannot act sufficiently without faculties and qualities? The infinite perfection of the Divine essence excludes all passive or receptive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is by any accidents. The attributes of God are not diverse virtues or qualities in Him, as they are in the creatures; but really one and the same with the Divine essence, and among themselves. They are attributed to God, to supply the defect of our capacity, who are not able to understand that which is to be known of God under one name or one act of the understanding[d].

Furthermore he saith, that he "understands not how" I "conclude from hence, that eternity is an indivisible point, and not a succession." I will help him. The Divine substance is indivisible; but eternity is the Divine substance. The major is evident: because God is "*actus simplicissimus*" —"a most simple act;" wherein there is no manner of composition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and accidents, nor of parts, &c.; and by consequence no divisibility[e]. The minor hath been clearly demonstrated in mine answer

[d] [See Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. I. dist. viii. qu. iv. tit. "Qualiter, cum Deus sit simplex, multiplex tamen dicatur."]

[e] [See Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. I. dist. viii. qu. iv. art. 1;—and Aug., De Trin., lib. v. c. 1. § 2, Op. tom. viii. p. 833.]

to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men,—that "whatsoever is in God, is God[f]."

Lastly, he saith, he "conceives not how it can be said, that an infinite point, wherein is no succession, can comprehend all time, which is successive." I answer, that it doth not comprehend it formally, as time is successive, but eminently and virtually, as eternity is infinite. To-day all eternity is co-existent with this day. To-morrow all eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow. And so in like manner with all the parts of time, being itself without parts. He saith, he "finds not these phrases in the Scripture." No, but he may find the thing in the Scripture;—that God is infinite in all His attributes, and not capable of any imperfection.

[T. H.'s boastful conclusion.]

And so, to shew his antipathy against the School-men, that he hath no liberty or power to contain himself, when he meets with any of their phrases or tenets, he falls into another paroxysm or fit of inveighing against them; and so concludes his answer with a *'plaudite'* to himself, because he hath defeated both my "squadrons" of arguments, and "reserves of distinctions."—

"Dicite, Io pæan; et io, bis dicite, pæan[g]."

But because his eyesight was weak, and their backs were towards him, he quite mistook the matter. Those whom he see routed and running away, were his own scattered forces.

[V. THE REMAINDER OF T. H.'S ANSWER.]

NUMBER XXV.

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

[i. *Of actions done without deliberation.*]

T. H.—First, I conceive that when it cometh into a man's mind, to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate the doing or abstaining, [he] necessarily followeth the present thought he had of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As, for example, in sudden

[f] ["Hujus autem" (Dei) "Essentiæ simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, *quod non est in Eâ aliquid quod non sit Ipsa;* sed idem est habens et quod habetur." Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. I. dist. viii. qu. v. tit. "QUOD NON EST IN DEO ALIQUID QUOD NON SIT DEUS."]

[g] [Ovid., Art. Amat., ii. 1.]

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anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden fear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call voluntary. He, if I understand him aright, calls them spontaneous. I call them voluntary, because those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary. And here, where there is one only appetite, that one is the last.

Besides, I see 'tis reasonable to punish a rash action, which could not be justly done by man, unless the same were voluntary: for no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden, because 'tis supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall 713
nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time wherein he was able to consider, whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election.

[Reply.] J. D.—This part of T. H. his discourse hangs together like a sick man's dreams. Even now he tells us, that "a man may have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate;" by and by he saith, that "no action of a man, though never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation." He tells us, Numb. xxxiii, that the scope of this section is to shew what is spontaneous[h]. Howbeit he sheweth only what is voluntary, so making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one; whereas before he had told us, that 'every spontaneous action is not voluntary, because indeliberate, nor every voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from fear[i].' Now he tells us, that "those actions which follow the last appetite, are voluntary, and where there is one only appetite, that is the last." But before he told us, that "voluntary presupposeth some precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action[j]."

[h] [Below, p. 175.]
[i] [Above, Numb. viii. p. 45.]
[j] [Ibid.]

He defines liberty, Numb. xxix, to be "the absence of all extrinsecal impediments to action[k]." And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not done, is therefore not done, because the agent was necessitated by extrinsecal causes not to do it. Are not extrinsecal causes, which determine him not to do it, "extrinsecal impediments to action?" So no man shall be free to do anything but that which he doth actually. He defines a free agent to be "him, who hath not made an end of deliberating" (Numb. xxviii[l]), and yet defines liberty to be "an absence of outward impediments." There may be "outward impediments," even whilst he is deliberating; as a man deliberates whether he shall play at tennis, and at the same time the door of the tennis-court is fast locked against him. And after a man hath ceased to deliberate, there may be no outward impediments; as when a man resolves not to play at tennis, because he finds himself ill disposed, or because he will not hazard his money. So the same person, at the same time, should be free and not free, not free and free. And as he is not firm to his own grounds, so he confounds all things, the "mind" and the "will," the "estimative faculty" and the "understanding," "imagination" with "deliberation," the end with the means, "human will" with the "sensitive appetite," "rational hope or fear" with "irrational passions," "inclinations" with "intentions," a "beginning of being" with a "beginning of working," "sufficiency" with "efficiency;" so as the greatest difficulty is to find out what he aims at: so as I had once resolved not to answer this part of his discourse; yet, upon better advice, I will take a brief survey of it also, and shew how far I assent unto, or dissent from, that which I conceive to be his meaning.

[Of actions done in sudden passions.]

And, first, concerning sudden passions, as anger or the like. That which he saith, that "the action doth necessarily follow the thought," is thus far true, that those actions, which are altogether undeliberated and do proceed from sudden and violent passions, or *motus primo primi*, which surprise a man, and give him no time to advise with reason, are not properly and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary actions; as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard, out of a secret antipathy.

[k] [Below p. 166.]

[l] [Below p. 165.]

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[Of actions done without present deliberation.]

Secondly, as for those actions, "wherein actual deliberation seems not necessary, because never anything appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence," I do confess, that actions done by virtue of a precedent deliberation, without any actual deliberation in the present when the act is done, may notwithstanding be truly both voluntary and free acts; yea, in some cases, and in some sense, more free, than if they were actually deliberated of in present: as one who hath acquired, by former deliberation and experience, a habit to play upon the virginals, needs not deliberate what man or what jack he must touch, nor what finger of his hand he must move, to play such a lesson; yea, if his mind should be fixed or intent to every motion of his hand, or every touch of a string, it would hinder his play, and render the action more troublesome to him. Wherefore I believe, that not only his playing in general, but every motion of his hand, though it be not presently deliberated of, is a free act, by reason of his precedent deliberation. So then (saving improprieties of speech, as calling that voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to the last appetite, and other mistakes, as that no act can be said to be without deliberation), we agree also for the 714
greater part in this second observation.

[Actions done in passion justly punished, because done through past or present choice.]

Thirdly, whereas he saith, that "some sudden acts, proceeding from violent passions which surprise a man, are justly punished." I grant they are so sometimes, but not for his reason—because they have been formerly actually deliberated of, but because they were virtually deliberated of, or because it is our faults, that they were not actually deliberated of; whether it was a fault of pure negation, that is, of not doing our duty only, or a fault of bad disposition also, by reason of some vicious habit, which we had contracted by our former actions. To do a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly punishable, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsecal causes. As if a child before he had the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion, yet, because he wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it, he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular justice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case. But if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, and by our own faults, it is justly punishable. As he who by his wanton

thoughts in the day-time, doth procure his own nocturnal pollution. A man cannot deliberate in his sleep, yet it is accounted a sinful act, and consequently a free act, that is, not actually free in itself, but virtually free in its causes; and though it be not expressly willed and chosen, yet it is tacitly and implicitly willed and chosen, when that is willed and chosen from whence it was necessarily produced. By the Levitical law, if a man digged a pit, and left it uncovered, so that his neighbour's ox or his ass did fall into it, he was bound to make reparation; not because he did choose to leave it uncovered on purpose that such a mischance might happen, but because he did freely omit that which he ought to have done, from whence this damage proceeded to his neighbour. Lastly, there is great difference between the first motions, which sometimes are not in our power, and subsequent acts of killing or stealing or the like, which always are in our power, if we have the use of reason, or else it is our own fault that they are not in our power. Yet to such hasty acts, done in hot blood, the law is not so severe, as to those which are done upon long deliberation and prepensed malice, "unless" (as I said) "there be some mixture of public justice in it." He that steals a horse deliberately may be more punishable by the law, than he that kills the owner by chance-medley. Yet the death of the owner was more "noxious" (to use his phrase), and more damageable to the family, than the stealth of the horse. So far was T. H. mistaken in that also, that the right to kill men doth proceed merely from their being "noxious[m]."

Discourse I.

[Exod. xxi. 33, 34.]

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T. H.—Secondly, I conceive, when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing, that he does nothing else but consider, whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it; and to consider an action is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil: from whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or

[ii. *Of actions done with deliberation.*]

[m] [T. H.] Numb. xiv. [above, p. 86.]

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(which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.

[Reply.]

J. D.—If I did not know what deliberation was, I should be little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes it to be a consideration, or an act of the understanding; sometimes an imagination, or an act of the fancy; sometimes he makes it to be an alternation of passions, hope and fear; sometimes he makes it concern the end; sometimes to concern the means. So he makes it I know not what. The truth is this, in brief:—deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, whether this or that, definitely considered, be a good and fit means, or, indefinitely, what are good and fit means, to be chosen for attaining some wished end[n].

NUMBER XXVII.

[iii. *The will the last step before action.*]

T. H.—Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will, and is immediately before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberation, are usually called intentions and inclinations but not wills, there being but one will; which also in this case may be called last will, though the intention change often.

[Reply.—T. H. confounds the act of volition with the will itself.]

J. D.—Still here is nothing but confusion. He confounds the faculty of the will with the act of volition; he makes the will to be the last part of deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most proper and elicit act of the will, "or a willing of the end, as it is to be attained by certain means[o]," to be no willing at all, but only some antecedaneous "inclination" or propension. He might as well say, that the uncertain agitation of the needle hither and thither, to find out the pole, and the resting or fixing of itself directly towards 715

[n] ["Βουλευόμεθα, . . θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, . . καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα . . δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται." Aristot., Ethic., III. v. 11.]

[o] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. xii. art. 1. Ad quartum.]

the pole, were both the same thing. But the grossest mistake is, that he will acknowledge no act of a man's will to be his will, but only the last act, which he calls the "last will." If the first were no will, how comes this to be the "last will?" According to this doctrine, the will of a man should be as unchangeable as the will of God; at least so long as there is a possibility to effect it. According to this doctrine, concupiscence with consent should be no sin, for that which is not truly willed is not a sin; or rather should not be at all, unless either the act followed, or were rendered impossible by some intervening circumstances. According to this doctrine, no man can say, this is my will, because he knows not yet whether it shall be his last will. The truth is, there be many acts of the will, both in respect of the means and of the end. But that act, which makes a man's actions to be truly free, is election, which is the 'deliberate choosing or refusing of this or that means, or the acceptation of one means before another, where divers are represented by the understanding[p].'

NUMBER XXVIII.

[IV. *A voluntary act free until deliberation ends.*]

T. H.—Fourthly, that those actions, which man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon choice and election. So that voluntary action, and action proceeding from election, is the same thing; and that of a voluntary agent, 'tis all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating.

[Reply.]

J. D.—This short section might pass without an animadversion but for two things. The one is, that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act. A free act is only that which proceeds from the free election of the rational will after deliberation; but every act that proceeds from the sensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or election, is truly voluntary. The other thing observable is his conclusion,—that "it is all one to say, a man is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating." Which confession of his overturns his whole structure of absolute necessity: for if every agent be necessitated to act

[p] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. lxxxiii. art. 3.]

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what he doth act by a necessary and natural flux of extrinsecal causes, then he is no more free before he deliberates, or whilst he deliberates, than he is after; but by T. H. his confession here, he is more free whilst he deliberates than he is after. And so, after all his flourishes for an absolute or extrinsecal necessity, he is glad to sit himself down, and rest contented with a hypothetical necessity, which no man ever denied or doubted of; ascribing the necessitation of a man in free acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to his last thought (Numb. xxv[r]). What is this to a natural and special influence of extrinsecal causes? Again, "liberty," saith he, is "an absence of extrinsecal impediments;" but deliberation doth produce no new extrinsecal impediments; therefore (let him choose which part he will) either he is free after deliberation by his own doctrine, or he was not free before. Our own deliberation, and the direction of our own understanding, and the election of our own will, do produce a hypothetical necessity,—that the event be such as the understanding hath directed, and the will elected. But forasmuch as the understanding might have directed otherwise, and the will have elected otherwise, this is far from an absolute necessity. Neither doth liberty respect only future acts, but present acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create the world. In the same instant wherein the will elects, it is free, according to a priority of nature though not of time, to elect otherwise. And so, in a divided sense, the will is free, even whilst it acts, though in a compounded sense it be not free. Certainly, deliberation doth constitute, not destroy liberty.

NUMBER XXIX.

[v. *Definition of liberty.*]

T. H.—Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner. Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and in the intrinsecal quality of the agent. As, for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments.

[r] [Above, p. 160.]

And though water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power; because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsecal. So also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because
716 the impediment is not in him but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.

J. D.—How that should be a right definition of liberty which comprehends neither the genus nor the difference, neither the matter nor the form of liberty, which doth not so much as accidentally describe liberty by its marks and tokens; how a real faculty, or the elective power, should be defined by a negation, or by an "absence;"—is past my understanding, and contrary to all the rules of right reason which I have learned. Negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By this definition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into the air, because there is no outward impediment to hinder it; and so a violent act[s] may be a free act. Just like his definition are his instances, of the liberty of the water to descend down the channel, and a sick or a lame man's liberty to go. The latter is an impotence, and not a power or a liberty. The former is so far from being a free act, that it is scarce a natural act. Certainly, the proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy bodies, is to descend directly downwards towards the centre; as we see in rain, which falls down perpendicularly. Though this be far from a free act, which proceeds from a rational appetite, yet it is a natural act, and proceeds from a natural appetite, and hath its reason within self. So hath not the current of the river in its channel; which must not be ascribed to the proper nature of the water, but either to the general order of the universe, for the better being and preservation of the creatures,—otherwise the waters should not move in seas and rivers as they do, but cover the face of the earth, and possess their proper place between the air and the earth, according to the degree of their gravity,—or to an extrinsecal principle, whilst one particle of water thrusteth and forceth forward another, and so comes a current, or at least so comes

[Reply.—T. H.'s definition one of negatives.]

[His instances.]

[s] ["Η δὲ ἀνάγκη διττή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν, ἡ δὲ βίᾳ ἡ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν· ὥσπερ λίθος καὶ κάτω καὶ ἄνω φέρεται, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγκην." Aristot., Anal. Poster., II. xi. 9.]

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the current to be more impetuous; to which motion the position of the earth doth contribute much, both by restraining that fluid body with its banks from dispersing itself, and also by affording way for a fair and easy descent by its proclivity. He tells us sadly, that "the water wants liberty to go over the banks, because there is an extrinsecal impediment; but to ascend up the channel it wants not liberty, but power." Why? Liberty is a power: if it want power to ascend, it wants liberty to ascend. But he makes the reason why the water ascends not up the channel to be intrinsecal, and the reason why it ascends not over the banks to be extrinsecal; as if there were not a rising of the ground up the channel, as well as up the banks, though it be not so discernible, nor always so sudden. The natural appetite of the water is as much against the ascending over the banks, as the ascending up the channel. And the extrinsecal impediment is as great in ascending up the channel as over the banks, or rather greater, because there it must move, not only against the rising soil, but also against the succeeding waters, which press forward the former. Either the river wants liberty for both, or else it wants liberty for neither.

[His definition far removed from the idea of moral liberty.]

But to leave his metaphorical "faculties," and his catachrestical liberty; how far is his discourse wide from the true moral liberty, which is in question between us! His former description of a free agent,—that is, "he who hath not made an end of deliberating[t],"—though it was wide from the mark, yet it came much nearer the truth than this definition of liberty: unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deliberating whether it will go over the banks, but hath not done deliberating whether it will go up the channel.

NUMBER XXX.

[vi. *All things take their being from an antecedent and extrinsecal cause.*]

T. H.—Sixthly, I conceive, nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself. And that, therefore, when first a man had an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else, not in his own disposing. So that,

[t] [Above, T. H. Numb. xxviii. p. 165.]

whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause, and (by this which is said) the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated. DISCOURSE I.

J. D.—This sixth point doth not consist in explicating of terms, as the former, but in two proofs, that voluntary actions are necessitated. The former proof stands thus,—"Nothing takes beginning from itself, but from some agent without itself, which is not in its own disposing; therefore," &c.— [Reply.]

717 *Concedo omnia*—I grant all he saith. The will doth not "take beginning from itself." Whether he understand by "will" the faculty of the will, which is a power of the reasonable soul, it "takes not beginning from itself," but from God, who created and infused the soul into man, and endowed it with this power; or whether he understand by "will" the act of willing, it "takes not beginning from itself," but from the faculty, or from the power of willing, which is in the soul. This is certain,—finite and participated things cannot be from themselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from hence? that therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of the will? or that the faculty is always determined antecedently, extrinsecally, to will that which it doth will? He may as soon "draw water out of a pumice[u]," as draw any such conclusion out of these premisses. Secondly, for his "taking a beginning." Either he understands "a beginning of being," or "a beginning of working and acting." If he understand a beginning of being, he saith most truly, that nothing hath a beginning of being in time from itself. But this is nothing to his purpose. The question is not between us, whether the soul of man or the will of man be eternal. But if he understand "a beginning of working or moving actually," it is a gross error. All men know, that when a stone descends, or fire ascends, or when water that hath been heated returns to its former temper, the beginning or reason is intrinsecal, and one and the same thing doth move and is moved in a diverse respect. It moves in respect of the form, [Nothing finite begins to be of itself.] [Many things begin to act of themselves.]

[u] [Plaut., Pers., I. i. 42.]

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and it is moved in respect of the matter. Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end, is most properly said to move himself. Yet I do not deny but that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do concur with the will: some outward, as the First Cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, the understanding by directing; so[me inward, as] passions and acquired habits. But I deny, that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one, except God alone, Who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases: and where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty.

[The will is not a necessary cause of its particular acts.]

His second argument is *ex concessis*. "It is out of controversy," saith he, "that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause." The argument may be thus reduced;—necessary causes produce necessary effects; but the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might deny his major. Necessary causes do not always produce necessary effects, except they be also necessarily produced; as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras his book[x]. But I answer clearly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without "controversy" indeed; for it is without all probability. That it wills when it wills, is necessary; but that it wills this or that, now or then, is free. More expressly;—the act of the will may be considered three ways; either in respect of its nature, or in respect of its exercise, or in respect of its object. First, for the nature of the act. That which the will wills is necessarily voluntary, because the will cannot be compelled; and in this sense, "it *is* out of controversy, that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions." Secondly, for the exercise of its acts, that is not necessary. The will may either will or suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object; that is not necessary but free. The will is not extrinsecally determined to its objects. As, for example, the Cardinals meet in the conclave to choose a Pope. Whom they choose, he is necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary, that they shall

[x] [Above Numb. xx. p. 138.]

choose this or that day. Before they were assembled, they might defer their assembling; when they are assembled, they may suspend their election for a day or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will choose, it is freely in their own power; otherwise, if the election were not free, it were void, and no election at all. So that which takes its beginning from the will is necessarily voluntary, but it is not necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular; as it was necessary, that the person freely elected should be Pope, but it was not necessary, either that the election should be at this time, or that this man should be elected. And therefore voluntary acts in particular have not necessary causes, that is, they are not necessitated. Discourse I.

NUMBER XXXI.

T. H.—Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to
718 which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The same is also a necessary cause; for if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanted somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause; for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is produced necessarily; for whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. And therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated. [vii. *Every actual event hath a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause.*]

J. D.—This section contains a third argument to prove that all effects are necessary; for clearing whereof, it is needful to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient. [Reply.]

First, several causes singly considered may be insufficient, and the same taken conjointly be sufficient, to produce an effect: as two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach, which either of them singly is insufficient to do. Now, to make the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach, necessary, 1. [Causes singly insufficient which jointly are sufficient.]

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it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction be necessary, and their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of one of these horses will not suffer him to draw; if the smith have shod the other in the quick, and lamed him; if the horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade and will not draw but when he list; then the effect is not necessarily produced, but contingently, more or less, as the concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent.

2. [That cause properly sufficient which produceth the effect intended.]

Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man, or else because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as in the generation of a monster. The former is properly called a sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the debility of the cause be not necessary but contingent, then the effect is not necessary but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that the conclusion always follows the weaker part. If the premisses be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in causes as in propositions. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, the effect cannot be necessary.

3. [A cause is sufficient in respect of its ability, not of its will, to act.]

Thirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from necessity most nearly is, that a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect; but the cause may be sufficient though the will do not concur: as God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds, but it doth not follow from thence, either that He hath produced them, or that He will produce them. The Blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind; but it doth not follow, therefore, that all mankind shall be actually saved by virtue of His Blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor, though he will not teach every scholar; and a sufficient physician, though he will not administer to every patient. Forasmuch therefore as the concurrence of the will is needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the cause may be sufficient '*in sensu diviso*,' although the will do not concur; it follows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, and yet something which is needful to the produc-

tion of the effect may be wanting, and that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause.

Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light, and say, that though the free agent be sufficient '*in sensu diviso*,' yet he is not sufficient '*in sensu composito*,' to produce the effect without the concurrence of the will, he says true: but, first, he bewrays the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a mere trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a compounded sense: and seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may consist with liberty.

4. [A sufficient cause inclusive of will, only hypothetically necessary.]

NUMBER XXXII.

T. H.—Lastly, I hold, that the ordinary definition of a free agent,—namely, that a free agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it[y],—implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be "sufficient," that is, "necessary," and yet the effect not follow.

[viii. *Free agency a self-contradiction, because it implies a sufficient cause without an actual effect.*]

719 J. D.—This last point is but a corollary or an inference from the former, doctrine,—that "every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily;" which pillar being taken away, the superstructure must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. "Lastly, I hold," saith he—(what he is able to *prove* is something; so much reason, so much trust; but what he "holds," concerns himself not others; but what holds he?—"I hold," saith he),—"that the ordinary definition of a free agent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense." That which he calls the "ordinary definition" of liberty, is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of philosophers and schoolmen. And doth he think that all these spake "nonsense?" or had no more judgment than to 'contradict' themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect himself, than censure so many.

[Reply.]

[y ["Illa est potentia libera, quæ, omnibus positis quæ requiruntur ad agendum, potest agere et non agere." Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 7; Op. tom. iii. p. 663. B.]

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Let us see the definition itself:—"A free agent is that, which, when all things are present that are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it." I acknowledge the old definition of liberty, with little variation: but I cannot see this "nonsense," nor discover this "contradiction;" for in these words, "all things needful," or "all things requisite," the actual determination of the will is not included. But by "all things needful or requisite," all necessary power, either operative or elective, all necessary instruments and adjuments extrinsecal and intrinsecal, and all conditions, are intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will, and yet he may forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money, and arms, and munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all things requisite for war, yet he may make peace if he will. Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel,—"I have prepared My dinner, My oxen and My fatlings are killed, all things are ready, come unto the marriage." According to T. H. his doctrine, the guests might have told him, that he said not truly, for their own wills were not ready. And indeed, if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will, then, if the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now, when science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men's experience, doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecal necessitation; if the power to will be present '*in actu primo*,' determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.

[Sufficient causes include not the actual determination of the will.]

Matt. xxii. 4.

Secondly, these words 'to act or not to act, to work or not to work, to produce or not to produce,' have reference to the effect, not as a thing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to be done. They imply not the actual production, but the producibility, of the effect. But when once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and conditions and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible or producible, but it is in being, and actually produced.

[And refer to the producibility, not to the production, of the effect.]

Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The question is, whether effects producible be free from necessity. He shuffles out 'effects producible,' and thrusts in their places 'effects produced,' or, 'which are in the act of production.' Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither "nonsense" nor "contradiction" to say, that a free agent, when all things requisite to produce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it.

NUMBER XXXIII.

T. H.—For my first five points,—where it is explicated, first, what spontaneity is; secondly, what deliberation is; thirdly, what will, propension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free agent is; fifthly, what liberty is;—there can be no other proof offered but every man's own experience, by reflecting on himself, and remembering what he useth to have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent or that action is free. Now he that so reflecteth on himself cannot but be satisfied, but that "deliberation" is the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come; that by "spontaneity" is meant inconsiderate proceeding (for else nothing is meant by it); that "will" is the last act of our deliberation; that a "free agent" is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and that "liberty" is the absence of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains, to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient; because experience and matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good are all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved, that eternity is not "*nunc stans*," to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind? Also the sixth point,—that

[*Proof of necessity, from men's experience of their own meaning in the use of words.*]

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a man cannot imagine anything to begin without a cause,—can no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as another; that is, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And therefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then rather than sooner or later, or else that it began never, but was eternal.

[Reply.] J. D.—Now at length he comes to his main proofs. He that hath so confidently censured the whole current of schoolmen and philosophers of "nonsense," had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls his reasons (Numb. xxxvi[z]) "demonstrative proofs." All demonstrations are either from the cause or the effect, not from private notions and conceptions, which we have in our minds. That which he calls a 'demonstration,' deserves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus:—'That which a man conceives in his mind by these words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c., that they are.' This is his proposition, which I deny. The true natures of things are not to be judged by the private ideas or conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an ordinary person what "upwards" signifies, and whether our antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; and he will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be downwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof;—that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is towards heaven is upwards. This same erroneous notion of "upwards" and "downwards," before the true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary capacities; as appears by their arguments of "*penduli homines*" and "*pendulæ arbores*[a]." Again, what do men conceive ordinarily by this word "empty," as when they say an empty vessel; or by this word "body," as when they say, there is no body in that room? They intend not to exclude the air either out of the vessel or out of the room. Yet reason tells

[Truth to be sought in reason, not in vulgar notions.]

[z] [Below p. 189.]

[a] [Lactant., Div. Inst., lib. iii. c. 24. pp. 288, 289. ed. Oxon. 1684; and see Aug., De Civ. Dei, lib. xvi. c. 9, Op. tom. v. p. 423. E, F.]

us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a true body. I might give a hundred such like instances. He who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errors: like him, who leaves a certain guide to follow an *ignis fatuus*, or a will-with-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. His reason,—"that matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory,"—is likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact, and sense is the proper judge of it; but what these words do or ought truly to signify, is not to be judged by sense, but by reason. Secondly, reason may and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object. Sense tells us, that the sun is no bigger than a good ball; but reason demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the earth. As to his instance,—"How can it be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these words?"—I confess it cannot be proved, for it is not true. Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as goodness. '*Cos amoris amor.*' Love is a passion of the will, but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father may love an ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house better than another man's, yet he cannot but esteem many others better than his own. His other instance,—"How can it be proved, that eternity is not '*nunc stans*,' to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind?"—is just like the former; not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel, which one gave to a novice about the choice of his wife, to advise with the bells: as he fancied, so they sounded, either take her or leave her.

[Men's experience contrary to T. H.'s conclusions.]

Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition; —that by these words, spontaneity, &c., men do understand as he conceives. No rational man doth conceive a "spontaneous" action and an "indeliberate" action to be all one. Every "indeliberate" action is not "spontaneous." The fire
721 considers not whether it should burn, yet the burning of it is not "spontaneous." Neither is every "spontaneous" action

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"indeliberate;" a man may deliberate what he will eat, and yet eat it "spontaneously." Neither doth "deliberation" properly signify the "considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come;" but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest means, for obtaining such an end. The physician doth not deliberate whether he should cure his patient, but by what means he should cure him[b]. Deliberation is of the means, not of the end[c]. Much less doth any man conceive, with T. H., that deliberation is an "imagination," or an act of fancy, not of reason, common to men of discretion with madmen and natural fools and children and brute beasts. Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or can conceive, either that the "will is an act of deliberation,"—the understanding and the will are two distinct faculties,—or that "only the last appetite is to be called our will." So no man should be able to say, this is my will; because he knows not whether he shall persevere in it or not. Concerning the fourth point, we agree, that "he is a free agent, that can do if he will and forbear if he will." But I wonder how this dropped from his pen. What is now become of his absolute necessity of all things? If a man be free to do and to forbear anything, will he make himself guilty of the "nonsense" of the Schoolmen, and run with them into "contradictions" for company[d]? It may be he will say, he can do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will. This will not serve his turn: for if the cause of a free action, that is, the will, be determined, then the effect, or the action itself, is likewise determined; a determined cause cannot produce an undetermined effect: either the agent can will, and forbear to will, or else he cannot do, and forbear to do. But we differ wholly about the fifth point. He who conceives "liberty" aright, conceives both a "liberty in the subject"—to will or not to will, and a "liberty to the object"—to will this or that, and a "liberty from impediments." T. H., by a new way of his own, cuts off the "liberty of the subject;" as if a stone was free to ascend or descend, because it hath no outward impediment: and the "liberty towards

[b] [Aristot., Ethic., III. v. 11.]

[c] ["Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη." Id., ibid.]

[d] [See above, T. H. Numb. xxxii. p. 173.]

the object;" as if the needle touched with the loadstone were free to point either towards the north or towards the south, because there is not a barricado in its way to hinder it: yea, he cuts off the "liberty from inward impediments" also; as if a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked, but not when they are tied. And so he makes "liberty from extrinsecal impediments" to be complete liberty; so he ascribes "liberty" to brute beasts, and "liberty" to rivers; and by consequence makes beasts and rivers to be capable of sin and punishment. Assuredly, Xerxes, who caused the Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes[e], was of this opinion. Lastly, T. H. his reason,—that "it is custom, or want of ability, or negligence, which makes a man conceive otherwise,"—is but a begging of that which he should prove. Other men consider as seriously as himself, with as much judgment as himself, with less prejudice than himself, and yet they can apprehend no such sense of these words. Would he have other men feign that they see fiery dragons in the air, because he affirms confidently that he sees them, and wonders why others are so blind as not to see them?

The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a fantastical, or imaginative reason:—'how can a man imagine anything to begin without a cause? or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at this time rather than at that time?' He saith truly, nothing can "begin without a cause," that is, *to be*; but it may "begin" *to act* of itself without any other cause. Nothing can begin without a cause, but many things may begin, and do begin, without necessary causes. A free cause may as well choose his time when he will begin, as a necessary cause be determined extrinsecally when it must begin. And although free effects cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in their causes, yet, when the free causes do determine themselves, they are of as great certainty as the other; as, when I see a bell ringing, I can conceive the cause of it as well why it rings now, as I know the interposition of the earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon, or the most certain occurrent in the nature of things.

And now that I have answered T. H. his arguments drawn

[e] [Herod., vii. 35.]

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from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words, I desire him seriously, without prejudice, to examine himself, and those natural notions which he finds in himself, not of words, but of things; these are from nature, those are by imposition: whether he doth not find by experience, that 722
he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would, and omits many things which he might have done if he would; whether he doth not some things out of mere animosity, and will, without either regard to the direction of right reason, or serious respect of what is honest or profitable, only to shew that he will have a dominion over his own actions; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise men find at some times in themselves by experience, and I apprehend this very defence of necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind: whether he is not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires;—if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be angry with them, any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, or a rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent will:—whether he doth not sometime blame himself, and say, O what a fool was I to do thus and thus! or wish to himself, O that I had been wise! or, O that I had not done such an act! If he have no dominion over his actions, if he be irresistibly necessitated to all things what he doth, he might as well wish, O that I had not breathed! or blame himself for growing old,—O what a fool was I to grow old!

NUMBER XXXIV.

[*Sufficient causes necessary causes.*]

T. H.—For the seventh point,—that all events have necessary causes,—it is there proved, in that they have sufficient causes. Further, let us in this place also suppose any event

[*Instance of throwing dice.*]

never so casual, as, for example, the throwing ambs-ace upon a pair of dice, and see if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown: for, seeing it was thrown, it had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, consisting partly in the dice, partly in the outward things, as the posture of the party's hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting that was necessa-

rily requisite to the producing of that particular cast; and, consequently, that cast was necessarily thrown. For if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be proved, that every other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily; which is that J. D. disputes against. The same also may be proved in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. 'Tis necessary, that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain. If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain. Otherwise it is not necessary, that the proposition—it shall rain, or it shall not rain—should be true. I know there are some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not singly—that it shall rain or it shall not rain. Which is as much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity they make a distinction, that neither of them is true *determinatè* but *indeterminatè;* which distinction either signifies no more than this, one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not: or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And they might as well have said, one of them is true *Tityrice,* but neither of them *Tupatulice.*

Discourse I.

[*And of a shower of rain.*]

J. D.—His former proof,—that all sufficient causes are necessary causes,—is answered before, Numb. xxxi.[f] And his two instances, of casting ambs-ace, and raining to-morrow, are altogether impertinent to the question now agitated between us: for two reasons.—

[Reply.]

1. First, our present controversy is concerning free actions, which proceed from the liberty of man's will: both his instances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the indetermination, or contingent concurrence, of natural causes. First, that there are free actions, which proceed merely from election without any outward necessitation, is a truth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens; and he that doubteth of it, may as well doubt whether there shall be "a

[Our question, of human actions, not of natural contingencies.]

[f] [Above pp. 171—173.]

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shell without the nut, or a stone within the olive[6]." A man proportions his time each day, and allots so much to his devotions, so much to his study, so much to his diet, so much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visits, so much to his rest; he who will seek for I know not what causes of all this without himself, except that good God Who hath given him a reasonable soul, may as well seek for a cause of the Egyptian pyramids among the crocodiles of Nilus. Secondly, for mixed actions, which proceed from the concurrence of free and natural agents, though they be not free, yet they are not necessary: as, to keep my former instance, a man walking through a street of a city to do his occasions, a tile falls from a house and breaks his head; the 723
breaking of his head was not necessary, for he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation, neither was it free, for he did not deliberate of that accident, therefore it was contingent, and by undoubted consequence there are contingent actions in the world which are not free. Most certainly, by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the good and bad angels, and men, with natural agents, sometimes on purpose and sometimes by accident, many events happen which otherwise had never happened, many effects are produced which otherwise had never been produced. And admitting such things to be contingent, not necessary, all their consequent effects, not only immediate but mediate, must likewise be contingent; that is to say, such as do not proceed from a continued connexion and succession of necessary causes: which is directly contrary to T. H. his opinion. Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, though they be not free, though they have not the use of reason to restrain their appetites from that which is sensitively good by the consideration of what is rationally good, or what is honest, and though their fancies be determined by nature to some kinds of work, yet to think that every individual action of theirs and each animal motion of theirs, even to the least murmur or gesture, is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity to the extrinsecal causes or objects, I see no
[Matt. x. 29.] ground for it. Christ saith, "one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your Heavenly Father,"

[6] ["Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce duri." Hor., Epist., II. i. 31.]

that is, without an influence of power from Him, or exempted from His disposition; He doth not say, Which your Heavenly Father casteth not down. Lastly, for the natural actions of inanimate creatures, wherein there is not the least concurrence of any free or voluntary agents, the question is yet more doubtful; for many things are called contingent in respect of us, because we know not the cause of them, which really and in themselves are not contingent, but necessary. Also many things are contingent in respect of one single cause, either actually hindered, or in possibility to be hindered, which are necessary in respect of the joint concurrence of all collateral causes. But whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, so as they must all have concurred as they have done, and in the same degree of power, and have been deficient as they have been, in all events whatsoever, would require a further examination, if it were pertinent to this question of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed, that all elective actions are free from absolute necessity; and moreover, that the concurrence of voluntary and free agents with natural causes, both upon purpose and accidentally, hath helped them to produce many effects which otherwise they had not produced, and hindered them from producing many effects which otherwise they had produced; and that if this intervention of voluntary and free agents had been more frequent than it hath been (as without doubt it might have been), many natural events had been otherwise than they are. And therefore he might have spared his instances of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow. And first for his casting ambs-ace. If it be thrown by a fair gamester with indifferent dice, it is a mixed action. The casting of the dice is free, but the casting of ambs-ace is contingent: a man may deliberate whether he will cast the dice or not, but it were folly to deliberate whether he will cast ambs-ace or not, because it is not in his power, unless he be a cheater, that can cog the dice, or the dice be false dice; and then the contingency or the degree of contingency ceaseth, accordingly as the caster hath more or less cunning, or as the figure or making of the dice doth incline them to ambs-ace more than to another cast, or necessitate them to this

PART III.

cast and no other. Howsoever, so far as the cast is free, or contingent, so far it is not necessary; and where necessity begins, there liberty and contingency do cease to be. Likewise, his other instance, of raining or not raining to-morrow, is not of a free elective act, nor always of a contingent act. In some countries, as they have their "*stati venti*"—their "certain winds" at set seasons, so they have their certain and set rains. The Ethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of the certain inundation of Nilus. In some eastern countries they have rain only twice a year, and those constant, which the Scriptures call "the former and the latter rain." In such places, not only the causes do act determinately and necessarily, but also the determination or necessity of the event is foreknown to the inhabitants. In our climate the natural causes, celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so necessarily at set times; neither can we say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow. Nevertheless it may so happen, that the causes are so disposed and determined, even in our climate, that this proposition, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow, may be necessary in itself; and the prognostics or tokens may be such in the sky, in our own bodies, in the creatures, animate and inanimate, as weather-glasses, &c., that it may become probably true to us that it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow. But ordinarily it is a contingent proposition to us. Whether it be contingent also in itself, that is, whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary, whether the vapours or matter of the rain may not yet be dispersed, or otherwise consumed, or driven beyond our coast, is a speculation which no way concerns this question. So we see one reason, why his two instances are altogether impertinent,—because they are of actions which are not free, nor elective, nor such as proceed from the liberty of man's will.

[Deut. xi. 14.—Jerem. v. 24.—&c.]

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[And of absolute, not of hypothetical, necessity.]

2. Secondly, our dispute is about absolute necessity; his proofs extend only to hypothetical necessity. Our question is, whether the concurrence and determination of the causes were necessary, before they did concur or were determined. He proves, that the effect is necessary after the causes have concurred and are determined. The freest actions

of God or man are necessary by such a necessity of supposition; and the most contingent events that are: as I have shewed plainly, Numb. iii[h], where his instance of ambs-ace is more fully answered. So his proof "looks another way" from his proposition. His proposition is, that the casting of ambs-ace was "necessary before it was thrown." His proof is, that it was necessary when it was thrown. Examine all his causes over and over, and they will not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity. The first cause is in "the dice:" true; if they be false dice there may be something in it, but then his contingency is destroyed; if they be square dice, they have no more inclination to ambs-ace than to cinque and quater, or any other cast. His second cause is "the posture of the party's hand:" but what necessity was there that he should put his hand into such a posture? None at all. The third cause is "the measure of the force applied by the caster." Now, for the credit of his cause, let him but name, I will not say a convincing reason, nor so much as a probable reason, but even any pretence of reason, how the caster was necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force, and neither more or less. If he cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold his peace for ever. His last cause is "the posture of the table." But tell us in good earnest, what necessity there was why the caster must throw into that table rather than the other, or that the dice must fall just upon that part of the table "before" the cast "was thrown." He that makes these to be necessary causes, I do not wonder if he make all effects necessary effects. If any one of these "causes" be contingent, it is sufficient to render the cast contingent; and now that they are all so contingent, yet he will needs have the effect to be necessary. And so it is when the cast is thrown, but not before the cast was thrown, which he undertook to prove. Who can blame him for being so angry with the Schoolmen, and their distinctions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing they touch his freehold so nearly?

[Of T. H.'s instance of the shower of rain.]

But though his instance of raining to-morrow be impertinent, as being no free action, yet, because he triumphs so much in his argument, I will not stick to go a little out of

[h] [Above, pp. 29, 30.]

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my way to meet a friend. For I confess, the validity of the reason had been the same, if he had made it of a free action: as thus,—either I shall finish this reply to-morrow, or I shall not finish this reply to-morrow, is a necessary proposition. But because he shall not complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of his terms, I will for once adventure upon his shower of rain. And, first, I readily admit his major,—that this proposition (either it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow) is necessarily true; for of two contradictory propositions the one must of necessity be true, because no third can be given. But his minor,—that "it could not be necessarily true, except one of the members were necessarily true,"—is most false. And so is his proof likewise;—that "if neither the one nor the other of the members be necessarily true, it cannot be affirmed that either the one or the other is true." A conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the proposition be true; as, If the sun shine it is day, is a true proposition at midnight. And T. H. confesseth as much 725
Numb. xix.—"If I shall live I shall eat, . . is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered; but it is not the necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live, or that the man shall eat[i]." And so T. H. proceeds, "I do not use to fortify my distinctions with such reasons[j]." But it seemeth he hath forgotten himself, and is contented with such poor fortifications. And though both parts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false, because if it be a right disjunction the members are repugnant, whereof one part is infallibly true; yet vary but the proposition a little to abate the edge of the disjunctions, and you shall find that which T. H. saith to be true, that "it is not the necessity of the thing" which makes the proposition to be true. As, for example, vary it thus:—"I know that either it will rain to-morrow, or that it will not rain to-morrow," is a true proposition: but it is not true, that I know it will rain to-morrow, neither is it true, that I know it will not rain to-morrow; wherefore the certain truth of the proposition doth not prove, that either of the members is determinately true in present. Truth is a conformity of the understanding to the thing known, whereof

[i] [Above p. 122.] [j] [Ibid.]

speech is an interpreter. If the understanding agree not with the thing, it is an error; if the words agree not with the understanding, it is a lie. Now the thing known is known either in itself or in its causes. If it be known in itself, as it is, then we express our apprehension of it in words of the present tense; as, The sun is risen. If it be known in its cause, we express ourselves in words of the future tense; as, To-morrow will be an eclipse of the moon. But if we neither know it in itself nor in its causes, then there may be a foundation of truth, but there is no such determinate truth of it that we can reduce it into a true proposition. We cannot say, it doth rain to-morrow or it doth not rain to-morrow. That were not only false but absurd. We cannot positively say, it will rain to-morrow; because we do not know it in its causes, either how they are determined, or that they are determined. Wherefore the certitude and evidence of the disjunctive proposition is neither founded upon that which will be actually to-morrow, for it is granted that we do not know that; nor yet upon the determination of the causes, for then we would not say indifferently, either it will rain, or it will not rain, but positively it will rain, or positively it will not rain: but it is grounded upon an undeniable principle, that of two contradictory propositions the one must necessarily be true. And therefore to say, either this or that will infallibly be, but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be, is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a "*Tityrice Tupatulice,*" but an evident truth, which no man that hath his eyes in his head can doubt of.

[A contrary instance.]

If all this will not satisfy him, I will give one of his own kind of proofs; that is, an instance. That which necessitates all things, according to T. H., is the decree of God, or that order which is set to all things by the eternal cause (Numb. xi.)[k]. Now God Himself, Who made this necessitating decree, was not subjected to it in the making thereof, neither was there any former order to oblige the First Cause necessarily to make such a decree; therefore this decree, being an act *ad extra*, was freely made by God without any necessitation. Yet nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily true,—Either God did make such a decree or He did not

[k] [Above pp. 58, 59.]

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make such a decree. Again, though T. H. his opinion were true—that all events are necessary, and that the whole Christian world are deceived, who believe that some events are free from necessity, yet he will not deny, but if it had been the good pleasure of God, He might have made some causes free from necessity, seeing that it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies any contradiction. Supposing, therefore, that God had made some second causes free from any such antecedent determination to one, yet the former disjunction would be necessarily true:—either this free undetermined cause will act after this manner, or it will not act after this manner. Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunctive proposition doth not prove, that either of the members of the disjunction, singly considered, is determinately true in present, but only that the one of them will be determinately true to-morrow.

NUMBER XXXV.

[*A free agent impossible, because a sufficient must be a necessary cause.*]

T. H.—The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely, that there is no such thing as an agent, which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily 726 inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an agent, it can work; and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action; and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before.

[Reply.]

J. D.—I wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole weight of this controversy doth rest upon this proposition,—"That there is no such thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to act,"—and yet bring nothing but such poor bulrushes to support it. "If it be an agent," saith he, "it can work." What of this? "*A posse ad esse non valet argumentum;*"—from "can work" to "will work," is a weak inference: and from "will work" to "doth work upon absolute necessity," is another gross inconsequence. He proceeds thus:—"If it

work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action." True, there wants nothing to produce that which is produced, but there may want much to produce that which was intended. One horse may pull his heart out, and yet not draw the coach whither it should be, if he want the help or concurrence of his fellows. "And consequently," saith he, "the cause of the action is sufficient." Yes, sufficient to do what it doth, though perhaps with much prejudice to itself, but not always sufficient to do what it should do, or what it would do: as he that begets a monster should beget a man, and would beget a man if he could. The last link of his argument follows:—"And if sufficient, then also necessary." Stay there. By his leave there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and efficiency, otherwise God Himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his argument is vanished. But I will deal more favourably with him, and grant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove, —that every effect in the world hath sufficient causes. Yea more, that supposing the determination of the free and contingent causes every effect in the world is necessary. But all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean, for still it amounts but to a hypothetical necessity, and differs as much from that absolute necessity which he maintains, as a gentleman who travels for his pleasure differs from a banished man, or a free subject from a slave.

NUMBER XXXVI.

[*Of the inconveniency of denying necessity.*]

T. H.—And thus you see, how the inconveniences, which he objecteth must follow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity itself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the inconveniency of denying necessity: as, that it destroys both the decrees and prescience of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have liberty such as he affirmeth from necessitation, might frustrate and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it and not decree it, or He should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

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J. D.—Thus he hath laboured in vain, to satisfy my reasons and to prove his own assertion; but for 'demonstration,' there is nothing like it among his arguments. Now he saith, he "could add" other arguments if he "thought it good logic." There is no impediment in logic, why a man may not press his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opinion. '*Argumentum ducens ad impossibile*,' or '*ad absurdum*,' is a good form of reasoning. But there is another reason of his forbearance, though he be loth to express it. "*Hæret lateri lethalis arundo*[1]." The arguments drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close in the sides of his cause, that he hath no mind to treat of that subject. By the way, take notice of his own confession, that he "could add other reasons if" he "thought it good logic." If it were predetermined in the outward causes that he must make this very defence and no other, how could it be in his power to add or substract any thing? Just as if a blind man should say in earnest, I could see if I had my eyes. Truth often breaks out whilst men seek to smother it. But let us view his argument.—

If a man have liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate the decrees of God and make His prescience false.

[Freedom of man not inconsistent with God's eternal decrees.]

First, for the decrees of God; this is His decree, that man should be a free agent. If he did consider God as a most simple act without priority or posteriority of time, or any composition, he would not conceive of His decrees as of the laws of the Medes and Persians, long since enacted, and passed before we were born, but as co-existent with our- 727
selves, and with the acts which we do by virtue of those decrees. Decrees and attributes are but notions to help the weakness of our understanding to conceive of God. The decrees of God are God Himself, and therefore justly said to be before the foundation of the world was laid; and yet co-existent with ourselves, because of the infinite and eternal being of God. The sum is this:—the decree of God, or God Himself, eternally constitutes or ordains all effects which come to pass in time, according to the distinct natures or capacities of His creatures. An eternal ordination is neither past nor to come, but always present. So free actions do pro-

[1] [Virg. Æn., iv. 73.]

ceed as well from the eternal decree of God as necessary, and from that order which He hath set in the world.

As the decree of God is eternal, so is His knowledge; and, therefore, to speak truly and properly, there is neither foreknowledge nor after-knowledge in Him. The knowledge of God comprehends all times in a point, by reason of the eminence and virtue of its infinite perfection. And yet I confess, that this is called foreknowledge in respect of us. But this foreknowledge doth produce no absolute necessity. Things are not therefore because they are foreknown, but therefore they are foreknown because they shall come to pass. If anything should come to pass otherwise than it doth, yet God's knowledge could not be irritated by it; for then He did not know that it should come to pass as now it doth, because every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its object. God did know, that Judas should betray Christ; but Judas was not necessitated to be a traitor by God's knowledge. If Judas had not betrayed Christ, then God had not foreknown that Judas should betray Him. The case is this:—a watchman standing on the steeple's top, as it is the use in Germany, gives notice to them below (who see no such things), that company are coming, and how many. His prediction is most certain, for he sees them. What a vain collection were it for one below to say, what if they do not come, then a certain prediction may fail. It may be urged, that there is a difference between these two cases. In this case the coming is present to the watchman, but that which God foreknows is future. God knows what shall be; the watchman only knows what is. I answer, that this makes no difference at all in the case, by reason of that disparity which is between God's knowledge and ours: as that coming is present to the watchman which is future to them who are below, so all those things which are future to us are present to God, because His infinite and eternal knowledge doth reach to the future being of all agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged by T.H. (Numb. xi.[m]),—that "foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they on it." To conclude: the prescience of God doth not make things more necessary than the production of

[Nor with His eternal prescience.]

[m] [Above p. 59.]

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the things themselves; but if the agents were free agents, the production of the things doth not make the events to be absolutely necessary, but only upon supposition that the causes were so determined. God's prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility, but not of antecedent extrinsecal determination to one. If any event should not come to pass, God did never foreknow that it would come to pass; for every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its object[n].

NUMBER XXXVII.

[*Conclusion.*]

T. H.—This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question, since I last considered it: and I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to J. D. And so, praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave, and am, my most noble and obliging Lord,

Your most humble servant, T. H.

[Reply.—Of T. H.'s desire of secrecy.]

J. D.—He is very careful to have this discourse kept secret, as appears in this section, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth sections[o]. If his answer had been kept private, I had saved the labour of a reply; but hearing that it was communicated, I thought myself obliged to vindicate both the truth and myself. I do not blame him to be cautious; for in truth this assertion is of desperate consequence, and destructive to piety, policy, and morality. If he had desired to have kept it secret, the way had been to have kept it secret himself. It will not suffice to say, as Numb. xiv[p], that "truth is truth;" this is the common plea of all men: neither is it sufficient for him to say, as Numb. xv[q], that "it was desired" by me. Long before that he had discovered his opinion by word of mouth; and my desire was, to let some of my noble friends see the weakness of his grounds, and the pernicious consequences of that opinion. But if he think that this ventilation of the question between us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed with prejudice. 728

[n] [See the passages from the Fathers collected in Bellarmine, De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iv. cc. 9, 13; Op. tom. iii. pp. 726—729, 738.]

[o] [Above pp. 85, 102. And see also T. H. Numb. xi, above p. 60.]

[p] [Above p. 85.]

[q] [Above p. 102.]

NUMBER XXXVIII.

POSTSCRIPT.

T. H.—Arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If anything do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errors: which is this.—Pious men attribute to God Almighty, for honour' sake, whatsoever they see is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c., but deny Him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have nor can conceive such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then they consider them again as if He had such faculties, and in that manner as we have them; this is not well: and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature; He is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain. [*The cause of the erroneous opinion of liberty.*]

J. D.—Though sophistical captions do "seldom work on men of wit and learning," because by constant "use they have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil;" yet solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments. The more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it; especially if the proofs be proposed without passion or opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply themselves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of success with "men of wit and learning." Those whose gold is true, are not afraid to have it tried by the touch. Since the former way hath not succeeded, T. H. hath another,—to "shew us the causes of our errors;" which he hopes will prove more successful. When he sees he can do no good by fight, he seeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy. "*Fistula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps*[r]." As they who behold [Reply.] Heb. v. 14.

[r] [Dionys. Caton., Distich., lib. i. dist. 27.]

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themselves in a glass, take the right hand for the left, and the left for the right (T. H. knows the comparison); so we take our own errors to be truths, and other men's truths to be errors. If we be in an error in this, it is such an error as we sucked from nature itself; such an error as is confirmed in us by reason and experience; such an error as God Himself in His sacred Word hath revealed; such an error as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered; such an error wherein we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, both natural and moral; such an error as bringeth to God the glory of justice, and wisdom, and goodness, and truth; such an error as renders men more devout, more pious, more industrious, more humble, more penitent for their sins. Would he have us resign up all these advantages to dance blindfold after his pipe? No; he persuades us too much to our loss. But let us see what is the imaginary cause of an imaginary error. Forsooth, because we "attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom; but deny Him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains:" and "so far," he saith, "we do well." He hath reason; for since we are not able to conceive of God as He is, the readiest way we have is by removing all that imperfection from God which is in the creatures,—so we call Him infinite, immortal, independent; or by attributing to Him all those perfections which are in the creatures after a most eminent manner,—so we call Him best, greatest, most wise, most just, most holy. But, saith he, "when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then they consider them again as if He had such faculties, and in the manner as we have them." And is this the cause of our error? That were strange indeed; for they who dispute philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to Him in that manner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God. God's understanding and His will is His very essence, which for the eminency of its infinite perfection doth perform all those things alone, in a most transcendent manner, which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties. Thus to dispute of God with modesty and reverence, and to clear the Deity from the imputation of 729
tyranny, injustice, and dissimulation, which none do throw

upon God with more presumption than those who are the patrons of absolute necessity, is both comely and Christian. It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed error, which draws them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who dispute of the Deity. For some of themselves dare anatomise God, and publish His eternal decrees with as much confidence as if they had been all their lives of His cabinet council. But it is for fear, lest those pernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially, and reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness, should be laid open to the view of the world; just as the Turks do,—first establish a false religion of their own devising, and then forbid all men, upon pain of death, to dispute upon religion; or as the priests of Molech ("the abomination of the Ammonites") did make a noise with their timbrels all the while the poor infants were passing through the fire in Tophet, to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their parents: so they make a noise with their declamations against those who dare dispute of the nature of God, that is, who dare set forth His justice, and His goodness, and His truth, and His philanthropy, only to deaf the ears and dim the eyes of the Christian world, lest they should hear the lamentable ejulations and howlings, or see that rueful spectacle, of millions of souls tormented for evermore in the flames of the true Tophet, that is, Hell, only for that which according to T. H. his doctrine was never in their power to shun, but which they were ordered and inevitably necessitated to do; only to express the omnipotence and dominion, and to satisfy the pleasures, of Him Who is in truth the "Father of" all "mercies," and the "God of" all "consolation." "This is life eternal," saith our Saviour, to "know the only true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom He hath sent." "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world," saith St. James. "Fear God and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty of man," saith Solomon. But T. H. hath found out a more compendious way to Heaven. "True religion," saith he, "consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their

[1 Kings xi. 5, 7.]

[2 Cor. i. 3; Rom. xv. 5.]

John xvii. 3.

James i. 27.

Eccles. xii. 13.

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several lieutenancies shall ordain." That is to say, be of the religion of every Christian country where you come. To make the civil magistrate to be "Christ's lieutenant" upon earth for matters of religion, and to make him to be supreme judge in all controversies, whom all must obey, is a doctrine so strange, and such an uncouth phrase to Christian ears, that I should have missed his meaning, but that I consulted with his book *De Cive*, c. xv. sect. 16[s], and c. xvii. sect. 28[t]. What if the magistrate shall be no Christian himself? What if he shall command contrary to the law of God or nature? Must we "obey him rather than God?" Is the civil magistrate become now the only "ground and pillar of truth?" I demand then, why T. H. is of a different mind from his sovereign, and from the laws of the land, concerning the attributes of God and His decrees? This is a new paradox, and concerns not this question of liberty and necessity. Wherefore I forbear to prosecute it further, and so conclude my reply with the words of the Christian poet;—

Acts [v.] 29.

[1 Tim. iii. 15.]

"Cæsaris jussum est ore Gallieni
"Princeps quod colit ut colamus omnes.
* * * *
"Æternum colo Principem, dierum
"Factorem, Dominumque Gallieni[u]."

[s] [p. 188. The title of this section (p. 173) runs thus,—"In regno Dei naturali civitatem posse cultum Dei instituere arbitrio suo."]

[t] [pp. 254—256: and the title (p. 215),—"Christianam civitatem Scripturas interpretari debere per pastores Ecclesiasticos."

[u] [Prudent., Περι Στεφανων, Hymn. in honor. Fructuosi, &c., vv. 41—45. This quotation as printed in the original edition of 1655, contained several misprints; and among others, "colemus" for "colo" in the third line: see below p. 502. Bramhall seems also to have followed the punctuation of the older editions of Prudentius in vv. 3, 4; viz. "Principem dierum, Factorem Dominumque Gallieni:" which after all seems the better reading of the two.]

DISCOURSE II.

CASTIGATIONS

OF

MR. HOBBES

HIS LAST ANIMADVERSIONS

IN THE CASE

CONCERNING LIBERTY AND UNIVERSAL NECESSITY;

WHEREIN

ALL HIS EXCEPTIONS ABOUT THE CONTROVERSY

ARE FULLY SATISFIED.

BY

JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.

AND

BISHOP OF DERRY.

"THE LIP OF TRUTH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED FOR EVER, BUT A LYING TONGUE IS BUT FOR A MOMENT."—Prov. xii. 19.

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AN ANSWER

TO

MR. HOBBES HIS Προλεγόμενα:

AND FIRST

TO

HIS EPISTLE TO THE READER.

CHRISTIAN READER, thou hast here the testimony of Mr. Hobbes, that "the questions concerning necessity, freedom, and chance," are "clearly discussed" between him and me, in that little volume which he hath lately published[a]. If they be, it were strange; whilst we agree not much better about the terms of the controversy, than the builders of Babel did understand one another's language. A necessity upon supposition (which admits a possibility of the contrary) is mistaken for an absolute and true necessity. A freedom from compulsion is confounded with a freedom from necessitation. Mere spontaneity usurpeth the place of true liberty. No chance is acknowledged, but what is made chance by our ignorance or nescience,—because we know not the right causes of it. I desire to retain the proper terms of the Schools; Mr. Hobbes flies to the common conceptions of the vulgar; a way seldom trodden but by false prophets and seditious orators. He preferreth their terms as more intelligible; I esteem them much more obscure and confused. In such intricate questions, vulgar brains are as uncapable of the

Mr. Hobbes his mistake of the question.

[Gen. xi. 7.]

[a] [Epistle to the Reader, prefixed to "The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated and debated between Dr. Bramhall Bishop of Derry and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury," 4to. Lond. 1656.—in which the whole of Bramhall's Defence (Disc. i. Pt. iii.), viz. all the three tracts contained in it, was reprinted, with Hobbes' "Animadversions" upon each number successively.]

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things, as of the terms. But thus it behoved him to prevaricate, that he might not seem to swim against an universal stream; nor directly to oppose the general current of the Christian world. There was an odd fantastic person in our times, one Thomas Leaver[b], who would needs publish a logic in our mother's tongue. You need not doubt but that the public good was pretended. And because the received terms of art seemed to him too abstruse, he translated them into English; styling a subject an inholder, an accident an inbeer, a proposition a shewsay, an affirmative proposition a yeasay, a negative proposition a naysay, the subject of the proposition the foreset, the predicate the backset, the conversion the turning of the foreset into the backset and the backset into the foreset. Let Mr. Hobbes himself be judge, whether the common logical notions or this new gibberish were less intelligible.

"Hæc a se non multum abludit imago[c]."

Mr. Hobbes his principles refuted by his practice.

But, reader, dost thou desire to see the question discussed clearly to thy satisfaction? Observe but Mr. Hobbes his practics, and compare them with his principles, and there needs no more. He teacheth, that all causes and all events are absolutely necessary; yet, if any man cross him, he frets and fumes and talks his pleasure;—

"Jussit quod splendida bilis[d]."

Doth any man in his right wits use to be angry with causes that act necessarily? He might as well be angry with the sun, because it doth not rise an hour sooner; or with the moon, because it is not always full for his pleasure. He commands his servant to do thus to as much purpose, if he be necessitated to do otherwise, as Canutus commanded the waves of the sea to flow no higher[e]. He punisheth him, if he transgress his commands, with as much justice, if he have no dominion over his own actions, as Xerxes com-

[b] ["The Arte of Reason, rightly termed WITCRAFT, teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute: Made by *Raphe* Lever:" 8vo. Lond. 1573:—in four books, pp. 233, with "A note to understand the meaning of neue devised Termes" subjoined. Bramhall's recollection of the book is substantially accurate. The other "new devised terms" are if possible more ludicrous than those quoted in the text: e. g. a definition is a "say-what," a category is a "storehouse," a mood is a "seat," &c.]

[c] [Horat., Sat., II. iii. 320.]

[d] [Id., ibid., 141.]

[e] [See Sharon Turner, Hist. of Anglo-Saxons, bk. vi. c. 11. vol. ii. pp. 342—344. 8vo. edit.; from Matt. Westmon., Henry of Huntingdon, &c.]

manded so many stripes to be given to the Hellespont for breaking down his bridge[f]. He exhorts him, and reprehends him; he might as well exhort the fire to burn, or reprehend it for burning of his clothes. He is as timorous in a thunder or a storm, as cautelous and deliberative in doubtful causes, as if he believed that all things in the world were contingent, and nothing necessary. Sometimes he chideth himself;—"how ill advised was I, to do thus or so!"—"O that I had thought better upon it!" or "had done otherwise!" Yet all this while he believeth, that it was absolutely necessary for him to do what he did, and impossible for him to have done otherwise. Thus his own practice doth sufficiently confute his tenets. He will tell us, that he is timorous and solicitous because he knows not how the causes will determine. To what purpose? Whether their determination be known or unknown, he cannot alter it with his endeavours. He will tell us, that deliberation must concur to the production of the effect. Let it be so; but if it do concur necessarily, why is he so solicitous and so much perplexed? Let him sleep or wake, take care or take no care, the necessary causes must do their work.

Yet from our collision some light hath proceeded towards the elucidation of this question; and much more might have arisen, if Mr. Hobbes had been pleased to retain the ancient School terms; for want of which his discourse is still ambiguous and confused. As here he tells thee, that we "both maintain, that men are free to do as they will, and to forbear as they will[g]." My charity leads me to take him in the best sense, only of free acts, and then with dependence upon the First Cause. That man who knows not his idiotisms, would think the cause was yielded in these words, whereas in truth they signify nothing. His meaning is, he is as free to do and forbear, as he is free to call back yesterday. He may call until his heart ache, but it will never come. He saith, a man is free to "do" if he will, but he is not free to "will" if he will[h]. If he be not free to will, then he is not free to do. Without the concurrence of all necessary causes it is impossible that the effect should be produced. But the concur-

Freedom to do and not to will refuted.

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[f] [Herod., vii. 35.]
[g] [Questions &c., as quoted in note a, p. 209, Epist. to Reader.]
[h] [Ibid.]

PART III. rence of the will is necessary to the production of all free or voluntary acts. And if the will be necessitated to nill, as it may be, then the act is impossible; and then he saith no more in effect but this—a man is free to do if he will that which is impossible for him to do. By his doctrine, all the powers and faculties of a man are as much necessitated and determined to one, by the natural influence of extrinsecal causes, as the will. And therefore, upon his own grounds, a man is as free to will as to do.

The points wherein he saith we disagree are set down loosely in like manner. What our tenets are, the reader shall know more truly and distinctly by comparing our writings together, than by this false dim light which he holds out unto him.

He is pleased, if not ironically, yet certainly more for his own glory than out of any respect to me, to name me a "learned school divine[i];" an honour which I vouchsafe not to myself. My life hath been too practical to attend so much to those speculative studies. It may be, the Schoolmen have started many superfluous questions, and some of dangerous consequence; but yet I say, the weightier ecclesiastical controversies will never be understood and stated distinctly without the help of their necessary distinctions[k].

Reader, I shall not in this rejoinder abuse thy patience with the needless repetition of those things which thou hast seen already, nor quest at every lark which he springs; but wheresoever he hath put any new weight into the scale, either in his answers or objections, I shall not omit it in due place.

[i] [Questions &c., Epist. to Reader.]

[k] [Compare the Vindic. of Grotius and Episcop. Divines against Baxter, c. vii; above in vol. iii. pp. 567, 568, note a, Disc. iii. Pt. ii.]

AN ADVERTISEMENT[a] FROM THE AUTHOR TO THE READER.

MARCH 11, 1658. STILO NOVO.

CHRISTIAN READER, by the slowness of this edition, and by the errors of the press, which do ordinarily happen to authors that are absent, thou mayest judge of the difficulties and *remoras* which we meet withal in such occasions. The greatest part of the errata are obvious to an intelligent reader; I intreat thee to correct them with thy pen. Some of the chiefest (which did seem to alter or obscure the sense) I have collected, and appointed them to be set down at the foot of this advertisement; so many as I could observe in once reading over the copies cursorily, for I have had no more time since I received them.

Be pleased further to take notice, that yesterday came to my hands a copy of Mr. Serjeant's treatise called Schism Dispatched[b], written against Doctor Hammond and myself, it being the first time that I have viewed it. I wish I had had a graver adversary in this cause, who had consulted more with his own judgment and experience, and less with passion and prejudice. The contention is not equal, between an ancient doctor and a young prevaricator, whose office is to make freshmen laugh and gape[c]. When Mr. Serjeant hath wearied himself twenty or thirty years longer in the study of theology[c], he will grow less impetuous and censorious,

[a] [The Castigations were first printed in 1657, as appears by a title-page to the tract, which to half the impression forms the only title, and which bears this date. The work of printing the book however lasted until 1658; when four leaves were added to the remaining copies; two before the original title-page, containing a new title-page, dated 1658, as follows—Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last Animadv. in the case concerning Liberty and Univ. Necessity, with an Appendix concerning the Catching of Leviathan or the Great Whale,—the other leaf being blank; two after the Answ. to the Προλεγόμενα, containing the above Advertisement and a Table of Errata. In other respects, the several copies of this the original edition, one or two trifling corrections excepted, are identically the same.]

[b] [Schism Dispatch't, or, A Rejoynder to the Replies of Dr. Hammond and the Ld. of Derry, by S. W. 8vo. n. p. 1657. See above in vol. ii. Preface, and pp. 358. note j, 363. note a; and vol. i. p. xxviii.]

[c] [See above in vol. ii. pp. 356. note b, 358. note j.]

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but more judicious and discreet; and of so much more value in the eyes of others as he setteth a less value upon himself. Now I have a copy, if God bless me with life and health, I shall endeavour in a short time to let the world see, that my religion is as much better than his, as my charity is greater.

DISCOURSE II.

CASTIGATIONS

OF

MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.

[FIRST PRINTED IN LONDON, A.D. 1657—1658.]

AN ANSWER TO HIS RELATION OF THE OCCASION OF THE CONTROVERSY.

Eleven gross mistakes in a few lines.—[Concerning the old philosophers.]

1. HERE is nothing of moment to advantage his cause. Another man would say, here is nothing alleged by him which is true. Whereas he saith, that the "question disputed among the old philosophers" was,—"whether all things that come to pass proceed from necessity, or some from chance[a],"—it was as well debated among the old philosophers, whether all things come to pass by chance, and nothing proceed from necessity,—and likewise,—whether some events proceed from necessity, and some come to pass by chance,—as that which he mentions,—"whether all events proceed from necessity, or some" come to pass "by chance." That is the first error.

2. His second error is, that he opposeth "chance" to "necessity[b];" as if all things came to pass by necessity, which come not to pass by chance: whereas those ancient philosophers (of whom he speaks) did oppose contingency to necessity, and not chance alone. Chance is but one branch of contingency. Free acts are done contingently, but not by chance.

3. Thirdly, he is mistaken in this also, that he saith, those ancient philosophers did never "draw into argument the almighty power of the Deity[c]." For we find in Tully[d], and in

[a] [Questions &c., Occas. of Controv., p. 1.]
[b] [Ibid.]
[c] [Ibid.]
[d] [Cic., De Divin., lib. i. cc. 55, 56.]

PART III. Chrysippus (as he is alleged by Eusebius[e]), that one of the main grounds of the Stoics was the prescience of God; and that the predictions of their oracles and prophets could not be certain, unless all things came to pass by inevitable necessity.

4. Fourthly, he erreth in this, that liberty is a "third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from necessity and contingency[f]." For liberty is subordinate to contingency. They defined contingents to be those things which might either come to pass or not come to pass; that is, either freely or casually: and in all their questions of contingency, liberty was principally understood.

5. His fifth error is, that "free will is a thing that was never mentioned among them[g]." I believe it was never mentioned by them in English, by the name of "free will;" but he may find "*αὐτεξούσιον*" and "*προαίρεσιν.*" Let him read Aristotle alone; and he shall find not only this free elective power of the will, but also the difference between voluntary or spontaneous (which is all the liberty he admitteth), and free or that which is elected upon deliberation[h]. 736 Hear Calvin,—"*Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen extitit, Græcos vero non puduit arrogantius usurpare vocabulum, siquidem 'αὐτεξούσιον' dixerunt*[i]."

[Concerning the primitive Christians.] 6. Sixthly, he erreth yet more grossly in saying, that "free will was never mentioned by Christians in the beginning of Christianity," but "for some ages [past]" brought in by "the doctors of the Roman Church[k]." Whereas it is undeniably true, that sundry ancient Fathers have written whole treatises expressly of free will[l]; that there is scarcely one Father that doth not mention it; and sundry of the first

[e] [Chrysipp., ap. Euseb.,] De Præpar. Evang., lib. vi. c. 11. [p. 287. fol. Paris. 1628.]

[f] [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1. "distinct from necessity and *chance*."]

[g] [Ibid.]

[h] [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. cc. iii, iv, v.

[i] [Calvin,] Instit., [lib.] II. c. ii. sect. 4. [Op. tom. ix. p. 62. ed. Amst.]

[k] [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1.]

[l] [Compare the list given by Bellarmine in c. 1. bk. iii. of his Treatise De Grat. et Lib. Arb.: viz. St. Basil (Serm. de Lib. Arb.), St. Chrysostom (Orationes V. de Provid. et Fato), St. Augustin (De Lib. Arb., lib. iii., and De Gratiâ et Lib. Arb.), St. Prosper (Epist. de Grat. et Lib. Arb. ad Ruffinum), St. Anselm (Lib. de Concord. Gratiæ et Lib. Arb., and Dial. de Lib. Arb.), St. Bernard (Tractat. de Grat. et Lib. Arb.); and of Fathers who have treated the subject incidentally, Origen (De Princip., lib. iii.), Eusebius (Præp. Evang., lib. vi.), St. John Damascene (De Fide Orthod., lib. ii. c. 25, sq.), Boethius (De Consolat. Philosoph., lib. v.), &c.]

heretics, as Simon Magus[m], the Manichees, the Marcionites, &c.[n], and their followers, have been condemned for maintaining absolute necessity against free will.

[Concerning St. Paul.]

7. His seventh error is, that "St. Paul never useth the term of free will, nor did hold any doctrine equivalent" to it[o]. Hear himself;—"Am I not an Apostle? am I not free? . . have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as the other Apostles? . . or I only and Barnabas, have not we power to forbear working?" St. Paul did those things freely upon his own election, which he was not necessitated to do; and did forbear those things freely, which he was not necessitated to forbear. This doctrine is "equivalent" to ours, of the freedom of the will from necessitation. Take another place, wherein you have both the name and the thing;—"Nevertheless, he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will." The words in the original are a plain description of the old "*αὐτεξούσιον*" (which name Calvin did so much dislike) or free will;—"*ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἔχει περὶ τοῦ ἰδίου θελήματος.*" Here is not only freedom, but power and dominion. Mr. Hobbes teacheth us, that a man is free to do, but not free to will. St. Paul teacheth us, that a man "hath power over his own will." Then he is free to will; then his will is not extrinsecally predetermined.

[Concerning the doctors of the Roman Church.]

8. Eighthly, he wrongs the doctors of the Roman Church, as if they "exempted the will of man from the dominion of God's will[p]." They maintain, that the freedom of the will of man is expressly from the will of God, Who made it free. They teach, that God can suspend the act of the will, can determine the will, can change the will, doth dispose of all the acts of the will, can do anything but compel the will, which implieth a contradiction[q].

9. Ninthly (to let us see what a profound clerk he is in ecclesiastical controversies), Mr. Hobbes thinks he hath hit the nail on the head, of the difference between the Church of

[m] [See Vincent of Lerins, Commonit., p. 313. 4to. Bremæ 1688.—"Quis ante Simonem Magum . . auctorem malorum, id est, scelerum, impietatum, flagitiorumque nostrorum, ausus est dicere Creatorem Deum?"]

[n] [See for the Manichees, Aug. Lib. de Hæres., c. xlvi. (Op. tom. viii. p. 17. C, D), and for the Marcionites, Irenæus, Adv. Hæres., lib. i. c. 29 (p. 104. ed. Grabe).]

[o] [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1.]

[p] [Ibid. pp. 1, 2.]

[q] [See Bellarm., De Gratiâ et Lib. Arb., lib. iv. cc. 14—16; Op. tom. iii. pp. 740—753.]

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Rome and us concerning free will, in this disputation[r]. Just as the blind senator in Juvenal made a large encomium of the goodly turbot which lay before Cæsar, but (as ill luck would have it) turned himself the quite contrary way:—

". . . At illi dextra jacebat"
"Bellua[s] . . . ."

. The controversy lies on the other side; not about the freedom of the will in natural or civil actions, which is our question, but (if it be not a logomachy) about the power of free will in moral and supernatural actions without the assistance of grace.

[Concerning the Reformed Churches.]

10. In the tenth place, he misinforms his readers, that "this opinion" (of freedom from necessitation and determination to one) "was cast out by the Reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others[t]." Where have the Reformed Churches, or any of them, in their public confessions, cast out this freedom from necessitation whereof we write? Indeed Luther[u] was once against it, and so was Melancthon[x]; but they grew wiser, and retracted whatsoever they had written against it[y]. And so would Mr. Hobbes do likewise, if he were well advised. Either he did know of Luther's retraction, and then it was not ingenuously done to conceal it; or (which I rather believe) he did not know of it, and then he is but meanly versed in the doctrine and affairs of the Protestants.

[Concerning Arminius.]

11. Lastly, he accuseth "Arminius" to have been a restorer or "reducer" of the Romish doctrine of free will[z] by a *postliminium*. I do not think that ever he read one word of Arminius in his life, or knoweth distinctly one opinion that Arminius held. It was such deep controvertists as him-

[r] [Qu., Occ. of Controv., pp. 1, 2.]
[s] [Juv., iv. 120, 121.]
[t] [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 2.]
[u] [See the Assert. Omn. Art. D. M. Lutheri a Leone X. Damnat., art. 36; inter Opera M. Lutheri, tom. ii. pp. 310. b, &c. fol. Jenæ, 1564;—and the Quæstio de Viribus et Voluntate Hominis sine gratiâ, disputata Wirtembergæ Anno 1516, Conclus. ii. Coroll. 1; ibid. tom. i. p. 1, a;—and the celebrated tract De Servo Arbitrio, 8vo. Witemb. 1526.]
[x] [See his Annot. on the Epist. to the Romans, c, viii. (p. 50. 8vo. 1523); and his Loci Communes, art. de Lib. Arb., as it stands in the first edition of the book, 12mo. 1521: and Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iv. c. 5, Op. tom. iii. pp. 718, 719.]
[y] [By Luther, in his Liber de] Visitat. Saxon., [viz. his Apolog. pro Confess. Aug., A.D. 1538, Artic. de Lib. Arb.; Op. tom. iv. p. 248].—[By Melanchthon, in his] Loci Commun., [artt. De Lib. Arbit. et de Caussâ Peccati,] edit. poster. [scil. 12mo. 1546.—The book was first published in 1521, and the first article of those just referred to was almost wholly rewritten for the later edition.]
[z] [Qu. Occ. of Controv., p. 2.]

self that accused the Church of England of Arminianism, for holding those truths which they ever professed before Arminius was born. If Arminius were alive, Mr. Hobbes, out of conscience, ought to ask him forgiveness. Let him speak for himself:—"*De libero hominis arbitrio ita sentio,*" &c.; "*in statu vero lapsus,*" &c.—"This is my sentence of free
737 will, that man . . . fallen can neither think, nor will, nor do that which is truly good, of himself and from himself; but that it is needful that he be regenerated and renewed in his understanding, will, affections, and all his powers, from God, in Christ, by the Holy Ghost, to understand, esteem, consider, will, and do aright, that which is truly good[a]." It was not the speculative doctrine of Arminius, but the seditious tenets of Mr. Hobbes, and such like, which opened a large window to our troubles.

How is it possible to pack up more errors together in so narrow a compass? If I were worthy to advise Mr. Hobbes, he should never have more to do with these old philosophers (except it were to weed them for some obsolete opinions,—Chrysippus used to say, 'he sometimes wanted opinions but never wanted arguments[b]'), but to stand upon his own bottom, and make himself both party, juror, and judge in his own cause.

CONCERNING THE STATING OF THE QUESTION.

The right stating of the question is commonly the midway to the determination of the difference; and he himself confesseth, that I have done that more than once; saving that he thinketh I have done it over cautiously,—"with as much caution as" I would draw up "a lease[c]." Abundant caution

The conversion of a wilful sinner concerneth not this question.

[a] Declar. Sententiæ Arminii ad Ord. Hollandiæ, [pp. 121, 122. inter Op. Jac. Arminii, Lugd. Bat. 4to. 1629.—"*De libero arbitrio hominis ita sentio;* hominem in primo statu creationis suæ ejusœmodi notitiâ, sanctitate, iisque viribus instructum fuisse, ut verum bonum intelligere, æstimare, considerare, velle, et perficere valuerit, prout quidem ei mandatum erat; sed hoc tamen non nisi cum auxilio gratiæ Dei: *in statu vero lapsus et peccati, ex seipso et a seipso, quod quidem vere bonum est, neque cogitare, neque velle, aut facere posse; sed necesse esse ut a Deo in Christo per Spiritum Sanctum Ipsius regeneretur et renovetur in intellectu, affectionibus sive voluntate, omnibusque viribus, ad id quod vere bonum est recte intelligendum, æstimandum, considerandum, volendum, et faciendum.*"]

[b] [Diog. Laert., vii. 179.]

[c] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 3.]

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was never thought hurtful until now. Doth not the truth require as much regard as "a lease?" On the other side, I accuse him to have stated it too carelessly, loosely, and confusedly. He saith, he understands not these words, "the conversion of a sinner concerns not the question[e]." I do really believe him. But in concluding, that whatsoever he doth not understand is unintelligible, he doth but abuse himself and his readers. Let him study better what is the different power of the will in natural or civil actions, which is the subject of our discourse, and moral or supernatural acts, which concerns not this question; and the necessity of adding these words will clearly appear to him.

A wilful cavil.

Such another pitiful piece is his other exception, against these words, "without their own concurrence[f];" which, he saith, are "unsignificant, unless" I "mean that the events themselves should concur to their own production[g]." Either these words were "unsignificant," or he was blind, or worse than blind, when he transcribed them. My words were these, "whether all agents and all events be predetermined[h]:" he fraudulently leaves out these words, "all agents," and makes me to state the question thus,—"whether all events be predetermined without their own concurrence[i];" whereas those words—"without their own concurrence"—had no reference at all to "all events" but to "all agents;" which words he hath omitted.

Difference between natural and moral efficacy.

The state of the question being agreed upon, it were vanity and mere beating of the air in me, to weary myself and the reader with the serious examination of all his extravagant and impertinent fancies: as this,—"whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural[k];"—which is so far from being the question between us, that no man makes any question of it, except one, who hath got a blow upon his head with a mill-sail. Natural causes produce their effects by a true real influence, which implies an absolute determination to one: as a father begets a son, or fire produceth fire. Moral causes have no natural influence into the effect, but move or induce

[e] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 3.—"Not intelligible, is, first, that 'the conversion,'" &c.—from the Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 32, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[f] [Ibid., from the Defence, ibid.]

[g] [Ibid.]

[h] [Defence,] Numb. iii. [above, p. 32.]

[i] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 2.]

[k] [Ibid., p. 3.]

some other cause without themselves to produce it: as when a preacher persuadeth his hearers to give alms; here is no absolute necessitation of hearers, nor anything that is opposite to true liberty.

Such another question is that which follows,—"whether the object of the sight be the cause of seeing[l];"—meaning (if he mean aright) the subjective cause: or,—how "the understanding" doth "propose the object to the will[m];"—which though it be blind, as philosophers agree, yet not so blind as he that will not see, but is ready to follow the good advice of the intellect. I may not desert that which is generally approved, to satisfy the fantastic humour of a single conceited person. No man would take exceptions at these phrases, "the will willeth," "the understanding understandeth[n]," the former term expressing the faculty, the latter the elicit act, but one who is resolved to pick quarrels with the whole world.

Not to will is a mean of abnegation between willing and nilling.

"To permit a thing willingly to be done" by another[o], that is evil, not for the evil's sake which is permitted, but for that good's sake which is to be drawn out of it, is not to will it positively, nor to determine it to evil by a natural influence; which whosoever do maintain, do undeniably make God the author of sin. Between positive willing, and nilling, there is a mean of abnegation, that is, not to will.

738 That "the will" doth "determine itself[p]," is a truth not to be doubted of. What different degrees of aid or assistance the will doth stand in need of in different acts, natural, moral, supernatural; where a general assistance is sufficient, and where a special assistance is necessary[q]; is altogether impertinent to this present controversy, or to the right stating of this question.

His distinction between free to will and free to do, confuted.

In the last place, he repeateth his old distinction, between a man's freedom "to do" those things which are "in his power," if he "will," and the freedom "to will" what he will[r]; which he illustrateth (for similitudes prove nothing) by a comparison drawn from the natural appetite to the rational appetite;—"will is appetite," but "it is one question, whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite; and

[l] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.—"Cause *that it is seen.*"]
[m] [Ibid.]
[n] [Ibid.]
[o] [Ibid.]
[p] [Ibid.]
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [Ibid.]

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another" question, "whether he be free to have an appetite[s]." "In the former," he saith, he "agreeth with" me, that a man is "free to do what he will[t]." "In the latter," he saith, he "dissents" from me, that a man is not "free to will[u]." And (as if he had uttered some profound mystery) he addeth in a triumphing manner, that "if" I "have not been able to distinguish between those two questions," I "have not done well to meddle with either;" and "if" I "have understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with" my "readers[x]."

Yet let us have good words. "*Homini homo quid præstat*[y]" —"what difference is there between man and man?" That so many wits before Mr. Hobbes in all ages should beat their brains about this question all their lives long, and never meet with this distinction, which strikes the question dead. What should hinder him from crying out "εὕρηκα, εὕρηκα"—"I have found it, I have found it[z]?" But stay a little; the second thoughts are wiser; and the more I look upon this distinction, the less I like it. It seemeth like the log in the fable, which terrified the poor frogs with the noise it made at the first falling of it into the water, but afterwards they insulted over it, and took their turns to leap upon it. Some take it to be pure nonsense;—"whether a man be free in such things as be within his power[a];" that is, whether he be free wherein he is free, or that be within his power which is in his power.

I have formerly shewed[b], and shall demonstrate further as there is occasion, that this distinction is contradictory and destructive to his own grounds; according to which all the other powers and faculties of a man are determined to one by an extrinsecal flux of natural causes, equally with the will; and therefore a man is no more necessitated to will or choose what he will do, than to do what he wills. Secondly, I have shewed[c], that this distinction is vain and unuseful, and doth not hold off so much as one blow from Mr. Hobbes and his

[s] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.]
[t] [Ibid.]
[u] [Ibid.]
[x] [Ibid.]
[y] [Terent., Eun., II. ii. 1.]
[z] [Archimedes, ap. Plut., Disput. quâ docetur ne suaviter quidem vivi posse secund. Epicuri decreta, c. xi; Op. Moral., tom. v. p. 311. ed. Wyttenb.]
[a] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.]
[b] [Defence, Numb. iii. above, p. 30.]
[c] [Ibid., p. 32.]

bleeding cause. All those gross absurdities which do necessarily follow the inevitable determination of all actions and events by extrinsecal causes, do fall much more heavily and insupportably upon the extrinsecal determination of the will. So he sticks deeper by means of this distinction in the same mire. All the ground of justice that he can find in punishments, is this; that though men's actions be necessary, yet they do them willingly[d]. Now if the will be irresistibly determined to all its individual acts, then there is no more justice to punish a man for willing necessarily than for doing necessarily. Thirdly, I have shewed already[e] in part, that this distinction is contrary to the sense of the whole world, who take the will to be much more free than the performance: which may be thus enlarged.—Though a man were thrust into the deepest dungeon of Europe, yet in despite of all the second causes he may will his own liberty. Let the causes heap a conglomeration of diseases upon a man, more than Herod had; yet he may will his own health. Though a man be withheld from his friend by seas and mountains, yet he may will his presence. He that hath not so much as a cracked groat towards the payment of his debts, may yet will the satisfaction of his creditors. And though some of these may seem but pendulous wishes of impossibilities, and not so compatible with a serious deliberation, yet they do plainly shew the freedom of the will. "In great things" (said the poet) "it is sufficient to have willed[f];" that is, to have done what is in our power. So we say, "God accepteth the will," that which we can, "for the deed," that which we cannot. "If there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath" (that is, to will), "and not according to that he hath not" (that is, 739 to perform). And yet more plainly,—"To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, that find I not." Yet saith T. H., "a man is free to do what he wills," but not "to will" what he will do[g].

Discourse II.

[Acts xii. 23.]

2 Cor. viii. 12.

Rom. vii. 18.

To come yet a little nearer to T. H. For since he refuseth all human authority, I must stick to Scripture. It is called

[Holy Scripture.]

[d] [See above in the Defence, T. H., Numb. xiv. p. 85.]

[e] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.]

[f] ["In magnis et voluisse sat est." Propert., Eleg., II. x. 6.]

[g] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.]

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a man's "own will," and his "own voluntary will." If it be determined irresistibly by outward causes, it is rather *their* "own will" than *his* "own will." Nay, to let him see, that the very name of "free will" itself is not such a stranger in Scripture as he imagineth, it is called a man's "own free will." How often do we read in the books of Moses, Ezra, and the Psalms, of "free will offerings." This free will is opposed not only to compulsion, but also to necessity;—"not of necessity but willingly;"—and is inconsistent with extrinsecal determination to one, with which election of this or that indifferently is incompatible. "Is not the whole land before thee?" said Abraham to Lot; "if thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left." God said to David, "I offer thee three things, choose one of them;" and to Solomon, "because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked long life," or "riches." And Herod to his daughter, "Ask of me whatsoever thou wilt." And Pilate to the Jews, "Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you?" And St. Paul unto the Corinthians, "What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love?" Both were in their choice. Yet T. H. doth tell us, that all these were free to do this or that indifferently, if they would, but not free to will. To choose and to elect, is, of all others, the most proper act of the will. But all these were free to choose and elect this or that indifferently, or else all this were mere mockery. And therefore they were free to will. The Scripture knoweth no extrinsecal determiners of the will, but itself. So it is said of Eli's sons, "Give flesh to roast for the priest, for he will not have sodden flesh of thee, but raw," and "if thou wilt not give it, I will take it by force."

Lev. i. 3; and xix. 5.

Ezra vii. 13.

Philem. 14.

Gen. xiii. 9.

[2 Sam. xxiv. 12.]

[1 Kings iii. 11.]

[Mark vi. 22.]

[Matt. xxvii. 21.]

[1 Cor. iv. 21.]

1 Sam. ii. 15, [16.]

"Sic volo, sic jubeo; stat pro ratione voluntas[h]."

Here was more will than necessity. So it is said of the rich man in the Gospel; "What shall I do? . . this I will do, I will pull down my barns and build greater, and there will I bestow all my fruits and my goods; and I will say to my soul, . . take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry." Both his purse and person were under the command of his will.

Luke xii. 17—[19.]

[h] [Juv. vi. 223. "*Hoc* volo, sic jubeo, *sit*" &c.]

So St. James saith, "Go to now, ye that say, To-day or to-morrow we will go into such a city, and continue there a year, and buy, and sell, and get gain; whereas ye know not what shall be to-morrow," &c.; "for that ye ought to say, If the Lord will, we shall live, and do this or that." The defect was not in their will to resolve, but in their power to perform. So T. H. his necessity was their liberty, and their liberty was his necessity. Lastly, the Scriptures teach us, that it is in the power of a man to choose his own will for the future:—"All that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will go: as we hearkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee." So saith St. Paul;—"What I do, that I will do;"—and in another place, "I do rejoice, and I will rejoice;"—and, "They that will be rich." When Christ inquired of His disciples, "Will ye also go away," according to T. H. his principles, He should have said, 'Must ye also go away.'

Jam. iv. 13—[15.]

Josh. i. 16, [17.]

2 Cor. xi. 12. [Phil. i. 18; 1 Tim. vi. 9.] [John vi. 67.]

The sensual and rational appetite very different.

We have viewed his distinction, but we have not answered his comparison. "Will is an appetite:" and "it is one question, whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite." Comparisons are but a poor kind of reasoning at the best, which may illustrate something, but prove nothing. And of all comparisons this is one of the worst; which is drawn from the sensual appetite to the rational appetite. The rational appetite and the sensual appetite are even as like one to another as an apple and an oyster. The one is a natural agent, the other is a free agent. The one acts necessarily, the other acts contingently (I take the word largely). The one is determined to one, the other is not determined to one. The one hath under God a dominion over itself, and its own acts; the other hath no dominion over itself, or its own acts. Even the will itself, when it acts after a natural manner (which is but rarely, in some extraordinary cases, as in the appetite of the chiefest good, being fully revealed, or in a panical terror, which admitteth no deliberation), acts not freely but necessarily. How much more must agents merely natural, which have neither reason to deliberate, nor dominion or liberty to elect, act necessarily and determinately? So, to answer a comparison with a comparison, his argument is just such

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another as this;—The galley-slave, which is chained to the oar, is a man, as well as the pilot that sits at the stern; therefore the galley-slave hath as much dominion in the ship as the pilot, and is as free to turn it hither and thither. So falls this dreadful engine all in pieces, which should have battered down the fort of liberty.

His gentle reprehension,—that "if" I "have not been able to distinguish between these two questions," I "have not done well to meddle with either, and if" I "have understood them," I "have dealt uningenuously and fraudulently,"—would better become me, who defend liberty, than him, who supposeth an irresistible necessity of all events. If he think I have not done well, yet, according to his own grounds, he may rather blame the causes that do necessitate me, than blame me, who am irresistibly necessitated to do what I do. Fraud and deceit have no place in necessary agents, who can do no otherwise than they do. He might as well accuse the sea to have dealt fraudulently with him, because he mistook the tide, and could not pass over the ford at a high water, as he purposed. Such is the power of truth, that it comes to light many times when it is not sought for. He doth see in part already, that I understand the vanity of his distinction; and shall see it better yet before this treatise be ended. Yet, if I would be so courteous as to forgive him all this, his distinction would not prejudice me. The places of Scripture alleged by me in my former Defence, do not only prove that a man is free to do if he will, but much more, that a man is free to choose and to elect; that is as much as to say, to "will," and determine itself.

AN ANSWER TO HIS FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENTS IN THIS QUESTION.

Mr. Hobbes his flourish.

It is a certain rule, "contraries being placed one besides another, do appear much more clearly." He who desires to satisfy his judgment in this controversy, must compare our writings one with another without partiality, the arguments and answers and pretended absurdities on both sides. But T. H. seeketh to ingratiate himself and his cause beforehand; and if it be possible, to anticipate and pre-occupate

the judgments of his readers, with a flourish or *præludium*, under the specious name of "fountains of arguments[i]." So, before a serious war, cities used to personate their adverse party, and feign mock-combats and skirmishes, to encourage their friends; wherein (you may be sure) their own side shall conquer: players make their little puppets prate and act what they please, and stand or fall as they lend them motion. Which brings to my mind, the lion's answer in the fable, when the picture of a man beating a lion was produced to him,—"If a lion had made this picture, he would have made the lion above and the man beneath[k]." It is a sufficient answer to this prologue, that Mr. Hobbes (that is, an adversary) made it. Discourse II.

. . "Nihil est,
"Quin malè narrando possit depravarier[l]."

What had he to do to urge arguments for me? or to give solutions for me? or to press the inconveniences and absurdities which flow from fatal destiny on my behalf? I gave him no commission. I need none of his help. Yet, by this personated conflict, he hoped to have stolen an easy victory, "without either blood or sweat."

I will not tire out myself and the reader with the superfluous repetition of those things, which we shall meet with again much more opportunely in their proper places. Some authors are like those people, who measuring all others by themselves, believe nothing is well understood until it be repeated over and over again,—

"Qui nihil alios credunt intelligere, nisi idem dictum sit centies[m]."

But whatsoever is new in this preface, if it have but any one grain of weight, I will not fail to examine and answer it, either here or there.

His presumption.

And, first, I cannot choose but wonder at his confidence; that a single person, who never took degree in schools that I have heard of (except it were by chance in Malmesbury), should so much slight, not only all the scholars of this present age, but all "the fathers, schoolmen, and old philoso-

[i] [Qu., p. 5. "The Fountains of Arguments in this Question."]
[k] [Avieni Fab. xxiv.]
[l] [Terent., Phorm., IV. iv. 15, 16.]
[m] ["Nisi illos tuo ex ingenio judicas, Ut nil credas intelligere, nisi idem dictum sit centies." Id., Heautontim., V. i. 7, 8.]

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phers[o]," which I dare say he hath not studied much; and forget himself so far, as to deny all their authorities at once, if they give not him satisfaction; to make his private and crazy judgment to be the standard and seal of truth, and himself an universal dictator among scholars—to plant and to pull up, to reform and new modulate, or rather turn upside 741
down, theology, philosophy, morality, and all other arts and sciences, which he is pleased to favour so much as not to eradicate them, or pluck them up root and branch;—as if he was one of Æsop's fellows, who could do all things and say all things. He is not the first man in the world who hath lost himself by grasping and engrossing too much. As the Athenians used to say of Metiochus;—"Metiochus is captain, Metiochus is surveyor, Metiochus bakes the bread, Metiochus grinds the corn, Metiochus doth all; an evil year to Metiochus[p]." He mentioneth the Scriptures indeed; but his meaning is, to be the sole interpreter of them himself, without any respect to the perpetual and universal tradition of the Catholic Church, or the sense of all ancient expositors. Well, for once, I will forbear all the advantage which I have from the authority of councils, fathers, schoolmen, and philosophers; and meet him singly at his own weapon; yet, with this protestation, that if he value his own single judgment above all theirs, he comes within the compass of Solomon's censure,—

[Prov. xxvi. 12.] "Seest thou a man wise in his own eyes; there is more hope of a fool than of him."

The attributes of God argumentative.

He telleth us, that "the attributes of God" are "oblations . . given only for honour," but "no sufficient premisses to infer truth or convince falsehood[q]." Let them be "oblations," or sacrifices of praise, if he will; but are they not likewise truths? Hath not God given the same attributes to Himself every where in Holy Scripture? Doth God stand in need of a lie, to uphold His honour? It is true, they are not perfectly conceivable by mortal man. The goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of God are transcendent above the goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of

[o] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 5.]

[p] ["Μητίοχος μὲν γὰρ στρατηγεῖ, "Μητίοχος δὲ τὰς ὁδοὺς, Μητίοχος δ' "ἄρτους ἐποπτᾷ, Μητίοχος δὲ τ' ἄλφιτα, "Μητιόχῳ δὲ πάντα κεῖται, Μητίοχος "δ' ὀλμώξεται."] Plut, [Polit. Præcept., c. 15. tom. iv. p. 173; Op. Moral. ed. Wyttenb.]

[q] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 5.]

men, and of a quite different nature from them. As St. Aus- Discourse II.
tin said,—"God is good without quality, great without quantity, a Creator without indigence, everywhere without place, eternal without time[r]." But yet we do understand these attributes so far, as to remove from God all contrary imperfections. He that is good, or goodness itself, cannot be the author of evil. He that is true, or truth itself, cannot lie or dissemble. He that is merciful, or mercy itself, cannot be guilty of tyranny or cruel. He that is just, or justice itself, cannot do unjust actions. And thus far the attributes of God are argumentative. "That be far from thee to slay the righteous with the wicked; . . shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Gen. xviii. 25.

His texts of Scripture cited impertinently.

I come now to his texts of Scripture; and, first, to those which he saith do "make for[s]" him. To which I answer, first, in general, that there is not one of them all pertinent to the present question. They concern not true liberty from extrinsecal necessity, but the power of free will in moral and supernatural acts; wherein we acknowledge, that the will of man hath not power to determine itself aright, without the assistance of grace. His arguments tend rather to prove, that God is the author of sin, or that He saves men without their own endeavours, than to disprove true liberty. Secondly, I answer, that though his allegations were pertinent, yet they come all short of his conclusion. He should prove, that all acts of free agents are necessitated antecedently and extrinsecally; and he endeavoureth only to prove, that some particular acts of some particular persons were not free from necessity: which thesis we do not simply disapprove, though we dislike his instances. God may and doth sometimes extraordinarily determine the will of man to one; but when it is so determined, the act may be voluntary, not free: so he concludeth not contradictorily.

All his arguments out of Scripture answered.

Concerning his places in particular. To his first place,

[r] [Aug., De Trin., lib. v. c. 1. § 2; Op. tom. viii. p. 833. B, C. "Intelligamus Deum quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentiâ Creatorem, sine situ præsidentem" (editt. before Bened. "præsentem"), "sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ullâ Sui mutatione mutabilia facientem, nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest invenire omnino Quid sit, pic tamen caveat quantum potest aliquid de Eo sentire Quod non sit."]

[s] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 5.]

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[Gen. xlv. 5.]

Gen. xlv. 5[t], I answer, that we ought to distinguish between the action of Joseph's brethren, which was evil, and the passion of Joseph, which was good. God willed and predefined the sufferings of Joseph, and disposed them to His own glory and the good of His Church. "God sent" Joseph "before;" —how? dispositively, "to preserve life." But He willed not nor predefined the action of his brethren, otherwise than permissively, or at the most occasionally—by doing good, which they made an occasion of doing evil,—or in respect of the order of their evil act. The very same answer serveth to Acts ii. 23, and Acts iv. 27, 28.

[Of God's hardening the heart.]

To his instances of God's hardening the heart[u], Exod. vii. 3, and Deut. ii. 30, and to Rom. ix. 16, he hath had a large answer in my former Defence[x].

[Of Shimei's cursing David.]

To Shimei's cursing of David[y], 2 Sam. xvi. 10, I answer three ways. First, that God is often said to do or will those things, which He doth only will to permit, and dispose. All

Job i. 21.

that was acted against Job, is ascribed to God;—"The Lord hath taken away:"—yet it is as clear as the noon-day sun, 742 that God's concurrence in the determination of Job's sufferings, in respect of Satan, was only permissive. Secondly, God was the cause of Shimei's cursing David occasionally, by afflicting David for his sins, which exposed him to Shi-

[Exod. xxiii. 8.—Ecclesiast. xx. 29.]

mei's curses. So we say, 'occasion makes a thief,' and, "gifts blind the eyes of the wise." Thirdly, God was the cause of Shimei's cursing David, not as the author of that evil, but as the author of the order in evil, that is, by restraining Shimei's malice from breaking out at other times and in another manner, and letting him loose to vent his vindictive thoughts at that time in that manner. So he who shuts all the doors and windows in a chamber and leaves only one open, is in some sort the cause why a desperate person throws himself down headlong from that window rather than from another. In the same sense, the cause of Rehoboam's obsti-

1 Kings xii. 15.

nacy[z] is said to be "from the Lord." God is not obliged to confer prudence and other favours upon undeserving persons.

Ezek. iii. 20.

So likewise God is said to "lay a stumbling block before"

[t] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 5.]
[u] [Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 7.]
[x] [Defence] Numb. xii. [above pp. 69, &c.]
[y] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 6.]
[z] [Ibid.]

a wicked person. And therefore this note thence,—that the sins of the wicked are not the cause of their punishment[a], —is a mere collusion. The order in evil is God's, the sins are their own. Discourse II.

What he objecteth out of Job xii. 14, &c.[b], and likewise out of Isaiah x. 6[c], concerning the King of Assyria, deserveth no answer. God may freely and justly withdraw His protection and His other graces and favours from His creatures, and leave them to be afflicted for their offences by evil agents and instruments, and dispose the sins of others to be their punishments, without necessitating them to acts morally evil. Job is as far from disputing our question in that place, as these places by him alleged are from making God the author of evil by a physical determination. [Job xii. 14; &c.]

The "Prophet Jeremy saith, 'O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps[d].'" Most true: man is not secured from danger by his own wisdom and care, but by God's providence and protection; not preserved from all sin and utter destruction by the power of his own free will, but by the special grace of God; which doth freely prevent us, pursue us, excite us, assist us, operate in us, co-operate with us, by permanent habits, by transient motions, sufficiently, effectually, according to His good pleasure, Whose grace is the only fountain of salvation. If we fancied an all-sufficient or independent power to ourselves, this text were to the purpose; now it signifies nothing. Jerem. x. 23.

"Our Saviour saith[e], 'No man can come unto Me except the Father which hath sent Me draw him.'" "*Scis tu simulare cupressum, quid hoc*[f]"—"He knows how to paint a cypress tree, but what is that" to the question of liberty and necessity? The coming unto Christ is a supernatural action, and requireth the preventing or preparing grace of God, which is called His "Father's drawing." But this "drawing" is not such a physical determination of the will, as to destroy liberty in the very act of conversion; but an inward calling in an John vi. 44.

[a] [Ibid.—"Note here, God layes the stumbling-block, yet he that falleth, dyeth in his sin; which shewes, that God's justice in killing dependeth not on the sin onely."]

[b] [Ibid.]

[c] [Ibid.]

[d] [Ibid.]

[e] [Ibid.]

[f] [Horat., A. P., 19, 20.]

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opportune time, a persuading of the heart, an enlightening of the mind, an inspiring of the seed of good desires, yet withal leaving to the will its natural freedom to elect, and will actually, and to consent to the calling of God, that is, to determine itself by the power of grace.

[1 Cor. iv. 7.]

To 1 Cor. iv. 7.[g] I answer, whether we understand the text of saving grace or of graces freely given, both ways it is the grace of God that makes the discrimination. But all the debate is of the manner how it is made, whether morally by persuasion, or physically by determination of the will to one and destroying the liberty of it; of which this text is silent.

[1 Cor. xii. 6.]

The next place, 1 Cor. xii. 6[h], is understood of those miraculous graces freely given, such as the gift of tongues, of healing, of prophesying, &c.; and if it were understood of saving grace, yet it did not at all exclude our co-operation.

Phil. ii. 12, 13.

The same Apostle who teacheth us, that "it is God Who worketh in us both to will and to do of His good pleasure," in the same place exhorteth us to "work out our own salvation with fear and trembling." God worketh in us both the will and the deed, not by physical determination of the will, not by destroying the nature of His creature, but sweetly, morally, by illumination, persuasion, and inspiration.

[How we are God's workmanship.] Eph. ii. 10. [John xv. 5.]

We are said to be "the workmanship of God created in Christ Jesus unto good works[i]," because "without Christ we can do nothing." No man can have the actual will to believe 743 and to be converted, but by the preventing grace of God. Our endeavours are in vain, except He help them; and none at all, except He excite them. God's calling, and illumination, and inspiration, is not in our power; and we are brought by His grace as it were from nothing to a new being in Christ; in which respect a regenerated Christian is called "a new creature." Metaphors do not hold in all things. When David prayed, "Create in me a new heart, O Lord[k]," his meaning was not, that his heart should be annihilated, and a new substance created, but to have his heart purged and cleansed.

[2 Cor. v. 17.—Gal. vi. 15.] [Ps. li. 10.]

[Texts attributing the will to do good works to God.]

The main body of his forces is dispersed, yet his reserve

[g] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 7.]
[h] [Ibid.]
[i] [Ibid.]
[k] ["Create in me a *clean* heart, O God; and *renew* a right spirit within me."]

remains untouched; even "all the places, that make God the giver of all graces," and "wherein men are said to be dead in sin; for by all these" (saith he) "it is manifest, that although a man may live holily if he will, yet to will is the work of God, and not eligible by man[1]." Let him reduce his argument into what form he will, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses; namely, these words, "and not eligible by man." Who ever argued from the position of the principal cause to the removal of all second agents and means? It is most true, that all grace is from God; but it is most false, that God hath not given man a will to receive it freely. This is plain boys' play, to jump over the backs of all second causes. As all grace is from God, so the elective power to assent to the motions of grace is from God likewise. To shew him the weakness of his consequence, he argueth thus,—'All light is from the sun, therefore, though a man may use it if he will open his eyes, yet to open his eyes is the work of God, and not eligible by man.'

How sinners are said to be dead.

It is usual in Scripture, to call an habitual sinner a "dead" man; but it is a weak argument, which is drawn from a metaphor, beyond the scope of him that useth it; and if it be insisted on too much, involves men in palpable contradictions. As, not to step aside from the same metaphor, "this thy brother was *dead* and is alive again, and was lost and is found." If he was but "lost," then he was not absolutely "dead;" if he was absolutely "dead," then he was more than "lost." So in another place, "Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the *dead*." To "sleep" and to be "dead" are inconsistent; but sleep is an image of death. So is idleness;—"*Hic situs est Vaccia*"—"Here lieth Vaccia," was written upon an idle person's door. So is old age;—"He considered not his own body now *dead*, . . . nor the *deadness* of Sarah's womb." So is habitual sin;—"And you hath he quickened, who were *dead* in trespasses and sins." In sum, wheresoever there is no appearance of life (as in the trees in winter), there is an image of death. To leave metaphors, this 'death in sin' is not a natural, but a spiritual death; and therefore no utter extinction of the natural powers and faculties of a man. Such are the understanding

Luke xv. 32.

Eph. v. 14.

Rom. iv. 19.

Eph. ii. 1.

[1] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 7.]

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and the will; which, though they were much weakened by the fall of Adam, yet they were not, they are not, utterly extinct, either by original or actual sin; but, being excited, and as it were enlived by preventing grace, they may and do become subservient to grace; the understanding being illuminated by those rays of heavenly light, and the will enabled to consent as freely to the motions of grace in supernatural acts, as it did formerly to the dictates of reason in natural and civil acts. So, every way, T. H. is gone. First, the will is able and free, without preventing grace, to determine itself in natural and civil acts; which is enough to prove my intention, against the universal necessity of all events. Secondly, the will, being excited and assisted by grace, hath power to put in practice its natural freedom in supernatural acts; as, to consent to the motions of grace and to reject the suggestions of the flesh and the devil; without any physical determination of itself without itself. Even as the dead body of Abraham, and the dead womb of Sarah, being as it were new quickened by God, did truly beget Isaac; so, even in the act of conversion itself, the will is free from physical determination.

Man is more free to will than to do.

That physical determination of all causes and events whatsoever to one by an outward flux of natural causes, which T. H. maintains, doth as much necessitate *all* the actions of free agents as their wills, or more: because volition is an inward immediate act of the will, but all other acts of a free agent are external and mediate acts of the will, over which the will hath not so absolute a dominion as over the volition; whence it followeth irrefragably, that if there be no freedom to will, much less is there a freedom to do. He saith, "a man may live holily if he will, but to will is the work of God, 744
and not eligible by man." Can a man then "live holily" without the grace of God? or is not a holy life the work of God as much as a sanctified will? If he cannot shew this, let him never mention this vain distinction any more, of freedom to do without freedom to will. May not a man be so bold to put him himself in mind of that "jargon[n]" which he objected to the Schoolmen, unless perhaps he thinks nonsense is more intelligible in English than in Latin.

[n] [See above in the Defence, T. H., Numb. iv. p. 34.]

Hitherto I have traced T. H. his steps, though he be wandered quite out of the lists, or rather, in plain terms, fled away from his cause, to take sanctuary under the sacred name of God's grace, which will afford no shelter for his error. Our question was not about the concurrence of grace and free will in the conversion of a sinner, but merely about the liberty or necessity of all natural and civil events. When he hath acquitted himself like a man in the former cause, then he is free to undertake the second.

His second sort of texts do confute him unanswerably.

The next collection is of such places of Scripture as say there is election; of which T. H. is pleased to affirm, that they "make equally" for him and me[o]. I do not blame him, if he desire, that all places which maintain election, and that all natural and civil events, should quite be sequestered from this controversy. For it is not possible to reconcile these places with fatal necessity. All choice or election is of more than one; but there can be no choice of more than one, where there is an extrinsecal determination of all particular events with all their circumstances, inevitably, irresistibly, to one, by a flux of natural causes. So they leave no manner of election at all; no more freedom to choose a man's actions, than to choose his will. But all these places, and many more, prove expressly, that a man is free, not only to do it if he will, but to will. The reason is evident;—because to choose is to will, the proper elicit immediate act of the will; and to choose one thing before another, is nothing else but to will one thing before another. But all these places say, that a man is free to choose, that is, to will one thing before another. "*Choose* life," saith one place; "*choose* whom ye will serve," saith a second place; "*choose* one of three," saith a third place: and so of the rest. But I have pressed these places formerly[p]; and shall do further, if there be occasion.

[Deut. xxx. 19.—Josh. xxiv. 13.—2 Sam. xxiv. 12.]

T. H., [in his third sort of texts,] first woundeth the Scripture and then giveth it a plaster.

His third sort of texts are those, which "seem to make" for me against him[q]. But I am at age to choose and urge mine own arguments for myself, and cannot want weapons in this cause. Therefore he may forbear such a thankless office. He telleth us of a "great apparent contradiction" between the first sort of texts and the last; but "being both Scripture

[o] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 7.] [above, pp. 37—56, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[p] Defence, Numbers vi, vii, viii, ix.

[q] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 8.]

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they may and must be reconciled[r]." This is first to wound the credit of the Scriptures, and then to give them a plaster. The supposed contradiction is in his own fancy. Let him take them according to the analogy of faith, in that sense wherein the Church hath ever taken them, and there is no show of contradiction. "The Scripture consists not in the words, but in the sense, not in the outside but in the marrow[s]."

God's prescience doth not necessitate.

He demands, "whether the selling of Joseph did follow infallibly and inevitably upon the permission" of God[t]. I answer,—if we consider God's permission alone, neither "inevitably" nor "infallibly;" if we consider His permission jointly with His prescience, then "infallibly" but not "inevitably." Foreknowledge doth no more necessitate events to come to pass, than after-knowledge. God's prescience did no more make Judas his treason inevitable to him, than my remembrance now of what was done yesterday, did make it inevitable then to him that did it.

Yet is infallible.

He urgeth further,—so the prescience of God "might have been frustrated by the liberty of human will[u]." I answer, nothing less. The natures and essences of all things come to pass, because they were foreknown by God, Whose knowledge was the directive cause of them. But the acts and operations of free agents are therefore foreknown, because they will come to pass[x]. If anything should come to pass otherwise, God had foreknown from eternity that it should have come to pass otherwise: because His infinite understanding doth encompass all times and all events in the instant of eternity; and, consequently, he beholds all things past, present, and to come, as present. And, therefore, 745
leaving those forms of speech which are accommodated to us and our capacities, to speak properly, there is neither foreknowledge nor after-knowledge in God, Who neither knows one thing after another nor one thing by deduction from another.

[Of Joseph's brethren.]

He asks, whether "the treachery and fratricide of Joseph's

[r] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 8.]

[s] ["Nec putemus in verbis Scripturarum esse Evangelium, sed in sensu; non in superficie sed in medullâ." Hieron., In Epist. ad Galatas, c. 1; Op. tom. iv. P. i. p. 230.]

[t] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 9.]

[u] [Ibid.]

[x] ["Non enim ex eo quod Deus scit futurum aliquid, idcirco futurum est; sed quia futurum est, Deus novit." Hieron., in Comment. ad Hierem. c. xxvi, Op. tom. iv. p. 653.]

brethren" were "no sin[y]." I answer, yes; and therefore it was not from God positively, but permissively, and dispositively:— "Ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to save much people alive." But (he urgeth) "Joseph said, 'Be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither;' ought not a man to be 'grieved' and 'angry with himself' for sinning[z]?" Yes; but penitent sinners, such as Joseph's brethren were, have great cause of joy and comfort, when they understand that God hath disposed their sin to His glory, their own good, and the benefit of others.

Gen. l. 20.

[Gen. xlv. 5.]

[How God is the cause of corporal motions.]

He demands further, "Doth God barely permit corporal motions, and neither will them nor nill them?" or "how is God the cause of the motion," and the cause of "the law, yet not of the irregularity[a]?" It were a much readier way to tell us at once directly, that either there is no sin in the world or that God is the author of sin, than to be continually beating the bush after this manner. But I answer,—all corporal motion in general is from God, not only permissively, but also causally; that is, by a general influence, but not by a special influence. The specifical determination of this good general power to evil, is from the free agent, who thereby doth become the cause of the irregularity. There is no contrariety between motion in general and the law, but between the actual and determinate abuse of this good locomotive power and the law.

Hardness of heart not derived from God's permission.

He demands, "whether the necessity of hardness of heart" be not "as easily derived from God's permission; that is, from His withholding His grace, as from His positive decree[b]?" This question is proposed in a confused blundering manner, without declaring distinctly what grace he meaneth. I answer, two ways. First, we are to distinguish between a necessity of consequence or an infallibility, and a necessity of consequent or a causal necessity. Supposing, but not granting, that hardness of heart is as infallibly derived from the one as from the other, yet not so causally nor so culpably in respect of God; Who is not obliged in justice to give His free grace to His creature, but He is obliged, by the rule of His own jus-

[y] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 9.—Compare Bellarmine's arguments upon the same text, De Amiss. Gratiâ et Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c. 11; Op. tom. iii. p. 162.]

[z] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 9.]

[a] [Ibid.]

[b] [Ibid.]

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tice, not to determine His own creature to evil and then punish him for the same evil. Secondly, I answer, that even this supposed necessity of infallibility can no way be imputed to God; Who never forsakes His creature by withholding His grace from him, until His creature have first forsaken Him; Who never forsakes His creature so far, but that he may by prayers and using good endeavours obtain the aid of God's grace, either to prevent or remove hardness of heart. When God created man, He made him in such a condition, that he did not need special exciting grace to the determination of his will to supernatural good. And to all that are within the pale of His Church He gives sufficient grace to prevent hardness of heart, if they will. If man have lost his primogenious power, if he will not make use of those supplies of grace which God's mercy doth afford him, that is his own fault. But still here is no physical determination to evil, here is no antecedent extrinsecal determination of any man to hardness of heart, here is nothing but that which doth consist with true liberty.

God's hand in good and evil actions.

Lastly, he saith, we make God only to permit evil, and to will good actions "conditionally and consequently,—if man will them;" so we "ascribe nothing at all to God in the causation of any action, good or bad[c]." He erreth throughout. God is the total cause of all natures and all essences. In evil actions, God is cause of the power to act, of the order in acting, of the occasion, and of the disposition thereof to good. In good actions freely done, He is the author and original of liberty, He enableth by general influence, He concurreth by special assistance and co-operation to the performance of them, and He disposeth of them to good. He doth not will that merely upon condition, which Himself hath prescribed, nor consequently which He Himself hath antecedently ordained and instituted.

God's revealed will and His secret will not contrary.

Now, having cleared all his exceptions, it remaineth next to examine how he reconcileth the first and the third sort of texts. 'The will of God' (saith he) 'sometimes signifieth 746 the word of God, or the commandments of God, that is, His revealed will, or the signs or significations of His will. Sometimes it signifieth an internal act of God, that is, His counsel

[c] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 9.]

and decree. By His revealed will God would have all men to be saved, but by His internal will, He would not. By His revealed will He would have 'gathered' Jerusalem, not by His inward will. So, when God saith, 'What could I have done more to My vineyard?' that is to be understood outwardly, in respect of His revealed will:—what directions, what laws, what threatenings could have been used more? And when He saith, 'it came not into My mind,' the sense is, 'to command it[d].' This I take to be the scope and sum of what he saith. Thus far he is right, that he distinguisheth between the signifying will of God, and His good pleasure; for which he is beholding to the Schools[e]: and that he makes the revealed will of God to be the rule of all our actions; and that many things happen against the revealed will of God, but nothing against His good pleasure. But herein he erreth grossly, that he maketh the revealed will of God and His internal will to be contrary one to another; as if God did say one thing and mean another, or command one thing and necessitate men to do another; which is the grossest dissimulation in the world.

[Luke xi 34.] [Isai. v. 4] [Jerem. xix. 5; xxxii. 35.]

"Odi illos seu claustra erebi, quicunque loquuntur
"Ore aliud, tacitoque aliud sub pectore condunt[f]."

He saith, "it is not Christian to think, if God had a purpose to save all men, that any could be damned, because it were a sign of want of power to effect what He would[g]." It is true, if God had an absolute purpose to work all men's salvation irresistibly, against their wills, or without themselves. But God hath no such absolute will to save all men. He loves His creatures well, but His own justice better; and He that made men without themselves, will not save them without themselves. He co-operates with all His creatures, according to their distinct natures which He hath given them: with necessary agents necessarily, with free agents freely. God hath given men liberty to assent to saving truth; they abuse it. He hath proposed a condition under which they may be saved; they reject it. So He willeth their salvation by an antecedent will, and their damnation by a consequent

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will: which two wills in God, or within the Divine essence, are no way distinct; for they are the same with the Divine essence; but they are distinguished only in order to the things willed of God. Neither is there the least contradiction between them. The one shews us what God would have us to do; the other is what God Himself will do. The one looks upon man as he was created by God, or as he should have been or might have been without his own fault; the other looks upon man as he is with all circumstances. The one regards only the order of the causes and means designed by God for our salvation; the other regards also the application or misapplication of these means by ourselves.

In answering to these words, "Say not thou it is through the Lord I fall away, say not thou He hath caused me to err," he distinguisheth between "say not" and "think not[h];" as if it were unlawful to say so, but not unlawful to think so.

[Eccles. x. 20.] "Curse not thy king" (saith Solomon), "no, not in thy thought;" much less thy God. Thought is free from man, but not from God. It is not "honourable" (saith he) "to say so[i];" no more is it to think so. "It is not lawful" (saith he), "to say that any action can be done, which God hath purposed shall not be done[k];" that is, in his language, which shall not actually come to pass in due time. Our Saviour

[Matt. xxvi. 53.] was of another mind;—"Thinkest thou, that I cannot now pray to My Father, and He shall presently give Me more than twelve legions of angels?" He knew some things can be done, which never will be done.

[Inconveniences of] the doctrine of universal necessity. [It] taketh away all care of doing well.

Next he proceedeth to touch those inconveniences which flow from the opinion of universal necessity, but very gently and sparingly. "Arts, and arms, and books, and consultations, and medicines," &c., are not superfluous, though all events be necessary, because "the means are equally necessitated with the event[l]." Suppose it were so, so much the worse. This must needs utterly destroy all care and solicitude of free agents. He is a madman, that will vex, and trouble himself, and take care, and consult, about things that are either absolutely necessary, or absolutely impossible; as about the rising of the sun, or about the draining of the sea

[h] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 11. Ibid., pp. 11, 12.]
[i] [Ibid., p. 12.]
[k] [Ibid., pp. 12, 13.]

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[d] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., pp. 10, 11.]

[e] ["Voluntas signi—Voluntas beneplaciti." See e. g. Thom. Aquin. Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xx. art. 11.]

[f] ["'Εχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν, Ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ." Homer., Iliad., ix. 312, 313.]

[g] [Qu. Fount. of Arg., p. 10.]

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I do, this is true, that which shall be, shall be. But if I walk abroad (as I may do), then my stay within doors shall not be. And, on the other side, if I stay within doors (as I may do likewise), then my walking abroad shall not be. The event hath yet no determinate certainty in the causes, for they are not yet determined. The agent may determine itself otherwise, the event may come otherwise to pass, even until the last moment before the production. And when the event is actually produced, and is without its causes, it hath a determinate certainty, not antecedent, not from extrinsecal determination, not absolute, but merely hypothetical or upon supposition; the not distinguishing aright of which two different kinds of necessity makes the reader and us all this trouble.

T. H. his confession, that no man is justly punished but for crimes he might have shunned.

It follows,—"Laws are not superfluous, because by the punishment of one or a few unjust men they are the cause of justice in a great many[n]." This answer hath been taken away already[o]; and shall be further refelled, if it be further pressed. But he willingly declineth the main scope of my argument; which reflected more upon the injustice than upon the superfluity of human laws, if his opinion were true. Those laws are unjust, which punish men for not doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to do, and for doing that which was impossible for them to leave undone. But upon supposition of T. H. his opinion, of the absolute necessity of all events, all human laws do punish men for not doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to do, and for doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to leave undone. Here we have "*confitentem reum*," our adversary's confession, within a very few lines;—"It is true, that seeing the name of punishment hath relation to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone[p]." This is the first ingenuous confession we have had from T. H. I hope we shall have more. From whence it followeth, first, that there neither is nor can be any crime deserving punishment in the world, that is to say, no such criminal thing as sin; for

[n] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 13.]
[o] [Defence] Numb. xiv. [above, pp. 92, 93. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[p] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 13.]

nothing by his doctrine was ever done that could "have been left undone." Secondly, it followeth hence, that no punishment is just, because nothing can be left undone that is done; and that all men are innocent, and there is no such thing as
748 a delinquent in the world. How saith he, then, that the laws are "the cause of justice in many," by punishing "one or a few unjust men?" Upon his principles, the laws and judges themselves are unjust to punish any men. If this be not a contradiction, I have lost my aim.

[What holds good of punishments, holds good of rewards also.]

And if punishments are not just, then neither are rewards just. Thus, by his doctrine, we have lost the two great pillars or preservatives of all well-ordered societies, as Lycurgus called them[r], the two hinges whereupon the commonwealth is turned, reward and punishment. Yet St. Peter doth teach us, that "kings" and "governors" are sent from God, "for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well."

1 Pet. ii. 14.

No proper punishment but for sin.

The last inconvenience which he mentions (of those that were urged by me), is this;—God in justice cannot punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which never was in his power to leave undone. To which, admitting (as you have heard) that "there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone," he gives two answers.

The first is this—"Instead of punishment if he had said affliction, may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin? doth He not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? and sometimes those that can sin, yet not for sin; as Job and the blind man in the Gospel[s]?" This is still worser and worser. He told us even now, that nothing which is dishonourable ought to be attributed to God[t]; and can there be anything in the world more dishonourable than to say, that God doth torment poor innocent creatures in Hell fire, without any fault of theirs, without any relation to sin, merely to shew His dominion over them? The Scripture teacheth us clear otherwise;—that "a man complains for the punishment of his sins." Sin and punishment are knit together with adamantine bonds. He phrases it, "for the manifestation of His

Lam. iii. 39.

[r] [See the tract of Plutarch against Colotes, Op Moral., tom. v. p. 396. ed. Wyttenb.]

[s] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 13.]

[t] [Ibid., p. 11.]

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power[u]." If it were true, it was the greatest "manifestation" of cruelty and tyranny that is imaginable.

I confess, that chastisements inflicted after the sin is forgiven, are not properly punishments; because they proceed "*a patre castigante, non a judice vindicante*"—"from a father correcting, not from a judge revenging." Yet even these chastisements are grounded upon sin:—"The Lord hath put away thy sin; thou shalt not die: howbeit, because by this deed thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child that is born unto thee, shall surely die." But what place have such chastisements as David's were in Hell? Is any man bettered by his sufferings there? What place have probations and trials of men's graces (such as Job's were) in Hell, where there are no graces to be tried? Job's trial, and David's chastisements, and the poor man's blindness, were the greatest blessings that ever befel them: "for their light afflictions, which were but for a moment, did work out unto them a far more excellent and eternal weight of glory." But the pains of Hell are heavy, and endless, and work out nothing but torment. In a word, these afflictions we now treat of are downright punishments. So the Holy Ghost styles them;—"everlasting punishment." He doth not "afflict the children of men willingly;" except it be for sin,—"Fools are afflicted because of their transgression." The "afflictions[x]" (as he calleth them) of "those creatures that cannot sin," that is, brute beasts, are altogether of another nature. They were created for the use of man, they were given for the sustenance of men;—"every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb, have I given you all things." But the tormenting even of the brute creatures needlessly, for the pleasing of our sensual appetites or the satisfaction of our humour, is not only unchristian but inhuman. "A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." God hath made two covenants with man, none with the beasts.

2 Sam. xii. 13, 14.

2 Cor. iv. 17.

Matt. xxv. 46.

Job xxxvii. 23.

Lam. iii. 33.

Ps. cvii. 17.

Gen. ix. 3.

Prov. xii. 10.

Why God did not make man impeccable.

He saith, it is "no more cruelty" to afflict a man with endless torment "for sin," than without sin, when He "might without trouble have kept him from sinning[y]." Is it not great pity,

[u] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 13.]
[x] [Ibid.]
[y] [Ibid.]

that T. H. was not of God Almighty's council when He ordered the world? that he might have advised Him to have made man impeccable, which He might have done without any trouble; or that otherwise his fall, and consequently his punishment, might be justly imputed to God Himself. It was well enacted in the laws of the twelve tables, "*Ad Divos adeunto castè, pietatem adhibento, qui secus faxit Deus Ipse vindex erit*[z]"—our "addresses to God" ought to be "pure" and devout; "they who do otherwise," will find "God Himself the revenger." Doth T. H. believe St. Jude, that "God hath reserved the angels that kept not their first estate, Jude 6.
749 in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day?" God could by His absolute power have kept them in their first estate, yet He would not. By His absolute power, He can do all things which do not imply imperfection or contradiction: but by His ordinate power He cannot change His decrees, nor alter what He hath ordained. Acts of grace may be free, but punishments must be always just. That king who doth not pardon a wilful traitor, is not equally guilty of murder with him that hangs up an innocent subject. Then to answer fully to his question, why God suffered man to sin, having power to withhold him. To preserve that order and course which He had established in the world, and to draw a greater good out of evil, for the further manifestation of His own glory. First, the manifestation of His power; as St. Austin saith,—"He that created all things very good, and did foreknow that evil would arise from good, knew likewise, that it appertained rather to His most almighty goodness to draw good out of evil, than not to suffer evil[a]." Secondly, the manifestation of His providence; in suffering man, whom He had endowed with the freedom of will and power, sufficient to resist and overcome Satan, either to conquer or yield at his own choice. Thirdly, the manifestation of His justice and mercy; by punishing some out of the corrupted mass justly, and saving others out of His mere mercy. If T. H. thinks

[z] [Cic., De Leg., ii. 8.]

[a] [Aug., De Corrept. et Gratiâ, c. x. § 27; Op. tom. x. pp. 764. G, 765. A. "Quapropter saluberrime confitemur, quod rectissime credimus, Deum Dominumque rerum omnium, quia creavit omnia bona valde, et mala ex bonis exoritura esse præscivit, et scivit magis ad Suam omnipotentissimam bonitatem pertinere, etiam de malis bene facere, quam mala esse non sinere, sic ordinasse angelorum et hominum vitam," &c.]

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vainly, that the only "manifestation" of God's "power" is a sufficient ground for the punishment of man in Hell fire, without their own faults or crimes, how much better may good Christians conclude, that the greater manifestation of God's power, and providence, and justice, and mercy, is a sufficient ground for the punishment of men with the like torments, for their own crimes.

Punishments of the damned are eternal.

His second answer is set down by way of interrogation,—"What infallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be . . eternally in torments, and never die[b]?" Even the authority of our Saviour and the Holy Scriptures, which call it an "everlasting fire," an "eternal fire," a "fire that is not quenched," "everlasting punishment," "everlasting chains," the "worm that never dieth, and the fire that goeth not out;"—"Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." "The Bishop" hath the testimony of the Athanasian Creed;—that "they who have done good, shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil, into everlasting fire." He hath the testimony of the universal Church of all ages, except a few Origenists[c]. If T. H. have no more than his own single private authority to oppose against all these, he is a bold man. They who question everlasting torments, will not stick to question everlasting life. To his demand about the "second death[d]," I answer, this is the second death, if he could see wood for trees.

Matt. xxv. 41, 46;—Mark ix. 44, 45;—Jude 6, 7.

God's prescience proveth infallibility, not necessity.

In the next place, he urgeth, how that "inconveniencies" follow from our opinion. First, that man's liberty to will "quite takes away the prescience of God;" for if man have it in his power to will or not to will, it cannot be certainly foreknown what he will will[e]. The second, that God's prescience doth take away liberty, by making all events necessary from eternity; "for it is impossible that that should not come to pass, or come to pass otherwise than it was foreknown, which God foreknoweth shall come to pass;" and if it be impossible that it should not come to pass, then it is "necessary" that it should come to pass[f]. This is too severe; first, to make us take prescience quite away, and yet, with the same

[b] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 13.]
[c] [See Mosheim's Ch. Hist., bk. II. Pt. ii. c. 3. § 9; and the authorities there quoted.]
[d] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 13.]
[e] [Ibid., p. 14.]
[f] [Ibid.]

breath, to argue against us from prescience. But, for once, I will give him a clear solution to both his pretended demonstrations; and let him see, that there is no necessity, that men must either turn blocks without liberty, or sacrilegious, to rob God of His prescience. But I give him it upon a condition,—that hereafter, before he take away either prescience or liberty, he will first take away this answer, and not repeat us the same thing over and over again, to no purpose.

To the first inconvenience I answer, that a thing may be said to be foreknown two ways[g]: either as it is in its causes, before it be produced; and so, I confess, that if the free agent have it in his power to will or not to will, there is no determinate truth of future contingents, that is, in their causes, and consequently no prescience or foreknowledge in that respect: or else a thing may be said to be foreknown, as it is or shall be in itself, in the nature of things, after it is produced; and thus every particular event that shall be until the end of the world, is foreknown, or, to speak more properly, is known to God from all eternity. For, in God's knowledge, there is neither before nor after, past nor to come. Those things which are past or to come to us, are always present to God; Whose infinite understanding (that is, Himself) doth encompass all times and events in one instant of eternity, and so doth prevent or anticipate all differences of time. Time is the measure of all our acts; but God's knowledge, being infinite, is not measured but by eternity: so that which is a prescience, or a before-hand knowledge[h] (as he calleth it), to us, is a present intuition with God. And therefore, as my present beholding of a man casting himself down headlong from some precipice, whilst he is in the act of casting himself down, is not the cause of his precipitation, nor doth any way necessitate him to precipitate himself, yet, upon supposition that I do see him precipitate himself, it is necessarily (that is, infallibly) true, that he doth precipitate himself, but not necessarily true by any antecedent and extrinsecal determination of him to do that act, nor so necessarily true as to exclude his freedom or liberty in the act; even so God's knowledge of future contingents, being a present intuition or

[g] [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xiv. art. 13, Respondeo.]

[h] [See Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 9.]

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Much of this is confessed by Mr. Hobbes himself:—"that the foreknowledge of God should be the cause of anything, cannot be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of things known, and not they on it[i]."

I desire to know, whether God do His own works *ad extra* (as the creation and destruction of the world) freely or necessarily? as, whether He was necessitated to create the world precisely at such a time, in such a manner? Certainly God foreknoweth His own works, as much as He foreknoweth the determinate acts of free agents; yet His foreknowledge of His own works *ad extra*, doth not necessitate Himself. If he say, that God Himself determineth His own acts *ad extra*, so I say doth the free agent also; with this difference, that God is infinite and independent upon any other, but the free agent is finite and dependent upon God, both for his being and for his acting. Then, if God's freedom in His own works *ad extra* doth not take away His prescience, neither doth the liberty of free agents take it away.

To his second inconvenience,—that "it is impossible that that which is foreknown by God should not come to pass, or come to pass otherwise than it is foreknown,"—I answer, that God's foreknowledge is not such an act as T. H. imagineth; that is, an act that is expired, or an act that is done and past; but it is always in doing, an eternal act, a present act, a present intuition; and consequently doth no more make the agent unfree, or the contrary event impossible, until it be actually produced, than my knowing that such a man stabbed himself upon such a day, made it then unpossible for him to have forborne stabbing of himself, or my seeing a man eat in present, made it unpossible for him, before he did eat, to have forborne eating. God is the total cause of all natures and essences, but He is not the total cause of all their acts and operations. Neither did He create His creatures to be idle,

[i] [See above in the Defence, T. H., Numb. xi. pp. 58, 59.]

but that they should each of them exercise such acts as are agreeable to their respective natures; necessary agents, necessary acts; free agents, free acts. And until the free agent have determined itself, that is, until the last moment before production, the contrary act is not made unpossible; and then, only upon supposition. He that precipitated himself, until the very moment that he did precipitate himself, might have withheld himself; and if he had withheld himself, then I had not seen him precipitate himself, but withhold himself.

[T. H.'s invectives against unsignificant words.]

His frequent invectives against unsignificant words are but like the complaints of that old beldame Harpaste in Seneca, who still cried out against the darkness of the room, and desired to be brought into another chamber, little believing that her own blindness was the true cause of it[k]. What Suarez[l] saith, as I know neither what nor where, so neither doth it concern either me or the cause.

[His confusion between willing and thinking.]

His last assault against liberty in his "Fountains of Arguments" is this;—"Certainly to will is impossible without thinking on what a man willeth, but it is in no man's election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on[m]." A man might well conjecture by this very reason, that his
751 "fountain" was very near drying up. This argument is levied rather against the memory, or against the understanding, than against the will: and may serve as well against freedom to do, as against freedom to will; which is contrary to his principles. It is as impossible to do without thinking on what a man doth, as it is "to will without thinking on what he willeth;" but "it is in no man's election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on;" therefore a man is not free to choose what he will do. I know not what this word "to think" signifies with him, but I know what other authors make it to signify,—to use reason, to understand, to know; and they define a "thought" to be "the understanding actually employed or busied about some object[n]." Hath not he spun us a fair thread? He undertaketh to shew a defect in the will, and he allegeth a defect in the

[k] [L. A. Senec., Epist. 50; Op. p. 262. Paris, 1607.]

[l] [Cited by Hobbes in Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 14; but without a reference.]

[m] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 15.]

[n] ["Intellectus actu circa res occupatus." This seems to be borrowed from Aristotle, De Animâ, III. iv, v.; but through what intermediate channel, does not appear. See however Gassendi, Syntagm. Philosoph., Pars II. Sect. iii. Membr. Poster. lib. ix. c. 1.]

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understanding. Is a man therefore not free to go to his dinner, because perhaps he thinks not on it just at dinner time? Let the free agent be free to will or nill, and to choose which part he will, without necessitation or determination to one, when he doth think on it; and we shall not want true liberty.

AN ANSWER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE EPISTLE TO MY LORD OF NEWCASTLE.

It was no 'passion' but a sad truth, to call the opinion of fatal destiny "blasphemous[o];" which maketh God to be directly the author of sin, which is a degree worse than atheism; and "desperate[o]," which taketh away all care and solicitude, and thrusts man headlong, without fear or wit, upon rocks and precipices; and "destructive[o]" which turneth all governments, Divine and human, off from their hinges; the practical consequences whereof do utterly ruin all societies. Neither am I guilty (that I know of yet) so much as of one "uncivil word[p]," either against Mr. Hobbes his person, or his parts. He is over unequal and indulgent to himself; who dare assume the boldness to introduce such insolent and paradoxical opinions into the world, and will not allow other men the liberty to welcome them as they deserve. I wish he himself in his Animadversions, and his parasitical publisher of his former treatise, had observed the same temper and moderation: particularly towards the lights of the schools, whom he slighteth and vilifieth every where, as a company of pedantic dunces who understood not themselves, yet held the world in awe under contribution by their fustian "jargon," until "a third Cato dropped down from heaven[q]," to stand up for the vindication of Christian liberty from scholastic tyranny, and Stoical necessity from natural and moral liberty. But this is certain; if these poor despised Schoolmen were necessitated by antecedent and extrinsecal causes to speak such gibberish and nonsense, and the Christian world to receive it and applaud it, they cannot be justly blamed. And

[o] [Epistle to the Marquis of Newcastle, prefixed to the Defence, above p. 17; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bishop's Epist. to my Lord of Newcastle, p. 17.]

[q] [Juv., ii. 40.]

if that great assertor were necessitated in like manner, he cannot justly be praised; any more than we praise a conduit for spouting out water, when the cock is turned.

AN ANSWER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S EPISTLE TO THE READER.

[T. H.'s Epistle surreptitiously printed.]

I am well contented to believe, that the copy of T. H. his treatise was surreptitiously gained from him[r]. Yet he acknowledgeth, that he shewed it to two; and if my intelligence out of France[s] did not fail, to many more. I am well pleased to believe, that he was not the author[t] of that lewd Epistle, which was prefixed before it; but rather some young braggadocio, one of his disciples, who wanted all other means to requite his master for his new acquired light, but servile flattery: whom he styleth the "great author—the repairer of our breaches—the assertor of our reputation, who hath performed more in a few sheets" than is comprehended "in all the voluminous works of the priests and ministers;" yea, as if that expression were too modest, in all "the libraries of the priests, jesuits, and ministers," or in "the catechisms and confessions of a thousand assemblies[u]." On the other side, he belcheth out reproaches against the poor clergy, as if they were a pack of fools and knaves. For their folly, he sticks not to style "the black coats, generally taken, a sort of ignorant tinkers[x]," &c. And for their knavery, he saith, they make the Scriptures (which he setteth forth in as graceless a dress as he can imagine) "the decoys of the people," to advance themselves "to promotions, leisure, and luxury[y]." And so he concludeth, that this little treatise of Mr. Hobbes "will cast an eternal blemish on all the cornered caps of the priests and jesuits, and all the black and white caps of the" ministers[z]. Herein I cannot acquit Mr. Hobbes, that being in

[r] [As Hobbes asserts, Qu., Animadv. upon the Bishop's Epistle to the Reader, p. 19.]

[s] [This treatise, and apparently the Defence also, were both written in Holland; see above, pp. 24, 213. notes b, a.]

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader, p. 19. See above p. 20, note f.]

[u] [From the Epistle prefixed to the first edition of Hobbes' original answer, with which the present editor has not succeeded in meeting. It is reprinted in Molesworth's edition of Hobbes' Works. See vol. iv. pp. 235—237.]

[x] [Ibid., p. 235.]

[y] [Ibid., p. 232.]

[z] [Ibid., p. 238.]

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London at the same time when this ridiculous Epistle was printed and published[a], he did not for his own cause, sooner or later, procure it to be suppressed.

Concerning myself, I can safely say, that I was so far from 752
"intending" my defence "for the press[b]," that since it was perfected, and one only copy transcribed for the Marquis of Newcastle and himself, it hath scarcely ever beheld the sun. Questions may be ventilated, and truth cleared from mistakes, privately between particular persons, as well or better than publicly in print.

[The author's exceptions to T. H.'s book *De Cive*.]

As touching my exceptions to his book *De Cive*, he saith, he "did indeed intend to have answered them, as finding them neither political nor theological, nor that" I "alleged any reasons by which they were to be justified[c]." The inference would have holden more strongly the contrary way;—that because they were neither theological nor political, and destitute of reasons to support them, they were fitter to be despised than to be answered. But why did he then "intend to answer them," and thought himself so much concerned in it? Surely he hath forgotten himself: for there was never a one of those exceptions which was not backed with several reasons. But concerning them and his Leviathan, I shall be sparing to speak more in present. Peradventure I may reserve two or three chapters, one to shew him his theological errors, another how destructive his political errors are to all societies, a third of his contradictions; out of all which, if my leisure serve me, I may chance to gather a posy, and present it to him[d].

He chargeth me to say, that there were "two of our own Church answering" his Leviathan[e]. It may be so: but it is more than I know. I said, "one of our own Church, and one stranger[f]."

[The author's valediction defended.]

In the conclusion of my Epistle to the Reader, I used this

[a] [Shortly after the publication of the Leviathan, that is, in the latter part of 1651, Hobbes returned home from Paris, and continued to reside in England thenceforward. See his Life in the Biogr. Brit. His Letter on Liberty and Necessity was published in 1654.]

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader, pp. 19, 20.]

[c] [Ibid., p. 20.]

[d] [See the Catching of Leviathan, Disc. iii. Pt. iii; at the end of this volume.]

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader, p. 20.]

[f] [Defence, Epist. to the Reader, above p. 20; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

innocent form of valediction, "So God bless us[g];" a form of all others most usual for shutting up our Epistles,—"So God bless us," or "So God bless you," or "So I commit you to God," or "commend you to the protection of the highest Majesty." But it seemeth, he, misapprehending it to be a prayer for protection or deliverance from his opinions, styles my well-meant prayer, "a buffoonly abusing of the name of God to calumny[h]." How? Am I charged with "buffoonery," and "calumny," and "abusing" of the holy name of God? And all this for saying "God bless us?" Is this a fit man to reprehend others for incivility? Did he learn this high strain of courtesy at Malmesbury? I confess, I do not dislike a little toothless jesting, when the subject will bear it.

"Ridiculum acri
"Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res[i]."

But I do not like jesting with edge-tools, nor jesting with God Almighty; much less, "buffoonly abusing" of the holy "name of God to calumny." He need not fear any such reviling terms from me; but if his cause meet now and then with an innocent jerk for it, "*sciat responsum, non dictum esse.*" He that knoweth not the way to the sea, must get a river to be his guide.

AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON MY REPLY;— NUMBER I.

I said I was "diverted" from reading his Defence by business[k]: hence he inferreth, that "the will is not free; for nothing is free that can be diverted by anything but itself[l]." I deny this proposition, and he will prove it at the Greek Calends. There is a great difference between diversion and determination. Diversion is but an occasional suspension of the exercise of liberty; but physical determination to one is a compulsion of the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion, that is, necessitation. The will doth choose its own diversion, but there is no choice in necessitation. And there-

[Difference between diversion and determination.]

[g] [Ibid.]
[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader, p. 20.]
[i] [Horat., Sat., I. x. 14, 15.]
[k] [Defence, Numb. i. above p. 24. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 25.]

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fore necessitation to one is opposite to liberty, but diversion is not, nor moral efficacy.

Resolution proveth election and liberty.

Out of his very first words—"I had once resolved," &c.—I urged two arguments against him.

First, all resolution presupposeth deliberation; so much is acknowledged by himself,—that "to resolve is to will after deliberation[m]" (he knoweth no difference between willing and electing):—but all deliberation of that which is inevitably determined without ourselves (as all events are determined, according to his opinion) is vain; as, it is vain for a condemned person to deliberate whether he should be executed, it is vain for a man to deliberate whether he should grow in stature, or whether he should breathe. The only thing questionable in this argument is the truth of the assumption,—whether it be vain to deliberate of that which is already inevitably determined: to which he answereth not one syllable *in terminis*, but runs away with a false scent, altogether wide from the purpose;—"A man" 753 (saith he) "may deliberate of what he shall do, whether the thing be [im]possible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility, though he cannot deliberate what another shall do to him;" and therefore my three instances "are impertinent, because the question is not what they shall do, but what they shall suffer[n]." And here he vapoureth marvellously, supposing that he hath me at a huge advantage. Such are commonly all his advantages: much good may they do him. First, he erreth grossly in affirming, that all deliberation is only of what a man will do, or not do; and not at all of what a man will suffer, or not suffer. Deliberation is as well about evil to be eschewed, as about good to be pursued. Men deliberate equally of their doings and of their sufferings, if they be not inevitably determined; but if they be, then neither of the one nor of the other. A martyr or a confessor may deliberate, what torments he will suffer for his religion. Many of those acts whereabout we do usually deliberate, are mixed motions, partly active and partly passive; as all our senses. Secondly, it is a shame for him to distinguish betwen actions and sufferings in this cause,

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 25.]

[n] [Ibid.]

when all the actions of all the free agents in the world, by his doctrine, are mere sufferings. A free agent is but like a bullet rammed up into the barrel by the outward causes, and fired off by the outward causes; the will serves for no use but to be a touch-hole; and the poor agent hath no more aim or understanding of what he doth, than the arrow which is forced out of the bow towards the mark, without any sense or concurrence in itself. A condemned person may be reprieved, and deliberate about that; but the sentence of the causes produceth a necessity from eternity[o] (as he phraseth it), never to be interrupted or altered. Thirdly, he erreth in this also, that he affirmeth all my three instances to be only of passions or sufferings. Growing up in stature is a vegetative act. Respiration is a sensitive act, or an act of the moving and animal faculty. Some question there hath been, whether respiration were a natural motion, or a voluntary motion, or a mixed motion; but all conclude, that it is an act or motion which is performed whilst we sleep, when we are incapable of deliberation. Lastly, to say that a man may deliberate of a thing that is not possible, if "he know not of the impossibility," will not advantage his cause the value of a rush. For, supposing an universal necessity of all events from eternity, there can be no such case; seeing all men know, that upon this supposition all acts and events are either antecedently and absolutely necessary, or antecedently and absolutely impossible; both which are equally uncapable of deliberation. So the 'impertinence' will prove to be in his answer, not in my instances.

My second argument out of his own words was this.—"To resolve a man's self, is to determine his own will; and if a man determine his own will, then he is free from outward necessity. But T. H. confesseth, that a man may resolve himself:—"I resolved once," &c.; and yet further,—"To resolve is to will after deliberation." Now "to will after deliberation," is to elect; but that he hateth the very term of electing or choosing, as being utterly destructive to his new-modelled fabric of universal necessity. And for that very reason, he confounds and blunders together the natural, sensitive, and intellectual, appetites. Either the will determineth itself

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]

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in its resolution; or both will, and deliberation, and resolution, are pre-determined by a necessary flux of natural causes. If the will determine itself in its resolution, then we have true liberty to will or nill. If both the will, and the deliberation, and the resolution, be pre-determined by outward causes, then it is not the resolution of the will itself, nor of the agent, but of the outward causes; then it was as much determined, that is to say, resolved, before the deliberation, as after; because the deliberation itself, and the whole event of it, particularly the last resolution, was outwardly pre-determined from eternity.

[T. H.'s objections answered.]

To this he answereth nothing; but, according to his usual manner, he maketh three objections. First, "No man can determine his own will, for the will is an appetite," and 'it is not in man's power to have an appetite when he will[p].' This argument would much better become the kitchen than the schools:—to argue from the lesser to the greater negatively, which is against all rules of logic. Just thus,—a brute beast cannot make a categorical syllogism, therefore a man cannot make one. So here,—the sensitive appetite hath no dominion over its own acts, therefore neither hath the rational appetite any dominion over its own acts. Yet this is the only pillar that supporteth his main distinction, which must uphold his castle in the air from tumbling down about his 754
ears. But be what it will be, it hath been sufficiently answered already[q].

His second objection hath so little solidity in it, that it is ridiculous;—"Over whatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not free;" but over a man's actions there is "the dominion of his will[r]." What a *medius terminus* hath he light upon. This which he urgeth against liberty, is the very essence of liberty. If a man's actions were under the dominion of another man's will, or under the dominion of his extrinsecal causes, then they were not free indeed; but for a man's own actions to be in his own power, or in the power or under the dominion of his own will, that is that which makes them free.

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 25.]

[q] In the Answer to the Stating of the Questio[illegible]pp. 225, 226.]

[r] [Qu., [illegible]on Numb. i. p. 26.]

Thirdly, he objects, "If a man determine himself, the question will yet remain, what determined him to determine himself[s]." If he speak properly, in his own sense of physical determination, by outward causes, he speaketh plain nonsense: for if he was so determined by another, then he did not determine himself. But if he mean only this—what did concur with the will in the determination of itself,—I answer, that a friend by persuasion might concur morally, and the understanding by representing might concur intrinsecally, but it hath been demonstrated to him over and over, that neither of these concurrences is inconsistent with true liberty from necessitation and physical determination to one. DISCOURSE II.

Something I say afterwards which doth not please him, which he calleth "a talking to" myself "at random[t]." My aim in present is only to answer his exceptions, a little more punctually than he hath done mine; not at all to call him to an account for his omissions. That part I leave to the reader's own observation.

He telleth me plainly, that I "neither understand" him, "nor what the word 'necessary' signifieth, if" I "think" he "holds no other necessity, than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule, 'whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is[u].'" If I understand him not, I cannot help it; I understand him as well as I can, and wish that he understood himself a little better, to make him speak more significantly. Let us see where the fault lies, that he is no better understood. First, he defineth what is necessary;—"that is necessary, which is impossible to be otherwise;"—whence he inferreth, that "necessary, possible, and impossible, have no signification in reference to the time past, or time present, but only the time to come[x]." I think all men will condescend to him thus far, that *possibility* hath only reference to "the time to come." But for necessity, and impossibility, he overshooteth himself beyond all aim. If a house do actually burn in present, it is "necessary," that is, infallible, that that house do burn in present, and "impossible," that it do not burn. If a man was slain yesterday, it is "neces- What is necessary.

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
[t] [Ibid.]
[u] [Ibid.]
[x] [Ibid.]

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sary," that he is slain to-day, and "impossible," that he should not be slain. His own definition doth sufficiently confute him,—"that is necessary which is impossible to be otherwise;"—but it is "impossible," that that which is doing in present, or which was done yesterday, should "be otherwise." How hang these things together? Or this that he telleth us, that his "'necessary' is a necessary from all eternity[y]," which with him is an everlasting succession[z]. And yet he telleth us, that necessary signifieth nothing in reference to the time past; then how is it "necessary from all eternity?" And here he thrusteth out for rotten a great many of old scholastic terms, as "empty words[a];" as, "necessary when it is," or, "absolutely and hypothetically necessary," and, "*sensus compositus et divisus*," and, "the dominion of the will," and, "the determining of itself." I must put him in mind again of the good old woman in Seneca, who complained of the darkness of the room, when the defect was in her own eyesight[b]. I wonder not that he is out of love with distinctions, more than I wonder why a bungling workman regards not a square or a plumb; but if he understood these distinctions a little better, he would not trouble his reader with "that which shall be, shall be," and a bundle of such like impertinencies.

He acknowledgeth, that "my Lord of Newcastle's desire, and" my "intreaty, were enough to produce a will in" him "to write" his "answer[c]." If they were enough, then he was not necessitated, nor physically predetermined, to write it. We had no more power than to persuade, no natural influence upon his will; and so he was, for us, not only free to write, but free to will also. But "perhaps there were other imaginations of" his "own that contributed their part[d]." Let it be so; yet that was no extrinsecal or absolute determination of his will. And so far was our request from producing his 755
consent, "as necessarily as the fire burneth[e]," that it did not, it could not, produce it at all, by any natural causal

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
[z] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxiv. p. 154.]
[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
[b] [See above p. 249. note k.]
[c] ["Whether" they "were enough," &c., "without concurrent causes, I am not sure;" but they "did somewhat." Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
[d] [Ibid.]
[e] [Ibid., p. 27.]

influence and efficacy. The sufficiency, and efficiency, and productive power, was in his will itself; which he will not be brought to understand.

AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE REPLY;— NUMBER II.

Here is nothing of moment to detain the reader. He saith, "Whosoever chanceth to read Suarez his Opuscula, shall find the greatest part, if not all, that" I "have urged in this question[f]." Said I not truly, give innovators "line enough, and they will confute themselves[g]?" "Whosoever chanceth," &c.—and why "*chanceth?*" By his doctrine, it was as necessary for him that readeth to read, as it is for the fire to burn[h]. Doth the fire sometimes burn by 'chance?' He will say, that where the certain causes are not known, we attribute events to chance[i]. But he sticks still in the same mire, without hope ever to be freed. Who knoweth the certain reason, why the needle touched with the loadstone pointeth always towards the north? Doth it therefore point by 'chance?' How many thousands are ignorant of the true causes of comets, and earthquakes, and eclipses? Do they therefore attribute them to 'chance?' Chance never hath place, but where the causes concur accidentally to produce some effect, which might have been produced otherwise. Though a man strive to "expel" these common notions "with a fork, yet now and then they will return[k]." And though I could not "surprise[l]" him, yet the truth can. Thus, Penelope like[m], he hath undone that in the dark, which he hath been weaving all this while in the light. It were more ingenuous to say, it was a slip of his pen. Chance is from accidental concurrence, not from ignorance.

It is indifferent to me, whether the greatest part of what I urge in this question, or all that I urge, or perhaps more than I urge, be contained in Suarez his Opuscula. So the truth [Suarez.]

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ii. p. 28.]
[g] [Defence, Numb. i. above p. 24, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 27: and see above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xx., p. 132.]
[i] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xx. p. 132, &c.]
[k] ["Naturam expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret." Horat., Epist., I. x. 24.]
[l] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.]
[m] [Odyss., ii. 93—110.]

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may prevail, I care not who have the honour of the achievement. But Suarez understood himself better than to confound two such different questions; namely, that of the necessity or liberty of all events, natural and civil, which is our question, with the concurrence of grace and free will in moral and supernatural acts, which he saith is the subject of Suarez his discourse in that place[n]. In all my life, that I do remember, I never read one line of Suarez his Opuscula, nor any of his works the sixteen years last past. I wish he had been versed in his greater works, as well as in his Opuscula, that he might not be so averse from the Schools. "*Ignoti nulla cupido.*" Then he would have known the terms and arguments used in the Schools as well as others. It is no blemish to make advantage of other men's pains and experience.

[Ps. xix. 2. Vulg.] "*Dies diei eructat verbum, et nox nocti indicat scientiam.*" But Mr. Hobbes, trusting over much to his own particular abilities, presumeth to stand upon his own bottom, without any dread of Solomon's "*Væ soli*"—"Wo to him that is alone when he falleth." He scrupleth not to "remove the ancient landmarks which his fathers had set," nor to "stumble from the ancient paths, to walk in a way that was never cast up." It were mere folly to expect either a known ground or a received term from him. Other men are contented to learn to write after a copy, but he will be printed a philosopher and a divine of the first edition by himself; and, Icarus like, find out a new way with his waxen wings which mortals never knew, though he perish in the attempt[o]. Such undigested fancies may please for a while, during the distemper and green-sickness fit of this present age; as maids infected with that malady, prefer chalk or coals in a corner before healthful food in their father's house[p]; but when time hath cured their malady, and experience opened their eyes, they will abominate their former errors, and those who were their misleaders.

Eccles. iv. 10. Prov. xxii. 28. Jerem. xviii. 15.

[n] ["Suarez his Opuscula, where he writeth of free will and of the concourse of God with man's will." Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ii. p. 28. Suarez' Opuscula Theologica, containing (among other tracts) Lib. III. de Concursu, Motione, et Auxilio Dei, were published at Lyons, 4to. 1600.]

[o] [Ovid., Metam., lib. viii. vv. 184, sq.—&c.]

[p] Ex Plutarchi Polit. ad Trajan., [c. iv; Op. Moral., tom. iv. p. 148. ed. Wyttenb.—"Καὶ γὰρ αἱ κιττῶσαι λίθους, καὶ οἱ ναυτιῶντες ἀλμυρίδας καὶ τοιαῦτα βρώματα διώκουσι πολλάκις, εἶτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐξέπτυσαν καὶ ἀπεστράφησαν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ οἱ δῆμοι διὰ τρυφὴν καὶ ὕβριν," κ. τ. λ.]

He had slighted whatsoever I produced as common and trivial, "having nothing new in it, either from Scripture or reason, which" he "had not often heard[q]." I replied only, that then I might "expect a more mature answer," and advised him, under the similitude of Epictetus his sheep, rather to shew his reading in his works than to glory of it[r]. And where I said, that "great recruits of reasons and authorities did offer themselves[s]" to me in this cause, he threateneth, "before" he "have done with me, to make it appear to be very bragging, and nothing else;" adding, that "it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool," because he was "not acquainted with paying of tithes[t]." I could not suspect, that a poor similitude out of Epictetus should make him so passionate. But "*tange montes, et fumigabunt*"—"touch the high mountains, and they will fume and smoke." It seemeth strange to me, that he should be so 756 ignorant in Epictetus (a Stoic, one of his principal friends, of so great fame, that his earthen lamp was preserved as a relic, and sold for three thousand drachmas[u], whom even Lucian, that great scoffer, calleth an "admirable old man[x]"), as to say, that "it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool." He meaneth, from sheep. To inform him better, let him hear his words;—"For sheep do not bring their grass to their shepherd, to shew him how much they have eaten; but, concocting their meat inwardly, do bring forth wool and milk[y]." This might be pardoned; but his scoffing at payment of "tithes," and particularly "lamb and wool," being an institution of God Himself, and established by the laws of our own realm, cannot be excused. I appeal to all those who have read anything upon this subject, whether I might not have added many more reasons, and produced the authority of the Christian world against him in this cause of liberty, with the suffrages of the Fathers

Discourse II. [Epictetus.]

[Ps. cxliv. 5.]

[q] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. ii. above p. 26.]

[r] [Defence, Numb. ii. above p. 26.]

[s] [Epist. to the Marq. of Newcastle, prefixed to the Defence, above p. 17.]

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ii. p. 28.]

[u] [Lucian., Dial. adv. Indoctum, c. xiii; Op. tom. iii. p. 111. ed. Hemsterhus. Amst. 1743.]

[x] ["Τῷ θαυμαστῷ ἐκείνῳ γέροντι." Id. ibid.]

[y] Encheirid., c. xlvi. [§ 2; p. 222. ed. Schweigh.—Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ πρόβατα οὐ χόρτον φέροντα ποιμέσιν ἐπιδεικνύει πόσον ἔφαγεν ἀλλὰ, τὴν νομὴν ἔσω πέψαντα, ἔρια ἔξω φέρει καὶ γάλα."]

PART III. in all successive ages. But I remember that of our Saviour, "Cast not your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet." Matt. vii. 6.

AN ANSWER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON NUMBER III.

Exact definitions not frequent.

He is displeased, that I do not "set down the definitions" of "necessity, spontaneity, and liberty," without which (he saith) "their difference cannot possibly appear[z]." Yet formerly[a], and again in this very chapter, he confesseth, that the question is truly and clearly stated by me;—"The question which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set down *verbatim*, and allowed[b]." What a trifling humour is this! Many things are not capable of perfect definition; as (to pass by all others) accidents, and modes, or such terms as signify the manner of being. And in such things as are capable of definition, yet essentials (whereof a definition must consist,—"ὁρισμός ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας γνωρισμὸς[c]") are neither so obvious nor so useful to common capacities. I believe, that all the perfect definitions which T. H. hath made in his life in philosophy or theology, may be written in one little ring; whereof I shall be bold henceforth, now and then as I find occasion, to put him in mind. Nay, even in mathematics, which by reason of their abstraction from matter are less subject to error, he can miss the cushion as well as his neighbours, and be contented sometimes to acknowledge it; not because those errors are greater or so great as his errors in philosophy or theology, but because their conviction is more easy, and more evident. And therefore for the most part a plain description must serve the turn; sometimes from the etymological unfolding of the name, sometimes by the removing of what is opposite or contrary, sometimes by a periphrastical circumlocution, sometimes by instances and examples. And thus, by his own confession, the question is cleared between us.

What liberty is.

Yet, to satisfy him, I will describe them more formally. To begin with liberty. Liberty is a power of the will (or free

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 35.]
[a] [Ibid., Stat. of Quest., p. 3.]
[b] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 41.]
[c] [See Aristot., Analyt. Poster., II. vii. 1.]

agent), to choose or to refuse this or that indifferently after deliberation, free from all antecedent and extrinsecal determination to one[d]. Election is the proper act of the will; and without indifferency or indetermination, and deliberation, there can be no election, which is a "consultative appetition[e]." And they, and they only, are free agents, who, supposing all things to be present that are requisite to action, can nevertheless either act or forbear to act, at their own choice[f]: which description hath already been explained[g], and shall be further in due place.

What is spontaneity.

Secondly, voluntary or spontaneous is that, which hath its beginning from an inward principle (that is, the will), with some knowledge of the end[h]. Such are the acts of children, fools, and madmen, whilst they want the use of reason; and the sudden acts of passionate persons, whensoever the violence of their passion doth prevent all deliberation. Such are many actions of brute beasts; as the spider's making of her webs to catch flies, the bird's building of her nest therein to lay her eggs; both which proceed "from an inward principle with some knowledge of the end." So then this is the difference between that which is free, and that which is voluntary or spontaneous;—that every free act is also a voluntary or spontaneous act, but every voluntary or spontaneous act is not a free act. The reason is evident;—because no act is free, except it be done upon deliberation; but many voluntary or spontaneous acts are done without all deliberation, as the acts of brute beasts, fools, children, madmen, and some acts of passionate persons. Secondly, there is no
757 liberty but where there is a possibility towards more than one, and freedom to choose this or that indifferently. But in all those other kinds of voluntary or spontaneous acts, there is an antecedent determination to one, and no indifferency of election. So spontaneity is an appetite of some object, proceeding either from the rational or sensitive will, either antecedently determined or not determined to one,

[d] [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. lxxxiii. art. 1.]

[e] ["Ὀρεκτὸς δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ," κ. τ. λ. Aristot., Ethic., III. v. 19.]

[f] ["Illa est potentia libera, quæ, omnibus positis quæ requiruntur ad agendum, potest agere et non agere." Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 7; Op. tom. iii. p. 663. B.]

[g] [Above in the Defence, Numb. xxxii. p. 173. note y.]

[h] [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. vi. art. 1. Respondeo.]

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either upon deliberation or without deliberation, either with election or without election.

What is necessity.

The last term is necessity. He himself hath defined "necessary," to be "that which is impossible to be otherwise[i]." Here is a definition without either matter or form, *genus* or *differentia*, without any thing in it that is essential, or so much as positive, a very periphrase or circumlocution, and (which is worst) not convertible or reciprocal with the thing defined. Many things may be "necessary" respectively, which are not "impossible to be otherwise;" as to let blood in a pleurisy. A horse is necessary for a long voyage; yet it is not impossible for a man to perform it on foot. And, on the other side, many things are "impossible to be otherwise," which are not "necessary" in that sense wherein we take necessity in this question: as that which is necessary upon science or prescience, and that which is necessary upon condition or supposition. As, if Thomas write, then he lives; yet neither his writing nor his living is absolutely necessary. So, "whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is[j]," or "impossible to be otherwise." None of these necessities have any place in this controversy. None of these sorts of necessity are opposite to true liberty. By the way, T. H. calls this rule—"Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is,"—an "old foolish rule[k]" (yet it is delivered by Aristotle, and received ever since in the world), upon his own authority, without ever examining it, or understanding it. "*Satis pro imperio.*" So then necessity (as it is proper to this question) I conceive may be thus fitly described,—necessity is a manner or propriety of being or of acting, whereby that which is, or acteth, cannot possibly but be and act, nor be or act otherwise than it doth, by reason of an antecedent, extrinsecal, and inevitable determination to one.

Necessity of being and acting distinguished.

I say, of being or of acting, because there is a double necessity, "*in essendo et in operando*[l]," and both considerable in this cause. That which is necessarily, may act freely, as God Almighty without Himself; and that which is freely

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]

[j] [Aristot.,] De Interpret., lib. i. cap. ult. [in versione Argyropyli.—c. ix. § 14. ed. Bekker.]

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]

[l] [See Thom. Aquin., in Sentent., P. I. Dist. xliii. Qu. ii. art. 1.]

or contingently, as fire kindled by the help of a tinderbox, or by the stumbling of a horse upon the pavement of a street, may act and burn necessarily. Here he may see, if he please, how necessity and will or spontaneity may meet together;—because that which is antecedently and extrinsecally determined to one, may agree well enough with my appetite, or the appetite of another;—but necessity and liberty can never meet together; because that which is antecedently and extrinsecally determined to one, cannot possibly be free, that is, undetermined to one, nor capable of election, which must be *inter plura*, nor a fit subject for deliberation.

[T. H. confoundeth liberty and will.]

He urgeth, that, "seeing" I "say necessity and spontaneity may meet together," he "may say that necessity and will may stand together[m]." He doth but betray his own ignorance, and intolerable boldness, to censure all the world for that which he never read nor understood. We all say in like manner, that "necessity and will may stand together;" for will and spontaneity are the same thing. But necessity and liberty can never stand together. If he will shut his eyes against the light, he may stumble as often as he pleaseth.

[His presumptuous rejection of received terms of art.]

He saith, he "doth not fear that it will be thought too hot for" his "fingers, to shew the vanity of such words as these, intellectual appetite, conformity of the appetite to the object, rational will, elective power of the rational will, reason is the root of liberty, reason representeth to the will[n]." Reader, behold once more the unparalleled presumption of this man. Words and terms are not by nature, but by imposition. And who are fit to impose terms of art but artists, who understand the art? Thus were all these terms imposed. Again, "*verborum ut nummorum*"—"words are as money is:" the most current is the best. This was the current language of all schools of learning, which we learned from our tutors and professors: but a private man starteth up, not bred in the Schools, who opposeth his own authority to the authority of the whole world, and cries down the current coin, that is, the generally received terms of art. Where is his commission? What is his reason? Because he doth not understand them, he guesseth, that they did not

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 35.]

[n] [Ibid., pp. 35, 36.]

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understand themselves. Is his private understanding (which 758 is filled up to the brim with prejudice and presumption) fit to be the public standard and seal of other men's capacities? They who will understand School terms, must learn and study them; which he never did. Those things that are excellent and rare, are always difficult[o]. He who shall affirm, that all the famous divines and philosophers in the world for so many succeeding ages did speak nonsense, deserveth to be contemned. His respect to weak capacities must not serve his turn. "*Nullæ sunt occultiores insidiæ, quam hæ quæ latent in simulatione officii*[p]." If he could shew any author before himself, wherein these terms were not used, or wherein his new terms were used, it were something. There is no art in the world which hath not proper terms; which none understand but they who understand that art.

But "*cui bono*[q]?" If we should be so mad to quit all received school terms and distinctions, and lose all the advantage which we might reap by the labours and experience of so many great wits, what advantage would this be to him? None at all at long running. Whatsoever be the terms, the state of the question must be the same. And those very reasons, which convince him now in the old language of the Schools, would convince him likewise in the new language which he desireth to introduce, after it was formed and generally understood. All the benefit that he could make of it, would be only a little time, between the suppression of the one and the introduction of the other, wherein he might juggle, and play hocus pocus under the cloak of homonomies, and ambiguous expressions. And that is the reason why he is so great a friend to definitions, and so great an enemy to distinctions.

Necessity upon supposition, what it is.

Whereas I affirmed, that "necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty[r]," he objecteth, that all necessity is upon supposition; as, "the fire burneth necessarily,.. upon supposition that the ordinary course of nature be not hindered by God (for the fire burnt not the three children in the furnace"), and [Dan. iv. 27.]

[o] ["Περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή." Aristot., Ethic., II. ii. 10.]

[p] Tull., [as quoted by St. Augustin, but without a reference.]

[q] [Id., Pro Milone, c. xii.—"Illud Cassianum, Cui bono fuerit."]

[r] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 33; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

upon "supposition that fuel be put unto it[s]." His supposition —"if the ordinary course of nature be not hindered"—is impertinent, and destructive to his own grounds. For though it be true, that those things which are impossible to the second causes, as to make "a camel go through the eye of a needle," are "all possible with God;" yet, upon his opinion, that all things are necessary from eternity, God hath tied His own hands, and nothing is possible to God, which is not absolutely necessary and impossible to be otherwise. His other instance—of "putting fuel" to the fire—is a necessary supposition to the continuance or duration of the fire, but not to the acting or burning of the fire. So long as there is fire, it doth and must burn. When all requisites to action are present, the will is free still to choose or refuse. When all things requisite to action are present to the fire, it cannot choose but burn, and cannot do otherwise. Thirdly, I answer, that there is a two-fold necessity upon supposition; the one a necessity upon an antecedent extrinsecal supposition. This cannot consist with liberty, because it implieth an antecedent determination, and the thing supposed was never in the power of the agent. The other is a necessity upon a consequent supposition, where the thing supposed is in the power of the free agent, or depends upon something, or supposeth something, that is in his power; this is very well consistent with true liberty. As, for example, if T. H. do run, then it is necessary that he moves. This necessity is no impediment at all to liberty, because the thing supposed, that is, to run or not to run, is in the power of the free agent. If a man's will be determined antecedently by extrinsecal causes to choose such a woman for his wife, and her will to choose him for a husband, then it is necessary that they elect one another. This necessity is upon an antecedent supposition, and is utterly destructive to liberty, because the determination of the extrinsecal causes is not in the power of the free agent. Lastly, T. H. his two instances of the fire are altogether impertinent. For, first, the fire is a natural necessary agent; and therefore no supposition, antecedent or consequent, can make it free. Secondly, God's hindering the ordinary course of nature is an antecedent supposition;

Discourse II.

Mark x. [25,] 27.

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 36.]

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He saith, that "it seemeth" I "understand not, what these words—'free' and 'contingent'—mean;" because I "put 756
causes among those things that operate freely[t]." What doth the man mean? Are not free agents "causes?" If they be not, how do they act? I understand these words—"free" and "contingent,"—as they ought to be understood; and as the world hath understood them for two thousand years. As for his new nicknaming of free and contingent agents, I heed it not.

He hath "shewed," that this liberty, whereof we treat, is common to brute beasts and inanimate creatures with man[u], as well as he could shew it, or can shew it, or ever will be able to shew it; that is, just as much as he hath "shewed," that the sea burneth. If it were not for this confounding of terms, and a company of trifling homonymies, he would have nothing to say or do.

Man is not a passive instrument, as the sword in his hand.

"When a man" (saith he) "doth any thing freely, many other concurrent agents work necessarily; as [when] the man moveth the sword freely, the sword woundeth necessarily[x]." A free agent may have concurrent agents, but his instance in a sword is very impertinent, which is but an instrument, yea, a passive instrument; and though it have an aptitude in itself, from the sharpness and the weight thereof, yet the determination of the action, and the efficacy or causation, ought to be ascribed to the principal agent. The sword did not wound, but the man wounded with the sword. Admit the sword may be said in some sense to concur actively to the cutting, certainly it concurs only passively to the motion. But he would make us believe that the man is no more active than his sword, and hath no more power to suspend or deny his concurrence than the sword, because a man doth "not move himself," or at least, not move himself "originally[y]." I have heard of some who held an opinion, that the soul of man was but like the winding up of a watch, and when the string was run out, the man died, and there the soul deter-

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 36.]
[u] [Ibid., pp. 36, 37.]
[x] [Ibid., p. 37.]
[y] [Ibid.]

mined; but I had not thought before this, that any man had made the body also to be like a clock, or a jack, or a puppet in a play, to have the original of his motion from without itself, so as to make a man in his animal motion to be as mere a passive instrument as the sword in his hand. If by "originally" he do understand independently, so as to suppose that a man hath his locomotive faculty from himself and not from God, we all affirm, that the original of a man's locomotive faculty is from God, "in Whom we live, and move, and have our being." But if he understand "originally," not in relation to the faculty, but to the act of moving (as he must mean unless he mean nonsense), then we affirm, that a man doth "move himself originally," and desire not to "taste" of his paradoxical "knowledge of motion." It is folly to dispute with such men, and not rather to leave them to their own phantastical chimeras; who deny all principles and rules of art, whom an adversary cannot drive into greater absurdities than they do willingly plunge themselves into. Thus they do on purpose put out the lights, and leave men to fence in the dark; and then it is all one, whether a man have skill at his weapon or not.

Discourse II.

Acts xviii. 28.

That he would have contingency to depend upon our knowledge, or rather our ignorance, and not upon the accidental concurrence of causes; that he confoundeth free causes, which have power to suspend or deny their concurrence, with contingent causes, which admit only a possibility to concur or not concur, rather out of impotence than power; that he maketh free causes, which are principal causes, to be guided by inferior and instrumental causes; as if a man should say, that a man is guided by the sword in his hand, and not the sword by the man[s];—deserves no other answer but contempt or pity, that a man should so poison his intellectuals, and entangle himself in his own errors.

[Of contingent and free causes.]

Such another mistake is his argument to prove, that contingent causes could not have concurred otherwise than they did; I know not whether more pedantical or ridiculous. "For I conceive not" (saith he), "how, when this runneth this way and that another, they can be said to concur, that is, run

[s] Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 37.]

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together[a]." Wheresoever there are divided parties, as in a court, or a camp, or a corporation, he who "concurreth" with one party, doth thereby desert the other.

The instance in ambs-ace hath lost T. H. his game.

Concerning his instance of the necessity of casting ambs-ace[b], if he can shew, that the caster was antecedently necessitated to cast, so that he could not possibly have denied his concurrence, and to cast so soon, so that he could not possibly have suspended his concurrence, and to cast just with so much force, so that he could not possibly have used more force or 760
less force, and to cast into that table and that very individual place (it may be whilst he winked, or looked another way),—I say, if he can shew that all these contingent accidents were absolutely predetermined, and that it was not at all in the caster's power to have done otherwise than he did, then he hath brought contingency under the jurisdiction of fate. But if he fail in any one of these (all men see that he must fail in all of these), then I may have leave to tell him, that his casting of ambs-ace hath lost him his game.

But now, reader, I desire thee to observe his answer, and to see him plainly yield the cause. Though the subject —"ambs-ace"—be mean and contemptible, yet it yieldeth thee light enough to see what notorious triflers these are. Thus he saith,—"The suspending of the caster's concurrence, or altering of his force, and the like accidents, serve not to take away the necessity of ambs-ace, otherwise than by making a necessity of deux-ace, or some other cast that shall be thrown[c]." This is ingenuously answered; I ask no more of him. He confesseth, that the caster might have suspended his concurrence, or have altered his force, or the accidents might have fallen out otherwise than they did; and that if these alterations had happened, as they might have happened, then there had been as great a "necessity of deux-ace or some other cast," as there was of ambs-ace. Where he saith, that the alteration of the accidents "serveth not to take away the necessity of ambs-ace, otherwise than by making a necessity of deux-ace or some other cast," he confesseth, that by making "a necessity of deux-ace or some other cast," they might "serve to take away the necessity of

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 37.]

[b] [Ibid.]

[c] [Ibid.]

ambs-ace." What is now become of his antecedent determination of all things to one "from eternity[d]?" and of the absolute impossibility that any event should come to pass otherwise than it doth? If this be all his necessity, it is no more than a necessity upon supposition, where the thing supposed was in the agent's power; and where, the contrary determination by the agent being supposed, the event must necessarily have been otherwise. And so he is come unwittingly under the protection of that "old foolish rule[e]," which even now he renounced,—"whatsoever is, when it is, is necessary so as it is."

[T. H. confoundeth absolute and hypothetical necessity.]

I said most truly, that "that is not the question which he maketh to be the question[f]." For although at some times he assent to the right stating of the question, yet at other times, like a man that doth not understand himself, he varieth quite from it: and in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity, he introduceth a consequent hypothetical necessity; as we have seen even now in the case of "ambs-ace;" and where he argueth from prescience[g]; and where he reasoneth thus, that which shall be, shall be[h]; as if the manner how it should be, were not material: and where he maketh "deliberation and persuasion[i]" to determine the will. All these do amount to no more than a necessity upon supposition. The question is as much or more of the liberty of doing what we will, as willing what we will. But he makes it to be only of willing.

T. H. his will is no more than the bias of a bowl.

He proceedeth like another Jehu;—"He that cannot understand the difference between free to do if he will, and free to will, is not fit to hear this controversy disputed, much less to be a writer in it[k]." Certainly I think he meaneth himself, for he neither understandeth what 'free' is, nor what the 'will' is. A bowl hath as much free will as he, the bowl is as much an agent as he; neither of them according to his opinion do "move themselves originally[l]." The bias is as much to the bowl, as his will is to him. The bias is determined to the one, so is his will. The bowl doth not bias

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
[e] [See above p. 264. note j.]
[f] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 30. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[g] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., pp. 14, 15.]
[h] [Ibid., p. 12.]
[i] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. i. pp. 26, 27.]
[k] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 38.]
[l] [Ibid., p. 37.]

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itself, no more hath he the government of his own will, but the outward causes. It is not the fault of the bowl, if it have too much bias, or too little bias, but his fault that biassed it; so, if he choose evil, it is not his fault, but the causes, which biassed him over much, or over little, or on the wrong side. And this is all his "freedom;" a determinate propension to one side, without any possibility to incline the other way: as a man that is nailed to a post, is free to lay his ear to it. Then as Diogenes called a displumed cock "Plato's man," a "living creature with two feet without feathers[m]," so I may call a bowl Mr. Hobbes his free agent.

[His absurd presumption.]

And yet he glorieth in this silly distinction, and hugs himself for the invention of it:—"It is true, very few have learned from tutors, that a man is not free to will, nor do they find it much in books[n]." Yea, when I call "shepherds, poets, pastors, doctors, and all mankind[o]" to bear witness for liberty, he answereth, that "neither the Bishop, nor they, 761 ever thought on this question[p]." If he make much of his own invention, I do not blame him; the infant will not live long before it be hissed out of the world. In all my life I never saw a little empty boat bear so great a sail, as if he meant to tow the world after him; but when the sun is at the lowest, it makes the longest shadows. Take notice (by the way), that his freedom is such a freedom, as none of mankind, from the shepherd to the doctor, ever dreamed of before himself. This vain unprofitable distinction, which wounds himself and his cause more than his adversary, and leaves him open to the blows of every one that will vouchsafe to assault him, which contradicts both the truth and itself, hath been twice taken away already[q] in a voider[r] (whither I refer the reader), and ought not, like twice sodden coleworts, to have been served up again in triumph so quickly, upon his single authority, and before this treatise be ended. I shall meet with it again to some purpose. I wonder whether he do never cast away a thought upon the poor woman that was

[m] [Diog. Laërt., vi. 40.]

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 40.]

[o] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31. note k; from St. Augustin.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 40.]

[q] See Stating of the Question, [above, p. 221;] and Answ. to [Animadv.] Numb. i. [above, p. 258.]

[r] [Viz. "a basket in which broken meat is carried away from the table." Johnson.]

drowned by mischance, whose dead body, whilst her neighbours sought for down the river, her husband, who knew her conditions better than they, advised them to seek up the river; for all her life long she loved to be contrary to all others, and he presumed she would swim against the stream being dead. Is it not hard, that he, who will not allow to other men any dominion over themselves or their own acts, will himself needs usurp an universal empire over the wills and understandings of all other men?

St. Austin more to be credited than T. H.

"Is it not freedom enough" (saith he), "unless a man's will have power over his will, and that his will must have another power within it, to do voluntary acts[s]?" His error proceedeth from the confounding of *voluntas* and *volitio*, the faculty of the will, and the act of willing. Not long after he reiterateth his mistake, taxing me for saying that "our wills are in our power;" adding, that "through ignorance" I "detect the same fault in St. Austin[t]." If he mean my "ignorance" to mistake St. Austin, let St. Austin himself be judge;—"*Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset nisi esset in nostrâ potestate*," &c.—"Therefore our will should not be our will, unless it were in our power; because it is in our power, it is free to us, for that is not free to us which is not in our power[u]," &c. If he mean that it is an error in St. Austin, he sheweth his insolence and vain glory. If this be an error in him, it is an error in all the rest of the Fathers; I will not bate him one of them in this cause. Mr. Calvin (whom he citeth sometimes in this treatise) professeth, that he will not differ a syllable from St. Austin[x]; I do not say, in this question of natural necessity or liberty, which no man then doubted of, but even in that higher question of the concurrence of grace with free will. So here is neither error in St. Austin, nor ignorance in me.

To give liberty to two, and limit to one, is a contradiction.

Whereas I demanded thus,—"If whatsoever a man doth and willeth be predetermined to one precisely and inevitably, to what purpose is that power" whereof T. H. speaketh, to do

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 38.]

[t] [Ibid., p. 40.]

[u] [Aug.,] De Lib. Arbit., lib. iii. c. 3. [§ 8; Op. tom. i. p. 613. F. "Voluntas igitur nostrâ," &c., "in nostrâ potestate: porro quia est in potestate libera est nobis; non enim est nobis liberum, quod in potestate non habemus." See above, Defence Numb. iii. p. 31. note j, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[x] [Instit., lib. II. c. iii. § 8; Op. tom. ix. p. 73. a.]

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if he will, and not to do if he will; which is never deduced into act indifferently, and *in utramque partem*, and consequently frustraneous[y]? He answereth, that "all those things may be brought to pass, which God hath from eternity predetermined[z]." In good time; he might as well say, that God hath given man a liberty to both parts, to do or not to do, to choose or to refuse, and yet hath limited him punctually and precisely to one part; which is a pure contradiction, —to give him choice of two, and yet restrain him to one.

He addeth, that though "the will be necessitated," yet "the doing what we will is liberty[a]." Yes, it is the liberty of a bowl, it is his mock liberty, but it is no wise man's liberty, where all deliberation is vain, and all election is impossible.

[He who is free to act, is much more free to will.]

I argued thus,—"If a man be free to act, he is much more free to will, because, '*quod efficit tale, illud magis est tale*[b]:'" to which he answereth with an ignorant jeer,—"As if he should say, if I make him angry, then I am more angry[c]." Pardon me, I will free him from this fear; I see nothing in him that should move a man to anger, but rather to pity. That canon holdeth only *in causis per se*, such causes as by nature or the intention of the free agent are properly ordained to produce that effect; such as his outward causes are supposed by him to be in the determination of the will; and therefore my instance was proper: not *in causis per accidens*, where the effect is not produced naturally, or intentionally, but accidentally; as in his ridiculous instance.

My last argument which he vouchsafeth to take notice of, 762
was this;—"If the will be determined, then the writing is determined; and then he ought not to say, he *may* write, but, he *must* write[d]." His answer is,—"It followeth that he must write, but it followeth not that I ought to say, he must write; unless he would have me say more than I know, as he himself doth[e]." What poor crotchets are these, unworthy of a man that hath anything of reality in him! as if my argument did regard the saying of it, and not the thing it-

[y] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 30.]
[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 38.]
[a] [Ibid.]
[b] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.]
[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]
[d] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.]
[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]

self. If it follow precisely that he must write, then he hath no freedom in *utramque partem*, either to write or not to write; then he is no more free to do, than to will; both which are contrary to his assertion.

I demanded, if a man's will be determined without his will, "why we do ask him, whether he will do such a thing or not[f]?" His answer is, "because we desire to know[g]." But he wholly mistaketh the scope of the question. The emphasis lieth not in the word "we," but in the word "his;" how it is "*his* will." For if his will be "determined by natural causes without his will," then it is the will of the causes, rather than his own will.

According to T. H. his principles all persuasions are vain.

I demanded further, "why we do represent reasons to men, why we do intreat them[h]." He answereth, "because we think to make them have the will they have not[i]." So he teacheth us, first, that the will is determined by a necessary influence of natural causes; and then prateth of changing the will by advice and moral persuasions. Let him advise the clock to strike sooner or later than it is determined by the weight of the plumb and motion of the wheels; let him dissuade the plants from growing; and see how much it availeth. He saith, the will doth will "as necessarily as the fire burneth[k]." Then let him intreat the fire to leave burning at his request. But thus it falleth out with them, who cannot, or will not, distinguish between natural and moral efficacy.

[Upon his principles] we can blame no man justly.

I asked then, why do we blame free agents; since no man blameth fire for burning cities, nor accuseth poison for destroying men[l]. First, he returneth an answer,—"We blame them because they do not please us[m]." Why? May a man blame every thing that doth not please his humour? Then I do not wonder why T. H. is so apt to blame others without cause. So the scholar may blame his master for correcting him deservedly for his good. So he who hath a vicious stomach may blame healthful food. So a lethargical person may blame his best friend for endeavouring to save his life.

[f] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.]
[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]
[h] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.]
[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]
[k] [Ibid., p. 36.]
[l] [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 32.]
[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]

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And now, having shot his bolt, he begins to examine the case;—"Whether blaming be any more than saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect[n]." Yes, moral blame is much more; it is an imputation of a fault. If a man be born blind or with one eye, we do not blame him for it; but if a man have lost his sight by his intemperance, we blame him justly[o]. He enquireth, "May not we say, a lame horse is lame[p]?" Yes, but you cannot blame the horse for it, if he was lamed by another without his own fault. "May not a man say, one is a fool or a knave" (saith he), "if he be so, though he could not help it[q]?" If he made himself a sot, we may blame him; though if he be a stark sot, we lose our labour. But if he were born a natural idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame him for it. Where did he learn, that a man may be "a knave," and "cannot help it?" Or that knavery is imposed inevitably upon a man without his own fault? If a man put fire to his neighbour's house, it is the fault of the man, not of the fire. He hath confessed formerly, that "a man ought not to be punished but for crimes[r]:" the reason is the very same, that he should not be blamed for doing that which he could not possibly leave undone; no more than a servant whom his master hath chained to a pillar, ought to be blamed for not waiting at his elbow. No chain is stronger than the chain of fatal destiny is supposed to be.

That piece of eloquence which he thinks[s] I borrowed from Tully, was in truth taken immediately out of St. Austin[t], who applieth it most properly to this case now in question.

A lame comparison.

He urgeth, that a man might "as well say, that no man halteth which cannot choose but halt," as say, that no man sinneth in those things which he cannot shun; "for what is sin but halting[u]?" This is not the first time that he hath contradicted himself. Before, he told us, that "there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left un-

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]

[o] [See Aristot., Ethic., III. vii. 15. "Οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμῆσαι."]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]

[q] [Ibid.]

[r] [Ibid., Fount. of Arg., p. 13. See above p. 242, note q.]

[s] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 40.]

[t] [See above p. 31. note k.]

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 41.]

done[x];" now he telleth us, that a man may sin, who cannot choose but sin: then sin is not a punishable crime. He
763 might even as well say, that there is no such thing as sin in the world; or if there be, that God is the author of it. Reader, whosoever thou art, if thou reverence God, eschew such doctrines. His comparison of "halting" is frivolous and impertinent. Halting is not against the eternal rule of God's justice, as sinning is. Neither doth a man choose his halting freely, as he doth his sinning.

T. H. maketh himself no better than a wooden top.

In the conclusion of his Animadversions upon Numb. iii. there is nothing that is new, but that he is pleased to play with a "wooden top[y]." He calleth my argument from Zeno's cudgelling of his man, "a wooden argument[z]." Let him choose, whether I shall call his a wooden, or a boyish, comparison. I did never meet with a more unfortunate instancer than he is. He should produce an instance of natural agents, and he produceth an instance of voluntary agents. Such are the boys that whip his "wooden top." He should produce an instance of a natural determination (so he affirmeth that the will is determined); and he produceth an instance of a violent determination, for such is the motion of his top. I hope he doth not mean, that the will is compelled. If he do, he may string it up with the rest of his contradictions. Hath not he brought his hogs to a fair market? when God hath created him a free man, a noble creature, to make himself like a wooden top! Deserveth not he to be moved, as the top is, with a whip, until he confess his error, and acknowledge his own liberty? If this wooden top should chance to hit T. H. on the shins, I desire to know whom he would accuse. The top? That were as mad a part, as it is in the dog to run after the stone and bite it, never looking at the man who did throw it. What then? Should he accuse the boys that whipped the top? No, that were equally ludibrious, seeing the boys are as much necessitated, and (to use his own phrase) as much "lashed[a]," to what they do by the causes, as the top is by the boys. So he may sit down patiently, and at last think upon his liberty which he had abandoned;

[x] [See above p. 242, note q.]

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 41.]

[z] [See above in the Defence, T. II. Numb. xiii. p. 82.]

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 41.]

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and if the causes will give him leave, get a plantain leaf to heal his broken shin.

Such an unruly thing as this top, which he fancieth, is he himself, sometimes dictating errors, sometimes writing paradoxes, sometimes justling out metaphysics, sometimes wounding the mathematics; and, in a word, troubling the world, and disordering all things, logic, philosophy, theology, with his extravagant conceits. And yet he is offended, that men will go about to keep possession of their ancient principles against his upstart innovations; and is ready to implead them (with that quarrelsome Roman), because they would not receive his weapon fairly with their whole bodies[b]. It were a much more Christian contemplation, to elevate his thoughts from this "wooden top" to the organical body of a man, wherein he may find God a hundred times; from the external form or figure of the one, which affords it only an aptitude to move and turn, to the internal and substantial form of the other, which is the subordinate beginning of animal motion; from the turning of his top, which is so swift that it prevents the discovery of the sharpest eye-sight, and seemeth to stand stock still, to the eternity of God, where motion and rest do meet together, or all motion is swallowed up into rest; lastly, from these boys, who hold the top up by their continued lashings, to the infinite power of an Almighty God, Who is both the procreating and conserving cause of all our life, being, and motion, and to magnify Him for His wonderful works, wherein He hath manifested to the world His own power and wisdom.

AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON NUMBER IV.

[Liberty of exercise and of specification.]

These Animadversions will produce no great trouble either to me or the reader. I did demonstrate in this section the difference between liberty of exercise or contradiction, and liberty of specification or contrariety. He only takes notice of it, and calls it "jargon[c];" and so without one word more, shaketh hands and withdraweth himself.

[b] [Cic., Pro Rosc. Amer., c. xii. "Caius Fimbria . . diem Scævolæ dixit, . . . quod non totum telum corpore recepisset."]

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47; and see above in the Defence, T. II. Numb. iv. p. 34.]

I said it was a rule in art, that homonymous words, or words of a double or doubtful signification, ought first to be distinguished, that disputants may understand one another rightly, and not beat the air to no purpose[d]. I shewed out of the Scriptures, that the word liberty or freedom was such an ambiguous word, and shewed further what this liberty is, whereof we dispute,—a liberty from necessitation or determination to one by extrinsecal causes[e]. He confesseth, that this is the question; adding, that he understandeth not how such a liberty can be[f]. Then what remained but to go to
764 our proofs? Yet here he raiseth a storm of words upon the by, and "foameth out his own disgrace." He denieth, that [Jude 13.] there is any such rule of art;—"I am sure" (saith he), "not in the art of reason, which men call logic[g]." And all logicians are sure of the contrary, who give not only one but many such rules, in treating of simple terms, of complex terms, of fallacies. They teach, that an ambiguous term before it be distinguished signifieth nothing; that it cannot be placed in any predicament; that it cannot be defined nor divided: and they give this general rule, "*Distinctio vocis ambiguæ prima sit in omni rerum consideratione.*" Either this man never read one word of logic in his life, or it is most strange how pride hath defaced all logical notions out of his mind.

Discourse II.

T. H. his deep skill in logic.

He telleth us, that the signification of an ambiguous word may be rendered perspicuous by a "definition[h]." But logicians teach us better,—that it cannot be defined before it be distinguished. How should a man define he knoweth not what? Suppose I should ask him the definition of a degree, can he or any man define a degree before they know what degree is to be defined? whether a degree in the heavens, or a degree in the schools, or a degree of consanguinity, or a degree of comparison? He may as well define a crab before he know whether it be a crab-fish or a crab-fruit. The definition and the thing defined are the same thing; but ambiguous words have several significations, which cannot be of the same thing.

His silly definitions.

[d] [Defence, Numb. iv. above p. 34, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[e] [Ibid.]
[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 46.]
[g] [Ibid.]
[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 46.]

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His definition of liberty is this,—"Liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion[k]." Before I have done, I shall make him out of love with his definitions. "Liberty is an absence;"—if liberty be "an absence," then liberty is nothing; for "an absence" is nothing in the nature of things but a mere privation:—"an absence of impediments;"—impediments may take away the liberty of execution, not the liberty of election; there may be true liberty where there are impediments and there may be no impediments yet without liberty:—"an absence of outward impediments;"—and why of "*outward* impediments?" may not inward impediments withhold a man from acting freely as well as outward? may not a fit of sickness keep a man at home, as well as a shower of rain? a man may be free, and act freely, notwithstanding impediments; many impediments are vincible; a man may go out of his house though there be a great log laid at his door:—lastly, "an absence of impediments to motions;"—election is the most proper intrinsecal act of liberty, which may be without local motion. I durst not style my poor description by the name of a definition. Yet it set down the right nature of liberty, and shewed what was the difference between us. His definition hath nothing to do with liberty, and cometh not near our question by twenty furlongs. Our controversy is, whether the will be antecedently determined by extrinsecal causes: we have nothing to do with "impediments of motion."

But to let him see the vanity of his definitions, I will demonstrate out of them, that the most necessary agents are free agents, and the most free agents necessary agents; that the will is free, and necessity is liberty. First, when a stone falleth from a steeple to the ground, or when a fire burneth, there is "an absence of all external impediments to motion;" yet, by his own confession, these are not free, nor so much as voluntary, but natural necessary actions. The stone falleth necessarily, not freely. The fire burneth necessarily, not freely. So his definition fitteth a necessary agent as well as a free agent. On the other side, he defineth "necessary" to be "that which is impossible to be otherwise[l]." But, by his

[k] [Ibid.; and in the Defence, T. II. Numb. xxxiii. above p. 175.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]

doctrine, it is "impossible" for any free or voluntary agent "to be otherwise" than it is, or act otherwise than it doth. Therefore, by his definition, all free and voluntary agents are necessary agents. Secondly, if "an absence of external impediments to motion" be a true definition of liberty, then the will is free; for the will hath no "external impediment to motion." External impediments may hinder action, not election, which is the proper act of the will. Lastly, by his definition, liberty itself is necessity, and necessity is liberty; as is made evident thus. The "absence of outward impediments to motion" is the definition which he giveth of liberty, and therefore must be reciprocal or convertible with liberty itself. But necessity is much more "an absence of outward impediments to motion." For if there were any impediments
765 that could hinder the production of the effect, there could be no necessity. Thus he confoundeth all things with his definitions; free agents with necessary agents, and necessary agents with free agents; necessity itself with liberty, and liberty with necessity. And now learning is well reformed.

He is displeased at me for calling him a "particular man," as if (saith he) I or any other was an universal man; and he conceiveth that I "mean a private man[m]." I mean as I write; a particular man is not opposed to an universal man, but to mankind: though he maketh his "city[n]" to be a kind of universal man. My meaning was, "a particular man," that is, not a Church, not a council, not so much as a company of men, but one single man, and it may be a handful of his seduced disciples. There is neither a Church, nor a council, nor a company of men, but they may justly challenge more respect than one single man.

Meditation little worth without making use of other men's experience.

Here he boasteth of his constant meditations;—that he hath "done almost nothing else but to meditate upon this and other natural questions[o]." Still he forgetteth Epictetus his rule, that "the sheep should not brag how much it hath eaten[p]." If he had "meditated" to any great purpose, we should have found it in his works. For my part, I do neither believe, that he had so much spare time from other employments to bestow upon his "meditations;" nor that private

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47.]

[n] [Viz. in his Treatise De Cive, tit. Imper., c. vi. § 9, p. 57.]

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47.]

[p] [See above p. 261, note y.]

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meditation, without making use of the studies and experience of other men, is so ready a way to attain to perfection in such hidden learning. If he had spent all his time in meditating how to become a good physician, and had never read a line of Hippocrates or Galen, or any other learned author, the meanest of which had more knowledge than he is able to attain unto with all his "meditation" during his whole life, what would it have availed him? "*Facile est inventis addere*;"—it is much easier to top a stately edifice, than to build it up from the very foundation. Lastly, I do not believe, that he was capable of "meditation" upon those high subjects; which he never understood, as appeareth plainly by his writings. How should a blind man judge of colours?

Terms of art are ungrateful to rude persons.

Yet he will not give over, until he have had another fling against School-terms; because he findeth it easier to censure, than either to confute or understand. He hath been answered formerly[q], and shall receive a further answer in due place. For the present, I shall only put him in mind of two sayings: the one of Scaliger,—"*Voces didacticæ rudibus ingeniis acerbæ, delicatis ridiculæ sunt*[r]"—"Terms of art devised for instruction are unpleasant to palates not exercised in them, and ridiculous to nice and delicate ears." There is a double perspicuity, the one vulgar, to common people, the other more intellectual, to artists. "In vulgar appellations" (saith Aristotle) "we are to speak as the common people, but in terms of art we are to follow the most approved artists[s]."

[Of Luther and Melancthon, and the Schoolmen.]

He asketh, "with what patience" I "can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon speak" against School theology[t]: whereof he giveth some instances, but without citing the places; so he must receive an answer without perusing of them. If they have condemned all Schoolmen and School learning, it is for him to defend them, not for me. For if they did so, I should not much value their judgment in that particular. But I do not believe that any who made so great use of School learning, did condemn all Schoolmen in general.

[q] [Above in the Answ. to the Προλεγόμενα, p. 209; and below Castig. upon Animadv., Numb. xi. p. 306, &c.]

[r] [Jul. Scalig., Exercit. de Subtilitate ad Cardan., Exercit. ccclix. c. 2. p. 1097. Francof. 1607.—"Mutuandæ sunt quotidianæ voces ad usum abstrusarum intellectionum; quæ rudibus inchoatisque ingeniis acerbæ sunt, delicatis atque Ciceronianis etiam ridiculæ."]

[s] Topic., lib. II. c. ii. § 9. ["Ταῖς μὲν ὀνομασίαις τὰ πράγματα προσαγορευτέον καθάπερ οἱ πολλοί, ποῖα δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα ἢ οὐ τοιαῦτα, οὐκέτι προσεκτέον τοῖς πολλοῖς."]

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. pp. 47, 48.]

Luther stinted his accusation to under three hundred years[u]. It may well be, that in that time some Schoolmen in some questions were too licentious. But T. H. condemneth not only the men but the learning, all their grounds, all their terms; and more particularly, in this very question of the liberty of the will, he censureth and contemneth all Fathers, philosophers, and classic writers. I trow, Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon did not so. DISCOURSE II.

He pleadeth, that he "doth not call all School learning jargon, but. . that which they say in defence of untruths; and especially in the maintenance of free will[x]." I believe he hath read very little School learning, either upon that subject, or any other; if he have, we find very little fruit of it in his writings. But if that be his quarrel against the Schoolmen, —for maintaining of freedom of will from antecedent and extrinsecal necessitation in natural acts,—if he will stand to authorities, I am contented to join issue with him, that not only all the Schoolmen, but all Fathers, philosophers, and classic writers, were propugners of this freedom or liberty of will; and particularly his two witnesses, whose words he
766 citeth in this place, Luther and Melancthon; whereof the former saith, that he and his party speak "undiscreetly[y]," and the other (that is, Melancthon) calleth his opinion of universal necessity, a "Manichean opinion," and a "horrible lie[z]."

CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER V.

In this fifth section there are no Animadversions, and so there is no need of Castigations.

CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER VI.

There is no occasion offered to make any long stay upon this subject. I produced three places of Scripture to prove, [Scripture proof that men have power of election.]

[u] [Luther., in Condemn. Libr. M. Lutheri per Univ. Paris., tit. De Philosophiâ et Theol. Scholasticâ, art. vi.; Op. tom. ii. p. 426. b. Jenæ 1566.]

[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47.]

[y] [Apolog. pro Confess. Aug., Art. de Lib. Arb., Op. tom. iv. p. 248.]

[z] [Melancthon., Loci Theolog., Art. de Lib. Arb., 2nd edit. 1545, Op. tom. i. p. 167. a. fol. Witeb. 1601.—"Hæc Manichæa imaginatio horribile mendacium est."]

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that men have liberty or power of election[a]. He answered, that men are necessitated, they choose by antecedent causes[b]. I took away this answer three ways[c]. First, by reason. To this he is silent. Secondly, by instances. Thirdly, by the texts themselves. To this he rejoineth;—that these texts and instances "do only prove, that a man is free to do if he will, which" he "denieth not;" but they do "not prove, that he is free to will:" and in the second instance, "the senior of the mess chooseth what he hath an appetite to, but he chooseth not his appetite[d]." This is all he answereth.

Freedom to do if one will, without freedom to will, a vain distinction.

This distinction hath been already sufficiently refuted[e] as contradictory to his own grounds, which do as much necessitate a man to do as to will; secondly, as unprofitable, the necessity of willing being much more subject and obnoxious to all those blows, and all those absurdities, which flow from fatal destiny, than the necessity of doing; thirdly, as contrary to the sense and meaning of the whole world; fourthly, as contrary to the Scriptures; lastly, I have demonstrated the unreasonableness of his comparison between the intellectual and sensitive appetite, both as it is a comparison,—*Theologia Symbolica non est argumentativa*,—as also as it is an inference from the lesser to the greater negatively.

Now I add, that "that gloss is accursed, which doth corrupt the text;" as this gloss of his doth,—that a man is free to do if he will, but not free to will. Election is that very thing which he saith is not free, that is, the appetite: and it is thus defined, "*Electio est appetitus rei præconsideratæ*"—"Election is an appetite of something that hath been predeliberated of[f]." But the texts alleged do demonstrate, that to choose or elect is free, and undetermined to one. Therefore they do demonstrate, that it is not free only to do, but much more to will or to choose. It is in the husband's choice, either to "establish the vow of his wife," or to "make it void." Here is a liberty of contradiction or of exercise.

Numb. xxx. 14 [13.]

[a] [Above in the Defence, Numb. vi. pp. 37, 38; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[b] [Ibid., T. H. Numb. vi. above p. 38.]

[c] [Ibid., Defence, Numb. vi. above pp. 38—41.]

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vi. p. 54.]

[e] Answer to the Stating of the Quest., [above p. 221; and to the] Fount. of Arg., [above p. 234;] and Castig., Numbers i. iii. [above pp. 257, 274; and] Defence, Numb. iii. [above pp. 30—32, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[f] [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. xiii. art. 2.]

Again, "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve, whether the Gods of your fathers, or the Gods of the Amorites;" and, "I offer thee three things, choose the which of them I shall do." Here is a liberty of contrariety or specification. And in all these places here is a liberty of election,—to will, to desire, to choose their own appetite. Secondly, the same is demonstrated from the definition of free will,—to be "a free power of choosing one thing before another, or accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently, given to the intellectual nature for the glory of God, in order to some end[g]." But all these texts by me alleged, and many more, do attribute unto the will a "power of choosing one thing before another," or of "accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently." Therefore all these texts do demonstrate, that the will of man is free, not only to do if he will, but to will, that is, to choose or to elect. Wheresoever, whensoever, and howsoever the will acteth, it is volition; but election is the proper formal act of the will, as it is free. And it is altogether impossible there should be any election, without a freedom to will. The will employeth the understanding to consider of the most convenient means to attain some desired end. The understanding doth return its judgment, which is like a bill presented to the king by the two houses. The will is free, either to suspend its act or deny its approbation, with "*La volonté s'avisera*"—"The will will advise better," or else to consent, with "*La volonté le veut*"—"The will approveth it;" which consent to the judgment of the understanding is properly election, as it were the conclusion of a practical syllogism, "an intellective appetite or an appetitive intellect[h]." If a great prince should offer to his poor subject three distinct gifts and bid him take his choice of them, having underhand given away two of them before to another from him, were it not an abuse, and a mere mockery? God

Discourse II.

Josh. xxiv. 15.—2 Sam. xxiv. 12.

[g] ["Liberum arbitrium est *libera potestas, ex his quæ ad finem aliquem conducunt, unum præ aliis eligendi, aut unum et idem acceptandi vel pro arbitrio respuendi, intelligenti naturæ ad magnam Dei gloriam attributa.*" Bellarm., De Gratiâ et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 2; Op. tom. iii. p. 650. D.]

[h] ["Διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική." Aristot., Ethic., VI. ii. 5.—"Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη· . . θέμενοι τέλος τι, τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι, διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι· δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου, πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται, κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν." Id., ibi[illegible] iii. 11.]

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offered David in like manner his choice of three things;—"I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall do." [2 Sam. xxiv. 12.] Did God openly offer to David the free choice of three things, and had secretly determined that two of them should never be? Far be this from God. Especially to do it so seriously, 767 Deut. xxx. 19. and with such solemn protestations; as, "I call heaven and earth this day to record against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." Can any man who [Matt. xiii. 31, 32.] hath but so much reverential fear of God, as "a grain of mustard seed, which is the least of seeds," harbour such an unworthy thought in his breast?—that Truth itself should be guilty of such gross dissimulation. It is a decided cause in law, that he who hath granted to another liberty of election, cannot before his election dispose of that which he hath granted away to another. He who hath a right to elect, if he choose an unworthy person, by the sentence of the law forfeits his right to elect for that turn. Why so, if he was necessitated without his will to choose as he did? We say truly, consent taketh away error. That man is not wronged, who consents to his own wrong. How so, if his consent be against or without his own will? If the will be not free but necessitated, then nothing is unlawful. "That which is not lawful by the law, necessity maketh lawful." In case not only of absolute, but even of extreme necessity, *meum* and *tuum* ceaseth, and that which otherwise had been plain theft, becometh just. He who necessitateth all events, taketh sin out of the world.

One of my instances was in the election of the king of the Romans[i]; to which he answereth as formerly, that "the electors are free to name whom they will, but not free to will[k]." If they be "not free to will," then they are not free to elect; for election is the proper formal act of the will: and then the electors are no electors. There is one contradiction. Neither are they free to name whom they will indifferently, if they be determined necessarily and antecedently to name one. Possibility of more than one, and a precise determination to one (that is, *may* name, and *must* name), are likewise con-

[i] [Defence, Numb. vi. above pp. 39, 40; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vi. p. 54.]

tradictories in *adjecto*. This is not all. We see by the Golden Bull[l], what care there is to bring the electors together to Frankfort, and to secure them there. Every one of them must take a solemn oath upon the Gospel of St. John, that "according to his faith which he oweth to God and the Roman empire, to the best of his discretion and understanding, he will choose"—"*volo eligere*"—"with the help of God, a king of the Romans, that is fit for it, and give his voice and vote without all pact, stipend, price, or promise[m]." And if they do not accord actually within thirty days, they are thenceforth to have nothing but bread and water until they have made their election[m]. If it was antecedently determined by extrinsecal causes who should be chosen and no other, what needed all this trouble and charge to so many great princes, when they might as well have stayed at home, and have set seven ordinary burghers to have drawn lots for it? Do men use to swear to choose that, which (it may be) is not in their power to choose, and to refuse that, which (it may be) is not in their power to refuse? The belly is a vehement orator; but if it be absolutely determined whom they must choose, and when, they might as well give them Moselle wine, and the best meat the country affords, as bread and water. Here we have expressly "*volo eligere*"—"I will choose;" which is as much as to say, "*volo velle*"—"I will will;" which phrase T. H.[n] esteemeth an absurd speech, but Julius Scaliger thought otherwise,—"*Dicimus et verè et ex omnium gentium consensu, volo velle*[o]." The very words, "*cum adjutorio Dei*"—"with *the help* of God," might teach them, that God is neither the total cause, nor the determining cause, of man's election. Lastly, this distinction maketh T. H. worse than the Stoics themselves; for the Stoics, together with their fate, did also maintain the freedom of the will; and as we find in many authors, both theirs and ours, did not subject the soul of man nor the will of man to the rigid dominion of destiny. The Stoics "substracted some causes, and subjected others to necessity: and among those which they would not have to be

And maketh T. H. a degree worse than the Stoics.

[l] Bulla Caroli IV. [A.D. 1356. See Goldast., Constit. Imp., tom. i. p. 355.]

[m] [Ibid.]

[n] [Qu., State of the Quest., p. 4.]

[o] [Exoteric. Exercit. de Subtilitate ad Hieron. Cardan.,] Exercit. cccvii. [c. 25. p. 970. Francof. 1607.]

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under necessity, they placed the will of man; lest it should seem not to be free, if it were subjected to necessity[p]." Chrysippus made two sorts of causes; principal causes, which did necessitate and compel all things, except the will of man; and adjuvant causes, as objects, which did only excite and allure. These (said he) do awaken the mind of man, but being awakened it can move of itself; which he setteth forth by the comparison of a whirligig, and a roller cast down a steep place, which have the beginning of their motion from without themselves, but their progress from their own form 768
and volubility[q]. So T. H. is worse than a Stoic in this respect, and extendeth fatal necessity further than they did. I have done with this distinction for this time. I say nothing of the bird, but the egg is bad.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER VII.

[How the will followeth the judgment of reason.]

In these Animadversions there is nothing contained which is material, either for necessity or against liberty; but passion and animosity. Where it is said, that "the will doth perpetually follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last judgment of right reason;" he excepteth, that I am "mistaken, . . for the will followeth as well the judgment of an erroneous as of a true reasoning[r]." First, his exception is improper. It is the judgment of reason, not of reason*ing*. Secondly, it is impertinent. The only question here is, whether the will do follow the last judgment of reason, not whether the reason be right or not. Thirdly, it is false. Whilst the will doth follow the erroneous judgment of reason, yet it followeth it as the judgment of right reason. When the judgment of reason is erroneous, the will followeth it only *de facto*; but when it is right, it followeth it both *de facto* and *de jure*.

[The will and the understanding explained.]

His second exception is, that I "make the understanding to be an effect of the will[s]." Good words. I said not the understanding, but "the act of the understanding[t]," that is, the deliberation or judgment of the understanding; which is so far

[p] Aug., De Civit. Dei, lib. v. c. 10. [§ 1; Op. tom. vii. p. 124. F.]
[q] Apud Gellium, [vi. 2.]
[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. p. 58.]
[s] [Ibid.]
[t] [Defence, Numb. vii. above p. 42; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

truly said to proceed from the will, because the will employeth the understanding to deliberate and judge. How the understanding moveth the will and the will moveth the understanding mutually, is a superfluous question; seeing they do not differ really, but rationally. The understanding is the essence of the soul as it knoweth, the will the same essence of the soul as it extendeth itself to enjoy the thing known. Neither am I obliged to read lectures. It is sufficient to know, that the will is moved to the specification of its act only by the understanding, or (which is all one) by the object known and represented. But the will is moved, and doth move the understanding to the exercise of its act, by itself; except only in that motion which is called "*motus primò primus*[u]," that is, the motion of the will towards the last end, which it is not in the power of the will to will or not to will, as its other motions are, but requireth the excitation of the First Cause. The will moveth both the understanding and itself effectively. The understanding moveth the will objectively,—by making those things to be actually known which were only potentially intelligible; as the light of the sun maketh those things actually visible, which before did lie hid in darkness[v].

If he will not understand those things, which all old divines and philosophers do assent unto (choosing rather to be a "blind leader of the blind," than a follower of them who see), nor the "command of the will," nor the difference between "natural" and "moral efficacy;" if he understand not what is "the judgment of the understanding practically practical," he must learn, and not adventure to censure before he knows what he censures. What he is not able to confute, he should not dare to slight. I do not justify all the questions, nor all the expressions, of all Schoolmen; but this I will say, there is often more profound sense and learning in one of these obscure phrases which he censures as "jargon[x]" and unintelligible, than in one of his whole treatises; and particularly, in this which he slighteth more than any of the rest in a domineering manner; that is, "the judgment of the understanding

"*Judicium practice practicum*" explained. [Matt. xv. 14.]

[u] ["Motus primo primus est, qui repente insurgit" (Alexand. Alens., Summa Theol., P. II. Qu. cix. memb. 2.); or as Vazquez explains it (In Prim. Secund. D. Thomæ, Disp. cvi. num. 1.), "qui subito et inopinanter ante omnem rationis considerationem in nobis insurgit."]

[v] [See Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund. Qu. ix. artt. 1—4.]

[x] [See above p. 278. note c.]

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when the understanding aimeth only at knowledge, what is true and what is false, without thought of any external action. Practical judgment is when the understanding doth not only judge what is true and what is false, but also what is good and what is evil, what is to be pursued and what is to be shunned[a]. So we have "the practical judgment of the understanding." Yet further, when the understanding hath given such a practical judgment, it is not necessary that the will shall follow it: but it may suspend its consent, and not elect; it may put the understanding upon a new deliberation, and require a new judgment. In this case the judgment of the understanding is practical, because it intends not merely contemplation, what is true and what is false, but also action, what is to be pursued and what is to be shunned; but yet it is not "practically practical," because it takes not effect, by reason of the dissent of the will. But whensoever the will shall give its free consent to the practical judgment of the

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. p. 59.]

[z] ["Τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ," and again, "ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή," are Aristotle's definitions of νοῦς.—De Animâ, III. iv. 1, 4.]

[a] ["Τῆς θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἡ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ." Aristot., Ethic., VI. ii. 3.]

understanding, and the sentence of reason is approved by the acceptation of the will; then the judgment of the understanding becomes "practically practical." Then the election is made; which philosophers do therefore call "a consultative appetition[b]." Not that the will can elect contrary to the judgment of reason; but that the will may suspend its consent, and require a new deliberation, and a new judgment, and give consent to the later[c]. So we have this seeming piece of nonsense, "*judicium intellectus practicè practicum*," not only translated but explained in English[d], consonantly to the most received opinions of classical authors. If he have anything to say against it, let him bring arguments, not reproaches; and remember how Memnon gave a railing soldier a good blow with his lance, saying, "I hired thee to fight, and not to rail[e]."

How the object is, and how it is not, the cause of seeing.

The absurdity which he imputeth to me in natural philosophy,—that "it is ridiculous to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing," which maketh him "sorry that" he "had the ill fortune to be engaged with" me "in a dispute of this kind[f]"—is altogether impertinent and groundless. The cause of seeing is either the cause of the exercise of seeing or the cause of the specification of the act of seeing. The object is the cause of the specification, why we see this or that, and not the cause of the exercise. He that should affirm, that the object doth not concur in the causation of sight (especially going upon those grounds that I do, that the manner of vision is not by sending out beams from the eye to the object, but by receiving the *species* from the object to the eye), were in an error indeed. For in sending out the *species* there is action, and in the reception of them passion. But he that should affirm, that the object is the cause of the exercise of sight, or that it is that which maketh that which is "*facultate aspectabile*" to be "*actu aspectabile*," or that it is

[b] ["Ὀρεκτὸς δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν." Aristot., Ethic., III. v. 19.]

[c] ["Est vero ratio data voluntati ut instruat illam, non destruat: . . si horum quodlibet" (scil. vel malum vel bonum) "prohibente ratione voluntas non posset, voluntas jam non esset." S. Bernard., De Lib. Arb., c. ii. § 4, Op. vol. I. tom. ii. p. 610. E. ed. Bened. —And see also Thom. Aquin., De Veritate, Qu. xxii. art. xv. Respond.]

[d] ["If *practice practicum* had been sense, he might have made a shift to put it into English." Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. p. 59.]

[e] Plut., [Apophthegm. Reg., &c.; Op. Moral. tom. i. p. 485. ed. Wyttenb.]

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. p. 59.]

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that which judgeth of the colour or light, or (to come home to the scope of the place) that the object doth necessitate or determine the faculty of sight or the sensitive soul to the exercise of seeing, were in a greater error. Among many answers which I gave to that objection—that the dictate of the understanding doth determine the will,—this was one, that supposing it did determine it, yet it was not naturally but morally, not as an efficient by physical influence into the will, but by proposing and representing the object; which is not my single opinion, but the received judgment of the best Schoolmen[g]. And in this sense, and this sense only, I said truly, that the understanding doth no more by proposing the object determine and necessitate the will to will, than the object of sight doth determine and necessitate the sensitive soul to the actual exercise of seeing; whereas all men know, that the sensitive agent (notwithstanding any efficacy that is in the object) may shut his eyes, or turn his face another way. So that which I said was both true, and pertinent to the question: but his exception is altogether impertinent; and if it be understood according to the proper sense and scope of the place, untrue. And this is the only philosophical notion which hitherto I have found in his Animadversions.

CASTIGATIONS OF HIS ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER VIII.

[All T. H.'s contention is about terms, not things.]

Whosoever desireth to be secure from T. H. his arguments, may hold himself close to the question, where he will find no great cause of fear. All his contention is about terms. Whatsoever there was in this section which came home to the principal question, is omitted; and nothing minded, but the meaning or signification of "voluntary" or "spontaneous" 770 acts, &c., which were well enough understood before by all scholars, until he arose up (like another Davus in the comedy[h]) to trouble all things. So he acts his part like those fond musicians, who spent so much time in tuning of their instruments, that there was none left to spare for their music.

Which are free, which are voluntary, or spontaneous, and which are necessary agents, I have set down at large, Numb. iii[i]; whither (to prevent further trouble) I refer the reader:

[g] [Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. ix. art. 1.]

[h] [Terent., Andria.]

[i] [Above, pp. 262—268.]

and am ready to make it good by the joint testimonies of a hundred classic authors, that this hath been the common and current language of scholars for many ages. If he could produce but one author, Stoic or Christian, before himself, who in the ventilation of this question did ever define liberty as he doth, it were some satisfaction. Zeno, one of the fairest flowers in the Stoics' garland, used to boast, that he sometimes wanted opinions but never wanted arguments[k]. He is not so lucky; never wanting opinions, ever wanting proofs. Hitherto we have found no demonstrations, either from the cause or from the effect; few topical arguments, or authorities that are pertinent to the question, except it be of "countrymen" and "common people;" with one comparison. Discourse II.

But to come to the Animadversions themselves. He chargeth me, "or rather the Schoolmen," for "bringing in this strange word, 'spontaneous,' merely to shift off the difficulty of maintaining" our "tenet of free-will[l]." If spontaneous and voluntary be the same thing, as we affirm, and use them both indifferently, I would gladly know, how the one can be a subterfuge more than the other? or why we may not use a word that is equipollent to his own word? But to cure him of his suspicion. I answer, that the same thing, and the same term of spontaneous, both in Greek and Latin, in the same sense that we take it, as it is distinguished from free, and just as we define it, was used by philosophers a thousand years before either I or any Schoolmen were born; as we find in Aristotle,—"That is spontaneous" (or "voluntary"—"*τὸ ἑκούσιον*"), "whose beginning is in itself, with knowledge of the end," or, "knowing every thing wherein the action doth consist[m]." And the same author, in the very next chapter, makes the very same difference between that which is voluntary, and that which is free or eligible[n], that we do. Spontaneity.

His second exception is against these words,—"Spontaneity Conformity signifieth

[k] [Diog. Laert., vii. 179; of *Chrysippus*, not Zeno, the pupil, not the master.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii. p. 69.]

[m] [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. c. ii. [§ 20.— "*Ὁντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις.*" And a little above, § 18.—"*Περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας, ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.*"]

[n] [Id., ibid., c. iv. § 16, 17.—"*Τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν· . . ἆρα γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας.*"]

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agreeableness as well as likeness.

consists in a conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive, to the object[o];" which words (saith he) do "signify, that spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the object, which to" him "soundeth as if" I "had said, that the appetite is like the object, which is as proper as if" I "had said that the hunger is like the meat;" and then he concludes triumphantly, "If this be his meaning, as it is the meaning of the words, he is a very fine philosopher[p]." All his philosophy consists in words. If there had been an impropriety in the phrase (as there is none), this exception had been below an Athenian sophister; I had almost said (saving the rigorous acception of the word, as it was used afterwards), an Athenian sycophant. Conformity signifies not only such a likeness of feature as he imagineth, but also a convenience, accommodation, and agreeableness. So the "savoury meat" which Rebecca made for her husband, was *conform* to his appetite. So Daniel and his fellows *conformed* their appetites to their pulse and water. Thus Tully saith, "*Ego me* conformo *ad ejus voluntatem*[q]"—"I *conform* myself to his will." Where there is an agreeableness, there is a conformity; as, to conform oneself to another man's humour, or to his council, or to his commands. He "resolveth to have no more to do with spontaneity[r]." I thought that it had not been himself, but the causes, that "resolved" him without his own will. But whether it be himself or the causes, I think, if he hold his resolution, and include liberty therein for company, it will not be much amiss for him.

[Gen. xxvii. 14.]

[Dan. i. 13, 16.]

Αὐτόματα, what they are.

Here he readeth us a profound lecture;—"that the common people, on whose arbitration dependeth the signification of words in common use, among the Latins and Greeks, did call all actions and motions, whereof they did perceive no cause, spontaneous and *αὐτόματα*[s];" and in the conclusion of his lecture, according to his custom, he forgetteth not himself;—"the Bishop, understanding nothing of this, might, if it pleased him, have called it jargon[t]." What pity is it, that he hath not his Gnatho[u] about him, to ease him of this trouble

[o] [Defence,] Numb. iii. [above p. 28.]
[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii. p. 70.]
[q] [Cic., Ad Famil., lib. i. Epist. 8.]
[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii. p. 70.]
[s] [Ibid.]
[t] [Ibid., p. 71.]
[u] [Terent., Eunuch.]

of stroking his own head? Here is a lecture, able to make all the blacksmiths and watchmakers in a city gape and wonder, to see their workmanship so highly advanced. Thus he vapoureth still, when he lights upon the blind side of an equivocal word. For my part, I not only "might have called" it, but do still call it, mere "jargon," and no better.

771 To pass by peccadillos; first, he telleth us, how "the common people did call all actions spontaneous, and *αὐτόματα*," &c. How doth he know what "the common people" called them? The books which we have, are the books of scholars, not of the common people. Secondly, he saith, that "the signification of all words dependeth upon the arbitration of the common people." Surely he meaneth only at Athens, where it is observed, that wise men did speak, and fools did judge. But neither at Athens, nor at any other place, were "the common people" either the perfecters or 'arbitrators' of language, who neither speak regularly nor properly, much less in words that are borrowed from learned languages. Thirdly, he supposeth, that these words—liberty, necessity, and spontaneity—are "words in common use;" which in truth are terms of art. There is as much difference between that liberty and necessity which ordinary people speak of, and the liberty and necessity intended in this question (whereof we are agreed), as there is between the pointing out of a man with one's finger and a logical demonstration, or between a habit in a tailor's shop and a habit in logic or ethics. Fourthly, he confoundeth spontaneity and chance, comprehending them both under the name of "*τὰ αὐτόματα*." I confess, that *τὸ αὐτόματον*, in poets and orators, is a word of very ambiguous signification; sometimes signifying a necessary, sometimes a voluntary or spontaneous, sometimes a casual, sometimes an artificial, agent or event. Such equivocal words are his delight. But as they are terms of art, all these words are exactly distinguished, and defined, and limited to their proper and certain signification. That which is voluntary or spontaneous, is called "*τὸ ἑκούσιον*;" as we see plainly in Aristotle: that which is freely elected, is called "*τὸ προαιρετὸν*," and that which is by chance, is called *τὸ αὐτόματον*; as he may see in the

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places cited in the margent[x], where all these words are exactly distinguished and defined. Fifthly, he saith, "the Latins and Greeks did call all actions and motions, whereof they did perceive no cause, *αὐτόματα*;" which, according to Aristotle and other philosophers, doth signify things done by chance. And in his reason—"whereof they did perceive no cause"—he is mistaken on both sides. For, first, the causes of many things are apparent, which yet are said to be done by chance; as when a tile falleth down accidentally from a house, and breaketh a man's head: and, on the other side, many things whereof the causes were not known, as the ebbing and flowing of the sea, were not said to be done by chance. I shall not need for the present to make any further enquiry into his extravagant interpretations of words, which he maketh gratis upon his own head and authority, and which no man admitteth but himself. "*Rectum est index sui et obliqui*[y]." Sixthly, he saith, "not every appetite, but the last, is esteemed the will," when men do "judge of the regularity or irregularity of one another's actions[z]." I do acknowledge, that "*de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio.*" If it do not appear outwardly to be his will, man cannot judge of it as his will. But if it did appear to be his will, first or last, though he change it over and over, it was his will, and is judged by God to have been his will, and may be justly judged so by man, so far as it did appear to have been his will by his words and actions. If he mean his last will and testament, that indeed taketh place and not the former; yet the former will was truly his will, until it was revoked. But of this, and of his 'deliberation,' I shall have cause to speak more hereafter.

A true will may be changed.

[T. H.'s contradictions.]

I come now to his contradictions. His first contradiction is this,—all voluntary acts are deliberate, some voluntary acts are not deliberate[a]. The former part of his contradiction is proved out of these words,—"Voluntary pre-supposes

[x] [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. cc. i, ii; lib. III. cc. iii, iv.—Physic. [Auscult.,] lib. II. c. vi. ["Τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης· ..... φανερὸν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἕνεκά του γινομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἕνεκα γένηται οὗ ἕξω τὸ αἴτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου λέγομεν."]

[y] ["Τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν." Aristot., De Anima, I. v. 20.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii. p. 71.]

[a] [Defence, Numb. viii. above p. 47; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of[b]." The second part is proved as plainly:—"When a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinions of the goodness or harm of it; these actions I call voluntary, &c.: because these actions that follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary;
772 and here, where there is one only appetite, that one is the last[c]." To this he answereth, "Voluntary presupposes deliberation, when the judgment whether the action be voluntary or not, is not in the actor, but in the judge, who regardeth not the will of the actor where there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice, yet knoweth, that though there be but one appetite, the same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it follow, a voluntary action[d]." To which term doth he answer? Of what term doth he distinguish? Some have been observed to have lost the benefit of their clergy at their deaths, because they despised it in their lives. It is no marvel, if he receive no help from any distinction now, who hath ever been an enemy to distinctions, and a friend to confusion. If his answer have any sense at all, this must be it,—that an indeliberate act may be in truth and in the judgment of the agent himself a voluntary act, yet in the common or public judgment of other men it may be esteemed and pass for an involuntary and unpunishable act. But, first, neither the question nor his assertion was, what is to be judged a voluntary act by men, who neither know the heart of man, nor are able to judge of his will; but what is a voluntary act in itself, and what is the essence and definition of a voluntary act. I argue thus;—that which is essentially a voluntary act, cannot by anything that is extrinsecal and subsequent, and which perhaps may never be, be made no voluntary act; but the judgment of other men is extrinsecal and subsequent to the act, and may perhaps never be. How many thoughts of every man every day pass

Voluntariness doth not depend on the judgment of others.

[b] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. viii. [above p. 45.]

[c] [Ibid.,] Numb. xxv. [above p. 160.]

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii. p. 71.]

PART III. unknown, unjudged, whether they were regular or irregular. Secondly, God Almighty, Who is the only "Searcher of [Rom. viii. 27, &c.] hearts," is the proper and only judge of the will. If the act be truly voluntary, He judgeth it to be truly voluntary, whether it be for the agent's advantage or disadvantage. Man cannot judge what acts are voluntary and what are not, because he doth not know the heart. If one perform outward obedience to the law against his will, man judgeth it to be willing obedience, and cannot do otherwise. If a man do an evil act, man must needs judge it to be a voluntary act; and indeed so much more voluntary, by how much it was less deliberated of, because the will is less curbed, and must have less reluctation. How much doth he err, who prefers the judgment of man before the judgment of God! Thirdly, according to T. H. his principles, all acts of free agents whatsoever are voluntary, and cannot possibly but be voluntary; for so he teacheth;—"that a man is free to do if he will, but he is not free to will." Would he have men judge that to be unvoluntary, which cannot possibly but be voluntary? "If he will," with him, is a necessary supposition. Lastly, judges do esteem rash unadvised acts not to be so irregular or so punishable as other acts, not because they are less voluntary (for they are more voluntary), but because the carefullest man breathing cannot arm himself sufficiently against all occasions, but that he may be surprised by sudden passion. But if, after the first fit of passion, he had time and means to cool his heat, and to deliberate of his duty, before the fact committed, and yet he continued obstinate, the law looks upon him without pity, not only as a willing but as a wilful offender, though there was no malice nor inveterate hatred in the case, but perhaps a quarrel upon some punctilio of honour. But for persons uncapable of deliberation, as natural fools, madmen, and children before they have use of reason, though there may be hatred and malice, as experience hath taught us, yet the law doth not punish them in the same nature, because it supposeth them uncapable of deliberation, and unable to consider seriously and sufficiently, either of their duty which they owe to God and man, or of the dangers which they incur by that act, and because it is not their fault that they are uncapable. So the

judgment of man is no safeguard to him from his contradiction. For judges go upon our grounds, which deny all liberty and power of election to such as have not sufficient use of reason without their own fault. But he goeth upon contrary grounds to us, and to the law, holding fools, madmen, children, yea, even brute beasts, to be capable of deliberation and election, and thereupon supposing all voluntary acts to be deliberated. In vain doth he seek shelter under our practice, who is an enemy to those principles, whereupon our practice is grounded. 773

His second contradiction, which he relateth amiss, is this; —All spontaneity is an inconsiderate proceeding,—this is plainly set down by himself, "By spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it[e];"—to which this is contradictory,—Some spontaneity is not an inconsiderate proceeding,—affirmed by him likewise, "When a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandize," &c., "he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is *sponte*, and therefore the action is spontaneous[f]." From whence I argue thus,—All giving merchandize for money is a spontaneous act, but all giving of merchandize for money is not an inconsiderate act, therefore all spontaneous acts are not inconsiderate acts[g]. To this he answereth nothing.

His third contradiction is this, that "having undertaken to prove, that children before they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect, yet" he "saith by and by after, 'that a child may be so young as to do what he doth without all deliberation[h].'" I acknowledge this to be no contradiction as it is here proposed. The acts of reason, as deliberation, do not come to a child in an instant but by degrees. A child is fit to deliberate of his childish sports, or whether he should cry or not, before he can deliberate of matters of greater moment. But if the contradiction be proposed, as I proposed it, and always intended it, of young suckling children soon after their birth, I see not how he can excuse his contradiction. For they have spontaneity the first hour; and yet, by his confession, they are "too young to deliberate[i]." But if

[e] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xxxiii. [above p. 175.]
[f] [Ibid.,] Numb. viii. [above p. 45.]
[g] [Defence, Numb. viii. above p. 48; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[h] [Ibid.]
[i] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. viii. [above p. 46.]

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deliberation were no more than he maketh it, a "demurring upon what they should do," out of sensitive "hope" to suck the breast, and sensitive "fear of some strange figure[k]," or, as he calleth it elsewhere, "an alternate appetite to do or acquit an action[l]," they may deliberate well enough.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER IX.

1 Kings iii. 11. [explained.]

To that place by me alleged,—"Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life," &c.,—he answereth thus,—"How doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solomon had a real power to ask long life? no doubt Solomon knew nothing to the contrary; yet it was possible that God might have hindered him; for though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing that he should choose, it doth not follow that He did not also give him the act of election[m]." It is no new thing with him to confound the act and the object, choice and the thing chosen, election, which is always of more than one, and the thing elected, which is precisely one. I doubt not but Solomon had his power to elect from God; I doubt not but the grace of God did excite Solomon, and assist him in his election to choose well. But that Solomon was necessitated by God to ask wisdom, and not to ask long life, or riches, or the life of his enemy, is clearly against the text. First, "God said to Solomon, ask what I shall give thee." If God had predetermined precisely what Solomon must ask and what he must have, and what he must not ask and what he must not have, it was not only a superfluous, but a ludicrous thing, to bid him ask what gift he would have from God. Then followeth Solomon's deliberation, to enable him to choose what was most fit for him. If God had determined what He would give, and what Solomon must ask, how ridiculous had it been for him to deliberate of what God had done. Thirdly, it is said, "The speech pleased the Lord, that Solomon had asked this thing." There is no doubt but

Election, of more than one.

Verse 5.

Verses 6, 7. 8, 9.

Verse 10.

[k] [In the Defence, T. II. Numb. viii. 164.] above p. 46.]

[l] [Ibid.,] Numb. xxvi. [above p.

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ix. pp. 71, 75.]

all the works of God do please Him. "God saw all that He made, and it was very good." But what had Solomon done to please God, if God did necessitate Solomon irresistibly to do what he did? Then follow the words alleged by me,—"Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life," &c.;—which words, if this opinion of universal necessity were true, can bear no other sense but this,—Because thou hast done this which was inevitably imposed upon thee to do, and hast not done that which was altogether impossible for thee to have done. As if a master should first bind his servant hand and foot, head and heels together, and chain him fast to a post, and then tell him, Because thou hast stayed here, and didst not run away.

Discourse II.

[Gen. i. 31.]

Verse 11.

He urgeth, "that Solomon knew nothing to the contrary," but that it was in his power to have done otherwise[n]. If
774 Solomon, the wisest of men, did not know it, there is little probability that T. H. should know it. But he must know, that it is not Solomon who speaketh these words, but God; I hope he will not suspect God Almighty either of ignorance or of nescience. Lastly, we see what a corollary God gave Solomon for asking well, above that which he did ask; "riches and honour." No man deserveth either reward or punishment for doing that which it was not in his power to leave undone.

I urged these words of St. Peter,—"After it was sold, was it not in thine own power[o]?"—to shew that power which a man hath over his own actions. He answereth, that "the word 'power' signifieth no more than right, not a real natural, but a civil power, made by a covenant," or "a right to do with his own what he pleased[p]." I answer, the word "power" doth not, cannot, signify any such "right to do with his own as he pleased," in this place. For that which St. Peter complaineth of, was Ananias his unjust and sacrilegious detention of part of that, which he had devoted to God, when it was in his power to have offered the whole, that is, to have performed his vow. If sacrilege be right, then this was right; if that which he had purloined sacrilegiously were

Acts v. 4.

—"Was it not in thy power?"—explained.

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ix. p. 75.]

[o] [Defence, Numb. ix. above p. 55; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ix. p. 75.]

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his own, then this was his own; if Ananias had been necessitated by external causes to hold back that part of the price, it had been no more sacrilege, than if thieves had robbed him of it before he could offer it. The reason is thus made evident;—If it was in the power of Ananias to have done that which he did not do, and to have offered that according to his vow, which he did detain contrary to his vow, then all actions and events are not necessitated, and it is in men's power to do otherwise than they do; but St. Peter saith, it was in Ananias his power to have offered that which he did not offer, &c.

CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER X.

Out of hatred to true liberty T. H. makes God hypocritical.

My reason against universal necessity in this section was this;—To necessitate all men to all the individual actions which they do, inevitably, and to expostulate with them, and chide them, and reprehend them, for doing of those very things which they were necessitated to do, is a counterfeited hypocritical exaggeration; but according to T. H. his doctrine, God doth necessitate all men inevitably to do all the individual actions which they do, and yet expostulates with them, and chides them, and reprehends them, for doing of those very things which He did necessitate them inevitably to do. This assumption, which only can be questioned, is proved by the expostulations and objurgations and reprehensions themselves contained in Holy Scripture. Therefore, according to his opinion, God Himself is guilty of counterfeited hypocritical exaggerations.

It were more ingenuous to confess, that this is not to be answered, than to bustle and keep a coil, and twist new errors with old, and tax others ignorantly of ignorance, and say nothing to the purpose.

His first answer is, generally, that I "would have men believe, that because" he "holds necessity, therefore" he "denies liberty[q]." A dangerous accusation, to accuse him of a matter of truth. But he saith, he "holds as much that there is true liberty, as" I "do, or more[r]." Yea, such a liberty, as children,

[q] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. p. 77.]

[r] [Ibid.]

and fools, and madmen, and brute beasts[s], and rivers[t], have; a liberty that consists in negation, or nothing. He saith indeed, that he holds a "liberty from outward impediments[u];" but it is not true: for external causes are external impediments; and if he say truly, all other causes are hindered from all other actions than what they do, by external causes. But true liberty from necessitation and determination to one, he doth not acknowledge; and without acknowledging that, he doth acknowledge nothing. I wonder to which of my propositions, or to what term in them, this answer is accommodated. Discourse II.

His second answer is particular, to the expostulations themselves;—that "these words spoken by God to Adam,—'Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldest not eat?'—do convince Adam, that notwithstanding that God had placed him in the garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying, in case he should accommodate his will to obedience of God's commandment concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own will, as to do it[x]." What ridiculous or rather deplorable stuff is this! How should it be expected, that Adam should be "master of his own will," if God did necessitate his will without his will, and determine him inevitably to what he did! If his doctrine were true, this doth not "convince" Adam, but God Almighty, Who did first necessitate his will, and then chide him for that which was God's own act. Can any man be so blind as not to see the absurdity of this doctrine?—that God did "place in the garden a means to keep man perpetually from dying," and yet did deprive him of it inevitably without his own fault. And this is all that he answereth to the other places; as that to Eve, "Why hast thou done this?"—and to Cain, "Why art thou wroth?"—and, "Why will ye die, O ye house of Israel?" [Gen. iii. 11.] [Gen. iii. 13; iv. 6.—Ezek. xviii. 31; xxxiii. 11.]

I urged this argument further;—"Doth God reprehend man for doing that, which He had antecedently determined that he must do[y]?" He answereth, "no[z]." How? "no?" Are

[s] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. viii. above pp. 45, 46.]
[t] [Ibid., Numb. xxix. above p. 166.]
[u] [Ibid., Numb. xxxiii. above p. 175.]
[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. pp. 77, 78.]
[y] [Defence, Numb. x. above p. 56; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. p. 78.]

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not these 'reprehensions?' Or doth not he maintain, that God had determined man antecedently to do what he did? Yes; but he saith, "God convinceth man and instructeth him, that though immortality was so easy to be obtained, as that it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it" thereby[a]. If God would only have "convinced" man, certainly He would have convinced him by fitter and juster means than hypocritical exaggerations. But how doth he say, that "immortality was so easy to be obtained," which by his doctrine was altogether impossible to be obtained by man by that means? It is neither so easy, nor possible, to oppose and frustrate the decrees of an infinite God.

I shall reserve his errors in theology for a fitter place. Whosoever would trouble himself with his contradictions, might find more than enough. Here he telleth us, that "the dependance of the actions on the will is that which properly and truly is called liberty[b];" elsewhere he told us, that rivers are free agents, and that a river hath true liberty[c]; which, if my ignorance do not mislead me, have no wills.

God's secret and revealed will not contrary; and why.

That God hath a secret and revealed will, no man denieth. To say that these wills are opposite one to another, all good men do detest; because, as I said formerly (which he taketh no notice of), they "concern several persons[d]." The secret will of God is what He will do Himself; the revealed will is

[Gen. xxii.] that which He would have us to do. He objecteth,—"God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, yet His will was he

[Jonah iii.] should not do it;" Jonah, by God's command, denounced the destruction of Nineveh, yet "it was God's will it should not be destroyed[e]." Doth not he see, that the person is varied in both these instances? God would prove Abraham's faith by his readiness to sacrifice his son upon His command. He did it. He would have Nineveh prepared for repentance by Jonah's denunciations of His judgments; His will was accomplished. But it was not God's will, that Isaac should be sacrificed, or Nineveh destroyed. All denunciations of God's judgments are understood with exception. He who fancieth

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. p. 78.]
[b] [Ibid.]
[c] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxix. above p. 166.]
[d] [Defence, Numb. x. above p. 56.]
[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. pp. 78, 79.]

any contradiction in these two instances, understandeth little of the rules of contradictions. There is great difference between that which God will have done by others, and what He will do Himself. There was just reason for what Abraham did, and what Jonah did; but there can be no reason for God to contradict Himself. If God had reprehended Abraham or Jonah for what they did in obedience to His own commands, and punished them for it, and justified it by His omnipotence, which is T. H. his inexcusable error (as I have shewed him already[f], and shall shew him further in due place, if there be occasion), this had been something to his purpose; now, all that he saith, is wholly impertinent.

Likewise, whereas he saith, that "the expostulation of man against God will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of all things be granted or denied, because God could have made man impeccable and did not[g]"—he doth but betray his own weakness and presumption, to talk of any "just expostulation with God" in any case. I have shewed him already, what a vain recrimination this is, and given him just reason, why God Almighty did not make man impeccable[h].

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XI.

In these Animadversions is contained, first, a repetition of my argument: to which he answereth nothing but this,—that "liberty is to choose what we will, not to choose our will," which he saith "no inculcation is sufficient to make" me "take notice of[i]." I know not what he calleth "taking notice." I have confuted it over and over again, both in my Defence[j] formerly, and now in these Castigations[k]; and shewed it to be a vain, silly, unprofitable, false, contradictory, distinction. What he would have me to do more for it, I understand not; but I observe, that he never mentioneth

[f] [Defence, Numb. xii. above pp. 64, &c.]
[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. p. 79.]
[h] [Answ. to] Fount. of Arg., in fine. [above pp. 244—246.]
[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xi. p. 86.]
[j] [Number iii.; above pp. 30—32.]
[k] [Answ. to Stat. of Quest., above p. 221.—Answ. to Animadv. Numb. iii. above p. 274.—Castig. of Animadv. Numb. vi. above p. 284.]

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this distinction but he is presently up upon his tiptoes. He will find by degrees, how little ground he hath for it. 776

[T. H.'s most ridiculous presumption.]

Then he proceedeth to my reply, to which he giveth two answers. First, "that if you take away these words from it, 'knowledge of approbation—practical knowledge—heavenly bodies act upon sublunary things, not only by their motion, but also by an occult virtue (which we call influence)—moral efficacy—general influence—special influence—infuse something into the will—the will is moved—the will is induced to will—the will suspends its own acts;' which are all nonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, if a beast could speak, unworthy of a beast[l]." There is a hundred times more sense in these phrases, than there is in his great Leviathan put all together. He who dare abuse and so much vilify many of the ancient Fathers, and all the lights of the Schools, for so many successive ages, and all philosophers, natural and moral, who have written any thing, as to style them all, without exception, "beasts," and worse than beasts, deserves no other answer but contempt of his ignorant presumption, or pity of his bold blindness. He saith, this malady happened to us by having our "natures depraved by doctrine[m]." We say, his malady happened to him, because his nature was never polished with "doctrine," but he would needs be a master in all arts before he had been a scholar in any art. The true reason why he slighteth these words is because he understandeth very little of them; and what he doth understand, he is not able to answer. So it fareth with him, as with one that hath a politic deafness, who seemeth not to hear what he knoweth not how to answer; as I could shew him by many and many instances, but that I dare not tell him, that any thing is "too hot for his fingers[n]."

Occult virtue or influence.

I said, that "the heavenly bodies do act upon sublunary things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence[o]." Against the matter he excepteth not, but against the expression,—"an occult virtue,"—whereas I should have said, "I know not how[p]." If he alone

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xi. p. 86.]
[m] [Ibid.]
[n] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 35.]
[o] [Defence, Numb. xi. above p. 60; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xi. p. 86.]

be so happy as to know distinctly the causes of all acts, it is well for him; but if this be nothing but bold presumption, it is so much the worse. I have good ground for the thing itself;—"Canst thou bind the sweet influences of the Pleiades?" If he be so much more skilful than all other men about the influences of the stars, I desire to know of him a natural reason of that peculiar virtue which the moon hath of moistening, and Saturn of cooling, and Mercury of raising winds, &c. I fear, when all is done, he will prove to be but one of Æsop's companions, who pretended to know all things, and did know nothing.

Job xxxviii. 31

I argued from his principles, that if God by special influence did necessitate the second causes to operate as they did, and if they, being thus determined, did necessitate man inevitably, unresistibly, by an essential subordination of causes, to do whatsoever he did, then one of these two absurdities must follow,—either that there is no such thing as sin in the world, or that God is more guilty of it than man[q], as the motion of the watch is more from the artificer who makes it and winds it up than from the watch itself[r]. To this he answereth only this, that my "consequence is no stronger, than if out of this—that a man is lame necessarily—one should infer, that either he is not lame, or that his lameness proceeded necessarily from the will of God[s]." And is it possible, that he doth not see, that this influence followeth clearly and necessarily from his principles? If he doth not, I will help his eyesight. All actions and accidents and events whatsoever do proceed from the will of God, as the principal cause, determining them to be what they are by a natural necessary subordination of causes,—this is the principle; I assume that which no man can deny,—but the lameness of this man (whom he mentioneth) is an accident or event; therefore this lameness (upon his principles) is "from the will of God," &c.

[T. H. reduced to an absurdity.]

[q] ["Καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη τούτου δυσσεβέστερος ἄλλος, τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεὸν, . . ἐπάναγκες ἐκβιαζόμενον τόνδε μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα ἀσεβεῖν," . . κ. τ. λ. "Ὡς μηδ' εὐλόγως ἐπιμέμφεσθαι τοῖς πλημμέλουσιν· ἀλλ' ἤτοι μηδὲ ἁμαρτήματα ταῦτ' εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἀπάντων ποιητὴν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι." Euseb., Præp. Evang., lib. vi. c. 6; p. 251. B, C. fol. Paris. 1628.]

[r] [Defence, Numb. xi. above p. 63; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xi. p. 87.]

PART III. CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XII.

In this section, he behaveth himself as the hound by Nilus, drinketh and runneth, as if he were afraid to make any stay[t]; quite omitting the whole contexture and frame of my discourse, only catching here and there at some phrase, or odd ends of broken sentences. The authority of St. Paul was formerly his palladium, the fate of his opinion of fate, or his sevenfold shield, which he bore up against all assailants. And now to desert it, as the ostrich doth her eggs in the sand, and "leave it to the judgment of the reader, to think of the same as 777
he pleaseth[u]," seemeth strange. That man usually is in some great distress, who quitteth his buckler. I desire but the judicious reader, upon the by, to compare my former Defence with his trifling exceptions; and I do not fear his verdict.

It is blasphemy to say, that God is the cause of sin.

He saith, "it is blasphemy to say that God can sin[x]." So it is blasphemy also to say, that God is the author or cause of any sin. This he himself saith (at least implicitly); and this he cannot but say, so long as he maintaineth an universal antecedent necessity of all things flowing from God by a necessary flux of second causes. He who teacheth, that all men are determined to sin antecedently without their own concurrence, irresistibly beyond their own power to prevent it, and efficaciously to the production of sin; he who teacheth, that it is the antecedent will of God, that men should sin and must sin; he who maketh God to be not only the cause of the act and of the law, but likewise of the irregularity or deviation, and of that very anomy wherein the being of sin (so far as sin hath a being) doth consist;—maketh God to be the principal cause and author of sin: but T. H. doth all this.

Or to say, that sin is efficaciously decreed by God.

He saith, "it is no blasphemy to say, that God hath so ordered the world, that sin may necessarily be committed[y]." That is true in a right sense; if he understand only a necessity of infallibility upon God's prescience, or a necessity of supposition upon God's permission. But what trifling and mincing of the matter is this! Let him cough out, and shew us the bottom of his opinion, which he cannot deny:—that God

[t] [Plin., Nat. Hist., viii. 61. "Certum est" (canes) "juxta Nilum amnem currentes lambere, ne crocodilorum aviditati occasionem præbeant."]

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 107.]

[x] [Ibid., p. 105.]

[y] [Ibid.]

hath so ordered the world, that sin must of necessity be committed, and inevitably be committed; that it is beyond the power of man to help it or hinder it; and that by virtue of God's omnipotent will and eternal decree. This is that which we abominate.

Yet he telleth us, that "it cannot be said that God is the author of sin, because not he that necessitateth an action, but he who doth command or warrant it, is the author[z]." First, I take that for granted which he admitteth—that by his opinion God necessitateth men to sinful actions,—which is a blasphemy as well as the other. Secondly, his latter part of his assertion is most false,—that he only who commandeth or warranteth sin, is the author of it. He who acteth sin, he who necessitateth to sin, he who first brings sin into the world, is much more the author of it than the bare commander of it. They make God to be the proper and predominant cause of sin, by an essential subordination of the sin of man to the will of God; and in essential subordinates always, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. If there had never been any positive commandment or law given, yet sin had still been sin, as being contrary to the eternal law of justice in God Himself. If a heathen prince should command a Christian to sacrifice to idols or devils, and he should do it, not the commander only, but he who commits the idolatry, is the cause of the sin. His instance, in the act of "the Israelites robbing the Egyptians of their jewels[a]," is impertinent. For it was no robbery nor sin, God, Who is the lord paramount of heaven and earth, having first justly transferred the right from the Egyptians to the Israelites; and, in probability, to make them some competent satisfaction for all that work and drudgery which they had done for the Egyptians without payment. This is certain;—if God necessitate the agent to sin, either the act necessitated is no sin, or God is the principal cause of it. Let him choose whether of these two absurdities, this Scylla or that Charybdis, he will fall into.

[Exod. xii. 35, 36.]

The reason which he gives of God's objurgation,—"to convince men that their wills were not in their own power, but

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. pp. 105, 106.]

[a] [Ibid., p. 106.]

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in God's power[b]"—is senseless, and much rather proveth the contrary,—that because they were chidden, therefore their wills were in their own power. And if their wills had not been in their own power, most certainly God would not have reprehended them for that which was not their own fault.

God's permission no naked permission.

He saith, that "by interpreting hardening to be a permission of God," I "attribute no more to God in such actions, than" I "might attribute to any of Pharaoh's servants, the not persuading their master[c]," &c. As if "Pharaoh's servants" had the same power over their master that God Almighty had, to hinder him, and stop him in his evil courses; as if "Pharaoh's servants" were able to give or withhold grace; as if "Pharaoh's servants" had Divine power, to draw good out of evil, and dispose of sin to the advancement of God's glory and the good of His Church; as if a humble petition or 'persuasion' of a servant, and a physical determination of the will by a necessary flux of natural causes, were the same thing. He who seeth a water break over its banks, and suffers it to run out of its due channel, that he may draw it by furrows into his meadows, to render them more fruitful, is not a mere nor idle sufferer. His absurdities drop as thick as Sampson's enemies, "heaps upon heaps." 77

[Judg. xv. 16.]

He objecteth, that I "compare this permission of God to the indulgence of a parent, who by his patience encourageth his son to become more rebellious, which indulgence is a sin[d]." Arguments taken from a parable or similitude, are of force no further than they pertain to the end of the parable, or that resemblance for which things are compared. The labourer's penny doth not prove an equality of glory in Heaven. Nor our Saviour's commendation of the unjust steward justify his cheating of his master. Christ proveth the readiness of God to do justice to His servants, upon their constant prayers, by a similitude taken from an unjust judge. So here, the end of the similitude was only to shew, that goodness may accidentally render evil natures more obdurate and presumptuous. Neither was there any 'sinful indulgence' either intended or intimated in my words, like that of Eli to his sons, but only

[Matt. xx. 9—13.]

[Luke xvi. 8.]

[Luke xviii. 1—8.]

[1 Sam. ii. 23—25.]

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 106.]

[c] [Ibid.]

[d] [Ibid.]

patience and innocence, gentleness of a tender father, such as God Himself doth vouchsafe to own;—"Despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath." [Rom. ii. 4, 5.]

He urgeth, that "whether it be called an antecedent or a consequent will, an operative or a permissive will, it is enough for the necessity of the thing, that the heart of Pharaoh should be hardened[e]." An antecedent will is without prevision of sin, a consequent will is upon prevision of sin. Is it all one, whether God do harden men's hearts for sin or without sin, for his fault or without his fault? An operative will produceth an absolute necessity, an antecedent necessity; a permissive will inferreth no more at the highest but a consequent necessity upon supposition, which may consist with true liberty; as hath been made clear to him over and over.

The difference between general and special influence.

He "desires the reader to take notice, that if" I "blame" him "for speaking of God as a necessitating cause, and as it were a principal agent in causing of all actions," I "may with as good reason blame" myself "for making" him "an accessary by concurrence[f]." And here he vapours;—"Let men hold what they will contrary to the truth; if they write much, the truth will fall into their pens[g]." I "desire the reader," likewise, "to take notice," and observe what silly cavils he brings commonly for exceptions, and how vainly he puffeth up himself, like the frog in the fable, with his abortive conceptions. Where did I ever use the word "accessary," or any thing in that sense? "*Mala mens malus animus.*" If he knew the difference between general and special influence, he would be ashamed to infer a particular guilt from a general concurrence. A general and special influence is no "nonsense[h]." A prince giveth commission to a judge, thereby enabling him to determine criminal and capital causes; that is a general influence of power. By virtue of this commission he heareth causes; and abusing this general power, taketh bribes, giveth unjust sentences, and punisheth innocent persons. Is the

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 107.]
[f] [Ibid.]
[g] [Ibid.]
[h] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. p. 59.]

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prince that gave him the commission and judiciary power, accessary to his fault? Nothing less; but the judge abuseth his commission, and misapplieth his just power. But if the prince had given him a special commission, like that of Jezebel, "Proclaim a fast, set Naboth on high, and let two men of Belial bear witness against him, saying, Thou didst blaspheme God and the king, and stone him that he die,"—this had been special influence indeed; and the prince had not only been an accessary, but a principal, in the murder. By which we may see, how God concurreth to the doing of evil by a general, not by a special influence.

1 Kings xxi. [9,] 10.

I exemplified this distinction of general and special influence to him, in the earth; which concurreth to the nourishment of all plants by a general influence, but that one plant converteth this nourishment to healthful food, another to poison; that is, not from the general influence of the earth, but from the special quality of the root: but quite contrary both to my words and to my sense, he misapplieth it to the operative and permissive will of God, without head or foot:—"It seemeth" (saith he), "that he thinketh that 779
God doth will . . but permissively, that the hemlock should poison a man, but operatively, that the wheat should nourish him[i]." "*Risum teneatis amici*[k]*?*"

[Case of David and Uriah.]

I cleared this likewise to him in his instance of the murder of Uriah; shewing him, that David's power was from God, but the misapplication of that power was from David himself. "As if" (saith he) "there were a power that were not the power to do some particular act, or a power to kill and yet to kill nobody in particular[l]." He might even as well say,—as if there were a commission or a power given by the prince to hear and determine causes in general, or to arraign and try malefactors in general, and not to sentence this man and hang that man in particular. Every general commission or power doth justify particular acts, whilst they who are empowered do pursue their commission, and not abuse their power; but if they abuse their power, neither will their general power justify their particular misdeeds,

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. pp. 107, 108.]

[k] [Horat., A. P., 5.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 108.]

nor their particular faults render the prince accessary, who gave them their general power. DISCOURSE II.

In his impertinent instance of "the Divine right of Bishops to ordain ministers[m]," which he bringeth in by the head and shoulders, he sheweth nothing but his ignorance and his teeth. Every man who hath an undoubted right to do some act, hath not presently a right to exercise it promiscuously, when and where and upon whom he will, without any respect to those who had a precedent right before himself. Let him inquire further into the difference between an actual and habitual power; and it will save him the further labour of inquiring, and me of informing him. "*Qui pauca considerat facile pronunciat.*"

He demandeth, "Did not God foreknow, that Uriah in particular should be murdered by David in particular? and what God foreknoweth shall come to pass[n]." Yes, God doth know in eternity; for with God, properly, there is neither fore-knowledge nor after-knowledge, neither past nor to come, but all things present always. Or if he will have us speak after the manner of men;—God did foreknow, that David should kill Uriah with the sword of the children of Ammon; and God did likewise foreknow, that T. H. should maintain this paradox so dishonourable to His majesty, that God did necessitate David to kill Uriah; but knowledge, of what kind soever it be, taketh away no man's liberty. Uriah might have gone to his own house upon David's entreaty; and then David had not killed Uriah upon any necessitation from God's fore-knowledge. Uriah might have killed David; and then God had foreknown that, not this. But this objection hath been formerly fully answered[o]: whither I refer the reader.

He chargeth me to "say, that the case agitated between us is, whether God's irresistible power or man's sin be the cause why He punisheth one man more than another;" whereas "the case agitated between us is, whether a man can now choose what shall be his will anon[p]." There are [The true question between T. H. and the author.]

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 108.]

[n] [Ibid.]

[o] [Answ. to] Fountains of Arguments, [above pp. 246—249.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 109.]

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several cases or questions between us. First, the general or main question; which is already stated by consent,—whether the will of man be free from extrinsecal determination to one antecedently[q];—and not, as it is here proposed by him fondly and ambiguously, "whether a man can now choose what shall be his will anon." For, first, a man is not certain, that he shall live so long to be able to choose his will. And although he were certain to live so long, yet succeeding time may make such a change of affairs, that he may have just reason to choose otherwise.

James iv. 13, 14.

> "Quemquam posse putas mores narrare futuros?
> "Dic mihi, si fias tu leo, qualis eris[r]."

But besides the main general question, there are likewise many particular subordinate questions; as this in this section,—whether this opinion of universal necessity do not make all punishment to be unjust, because, if a man be necessitated antecedently and unavoidably to do what he doth, he is punished without his own fault, and consequently unjustly. To escape this argument, he is driven to seek shelter under the omnipotence of God:—"Power irresistible justifieth all actions really and properly, in whomsoever it be found;" and, "when God afflicted Job, He did object no sin to him;" that "which He doth is justified by His doing it[s]." So the present dispute was, whether man's sin, or God's omnipotence, were the just ground of punishment. This was all I said, and more than I said. But he can set down nothing without either mistaking it or confounding it. God's power is not the rule of His justice, but His will; not because His will maketh that to be just, which otherwise was unjust, but because He can will nothing but 780
that which is just. But he addeth not one grain of weight more in these Animadversions about this subject to what he had formerly said; all which hath been fully and clearly satisfied in my former Defence[t], to which he hath replied nothing.

[The Jews might recover their former estate.]

That which I said of the Jews—that "it was in their own

[q] [See above in the Answ. to the State of the Quest., p. 219.]
[r] [Martial., Epigr., XII. xciv. 3, 4.]
[s] [In the Defence, T. II. Numb. xii. above p. 65.]
[t] [Defence,] Numb. xii. [above pp. 75, &c.; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

power by their concurrence with God's grace to prevent those judgments, and to recover their former estate[u],"—is so true, and so plainly affirmed by St. Paul, that no man but himself durst have cavilled against it. But he who knows no liberty but from outward impediments, no general power of motion without a necessitation to kill Uriah, no grace but that which is irresistible; who hath never heard of the concurrence of grace and free will in the conversion of a sinner; it is no marvel if he think, that God will save men without themselves, as well as He made them without themselves. Discourse II. Rom. xi. 23.

I said, God "may oblige Himself freely to His creature[x]." Who ever doubted of it before him[y]? What doth he think of God's promise to Abraham—I will "be the God of thee and of thy seed after thee?" Or of the legal covenant—"Do this and thou shalt live?" Or of the evangelical covenant—"He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved?" But he saith, "He that can oblige, can also release when he will, and he that can release himself when he will, is not obliged[z]." Is not this comfortable doctrine, and suitable to the truth and majesty of Almighty God, "in Whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning?" Nothing is impossible to God's absolute power; but according to His ordinate power, which is disposed by His will, He cannot change His own decrees, nor go from His promise. If God's decrees were changeable, what would become of his universal necessity? But he shooteth at random, not much regarding, so it fit his present humour, whether it make for his cause or against it. God may oblige Himself. [Gen. xvii. 3.] [Luke x. 28.—Lev. xviii. 5.] [Mark xvi. 16.] James i. 17.

But now I am to expect a heavy charge; hitherto he hath been but in jest;—that I am "driven to words ill becoming" me "to speak of God Almighty, for" I "make Him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary power of man to do[a]." How is this? I said, "God cannot 'destroy the righteous with the wicked,' which nevertheless is a thing done ordinarily by armies[b]." The great "mountain hath brought forth a little mouse[c]." Might not I say, that God cannot God cannot do any unrighteous thing. [Gen. xviii. 25.]

[u] [Defence,] Numb. xii. [above p. 77; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[x] [Ibid.]
[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 109.]
[z] [Ibid.]
[a] [Ibid., p. 110.]
[b] [Ibid.; from the Defence, Numb. xii. above p. 78.]
[c] ["Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus." Horat., A. P., 139.]

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sin, though men can do it? Why might not I say, that God cannot do unrighteous things, or God cannot be unrighteous (which is the same thing in effect), as well as the Scripture saith, God "cannot lie," God "cannot repent," God "cannot deny Himself," and, "God is not unrighteous to forget your works?" As if he should say, If God could break His promise, God could be unrighteous, but He cannot be unrighteous. Yea, the Lord doth submit Himself, as it were, to a trial upon this point;—"The Lord hath a controversy with His people, and He will plead with Israel." And He doth challenge them upon this very point;—"Hear now, O house of Israel, is not My way equal? are not your ways unequal?"—And in the same chapter He protesteth,—"As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, . . the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge;" but, "the soul that sinneth shall die." And Abraham saith the same that I say (though he deny it), by way of interrogation indeed, but with much more vehemency;—"Wilt Thou also destroy the righteous with the wicked?" &c.; "that be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked; that be far from Thee; shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Neither can he except, because it is not said, *Canst* Thou? but, "*Will* Thou?" for we speak of the ordinate power of God, which is ordered by His will.

Tit. i. 2.—Numb. xxiii. 19.—2 Tim. ii. 13.—Heb. vi. 10.

Micah vi. 2.

[Ezek. xviii. 25.]

[vv. 2—4.]

Gen. xviii. 23, 25.

That which he saith of an army[d] weigheth less than nothing. For, first, that destruction which an army maketh, is not like that destruction whereof Abraham speaketh, which fell upon Sodom and Gomorrah, which the Apostle calleth "the vengeance of eternal fire." The destruction made by an army may be a punishment to some, a chastisement or a blessing to others. Jeremy the prophet was involved with the rest of the Jews in the same Babylonian captivity; but the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah was an express punishment for sin. Thirdly, an army acteth by way of public justice, regarding the justice of the cause, not of particular persons; for it is not possible in the height of war to do justice according to the particular merits of single 781

Jude 7.

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 110.]

persons. But after this necessity is over, and particular justice can take place, then no man ought to suffer but according to his guilt; then it is no more lawful to "destroy the righteous with the wicked." Necessity may justify the sufferings of innocent persons in some cases; but no necessity can warrant the punishment of innocent persons. "*Innocentium lachrymæ diluvio periculosiores.*"

Whether they did well or ill for the manner of the act, who put out their bodily eyes because they supposed them to be an impediment to the eye of the soul, is not pertinent to our purpose, yet was apt enough to prove my intention,—that bodily blindness may sometimes be a benefit.

[T. H.'s irrelevant instance of the brute beasts.]

His instance, in "brute beasts, which are afflicted, yet cannot sin[e]," is extravagant. I did not go about to prove, that universal necessity doth take away afflictions: it rather rendereth them unavoidable. But I did demonstrate (and he hath not been able to make any show of an answer to it), that it taketh away all just rewards and punishments; which is against the universal notion and common belief of the whole world. Brute beasts are not capable of punishment: they are not knocked down out of vindictive justice for faults committed, but for future use and benefit. I said there was "a vast difference between the light and momentary pangs" of brute beasts, "and the intolerable and endless pains of Hell[f]." Sure enough, Dionysius the tyrant, seeing an ox knocked down at one blow, said to his friends, "what a folly it is to quit so fair a command for fear of dying, which lasts no longer a space[g]." He himself, when his wits are calmer, doth acknowledge as much as I, and somewhat more:—"Perhaps" (saith he), "if the death of a sinner were an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might, as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty, not accusing him of injustice," &c., "but of little tenderness and love to mankind[h]." But now he is pleased to give another judgment of it;—"As if the length or greatness of the pain made any

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 110.]

[f] [Defence, Numb. xii. above p. 79; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[g] Plut., [Apophthegm. Reg. &c.; Op. Moral., tom. i. p. 488. ed. Wyttenb.]

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb. x. [p. 79.]

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difference of the justice or injustice of inflicting it[i]." Yes, very much. According to the measure of the fault ought to be the number of the stripes. If the punishment exceed the offence, it is unjust. On the other side, it is not only an act of justice, but of favour and grace, to inflict temporary pains for a greater good. Otherwise a master could not justly correct his scholar; otherwise a chirurgeon might not lance an impostume, or put a man to pain to cure him of the stone. If God afflict a man with a momentary sickness, and maketh this sickness a means to fit him for an eternal weight of glory, he hath no cause to complain of injustice.

It is just to afflict innocent persons for their own good.

He is angry, that I "would make men believe, that" he "holds all things to be just, that are done by them who have power enough to avoid punishment[k]." He doth me wrong. I said no such thing. If he be guilty of this imputation, either directly or by consequence, let him look to it. He hath errors enough which are evident. I did indeed confute this tenet of his, that "irresistible power is the rule of justice[l];" of which he is pleased to take no notice in his Animadversions. But whereas he doth now restrain this privilege to that power alone which is absolutely irresistible, he forgetteth himself over much, having formerly extended it to all sovereigns and supreme councils, within their own dominions:—"It is manifest therefore, that in every commonwealth there is some one man or council which hath," &c., "a sovereign and absolute power, to be limited by the strength of the commonwealth and by no other thing[m]." What? Neither by the law of God, nor nature, nor nations, nor the municipal laws of the land, nor by any other thing but his "power" and "strength?" Good doctrine! "*Hunc tu Romane caveto*[n]."

Sin is properly irregularity.

Lastly, to make his presumption complete, he endeavoureth to prove, that God "is not only the author of the law,"—which is most true;—and "the cause of the act,"—which is partly true, because He is the only fountain of power,—but that He is "the cause of the irregularity," that is, in "plain English[o]" (which he delighteth in), the sin itself;—"I think"

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. pp. 110, 111.]
[k] [Ibid., p. 111.]
[l] [Defence, Numb. xii. above pp. 75, &c.; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[m] Lib. de Cive, tit. Imper., c. vi. num. 18. [p. 70.]
[n] [Horat., Sat., I. iv. 85.]
[o] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxiv. p. 155.]

(saith he), "there is no man but understands," &c., "that where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude, regularity or irregularity, that is between them, is made in and by the things themselves that are compared; the Bishop therefore, that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies Him to be the cause both of the law and of the action[p]." This is that which he himself calleth "blasphemy[q]" elsewhere,—that God is the author or cause of sin. Discourse II.

782 Sin is nothing but the irregularity of the act. So St. John defineth it in express terms, "ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία"—"sin is an anomy," or "an irregularity," or "a transgression of the law." For "sin is nothing else but a declination from the rule," that is, an irregularity[r]. Another definition of sin is this,—"Sin is that which is thought, or said, or done against the eternal law[s]." Still you see, the formal reason of sin doth consist in the contrariety to the law, that is, the irregularity. Others define sin to be "a want of rectitude, or a privation of conformity to the rule[t];" that is, irregularity. An irregular action is sin materially; irregularity is sin formally. Others define sin to be "a free transgression of the commandment[u]." Every one of these definitions demonstrate, that Mr. Hobbes maketh God to be properly the cause of sin. [1 John iii. 4.]

But let us weigh his argument. "He who is the cause of the law, and the cause of the action, is the cause of the irregularity; but God is the cause of the law, and the cause of the action." I deny his assumption. God indeed is "the cause of the law," but God is not the total or adequate "cause of the action." Nay, God is not at all "the cause of the action" *quâ talis*—as it is irregular, but the free agent. To use our former instance of an unjust judge: the prince is the author or cause of the law, and the prince is the cause of the judiciary action of the judge in general, because the judge de- God no cause of irregularity.

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 111.]

[q] [Ibid., p. 105. See above p. 308. note x.]

[r] ["Peccatum est transgressio legis." Aug., De Cons. Evang., lib. ii. c. 4. (§ 13; Op. tom. iii. P. ii. p. 31); quoted by Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. i. c. 1; Op. tom. iii. p. 71. A; who adds,—"Nihil est enim aliud peccatum nisi *declinare ac recedere a regulâ*."]

[s] [See above p. 80. note a.]

[t] ["Carentia rectitudinis sive privatio conformitatis ad regulam." Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. v. c. 3; Op. tom. iii. p. 359. A.]

[u] ["Libera transgressio præcepti." Id., ibid., lib. v. c. 17; ibid. p. 441. C.]

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riveth all his power of judicature from the prince; but the prince is not the cause of the irregularity, or repugnance, or non-conformity, or contrariety, which is between the judge's actions and the law, but the judge himself; who by his own fault did abuse and misapply that good general power, which was committed and entrusted to him by the prince; he is the only cause of the anomy or irregularity. Or as a scrivener, that teacheth one to write, and sets him a copy, is both the cause of the rule and of the action or writing, and yet not the cause of the irregularity or deviation from the rule. Sin is a defect, or deviation, or irregularity. No defect, no deviation, no irregularity, can proceed from God. But herein doth consist T. H. his error, that he distinguisheth not between an essential and an accidental subordination, or between a good general power and the determination or misapplication of this general power to evil. What times are we fallen into! to see it publicly maintained, that God is the cause of all irregularity, or deviation from His own rules.

[CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;]—NUMBER XIII.

Here is no need of Castigations, there being no Animadversions.

CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XIV.

In the beginning he repeateth his empty objections, from "what shall be, shall be," and from "foreknowledge," and that "a man cannot choose to-day for to-morrow;" and thence concludeth (*nemine consentiente*), that my deductions are irrational and fallacious, and that he "need make no further answer[x]." As if he should say, I sent forth two or three light horsemen to vapour, who were soundly beaten back, and made their defence with their heels, therefore I need not answer the charge of the main battle. He told me, that I "did not understand" him, if I thought he "held no

[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 133.]

other necessity, than that which is contained in that old foolish rule,—whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is[y]?" But I see, when all is done, he must sit down and be contented to make his best of that "old foolish rule;" for "prescience," and "what shall be, shall be," do imply no more. Discourse II.

In the next place, he chargeth me with three great "absurdities: the first, that" I "say, a law may be unjust; the second, that a law may be tyrannical; the third, that" I "say, it is an unjust law which prescribes things impossible in themselves to be done[z]." A grievous accusation. These absurdities are "at age," let them even "answer for themselves." Laws may be unjust. [John ix. 21.]

He saith, "Civil laws are made by every man that is subject to them, because every one of them consented to the placing of the legislative power[a]."

I deny his consequence. Indeed, in causes that are naturally, necessarily, and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect; as he that planteth a vineyard, is the cause of the vine. But in causes that are accidentally or contingently subordinate (as the people electing, the law-giver elected, and the law made, are), the cause of the cause is not always the cause of the effect; as he that planteth a vineyard, is not the cause of the drunkenness. The king's commission maketh a judge, but it is not the cause of his unrighteous judgment. Two cities
783 in Italy, contending about their bounds, chose the people of Rome to be their arbitrators; they gave either city a small pittance, and reserved all the rest to themselves,—"*Quod in medio est, populo Romano adjudicetur*[b]." The two cities did not so much like their arbitrators at the first, as they detested the arbitrament at the last; and though they had contracted a necessity of compliance by their credulous submission, yet this did not free that unconscionable arbitrament from palpable injustice; no, nor yet so much as from palpable injury: for though a man is not injured, who is willing to be injured ("*volenti non fit injuria*[c]"), yet he who doth choose an arbitrator, doth not choose his unjust arbitrament; nor

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]

[z] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 133.]

[a] [Ibid.]

[b] [Cic., De Offic., i. 10.]

[c] ["Βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πάσχει· ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών." Aristot., Ethic., V. xi. 6.]

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he that chooseth a law-giver, choose his tyrannical law. Though he have obliged himself to passive obedience, yet his obligation doth not render either the injurious arbitrament of the one, or the tyrannical law of the other, to be just. So the main ground of his error is a gross fallacy, which every sophister in the University is able to discover.

I answer, secondly, that though every subject had actually consented, as well to the laws, as to the law-giver, yea, though the law were made by the whole collective body of the people in their own persons, yet, if it be contrary to the law of God or nature, it is still an unjust law. The people cannot give that power to their prince, which they have not themselves.

Thirdly, many laws are made by those who are not duly invested with legislative power; which are therefore unjust laws.

Fourthly, many laws are made to bind foreigners, who exercise commerce with subjects; which, if they be contrary to the pacts and capitulations of the confederate nations, are unjust laws. Foreigners never consented to the placing of the legislative power.

Fifthly, no human power whatsoever, judiciary or legislative, civil or sacred, is exempted from excesses, and possibility of doing or making unjust acts.

Lastly, the people cannot confer more power upon their law-giver than God Himself doth confer; neither is their election a greater privilege from injustice, than God's own disposition: but they, who have been placed in sovereign power by God Himself, have both made unjust laws, and prescribed unjust acts to their subjects.

Impossibilities made by ourselves may be justly imposed, [but] not impossibilities in themselves.

I said, "Those laws were unjust, which prescribed things impossible in themselves[d]." Against this he excepteth,—"Only contradictions are impossible in themselves, all other things are possible in themselves, as to raise the dead, to change the course of nature:" but never any "tyrant did bind a man to contradictions, or make a law, commanding him to do and not to do the same action, or to be and not to be in the same place at the same moment of time[e]."

[d] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 88; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 133, 134.]

I answer, that tyrants may command, and by their deputies have commanded, contradictory acts; as for the same subjects to appear before several judges in several places at the same time, and to do several duties inconsistent one with another, which imply a contradiction; and have punished subjects for disobedience in such cases. Discourse II.

Secondly, I answer, that when we say, 'Law-makers ought to command things possible,' it ought to be understood of things possible to their subjects, upon whom they impose their commands; not of such things as are possible to God Almighty. To make a law, that subjects should raise the dead, or change the course of nature (which he reckons as things possible in themselves), is as unjust a law as a law that should enjoin them contradictions, and the act as impossible to the subject.

Thirdly, these words—"impossible in themselves,"—which he layeth hold now, have a quite contrary sense to that which he imagineth, and are warranted by great authors. Some things are impossible to us by our own defaults; as for a man to hold the liquor firmly without shedding, who hath contracted the palsy by his own intemperance[f]. These impossibilities may justly be forbidden and punished, when we have had power and lost it by our own fault. Secondly, there are other impossibilities in themselves, such as proceed not from our own faults, which never were in our power; as those which proceed from the antecedent determination of extrinsecal causes. To enjoin these by law, and to punish a man for not obeying, is unjust and tyrannical.

784 Whereas I called "just laws" the "ordinances of right reason[g]," he saith, "it is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives[h]." His reason is, "If laws be erroneous shall they not be obeyed? shall we rather rebel?" I answer, neither the one nor the other. We are not to obey them actively, because "we ought to obey God rather than man." Yet may we not rebel;—"Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake." Passive obedience is a mean between active obedience and rebellion. To

Acts v. 29. 1 Peter ii. 13.

[f] [See Aristot., Ethic., III. vii. 15.]
[g] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 88; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 134.]

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"just laws," which are "the ordinances of right reason," active obedience is due. To unjust laws, which are 'the ordinances of reason erring,' passive obedience is due. Who shall hope to escape exception, when this innocent definition is quarrelled at? I wish his own principles were half so loyal.

Proper punishment is ever vindictive in part.

He saith, I "take punishment for a kind of revenge, and therefore can never agree with" him, "who takes it for nothing else but for a correction, or for an example[i]," &c. I take punishment in the same sense, that all authors, both sacred and civil, Divines and philosophers, lawyers, and generally all classic writers, have ever taken it: that is, for "an evil of passion, which is inflicted for an evil of action[k]." So, to pass by other authors, as slighted by him, the Holy Scripture doth always take it: as,—"Wherefore doth a living man complain? for the *punishment* of his sins;"—and,—"This is a heinous crime, yea, it is an iniquity to be *punished* by the judges;"—and,—"Thou hast *punished* us less than our iniquities deserved." Yea, punishment doth not only presuppose sin, but the measure of punishment, the degree of sin:—"He that despiseth Moses' law, died without mercy; of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trampled under foot the Son of God?" The judge was commanded to cause the offender "to be beaten according to the fault." This truth we learned from the ferulas and rods, which we smarted under when we were boys; and from the gibbets, and axes, and wheels, which are prepared for offenders. "*Omnis pœna, si justa est, peccati pœna est*[l]."

Lam. iii. 39. Job xxxi. 11. Ezra ix. 13. Heb. x. 28. Deut. xxv.

That the punishment of delinquents hath other ends also, there is no doubt. "*Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur*[m]." Punishment respects the delinquent in the first place, either to amend him, or to prevent his doing of more mischief; secondly, it regardeth the party suffering, to repair his honour, or preserve him from contempt, or secure him for the time to come; lastly, it respects other persons, that the suffering of a few may be exemplary, and an admo-

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 134.]

[k] ["Malum passionis quod infligitur propter malum actionis." Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. II. c. xx. § 1; and Puffendorf, De Jure Naturæ et Gentium, lib. VIII. c. iii. § 4.]

[l] [Aug., De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 18. § 51; and Retract., lib. i. c. 9. § 5: Op. tom. i. pp. 631. B, and 14. E.]

[m] [Senec., De Irâ, lib. i. c. 16; Op. p. 547: from Plato, Protag., c. xxxix.]

nition to many. But herein lies his error,—that "punishment" is "for nothing else but for correction or example." "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down into Hell,"—that was no "correction;" and at the Last Judgment,—"Go ye cursed into everlasting fire,"—there is neither "correction" nor "example:" but in both instances there is "punishment." Whence it is apparent, that some punishment, especially Divine, doth look only at the satisfaction of justice.

2 Peter ii. 4.

[Matt. xxv. 41.]

I gave five instances of "unjust laws:" Pharaoh's law, to drown the Israelitish children; Nebuchadnezzar's law, to cast them who would not commit idolatry into the fiery furnace; Darius his law, that whosoever prayed to God for thirty days should be cast into the den of lions; Ahasuerosh his law, to destroy the Jewish nation root and branch; the Pharisees' law, to excommunicate all those who confessed Christ[n]. To all these he answereth nothing in particular, but in general, he giveth this answer,—that "they were just laws in relation to their subjects, because all laws made by him to whom the people have given the legislative power, are the acts of every one of that people, and no man can do injustice to himself; but they were unjust actions in relation to God[o]." He "feareth the Bishop will think this discourse too subtle[p]." Nay, rather, "the Bishop" thinketh it too flat and dull.

Yet further of unjust laws.

[Exod. i. 16.—Dan. iii. 4-6; vi. 6-9.—Esth. iii. 12, 13.—John ix. 22.]

"... Dii te Damasippe Deæque
"Tale ob consilium donent tonsore[q]."

I have answered his reason before;—that it is a sophistical fallacy, flowing from the accidental subordination of the causes. A man may will the lawgiver, and yet not will the law. That is one reply to his distinction.

Secondly, I reply, that when the people did "give" them "the legislative power," they gave a kingly power, to preserve and protect their subjects; they meant not a power to drown them, to burn them, to cast them to the lions, to root them out from the earth by the means of unjust, bloody, tyrannical laws, made on purpose to be pitfalls to catch subjects. Hear himself;—'No man can transfer or lay down his right to

[n] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 89; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 135.]

[p] [Ibid.]

[q] [Horat., Sat., II. iii. 16, 17. "*Verum* ob consilium," &c.]

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save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment[r].' If the right be not transferred in such cases, then the law is groundless and unjust, and made without the consent of the subject. They did not give, they did not intend to give, they could not give them a Divine power, or rather a power paramount above God,—to command idolatry, to forbid all prayer and invocation of God's holy name; and, therefore, though such laws do not warrant rebellion, because it is better to die innocent than to live nocent, yet that hindereth not but such laws are unjust both towards God and towards man. 785

Thirdly, if these laws had been "just in relation to the subjects," then the subjects had been bound to obey them actively; but they were not bound to obey them actively; yea, they were bound not to obey them. "The midwives feared God, and did not as the king of Egypt commanded them." The three children answered, "Be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship thy golden image, which thou hast set up." The parents of Moses are commended for their faith in saving Moses contrary to "the king's commandment."

Exod. i. 17.

Dan. iii. 18.

Heb. xi. 23.

Fourthly, subjects have given to their sovereigns as well judiciary as legislative power over themselves; but their judiciary power doth not justify their unjust acts or sentences, even towards their subjects. Elias accused Ahab of murder; and Elisha called his son Joram the "son of a murderer." Saul's injustice towards the Gibeonites did draw the guilt of blood upon his house; and the Lord was not satisfied, until the Gibeonites had received satisfaction. He himself styleth David's act towards Uriah "murder[s]." Certainly, "murder" is not just, either towards God, or towards man. Therefore neither doth the legislative power justify their unjust laws.

1 Kings xxi. [19.] 2 Kings vi. 32. [2 Sam. xxi. 1, 14.]

Fifthly, of all law-givers, those who are placed freely by the people, have the least pretence to such an absolute and universal resignation of all the property and interest of the subject. For it is to be presumed, that the people who did choose them had more regard to their own good than to the good of their law-giver, and did look principally at the protection of their own persons, and the preservation of their

[r] Leviath., Pt. i. c. 14. [pp. 65, 66. fol. Lond. 1651.]

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 108.]

own rights, and did contract accordingly. As we see in the most flourishing monarchies of the world, as that of the Medes and Persians; they had their fundamental laws, which were not in the single power of the present law-giver to alter or violate by a new law or command, without injustice. If a pupil shall choose a tutor or guardian for himself, he investeth him with all his power, he obligeth himself to make good all his acts. Nevertheless he may wrong his pupil, or do him injustice. There is only this difference, that a pupil may implead his guardian and recover his right against him, but from a sovereign law-giver there lies no appeal but only to God; otherwise there would be endless appeals, which both nature and policy doth abhor, as in the instance of the Roman arbitrament formerly mentioned. An arbitrary power is the highest of all powers. Judges must proceed according to law; arbitrators are tied to no law, but their own reason, and their own consciences. Yet all the world will say, that the Romans dealt fraudulently and unjustly with the two parties.

Dan. vi. 8.

Lastly, the Holy Scriptures do everywhere brand wicked laws as infamous, as "the statutes of Omri," and "the statutes of Israel;" and styleth them expressly unjust laws, or "unrighteous decrees."

Mich. vi. 16. —2 Kings xvii. 19.— Isai. x. 1.

He asketh, "to whom the Bible is a law[t]?" The Bible is not a law, but the positive laws of God are contained in the Bible. Doth he think the law of God is no law without his suffrage? He might have been one of Tiberius his council, when it was proposed to the Senate whether they should admit Christ to be a God or not[u].

The authority of the Scriptures not dependent on the printer.

He saith, I "know that it is not a law to all the world[v]." Not *de facto* indeed. How should it? when the world is so full of atheists, that make no more account of their souls than of so many handfuls of salt, to keep their bodies from stinking. But *de jure*—by right, it is a law, and ought to be a law, to all the world. The heathens, and particularly the Stoics themselves, did speak with much more reverence of 'the Holy Books;' of which to suspect a falsehood, they held to be a heinous and detestable crime[x]. And the first argument for necessity they

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 136.]

[u] [Euseb., Hist. Eccl., lib. ii. c. 2.]

[v] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. p. 136.]

[x] Ammonius, in [Section. Iidem Aristotelis] lib. de Interpret., [pp. 93. b, 94. a. Venet. 1546: speaking of the

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[How they are a law to us.] He asketh, "how the Bible came to be a law to us? did God speak it *vivâ voce* to us? have we seen the miracles? 786 have we any other assurance than the words of the Prophets, and the authority of the Church?" And so he concludeth, that "it is the legislative power of the Commonwealth," wheresoever it is placed, which "makes the Bible a law in England[z]."

[Exod. xxi. 33, 34.] If a man digged a pit, and covered it not again, so that an ox or an ass fell into it, he was obliged by the Mosaical law to make satisfaction for the damage. I know not whether he do this on purpose to weaken the authority of Holy Scripture, or not. Let God and his own conscience be his triers. But I am sure he hath digged a pit for an ox or an ass without covering it again; and if they chance to stumble blindfold into it, their blood will be required at his hands. If a Turk had said so much of the Alcorân at Constantinople, he were in some danger.

[Their Divine authority.] If it were within the compass of the present controversy, I should esteem it no difficult task to demonstrate perspicuously, that the Holy Scriptures can be no other than the Word of God Himself; by their antiquity, by their harmony, by their efficacy, by the sanctity and sublimity of their matter, such as could not have entered into the thoughts of man without the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, by the plainness of their style, so full of majesty, by the light of prophetical predictions, by the testimony of the blessed martyrs, by a multitude of miracles, by the simplicity of the penmen and promulgers, poor fishermen and shepherds, who did draw the world after their oaten reeds, and, lastly, by the judgments of God that have fallen upon such tyrants and others as have gone about to suppress or profane the sacred oracles. But this is one of those things, "*de quibus nefas est dubitare;*" which he that calleth into question, deserveth to be answered otherwise than with arguments[a].

[The law of nature coincident with them.] But that which is sufficient to confute him is the law of nature; which is the same in a great part with the positive

"πολύστοιχοι τῶν θείων ἐνεργειῶν πραγματεῖαι." But Bramhall's gloss upon the passage is very forced and far-fetched.]

[y] [Id., ibid.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 136.]

[a] [Aristot., Topic., I. xi. 8.]

law of God, recorded in Holy Scriptures. All the ten Commandments, in respect of their substantials, are acknowledged by all men to be branches of the law of nature. I hope he will not say, that these laws of nature were made by our suffrages: though he be as likely to say such an absurdity as any man living; for he saith, "the law of nature is the assent itself which all men give to the means of their preservation[b]." Every law is a rule of our actions; a mere "assent" is no rule. A law commandeth or forbiddeth, an "assent" doth neither. But to shew him his vanity: since he delighteth so much in definitions, let him satisfy himself out of the definition of the law of nature;—"The law of nature is the prescription of right reason, whereby, through that light which nature hath placed in us, we know some things to be done because they are honest, and other things to be shunned because they are dishonest[c]." He had forgotten what he had twice cited and approved out of Cicero[d], concerning the law of nature; which Philo calls "the law that cannot lie, not mortal, made by mortals, not without life, or written in paper or columns without life, but that which cannot be corrupted, written by the immortal God in our understandings[e]." Discourse II.

[Their antiquity.] Secondly, if this which he saith did deserve any consideration, it was before the Bible was admitted, or assented unto, or received as the Word of God. But the Bible hath been assented unto and received in England sixteen hundred years. A fair prescription. And in all that time, I do not find any law to authorize it, or to underprop heaven from falling with a bulrush. This is undeniable, that for so many successive ages we have received it as the law of God Himself, not depending upon our assents, or the authority of our law makers.

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 137.]

[c] ["Lex naturalis .. specialiter dicitur de dictamine seu judicio nostræ rationis, quo per lumen nobis ab æternâ lege impressum, aliqua esse bona seu naturæ nostræ consentanea certo cognoscentes statuimus ea agi debere, aut cognoscentes esse mala, seu naturæ nostræ dissentanea minimeque congrua, statuimus debere vitari." Reginaldus, Praxis Fori Pœnitentialis, lib. xiii. tractat. 2. in procœmio; tom. i. p. 511. a. fol. Mogunt. 1617.]

[d] [Cic., Pro Milone, cc. iv, xi.; quoted by Hobbes (Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 40, and upon Numb. xiv. p. 140). See below, p. 335. note 1: and Cic., De Republ. lib. iii, as quoted by Lactantius, Divin. Instit., lib. vi. c. 8. pp. 525, 526. Oxon. 1684.]

[e] [Philo Judæus, Liber Quod Omnis Probus Liber, Op. tom. ii. p. 452. ed. Mangey.—"Νόμος δὲ ἀψευδὴς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεῖνος ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, θνητοῦ φθαρτὸς, ἐν χαρτιδίοις ἢ στήλαις, ἄψυχος ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἄφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυπωθείς."]

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Thirdly, we have not only a national tradition of our own Church for the Divine authority of Holy Scripture, but (which is of much more moment) we have the perpetual constant universal tradition of the Catholic Church of Christ, ever since Christ Himself did tread upon the face of the earth. This is so clear a proof of the universal reception of the Bible for the genuine Word of God, that there cannot justly be any more doubt made of it, than whether there ever was a William the Conqueror or not.

[T. H. his standard of religious truth is the civil magistrate.]

But this is his opinion,—that 'true religion in every country is that which the sovereign magistrate doth admit and enjoin[f].' I could wish his deceived followers would think upon what rock he drives them. For if this opinion be true, then that which is true religion to-day, may be false religion to-morrow, and change as often as the chief governor or go- 787
vernors change their opinions; then that which is true religion in one country, is false religion in another country, because the governors are of different opinions; then all the religions of the world, Christian, Jewish, Turkish, Heathenish, are true religions in their own countries; and if the governor will allow no religion, then atheism is the true religion. Then the blessed Apostles were very unwise to suffer for their conscience, because they would "obey God rather than man;" [Acts v. 29.] then the blessed martyrs were ill advised, to suffer such torments for a false religion, which was not warranted, or indeed which was forbidden, by the sovereign magistrates. And so I have heard from a gentleman of quality[g], well deserving credit, that Mr. Hobbes and he talking of self-preservation, he pressed Mr. Hobbes with this argument drawn from holy martyrs, to which Mr. Hobbes gave answer, "they were all fools." This bolt was soon shot: but the primitive Church had a more venerable esteem of the holy martyrs, whose sufferings they called palms, their prison a paradise, and their death-day their birthday of their glory, to whose memory they builded Churches, and instituted

[f] [See below in the Catching of the Leviathan, c. iii. pp. 895, 896 (fol. edit.), Disc. iii. Pt. iii.]

[g] Mr. R. H. [Possibly Mr. Richard Harding, mentioned in the Queen of Bohemia's letters to Secretary Nicholas in 1654 (at the end of Bray's Memoirs of Evelyn, pp. 148, 151, 156. 4to. ed.). A presentation copy of the Castigations "for Mr. Harding" exists in a private library.]

festivals, whose monuments God Himself did honour with frequent miracles. Discourse II.

He asketh, "why the Bible should not be canonical in Constantinople as well as in other places," if it were not as he saith[h]? His question is apocryphal, and deserveth no other answer, but another question—why a ship, being placed in a stream, is more apt to fall down the stream than to ascend up against the stream. It is no marvel, if the world be apt to follow a sensual religion, which is agreeable to their own appetites; but that any should embrace a religion, which surpasseth their own understandings, and teacheth them to deny themselves, and to sail against the stream of their own natural corruptions, this is the mere goodness of God.

He saith, that "a conqueror makes no laws over the conquered by virtue of his power and conquest, but by virtue of their assent[i]." Most vainly urged, like all the rest. Unjust conquerors gain no right, but just conquerors gain all right. "*Omnia dat, qui justa negat*[k]." Just conquerors do not use to ask the assent of those, whom they have conquered in lawful war, but to command obedience. See but what a pretty liberty he hath found out for conquered persons;—they may choose whether they will obey or die. [Law of conquest.]

"Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem[l]."

What is this to the purpose, to prove that conquerors make laws by the assent of those whom they have conquered? Nothing at all. And yet even thus much is not true upon his principle. Conquered persons are not free to live or die indifferently, according to his principles; but they are necessitated either to the one or the other, to live slaves or die captives.

He hath found out a much like assent of children, to the laws of their ancestors, without which he would make us believe that the laws do not bind:—"When children come to strength enough to do mischief, and to judgment" that they are preserved from mischief "by fear of the sword that doth protect them, in the very act of receiving protection, and not renouncing it, they oblige themselves to the laws of their protectors[m]." And here he inserteth further some of his T. H. a fit catechist for disloyal and unnatural persons.

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 136.]
[i] [Ibid., pp. 136, 137.]
[k] [Lucan., Pharsal., i. 349.]
[l] [Virg., Æn., ii. 354.]
[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 137.]

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peculiar errors; as this,—that "parents who are not subject to others, may lawfully take away the lives of their children," and magistrates take away the lives of their subjects, without any fault or crime, "if they do but doubt of their obedience[n]." Here is comfortable doctrine for children,—that their parents may knock out their brains lawfully; and for subjects,—that their sovereigns may lawfully hang them up or behead them without any offence committed, "if they do but doubt of their obedience;" and for sovereigns,—that their subjects are quitted of their allegiance to them, so soon as they but receive actual protection from another; and for all men,—if they do receive protection from a Turk, or a heathen, or whomsoever, they are obliged to his Turkish, heathenish, idolatrous, sacrilegious, or impious laws[o]. Can such opinions as these live in the world? Surely no longer than men recover their right wits. Demades threatened Phocion, that the Athenians would destroy him, when they fall into their mad fits. And thee, Demades (said Phocion), when they return to their right minds[p].

He saith, that I "would have the judge to condemn no man for a crime that is necessitated; as if" (saith he) "the judge could know what acts are necessary, unless he knew all that had anteceded both visible and invisible[q]." If all acts be 788
necessary, it is an easy thing for the judge to know what acts are necessary. I say more, that no crime can be necessitated; for if it be necessitated, it is no crime. And so much all judges know firmly, or else they are not fit to be judges. Surely he supposeth there are, or have been, or may be, some Stoical judges in the world. He is mistaken; no Stoic was ever fit to be a judge, either capital or civil. And in truth, Stoical principles do overthrow both all judges and judgments.

[Not all law-givers elective.]

He denieth that he "ever said, that all magistrates at first were elective[r]." Perhaps not in so many words; but he hath told us again and again, that no law can be unjust, because

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 137.]

[o] [See below in the Catching of the Leviathan, c. iii. pp. 879, 880 (fol. edit.), Disc. iii. Pt. iii.]

[p] [Plut., in Vitâ Phocion., tom. iv. p. 184. ed. Bryant; Apophth. Reg. &c., Phoc. num. vi, Op. Moral. tom. i. p. 523. ed. Wyttenb.—For "Demades" in the text should be read "Demosthenes."]

[q] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 137.]

[r] [Ibid.]

every subject chooseth his law in choosing his law-giver[s]. If every law-giver be elective, then every sovereign magistrate is elective, for every sovereign magistrate is a law-giver. And he hath justified the laws of the kings of Egypt, of Assyria, of Persia, upon this ground, because they were "made by him, to whom the people had given the legislative power[t]."

He addeth, that "it appears that" I "am of opinion that a law may be made to command the will[u]." Nothing less, if he speaks of the law of man. My argument was drawn from the lesser to the greater; thus,—If that law be unjust, which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do, then that law is likewise unjust, which commands him to will that which is impossible for him to will[x]. He seeth I condemn them both, but much more the latter. Yet, upon his principles, he who commandeth a man to do impossibilities, commandeth him to will impossibilities; because without willing them he cannot do them. My argument is *ad hominem*, and goes upon his own grounds,—that "though the action be necessitated, nevertheless the will to break the law maketh the action unjust[y]." And yet he maintaineth, that the will is as much or more necessitated than the action, because he maketh a man free to do if he will, but not free to will. If a man ought not to be punished for a necessitated act, then neither ought he to be punished for a necessitated will.

[A just law justly executed a cause of justice.]

I said truly, that "a just law justly executed," is "a cause of justice[z]." He inferreth, that he hath "shewed that all laws are just, and all just laws are justly executed;" and hereupon he concludeth, that I "confess that all" I "reply unto here is true[a]." Do I "confess," that "all laws are just?" No, I have demonstrated the contrary. Or do I believe, that "all just laws are justly executed?" It may be so in Plato's Commonwealth, or in Sir Thomas More's Utopia, or in my Lord Verulam's Atlantis; but among us mortals, it is rather to be wished, than to be hoped for. He who builds partly upon

[s] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xiv. p. 85.]
[t] [Qu, Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 135.]
[u] [Ibid., p. 138.]
[x] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 91; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[y] [See in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xiv. above p. 85.]
[z] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 92.]
[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 138.]

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his own principles and partly upon his adversary's, is not very likely to lay a good foundation.

He accuseth me of charging him falsely, for "saying, that God having commanded one thing openly plots another thing secretly," which he calleth one of my "ugly phrases[b]." I did not charge him for saying that God did so, but "that He might do so without injustice[c]." Whether the charge be true or false, let his own words bear witness;—"That which God does, is made just by His doing; just, I say, in Him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is unjust[d]." I wish him a better memory.

Mankind never without laws.

I said there was never any time when mankind was without governors, laws, and societies[e]. He answereth, that "it is very likely to be true, that since the creation there never was a time in which mankind was totally without society;" and confesseth further, that "there was paternal government in Adam[f]." But he addeth, that "in those places where there are civil wars, there is neither law, nor commonwealth, nor society[g]." Why then doth he teach the contrary with so much confidence,—that "it cannot be denied, but that the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was a war of all men against all men[h]?" Why doth he say here, that "where there is no law, there no killing or any thing else can be unjust;" and that "by the right of nature we destroy (without being unjust) all that is noxious, both beasts and men[i]." Where there was "paternal government" from the beginning, there were laws, there were societies, there was no "war of all men against all men." Then the natural state of men was never without society. Doth he call a civil war the natural state of men? Neither was Adam alone such a governor, but all heads of 789
families. Neither the whole world, nor the tenth part of the world, was ever since the creation without society. The

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 139.]
[c] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 93; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[d] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xii. [above p. 65.]
[e] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 95.]
[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 139.]
[g] [Ibid.]
[h] De Cive, c. i. num. 12. [p. 9.—"Negari non potest, quin status hominum naturalis, antequam in societatem coiretur, bellum fuerit; neque hoc simpliciter, sed bellum omnium in omnes."]
[i] [Above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xiv. p. 86.]

world was long without war. What need had they to war one upon another, who had the sharing of the whole world among them? And when there was war, it was not civil war: and when and where there are civil wars, yet there are laws, though not so well executed, and a commonwealth, though much troubled and disordered. For him to make the natural and primogenious state of mankind to be "a war of all men against all men," to be lawless without government, barbarous without societies or civility, wherein it was lawful for any man to kill another as freely as a wolf or a tiger, and to enjoy whatsoever they could by force without further care or conscience, reflects too much, not only upon the honour of mankind, but likewise upon the honour of God Himself, the Creator of mankind. Discourse II.

He chargeth me to say, that "there never was a time when it was lawful ordinarily" those were my words "for private men to kill one another for their own preservation[k]." I say the same still, in that sense wherein I said it then; and I think all the world may say the same with me, except himself. In cases extraordinary, as when a man is assaulted by thieves or murderers, I said expressly then, and I say the same now, that it is lawful to kill another in his own defence, '*cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ;*' and this is all which the laws of God or nature do allow: which Cicero in his defence of Milo pleadeth for, as the words following do abundantly testify,—"*Ut si vita nostra in aliquas insidias, si in vim, in tela aut latronum aut inimicorum, incidisset, omnis honesta ratio esset expediendæ salutis;*"—and again,—"*Hoc et ratio doctis, et necessitas barbaris, et mos gentibus, et feris natura ipsa præscripsit, ut omnem semper vim quâcunque ope possent, à corpore, à capite, à vitâ suâ propulsarent*[l]." I wonder he was not ashamed to cite this place so directly against himself. He saith the same words in general that I say, but in a quite contrary sense,—that by the law of nature any man may kill another without scruple, "if he do but suspect him," or "if he may be noisome to him," as freely as man might pluck up a weed or any herb, because it draws the nourishment another way; and this ordinarily, though the other do

Never lawful for private men ordinarily to kill one another.

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 140.]

[l] [Cic., Pro Milon., cc. iv, xi; cited by Hobbes, Qu., ibid.]

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not offer to assault him, and though his own life be in no manner of peril[m]. This he maketh to be the first, and to be the natural, state of mankind, before they had entered into any pacts one with another. In this sense I did deny, and do still deny, that it either is, or ever was, ordinarily lawful for one private man to kill another: though he plead his own preservation and well-being never so much, and although T. H. telleth us here, without either reason or authority, that "it seemeth to" him, "that God doth account such killing no sin[n]:"—an excellent casuist! All creatures forbear to prey upon their own kind, except in case of extreme hunger.

". . . . . Parcit
" Cognatis maculis similis fera. Quando leoni
" Fortior eripuit vitam leo? Quo nemore unquam
" Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri?
" Indica tygris agit validâ cum tygride pacem
" Perpetuam. Sævis inter se convenit ursis[o]."

And were mankind only made to murder one another promiscuously? That is, to be worse than wild beasts, or savage cannibals.

We beheld him even now more bold than welcome with the Holy Scriptures, saving only that he abstained from the imputation of "jargon." Now he jests with "the pulpit[p];" as well he may, considering what small benefit he hath received from it. Then he laughs at "cases of conscience;" not in his sleeve, or through his fingers, although God Almighty was more careful in stating the cases of blood-guiltiness punctually; but he loves a distinction worse than manslaughter:—"After the man is killed" (saith he), "the Bishop shall be judge, whether the necessity was invincible, or the danger extreme, as being a case of conscience[q]." If he had writ this defence of wilful murder, as Demosthenes did the praise of Helen[r], or Erasmus the commendation of folly[s], only to try his wit, it had been too much to jest with the blood of man; but to do it in earnest, contrary to the law of God and nature, without any authority, sacred or 790

[m] [Above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xiv. pp. 85, 86.]
[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 140.]
[o] [Juv., Sat., xv. 159—164.]
[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 140.]
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [*Isocrates* was the author of the Ἑλένης Ἐγκώμιον.]
[s] [Μωρίας Ἐγκώμιον, seu Stultitiæ Laus, is the title of a satirical tract of Erasmus, published by him in 1521, with a dedication to Sir Thomas More.]

profane, without reason, nay, without common sense, is his own peculiar privilege. DISCOURSE II.

And yet, before he leave this subject, he must needs be fumbling once more upon the old string,—that in the natural state of man every man might lawfully kill any man whom he suspected, or who might be noisome to him; and so, taking this for granted, he concludeth, that he might lawfully resign it up into the hands of the magistrate[t]. I was the more sparing in confuting this point, because it is so absurd, that the very repetition of it is a sufficient confutation; it being an opinion so barbarous, and so brutish, fitter for a bloody cannibal, one of the African anthropophagi, than one who hath borne the name of Christian, or been a member of any civil society; such an opinion, as, if it had not all laws of God and man against it, yet the horrid consequences of it, if it were once entertained, would chase it out of the world, with the propugner of it. I would not cast away one text of Scripture upon it, but that he admitteth that proof, and rejecteth all "human authority[u]."

My first reason is demonstrative;—because all killing of men by private men was forbidden to all mankind by the positive law of God, presently after the flood, before there were ever any such pacts as he imagineth in the world. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man." That which he makes lawful in the natural state of man, and only prohibited by covenant between man and man, was declared unlawful by the positive law of God to Noah and his posterity, from whom all the cities and societies and commonwealths in the world are descended. Gen. ix. 6.

Secondly, this law of God was no new law then, but a declaration of the law of nature, which was imprinted in the heart of man from the beginning; as appeareth evidently by the reason annexed to the law,—"For in the image of God made He man" (either in the family of Adam was the natural state of man, or there never was any natural state of man in the world); before any such commonwealths as he imagineth could be gathered, or any such pacts or covenants made.

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 140.]

[u] [Ibid.,] Fount. of Arg., [p. 5.]

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Yet even then the killing of those whom they judged noisome to them by private persons, was not only esteemed an ordinary sin, but was a crying sin; for which we have the
Gen. iv. 10. testimony of God Himself to Cain,—"What hast thou done? the voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto Me from the ground."

Thirdly, private men never resigned up into the hands of the sovereign magistrate the power of defending their own lives in case of extreme necessity, though it were with the death of the assailant; for that power they hold still. Let him not confound two different powers together. This power which he challengeth, affirming that the people did resign it to the magistrate, which we deny with detestation, is "a right to destroy whatsoever a man thinketh can annoy him" (they are his own words in this place), or "a general power of killing their enemies;" that is, of killing whomsoever they will, for all men by their doctrine are their enemies, seeing he maketh it "a war of all men against all men." Now if private men had once such a right and did resign it up into the hand of the sovereign magistrate, then the sovereign magistrate may use the same right still, and kill whomsoever he thinketh may annoy him, without sin: but this he cannot do. Saul sinned in killing the Gibeonites, and the priests. "Wherefore wilt thou *sin* against innocent blood?" David sinned in killing Uriah. It is said of Manasseh, that "he filled Jerusalem with innocent blood, which the Lord would not pardon." Ahab is styled a murderer,—"Hast thou killed," &c.

[1 Sam. xxii. 18, 19. —2 Sam. xxi. 1.]— 1 Sam. xix. 5.—[2 Sam. xi. 14—17.] 2 Kings xxiv. 4. [1 Kings xxi. 19.]

Lastly, the exaggerations of this sin in Holy Scripture, and the incredible ways which God useth to find it out, and those blind blows[x] and ghastly horrors of conscience which do ordinarily accompany it, do proclaim to all the world, that there is more in it than an offence against mutual pacts and covenants between man and man. "He that doth violence to the blood of any person, shall flee to the pit, let no man stay him." The wilful murderer must be pulled out of the city of refuge; yea, God's altar must yield him no protection. This sin is a defacing of the image of God; "it defileth" a

Prov. xxviii. [17.] Deut. xix. 11, [12.] Exod. xxi. 14. Gen. ix. 6. [Numb. xxxv. 33.]

[x] [Quos diri conscia facti Mens habet attonitos et *surdo verbere* cædit." Juv., Sat., xiii. 193, 194.]

whole "land;" and proceedeth from the special instigation of the devil, who "was a murderer from the beginning." O how heavy (said one) is the weight of innocent blood! How much do all authors, sacred and civil, inveigh against the shedding of innocent blood! Some have apprehended a
791 fish's head in the platter for the head of him they had murdered. Others, after a horrid murder, had been observed to have their hands continually upon their daggers[y]. This opinion of his takes away all difference between nocent and innocent blood. This inward guilt, these fears of vengeance, and the extraordinary providence of God in the discovery of murders, do proclaim aloud, that there is more in bloodguiltiness than the breach of mutual pacts between man and man.

Discourse II. John viii. 44.

In the next place, he maketh us an elaborate discourse of a lion, and a bear, and an ox[z], as if he stood probationer for the place of attorney-general of the brutes. This is evident, —he hath deserved better of them, than either of his God, or of his religion, or of the human nature.

T. H. attorney-general for the brute beasts.

In the first place, he acquitteth the beasts from the dominion of man[a], and denieth that they owe him any subjection. He that shall use T. H. his books as the countryman did his prognostication, write down every thing contrary,—fair for foul, and foul for fair, true for false, and false for true,—if he could get but a good wager upon each opinion, would have advantage enough. I hope he doth not understand it of a political "dominion" or subjection, but only that the other creatures were designed by God for the use and service of men; in the same sense that Virgil saith,

> "Sic vos non vobis vellera fertis oves.
> "Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra boves[b]."

When God had created man, male and female, after His own image, He gave them His benediction; "Subdue the earth, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowls of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." And this very dominion was a part of the "image of God," wherein man was created. Therefore God

Gen. i. 28.

[Gen. i. 27.]

[y] [As is asserted of Richard III, after the murder of the two young princes: see Holinshead, Chron., vol. iii. p. 735.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 141, 142.]

[a] [Ibid., p. 142.]

[b] [Virgil, in Donatus' Life, c. xvii.]

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brought all the creatures to man as to their lord and master under Himself, to "give them names," which is a sign and a proof of dominion. Therefore said the kingly prophet, "Thou madest him" (man) "to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet, all sheep and oxen," &c. Here is but a harsh beginning of his attorneyship.

Gen. ii. 19.

Psal. viii. 6, [7.]

Secondly, he maintaineth, that the lion hath as much right, or, as he calleth it, "liberty," to eat the man, as the man hath to eat the ox[c]. I hope he will not deny, that the Creator of all things had right to the donation of His own creatures. Man hath God's deed of gift:—"Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things." Can he shew such another grant for the lions to devour men? When God said, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made He man,"—was it intended only, that his blood should be preserved for the lions? or do not their teeth deface God's image as much as man's weapons? But "the lion had liberty to eat man long before[d]." He is mistaken. The creatures did bear a more awful respect to the image of God in man before his fall; but man's rebellion to God was punished with the rebellion of the creatures to him. He saith, "it was impossible for most men to have" God's "license" to use the creatures for their sustenance[e]. Why so? As if all the world were not then comprised in the family of Noah: or as if the commandments and dispensations of God were not then delivered from father to son by tradition, as they were long after by writing. He asketh, how I would have been offended if he should have spoken of man as Pliny doth,—"than whom there is no living creature more wretched or more proud[f]." Not half so much as now. Pliny taxeth only the faults of men; he vilifieth not their human nature. "Most wretched;"—what is that but an argument of the immortality of the soul? God would never have created the most noble of His creatures for

Gen. ix. 3.

[Gen. ix. 6.]

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 141.]

[d] [Ibid.]

[e] [Ibid.]

[f] ["Nec miserius quidquam homine aut superbius." Plin., Nat. Hist., lib. ii. c. 5; quoted by T. H., Qu., ibid.]

the most wretched being. "Or more proud;"—that is, than some men. "*Corruptio optimi pessima*"—"the best things, being corrupted, turn the worst."

But he acknowledgeth "two advantages which man hath above other creatures, his tongue and his hands[g]." Is it possible, that any man who believeth that he hath an immortal soul, or that reason and understanding are any thing but empty names, should so far forget himself and his thankfulness to God, as to prefer his tongue and his hands before an immortal soul and reason? Then we may well change the definition of a man which those old dunces the philosophers left us, 'man is a reasonable creature,' into this new one, 'man is a prating thing with two hands.' How much more was the human nature beholden to Tully, a heathen, who
792 said, that man differed from other creatures in reason and speech[h]; or to Ovid, who styleth man,

"Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ[i]."

If he have no better luck in defending his Leviathan, he will have no great cause to boast of his "making" men "examples[k]."

And now it seemeth he hath played his masterpiece; for in the rest of his Animadversions in this section we find a low ebb of matter. Concerning consultations, he saith nothing but this, that my writing "was caused physically, antecedently, extrinsecally," by his answer[l]. In good time. By which I see right well, that he understandeth not what a physical cause is. Did he think his answer was so mathematical to compel or necessitate me to write? No, I confess I determined myself. And his answer was but a slender occasion; which would have had little weight with me, but for a wiser man's advice, to prevent his over-weening opinion of his own abilities. And then followeth his old dish of twice-sodden coleworts, about "free," and "necessary," and "contingent," and "free to do if he will[m];" which we have had often enough already.

Prov. xxvi. 5. ["Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit."]

His distinction between "seen" and "unseen necessity[n]," Seen and unseen necessity.

[g] [Qu., ibid.]
[h] [Cic., De Offic., i. 16. "Ratio et oratio."]
[i] [Ovid., Metam., i. 76.]
[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 348.]
[l] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 143.]
[m] [Ibid.]
[n] [Ibid., p. 144.]

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deserveth more consideration. The meaning is, that seen necessity doth take away consultation, but unseen necessity doth not take away consultation, or human endeavours.

Unseen necessity is of two sorts. Either it is altogether unseen and unknown, either what it is, or that it is; such a necessity doth not take away consultation, or human endeavours. Suppose an office were privately disposed; yet he who knoweth nothing of the disposition of it, may be as solicitous and industrious to obtain it as though it were not disposed at all. But the necessity which he laboureth to introduce, is no such unseen unknown necessity. For though he know not what the causes have determined particularly, or what the necessity is, yet he believeth, that he knoweth in general, that the causes are determined from eternity, and that there is an absolute necessity.

The second sort of unseen necessity is that, which is unseen in particular what it is, but it is not unknown in general that it is. And this kind of unseen necessity doth take away all consultation, and endeavours, and the use of means, as much as if it were seen in particular. As, supposing that the Cardinals have elected a Pope in private, but the declaration of the person who is elected is kept secret; here is a necessity, the Papacy is full; and this necessity is unseen in particular, whilst no man knoweth who it is; yet, forasmuch as it is known that it is, it taketh away all endeavours and consultations as much as if the Pope were publicly enthroned. Or suppose a jury have given in a privy verdict; no man knoweth what it is until the next court-day, yet it is known generally that the jurors are agreed and the verdict is given in: here is an unseen necessity; yet he who should use any further consultations or make further applications in the case, were a fool. So, though the particular determination of the causes be not known to us what it is, yet, if we know that the causes are particularly determined from eternity, we know that no consultation or endeavour of ours can alter them.

But it may be further objected, that, though they cannot alter them, yet they may help to accomplish them. It was necessary, that all who sailed with St. Paul should be saved from shipwreck; yet St. Paul told them, that "except" the

Acts xxvii. 22. and 31.

shipmen "did abide in the ship, they could not be saved." So, though the event be necessarily determined, yet consultation or the like means may be necessary to the determination of it. I answer, the question is not, whether the means be necessary to the end; for that is agreed upon by all parties; but the question is, to whom the ordering of the means which are necessary to the production of the event, doth properly belong, whether to the First Cause or to the free agent. If it belong to the free agent under God (as we say it doth), then it concerneth him to use consultations and all good endeavours, as requisite means to obtain the desired end. But if the disposition of the means belong solely and wholly to God (as he saith it doth), and if God have ordered all means, as well as ends and events, particularly and precisely, then it were not only a thankless and superfluous office to consult what were the fittest means to obtain an end, when God hath determined what must be the only means, and no other; but also a sauciness, and a kind of tempting of God, for a man to intrude himself into the execution of God Al-
793 mighty's decrees; whereas he ought rather to cast away all care and all thought on his part, and resign himself up wholly to the disposition of the second causes, which act nothing but by the special determination of God.

If all things be absolutely necessary, admonitions are all vain.

Concerning admonition he saith less than of consultation. "The reason" (saith he), "why we admonish men" of understanding rather than "children," fools, and madmen, is because they are more capable of "the good and evil consequences of their actions," and have more "experience," and their passions are more conform to their "admonitors[o];" that is to say, moderate and staid. And then, after his braggadocio manner, he concludeth,—"There be therefore reasons under heaven which the Bishop knows not of[p]." My one reason—"because they have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have not"—includeth more than all his three reasons put together. What is it that weigheth the good and evil consequences of our actions? Reason. What is it that preserveth us from being transported with our passions? Reason. And what is experienced

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 144, 145.] [p] [Ibid., p. 145.]

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of good and evil? Reason improved by observation. So we have gained nothing by the change of my reason, but three cracked groats for one good shilling.

But he hath omitted the principal part of my answer, that is, the "liberty and dominion over their actions," which men of understanding have much more than "children, fools, or madmen;" without which all his capableness of "good and evil consequences," all his "experience" of good and evil, all his calmness and moderation, do signify just nothing. Let a man have as much capacity as Solomon, as much experience as Nestor, as much moderation as Socrates; yet, if he have no power to dispose of himself, nor to order his own actions, but be hurried away by the second causes inevitably, irresistibly, without his own will, it is to as much purpose to admonish him, as when Icarus had his wings melted by the sun, and was tumbling down headlong into the sea[q], to have admonished him to take heed of drowning. A seasonable admonition may do much good; but that is upon our principles, not upon his. If all events, with all their circumstances, and the certain means to effect them, were precisely determined from eternity, it were high presumption in us to interpose without special warrant. Those means which we judge most convenient, are often not looked upon by God Almighty; Who doth use to bring light out of darkness, and restore sight by clay and spittle, and preserve men from perishing by perishing. No paragraph escapeth him without some supererogatory absurdities. As here, that a man may "deliberate" without "the use of reason," that brute "beasts" may deliberate, that madness or frenzy is "strength of passion[r]."

[2 Cor. iv. 6.—John ix. 6.—Matt. x. 39; xvi. 25. &c.]

A litter of absurdities.

He insisteth longer upon moral praise and dispraise, or moral goodness or badness; but speedeth worse, entangling himself in twenty errors, as these which follow.—"Metaphysical goodness is but an idle term"—that is good wherewith a man is "pleased"—"good is not of absolute signification to all men"—"nothing is good or evil but in regard of the action proceeding from it, and the person to whom it doth good or hurt"—"Satan is evil to us, but good to God"—

[q] [Ovid., Metam., viii. 223 sq.—Hygin., Fab. xl.—&c.]

[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 115.]

"if there were laws among beasts, a horse would be as morally good as man"—"the difference between natural and moral goodness, proceedeth from the" (civil) "law"—"the law is all the right reason that we have"—"we make it right reason by our approbation"—all "actions of subjects, if they be conformable to the law of the land, are morally good"—"moral praise is from obedience to the law, moral dispraise is from disobedience to the law"—"to say a thing is good, is to say, It is as I, or another, or the state would have it"—"that is good to every man which is so far good as he can see"—"all the real good, which we call honest and morally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to the law"—the law is "the infallible rule of moral goodness"—our particular reason is not "right reason"—'the reason of our governor, whom we have set over ourselves, is right reason'—"his laws, whatsoever they be, are in the place of right reason to us"—"as in play morality consisteth in not renouncing the trump, so all our morality consisteth in not disobeying the law[s]." Is not here a hopeful litter of young errors, to be all formed out of three penfuls of ink? as if he had been dreaming lately in Error's den. One Anticyra will not afford hellebore enough to cure him perfectly[t]. I was apt to flatter myself awhile, that by "the law" he understood the law of right reason; but I found it too evident, that by right reason he understands the arbitrary edicts of an elective governor. I could not choose but call to mind that of our laureat poet,—

"God help the man so wrapt in Error's endless train[u]!"

What is 'morally good.'

94 The reader might well have expected matter of more edification upon this subject: as, wherein the formal reason of goodness doth consist, in convenience, or in the obtaining of all due perfections; as likewise, the distinction of good, either subjectively, into the goods of the mind, the goods of the body, and the goods of fortune[x], or formally, into *bonum honestum, utile, et delectabile*[y], or, honestly good, profitably good, and delightfully good. That which is honestly good, is desirable in itself, and as it is such. That which is profitably good, is that which is to be desired as conducing to the

[s] [Ibid., pp. 145—147.]
[t] [Hor., A. P., 300.]
[u] [Spenser, Faery Queen, Canto i. stanza 18.]
[x] ["Αγαθὰ περὶ ψυχὴν—περὶ σῶμα—ἐκτός." See Aristot., Ethic., I. viii. 2.]
[y] ["Καλὸν—συμφέρον—ἡδύ." See Aristot., Ethic., II. iii. 7.]

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obtaining of some other good. Thirdly, delightfully good is that pleasure, which doth arise from the obtaining of the other goods desired. But he hath quite cashiered the two former sorts of good, that which is honestly good, and that which is profitably good; and acknowledgeth only that which is delightfully good, or that which pleaseth him or me: so as, if our humours differ, goodness must differ; and as our humours change, goodness must change; as the chamelion changeth her colours. Many things are good that please not us, and many things please us that are not good. Thus he hath left no real good in the world, but only that which is relatively good. Thus he hath made the devil himself to become good, and (which is yet worse) "good to God." Thus he hath made horses to be as capable of moral goodness as men, if they had but only "laws." I wonder why he should stick at that. Laws are but commands, and commands may be intimated to horses, as we might see in Bankes his horse, which we might call (upon his principles) an honest, virtuous, and morally good, horse. There is a woe denounced against
Isai. v. 20. them who "call evil good and good evil." This is not all; he confesseth, that "lawmakers are men, and may err, and think that law good for the people which is not[z];" yet with the same breath he telleth us, that there is no other "right reason" but their "law," which "is the infallible rule of moral goodness[a]." So right reason and erring reason, a fallible rule and an infallible rule, are all one with him. What? No other rule but this one Lesbian rule, the arbitrary dictates of a governor? What is become of the eternal law, or the rule of justice in God Himself? What is become of the Divine positive law recorded in Holy Scriptures? What is become of the law of nature, imprinted naturally in the heart of every man by the finger of God Himself? What is become of the law of nations, that is, those principles which have been commonly and universally received as laws by all nations in all ages, or at least the most prudent, pious, and civil nations? What is become of that synteresis[b] or noble light of the soul, which God hath

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 146.]

[a] [Ibid., p. 147.]

[b] [Συντήρησις, corrupted by the Schoolmen into "synderesis," is the word employed by some of the Greek Fathers, and from them by the Latin (e.g. S. Jerom, Comment. in Ezek. cap.i., who explains it by "scintilla conscientiæ"), to signify that power, by which the human reason instinctively apprehends the principles of moral truth.]

given mankind to preserve them from vices? Are they all gone? all vanished? and is no rule remaining but only the arbitrary edicts of a mortal law-giver, who may command us to turn Turks or Pagans to-morrow, who by his own confession "may err" in his law-giving? Then, not only "power absolutely irresistible doth justify whatsoever it doth," but also the power of mortal man may justify the violation of the laws of the immortal God. But I have shewed him sufficiently, that there are unjust laws, not only towards God, but likewise towards men; that unjust laws do not acquit our active obedience to them from damnable sin; that it is not only lawful but necessary to disobey them; that God Himself hath approved such disobedience, and rewarded it. To conclude, it is not the pleasing of him or me, or some private benefit that may redound from thence to him or me, that makes anything to be truly good, but the meeting of all perfection in it whereof that thing is capable. "*Bonum ex integrâ causâ, malum ex quolibet defectu*"—"all requisite perfections must concur to make a thing good, but one only defect makes it evil." Nothing is morally good, nothing is praiseworthy, but that which is truly honest and virtuous. And, on the other side, nothing is morally bad, nothing is dispraiseworthy, but that which is dishonest and vicious.

Exod. i. 21.

To wrangle everlastingly, whether those encouragements which are given to setting dogs and coyducks and the like be rewards[c], were a childish fighting with shadows; seeing it is confessed, that they are not recompenses of honest and virtuous actions, to which the laws did appoint rewards. Swine, that run by a determinate instinct of nature to succour their fellows of the same herd in distress, do not desire a civical crown, like him who saved the life of a citizen; nor the spiders, whose fancies are fitted by nature to the weaving of their webs, deserve the like commendation with Arachne, who attained to her rare arts of weaving by assiduous industry[d]. There is a great difference between natural qualities and moral virtues. Where nature hath bestowed excellent gifts, the chief praise redoundeth to the God of nature. And where the brutes have attained to any such

Rewards of brutes and men differ.

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 148, 149.]

[d] [Ovid., Metam., vi. 129—145.]

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rare or beneficial qualities by the instruction of man, the chief praise redoundeth unto him that taught them. The harp was not crowned in the Olympian games, but the harper; nor the horses, but the charioteer. And though the encouragements of men and brutes be sometimes the same thing materially, yet they are not the same thing formally.

But where he confoundeth a necessity of specification with a necessity of exercise, and affirmeth that the bees and spiders are necessitated by nature as well as to all their "individual actions" as to their several kinds of works[e], it deserveth no answer but to be slighted. His opinion doth require that he should say, that they are determined to their individual actions by the second causes and circumstances (though it be untrue); but to say they are determined by nature to each individual act, admitteth no defence.

In the last paragraph, I am beholden to him, that he would instruct me[f]; but I am of his mind, that it would be too great a labour for him. For I approve none of his new-fangled principles, and think he might have spent his time better in "meditating" upon somewhat else, that had been more proper for him. I see, that where the inferior faculty doth end, the superior doth begin: as, where the vegetative doth end, there the sensitive doth begin, comprehending all that the vegetative doth and much more; so, where the sensitive ends, the intellectual begins. And should I confine the intellectual soul, which is inorganical, immaterial, impassible, separable, within the bounds of the sensitive, or to the power and proceedings thereof, when I see the understanding doth correct the sense, as about the greatness of the sun? Sense hath nothing to do with universals, but reason hath. Even in memory, which he mentioneth, the intellectual remembrance is another manner of thing than the sensitive memory. But this belongs not to this question; and therefore I pass by it, and leave him to the censure of others.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XV.

[T. H.'s impertinencies.]

In this section he chargeth me first with a double breach

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 119.]

[f] [Ibid.]

of promise; yet there is no promise, and if they had been promises, both are accomplished. One of my promises was, that "I would not leave one grain of his matter unweighed;" yet I leave these words unanswered,—"our Saviour bids us pray, 'Thy will,' not our will 'be done,' and by example teacheth us the same, for He prayed thus—'Father, if it be Thy will, let this cup pass[g].'" First, this was no promise, but mine own private resolution, which I might lawfully change at any time upon better grounds. Secondly, it had been an easy thing to omit two lines in a whole discourse unwillingly. Thirdly, the intent was only to omit nothing that was material; but this was merely impertinent. Lastly, without any more to do, it was fully answered in my Defence in these words;—"In the last place he urgeth, that in our prayers we are bound to submit our wills to God's will; who ever made a doubt of this? we must submit to the preceptive will of God or His commandments, we must submit to the effective will of God, when He declares His pleasure by the event, or otherwise; but we deny, and deny again, that God wills *ad extra* necessarily, or that it is His pleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times; which is the question, and that which he allegeth to the contrary comes not near it[h]." Where were his eyes? That inference—"Which seemeth at least to imply that our prayers cannot change the will of God"—is now first added; and if it had been there formerly, is answered abundantly in the same section. Discourse II. [Luke xxii. 42.]

The second breach of promise is this; that I said, "Here is all that passed between us upon this subject, without any addition or the least variation from the original;" but I "have added these words—'Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and seeing their rare works, I have seen enough to confute all the boldfaced atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies[i].'" What a stir is here about two lines, which contain neither argument, nor answer, nor authority, nor any thing material! I did not apply these words to him, nor gave the least intimation of any such thing. If he be wronged, he wrongeth himself. I am as much offended with

[g] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 158.]

[h] [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 109. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 158; from the Defence, Numb. viii. above p. 52.]

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the theists of this age, as with the atheists; who are convinced that there is a God, and profess it, yet never do Him any service or worship, not so much as "*ante focum si frigus erit*" —by a warm fire's side in a winter's day; "who, when they know God, do not glorify Him as God." But to deal clearly with him;—I profess I do not know, either when any such words were added, or that any such words were added; neither ever had I any other copy but that original which was sent to the press, and that copy which was transcribed for him and sent to him at the first. If the amanuensis did omit two lines, either in the margent (which is most likely by what he saith) or otherwise, I could not help it. My asseveration (for it was no promise) was true,—that I sent the original itself[k], as it had lain long by me without any variation.

Rom. i. 21.

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When he is afraid to be hard put to it, then he layeth in the other scale,—to counterbalance those new reasons which are brought against him,—either "prescience," or, "What shall be, shall be," or, "A man cannot determine to-day, what his will shall be to-morrow[l]:"—all which are impertinent to the question, and have been abundantly answered in these Castigations. His instance of a debtor, who intended first to pay his creditor, then thought to defer it, and lastly resolved to do it for fear of imprisonment[m], is remote from the question. The determination of the debtor is not antecedent, but concomitant, not extrinsecal,—by the creditor, who perhaps never thought on it,—but intrinsecal,—by the dictate of his own reason; which he calleth "thoughts[n]," lest he should seem to attribute any thing to reason. What are "thoughts," but "*intellectus actu circa res occupatus*[o]" —"the understanding actually employed about something?" If he hold no other necessity but this, which no man opposeth, why doth he trouble the world with his debtor and creditor about nothing?

What it is to honour God.

I did not accuse him for making *all* piety to consist in the estimation of the judgment; he still mistaketh; but I did

[k] [i. e. to the press. Hobbes affirms, that the words in question were not in the copy of the Defence sent to himself (in 1645), nor in "the body of the copy sent to the press" (in 1655), but "onely in the margent" of the latter.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. pp. 158, 159.]

[m] [Ibid., p. 159.]

[n] [Ibid.]

[o] [See above p. 249. note n.]

and do accuse him for placing all the inward piety of the heart in the estimation of the judgment. So he saith expressly,—that "to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power[p]." If it were "nothing else," the devil honours God as much as the best Christian; for he believeth a God as much as they, and he cannot believe a God but he must believe Him to be omnipotent. "Thou believest there is one God, thou dost well; the devils also believe and tremble." I shewed him, that inward piety doth consist more in the submission of the will than in the estimation of the judgment[q]; but I may not say, that it was "too hot for his fingers[r]." He urgeth, that the devil "cannot esteem God for His goodness[s]." Let it be so. Neither is there any need that he should, to make him devout, if his ground were true,—that "to honour God is nothing else but to think Him to be of great power." Discourse II. Jam. ii. 19.

But to make amends for this oversight, he hath found us out "two sorts" of devils: "the one" (and indeed all the devils that are in his creed) "are wicked men," to whom he applieth the name of "Diabolus and Satan and Abaddon" in Holy Scripture; the other are heathen gods, "mere fancies or fictions of terrified hearts," or (as he styleth them out of St. Paul) "nothings[t]." What he will do with Heaven, I know not; but he hath emptied Hell at once, and swept away all the devils, except "wicked men." He might do well to acquaint the judges with it, to save the lives of so many poor old melancholic women, who suffer as witches for confederacy with the devil. I desire to know of him, whether those devils which our Saviour cast out of the possessed, or those devils which hurried the swine into the sea, or that devil who took our Saviour up to the pinnacle of the Temple, were "heathen gods," or "wicked men?" or how "a legion" of "heathen gods" or "wicked men" could enter into one possessed person, without crowding one another to death? But this belongeth to another speculation. He asketh, "in what classis of entities" I "place devils[u]?" Will he learn to

What are devils in his judgment.

[1 Cor. x. 19.]

[Matt. viii. 32, &c.—iv. 5, &c.]

[Mark v. 9.—Luke viii. 30.]

[p] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xv. p. 103.]

[q] [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 104; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 35.]

[s] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 160.]

[t] [Ibid.]

[u] [Ibid.]

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speak "jargon[x]?" I answer, with angels, among spiritual substances. He hath as much authority to empty Heaven of good angels, as to empty Hell of bad angels.

[The attributes of God not all included in His omnipotence.]

To cover his former error,—that the honour of God is nothing else but the estimation of His power,—he hath devised another error,—that all the attributes of God are included in His "omnipotence[y]." I confess, that the attributes of God are transcendents above our capacities, and are not of the same nature with the same attributes of mortal men. I confess further, that all the attributes of God, and whatsoever is in God, is God, or is the Deity itself. But to confound all these distinct attributes in one, to no purpose, without any ground, is absurd; and serveth only to make 797 those notions, which were piously invented to help our understandings, to be the ready means to confound our understandings.

God doth not hinder privately what He commands openly.

In the next place I shewed, that to command one thing openly, and to necessitate another thing privately, destroyeth the truth of God, the goodness of God, the justice of God, and the power of God. This is a heavy accusation, and he had need to acquit himself like a man. But I believe he will fail. Here he bringeth in the "prescience" of God again twice[z], to seem to stop a gap with it. But it will not serve his turn. Where the soldiers are mustered over and over, it is a sign the companies are but thin.

His opinion destroyeth the truth of God.

First, to save the truth of God, he saith, that "truth consisteth in affirmation and negation, not in commanding[a]." The sense is, that God, Who is truth itself, may will one thing and command another, and hinder that act which He commandeth. Mark but his reason;—"the Scripture, which is His word, is not the profession of what He intendeth, but an indication what those men whom He hath chosen to salvation . . or destruction, shall necessarily intend[b]." This is the same, which he renounced formerly as one of my "ugly phrases[c];"—that God should command one thing openly, and hinder the same privately or underhand. Reader, if thou delightest in such a God Who will command one thing

[x] [See above p. 278. note c.]
[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. pp. 160, 161.]
[z] [Ibid., p. 161.]
[a] [Ibid.]
[b] [Ibid.]
[c] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 139.]

publicly and hinder it privately, choose Mr. Hobbes his God. God forbid we should attribute any such double dealing to our God, Who is truth itself. Some contraries, as heat and cold, may meet together in remiss degrees; but truth and falsehood, a habit and privation, can never meet together. There is a truth in being; the picture of a man cannot be the man himself. There is a truth in knowing; if the understanding be not adequate to the thing understood, there is no truth in it. There is a truth in saying; which is a conformity or an adequation of the sign to the thing said, which we call veracity. When one thing is commanded publicly, and the same is hindered privately, and the party so hindered is punished for not doing that which was impossible for him to do, where is the veracity? where is the conformity and adequation of the sign to the thing said? I dare not tell Mr. Hobbes, that he understandeth not these things; but I fear it very much. If he do, his cause is bad, or he is but an ill advocate.

Next, to reconcile the goodness of God with his principles, he answereth first to the thing, that "living creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well as men," which they could not be "without the will of God[d]." I know no torments of the other creatures but death; and death is a debt to nature, not an act of punitive justice. The pangs of a violent death are less than of a natural; besides the benefit that proceedeth thence for the sustenance of men, for which the creatures were created. See what an argument here is (for all his answers are recriminations or exceptions), from brute beasts to men, from a debt of nature to an act of punitive justice, from a sudden death to lingering torments ("*ut sentiant se mori*[e]"), from a light affliction producing great good, to endless intolerable pains, producing no good but only the satisfaction of justice. Then, to the phrase of "God's delighting in torments," he answereth, that God "delighteth not" in them[f]. It is true. God is not capable of passions, as delight or grief. But when He doth those things, that men grieving or delighting do, the Scriptures by an anthro-

And His goodness.

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 174.]

[e] [An injunction of Caligula to the executioners of his victims: see Sueton., in Caio, c. 30. p. 424. ed. Græv.]

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 174.]

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popathy do ascribe delight or grief unto Him. Such are his exceptions, not to the thing but to the phrase, because it is too scholastical or too elegant. I see he liketh no tropes or figures. But in all this, here is not one word of answer to the thing itself;—that that which is beyond the cruelty of the most bloody men, is not agreeable to "the Father of mercies,"—to create men on purpose to be tormented in endless flames, without their own faults:—and so contrary to the Scriptures, that nothing can be more; wherein punishment is called God's "strange work," "His strange act;" for "God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living, . . but ungodly men with their works and words called it unto them." If this place seem to him apocryphal, he may have twenty that are canonical;—"As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that he turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?"

[2Cor.i.3.]

Isai.xxviii. 21.

Wisd. i. 13, [16.]

Ezek.xxiii. 11.

And His justice.

That his opinion destroyeth the justice of God, by making Him punish others for His own acts, is so plain that it admitteth no defence. And if any further corroboration were needful, we have his own confession,—that "there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone[g]." Yet he keepeth a shuffling of terms,—afflictions, and brute creatures,—which by his own confession are not capable of moral goodness or wickedness, and consequently not subject to punishment,—and quite taking away the proportion between sin and punishment, only to make a show of answering to them, who do not or cannot weigh what is said. Among guilty persons to single out one to be punished for example's sake, is equal and just; "that the punishment may fall upon few, fear to offend upon all[h]." But to punish innocent persons for example's sake, is only an example of great injustice. That which he calleth my "opinion" of the endless torments of Hell[i], I learned from Christ Himself,—"Go ye cursed into everlasting fire;"—and from my Creed. When Origen and some others, called the merciful Doctors[j], did

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[Matt.xxv. 41.]

[g] [Qu.,] Fount. of Arg., [p. 13.]

[h] ["Ut metus videlicet ad omnes, pœna ad paucos, perveniret." Cic., Pro Cluentio, c. xlvi.]

[i] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 174.]

[j] [See Sixtus Senensis, Biblioth. Sanct., lib. v. Annot. 131; lib. vi. An-

endeavour to possess the Church with their opinion of an universal restitution of all creatures to their pristine estate after sufficient purgation, it was rejected by the Church. Without doubt, a sin against infinite Majesty, and an aversion from infinite Goodness, do justly subject the offenders to infinite punishment. But he talketh, as though God were obliged to do acts of grace, and to violate His own ordinances that He might save men without their own wills. God loves His own creatures well, but His own justice better. DISCOURSE II.

Whereas I shewed, that this opinion destroyeth the omnipotence of God, by making Him the author or cause of sin, and of all defects, which are the fruits of impotence, not of power; he distinguisheth between the cause of sin, and the author of sin, granting that God is the cause of sin:—"He will say, that this opinion makes Him" (God) "the cause of sin; but does not the Bishop think Him the cause of all 'actions' and are not sins of commission actions? is murder no action? doth not God Himself say, 'there is no evil in the city which I have not done,' and was not murder one of those evils[k]?" But he denieth, that God is the author of sin, that is, God doth not "own" it, God doth not "give a warrant" for it, God doth not command it[l]. This is downright blasphemy indeed. When he took away the devil, yet I did not suspect, that he would so openly substitute God Almighty in his place. Simon Magus held, that God was the cause of sin[m]; but his meaning was not so bad; he only blameth God for not making man impeccable. The Manichees and Marcionites did hold, that God was the cause of sin[n], but their meaning was not so bad; they meant it not of their good God, whom they called light, but of their bad God, whom they termed darkness[n]. But T. H. is not afraid to charge the true God to be the very actor of all sin. When the prophet asketh,—"Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?"—he speaketh expressly of evil of punishment, not at all of the evil of sin. Neither will it avail him in the least, that he maketh not God to be the author of sin. For, first, it is

And [His] omnipotence, [by] making [Him] the cause of sin.

Amos iii. 6.

not. 290: and authorities in Mosh., bk. II. Pt. ii. c. 3. § 9, note 4. in Soames' edition.]

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 175.]

[l] [Ibid.]

[m] [See above p. 217. note m.]

[n] [See above p. 217. note n.]

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worse to be the physical or natural cause of sin, by acting it, than to be the moral cause of sin, by commanding it. If a man be the author of that which he commandeth, much more is he the author of that which he acteth. To be an author, is less than to be an actor. A man may be an author by persuasion, or by example; as it is said of Vespasian, that he, being "*antiquo cultu victuque*," was unto the Romans "*præcipuus astricti moris* auctor[o]"—by his observing of "the ancient diet" of the country and the old fashion of apparel, he was unto the Romans "the principal *author* of their frugality." Hath not he done God Almighty good service, to acquit Him from being "the author of sin," which is less, and to make Him to be the proper cause of all sin, which is more? Thus, to maintain fate, he hath deserted the truth of God, the goodness of God, the justice of God, and the power of God.

A right Hobbist cannot praise God.

In the next place, I demanded, "how shall a man praise God, who believeth Him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the world, creating millions to burn eternally without their own fault, to express His power[p]." He answereth, that the word tyrant was sometimes taken in a good sense[q]; a pretty answer, and to good purpose, when all the world sees that it is taken here in the worst sense. And when he hath fumbled thus a while after the old manner, all his answer is a recrimination:—"How can the Bishop praise God for His goodness, who thinks He hath created millions of millions to burn eternally, when He could have kept them so easily from committing any fault[r]." I do not believe, that God "created millions," nor so much as one single person, to burn eternally; 799 which is as true as his other slander in this place, that I "withdraw the will of man from God's dominion[s]." Both the one and the other are far from me. His principles may lead him upon such precipices, mine do not. God created not man to burn, but to serve Him here, and to be glorified by Him and with Him hereafter. That many men do miss this end, is not God's fault; Who gave them sufficient strength to have conquered, and would have given them a larger supply

[o] [Tacit., Annal., iii. 55.]
[p] [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 105; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[q] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 175.]
[r] [Ibid.]
[s] [Ibid.]

of grace if they had sought it; but man's. God was not bound to reverse His own decrees, or change the order of the government of the world, which He Himself had justly instituted, to hold up a man from sinning against his will, when He could by His almighty power draw good out of evil and a greater degree of glory out of the fall of man. Concerning the number of those who are reprobated for their sins, I have nothing to say, but that "secret things belong unto the Lord our God, and things revealed to us and to our children." [Deut. xxix. 29.]

My next demands were,—"how shall a man hear the Word of God with that reverence and devotion and faith that is requisite, who believeth, that God causeth His Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Christians without any intention that they should be saved[t]." Secondly, "how shall a man prepare himself for the receiving of the Sacrament with care and conscience, who apprehendeth, that 'eating and drinking unworthily' is not the cause of damnation, but, because God will damn a man, therefore He necessitateth him to eat and drink unworthily[t]." To which two demands he giveth one answer;—that faith is the gift of God; if they have faith, they shall both hear the Word and receive the Sacraments worthily; and if they have no faith, they shall neither hear the Word nor receive the Sacraments worthily[u]. There needeth no more to be said, to evidence to all the world, that he doth utterly destroy and quite take away all care, all solicitude, all devotion and preparation of ourselves, for holy duties. If God give us faith, we can want nothing; if God do not give us faith, we can have nothing. We use to say truly, that God doth not deny His grace to them who do their endeavours. "The kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force;" and, "How much more shall your Father which is in Heaven, give good things to them that ask Him!" St. Paul maketh hearing to be the way to obtain faith;—"How shall they believe on Him of whom they have not heard?"—and exhorteth Christians to "work out their salvation with fear and trembling." Devout prayers, and hearing and reading, and participating, did use to be the way to get faith, and to increase faith. As in our

Nor hear the Word or receive the Sacrament worthily.

[1 Cor. xi. 27, 29.]

Matt. xi. 12.

Matt. vii. 11.

Rom. x. 14.

[Phil. ii. 12.]

[t] [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 105.]
[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 176.]

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natural life, so in our spiritual life, we must earn our bread in the sweat of our brows. Such desperate opinions as these, which are invented only to colour idleness and quench devotion, are the "pillows" of Satan. We believe none are excluded from the benefit of Christ's passion but only they who exclude themselves. Absolute exclusion[x] is opposed to exclusion upon supposition; which useful and necessary distinction if he do not or will not understand, we have no reason to fancy it one jot the worse for his supercilious censures.

[Gen. iii. 19.]

[See Ezek. xiii. 18.]

Nor vow as he ought.

My next demand was, "how shall a man make a free vow to God, who believes himself to be able to perform nothing but as he is extrinsecally necessitated[y]." To this he answers, that "the necessity of vowing before he vowed, hindered not the freedom of his vow[z]." This itself is absurd enough; but whether it be his misapprehension, or his cunning to avoid the force of an argument, he comes far short both of the force and of the hope of this reason, which was this;—if a man be not left in any thing to his own disposition, and have no power over his own future actions, but is antecedently determined to what he must do and must not do, and yet knoweth not what he is extrinsecally determined to do and not to do, then it is not only folly but impiety, for him to vow that which he knoweth not whether it be in his power to perform or not; but upon his grounds every man is antecedently determined to every thing he shall do, and yet knoweth not how he is determined. Universal necessity and free vows cannot possibly consist together.

Nor repent of his misdeeds.

My last demand was, "how shall a man condemn or accuse himself for his sins, who thinketh himself to be like a watch wound up by God[a]?" His answer is, "Though a man think himself necessitated to what he shall do, yet, if he do not think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence, there will follow no impediment to repentance[b]." My argument looketh at the time past, his answer regardeth the time to come; both ways he is miserably entangled. First for the time past. If a man was wound up as a watch by God to all

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[x] ["Excluded, . . whether positively or not positively is nothing to the purpose." Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 176.]

[y] [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 105.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 177.]

[a] [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 105.]

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 177.]

the individual actions which he hath done, then he ought not to accuse or condemn any man for what he hath done: for, according to his grounds, neither he nor they did any thing but what was the secret and irresistible will of God that they should do; and when the secret will of God is made known by the event, we ought all to submit unto it. Much less can any man accuse or condemn himself without hypocrisy for doing that, which, if his life had lain a thousand times upon it, he could not have helped, nor done otherwise than he did. The very same reason holdeth for the time to come. There is the same necessity in respect of God's decree, the same inevitability on our parts for the future, that is for the time past; the same submission is due to the secret will of God, when it shall be declared by the event. How ill he hath been able to reconcile his principles with the truth and goodness and justice and power of God, and with those Christian duties which we owe unto God, as vows, repentance, and praising of God's Holy Name, the hearing of His Word, the receiving of His Sacraments, I leave to the judgment of the reader.

What repentance is.

The next thing which I disliked was his description of repentance;—"It is a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way[c]." Who ever heard before this of 'gladness' or joy in the definition of repentance? He telleth us, that it is not "Christian repentance" without a purpose of amendment of life[d]. That is true. A purpose of amendment was comprehended in the old definition of repentance;—'a godly sorrow for sins past, with a stedfast purpose to commit no more sins to be sorrowed for[e].' St. Peter found no great sense of joy, when "he went out and wept bitterly;" and some tell us, that so long as he lived, he did the same, so often as he heard the cock crow[f]: nor Mary Magdalene, when she washed the feet of Christ with her tears, and wiped them with her hairs; yet she was a true penitent, and purposed amendment: nor David, when he "washed his

[Matt. xxvi. 75.—Luke xxii. 62.]

[Luke vii. 37, 38.]

[Ps. vi. 6.]

[c] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xv. p. 103.]

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 177.]

[e] ["Pœnitentiam quippe agere, est et perpetrata mala plangere, et plangenda non perpetrare." Greg. Magni in Evang. Hom. xxxiv. Op. tom. i. p. 1609. C.]

[f] [This is asserted as upon the authority of S. Clement of Rome by Corderius (Annot. in c. xxii. v. 62. of the Catena in S. Lucam edited by him). See also the Life of S. Peter by Sanctorius in Bollandi Acta SS., June 29, c. i. § 16.]

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bed" night by night, and "watered his couch with his tears." St. Paul reckoneth all the parts of the repentance of the
2 Cor. vii. 11. Corinthians; "godly sorrow—carefulness—clearing of themselves — indignation — fear — vehement desires — zeal — revenge;" here is no word of joy or 'gladness' in all this. Joy is a consequent of repentance after reconciliation, but it is not of the essence of repentance; no more than a succeeding
[Luke xv. 24.] calm is of the essence of a storm, or the prodigal's festival joy after his re-admission into his father's house was a part of his conversion. He is afraid, that "this doctrine" of fasting, and mourning, and tears, and humicubation, and sackcloth, and ashes, "pertaineth to the establishment of Romish penance[g]." Or rather they were natural expressions of sorrow, before
Joel ii. 12. Rome was builded. "Turn ye to Me with all your heart, with fasting, and weeping, and mourning." Neither the
[Jonah iii. 6-8.—Matt. xi. 21.—Luke x. 13.] Ninevites, nor the Tyrians and Zidonians, did learn their "sackcloth and ashes" at Rome. But many men love to serve God now-a-days with as much ease as they can; as if God Almighty would be satisfied with any thing, '*vel uvâ vel fabâ*'—
[Matt. vii. 2.] 'either with a grape or with a bean.' And 'with the same measure they mete to God, He measureth to them again.'

Man's concurrence with God's grace.

He chargeth me, that I "labour to bring in a concurrence of man's will with God's will, and a power in God to give repentance if man will take it, but not the power to make him take it[h]." Hola! It is one question, '*utrum possit*'—'what God *can* do;' another, '*utrum sit*'—'what God *will* do.' God *can* determine the will irresistibly, but He doth not
Acts vii. 51. do it ordinarily. "Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in
Prov. i. 24. heart, . . ye do always resist the Holy Ghost;" and, "I have called and ye refused," &c. The concurrence of God and man in producing the act of our believing, or conversion to God, is so evident in Holy Scripture, that it is vanity and lost labour to oppose it. If God did not concur, the Scripture
[Phil. ii. 13.] would not say, "It is God that worketh in" us, 'both the will and the deed.' If man did not concur, the Scripture
[Phil. ii. 12.] would not say, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling." If our repentance were God's work alone, God
[Joel ii. 12.] would not say to man, "Turn ye unto Me with all your heart."

[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 178.]

[h] [Ibid.]

And if repentance were man's work alone, we had no need to pray, "Turn us, O Lord, and we shall be turned." We are commanded to "repent" and to "believe." In vain are commandments given to them, who cannot at all concur to the acting of that which is commanded. Faith and repent- Discourse II. [Jerem. xxxi. 18.—Lam. v. 21.] Mark i. 15.

301 ance are proposed unto us as conditions to obtain blessedness and avoid destruction:—"If thou shalt confess with thy mouth and believe with thy heart," &c., "thou shalt be saved;" and, "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." To propose impossible conditions, which they to whom they are proposed have no power either to accept or to refuse, is a mere mockery. Our unbelief and impenitence is imputed to us as our own fault;—"Because of unbelief thou wert broken off;" and, "After thy hardness and impenitent heart thou treasurest up unto thyself wrath." Their unbelief and impenitence were not their own faults, if they neither had power to concur with the grace of God to the production of faith and repentance, nor yet to refuse the grace of God. The Holy Scripture doth teach us, that God doth help us in doing works of piety;—"The Lord is my helper;" and, "The Spirit helpeth our infirmities." If we did not cooperate at all, God could not be said to 'help' us. There is therefore, there must be, cooperation. Neither doth this concurrence or cooperation of man at all intrench upon the power or honour of God, because this very liberty to cooperate is His gift, and this manner of acting His own institution. [Rom. x. 9.] [Luke xiii. 3, 5.] Rom. xi. 20. Rom. ii. 5. [Heb. xiii. 6.—Rom. viii. 26.]

Those words—"Behold I stand at the door and knock[1]," —are not understood only of the minister's outward knocking at the door of the ear with persuasive words, but much more of God Almighty's knocking at the door of the heart by His preventing grace. To what end doth He knock to have it opened, if He Himself had shut it by an irresistible decree? God first knocks at the door of our hearts by His preventing grace, without which we have no desire to open unto Christ; and then He helps us by His adjuvant or assisting grace, that we may be able to open. Yet the very name of God's 'adjuvant,' or 'assistant,' or 'helping' grace, doth admonish us, that there is something for us to do on our parts; that is, to open, to consent, to concur. Why should Rev. iii. 20.

[1] [Quoted by T. H., ibid.]

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our cooperation seem so strange, which the Apostle doth assert so positively? "We are labourers together with God;" and, "I laboured more abundantly than they all; yet not I" (that is, not I alone), "but the grace of God which was with me."

1 Cor. iii. 9. 1 Cor. xv. 10.

The last part of [t]his section is concerning prayer, which he manageth no better than the rest.

Confidence in prayer, and the efficacy of it.

First, he accuseth me for saying, that "prayer is a signification, that we expect" that which we pray for from God; which he calleth "a presumption" in me, and "a detraction from the honour of God[k]." But it is so far from being a presumption, that it is a necessary requisite in prayer. St. James will have us pray without "wavering;"—"Let him ask in faith nothing wavering." St. Paul will have men to "lift up holy hands without wrath or doubting." And our Saviour commands, "What things soever ye desire when ye pray, believe that ye shall receive them, and ye shall have them."

Jam. i. 6. 1 Tim. ii. 8. Mark xi. 24.

I cited many texts of Scripture to prove the efficacy of prayer; whereof he is pleased to take notice of three, and to deny, that helping, means, efficacy, availing, do "signify any causation[l];" contrary both to the words and scope of those texts, and contrary to the tenor of the whole Scripture. "The prayer of faith shall save the sick;" and, "I know that this shall turn to my salvation through your prayers." Hannah prayed and the Lord granted her request. We see the like in Ahab, in Zachary, in Cornelius, and many others. Hezekias prayed, and the Lord said, "I have heard thy prayer, I have seen thy tears, behold I will add unto thy days fifteen years." Nothing can be plainer than Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the Temple;—"If there be famine in the land, if there be pestilence," &c., "if their enemy besiege them in their cities, whatsoever plague, whatsoever sicknesses there be, what prayer or supplication soever be made by any man, or by all Thy people Israel," &c., "and spread forth his hands toward this house, hear Thou in Heaven Thy dwelling place, and forgive, and do," &c. To all which God Himself condescended, and promised to do accordingly.

Jam. v. 15. Phil. i. 19. [1 Sam. i. 27.] [1 Kings xxi. 27-29. Luke i. 8-11. Acts x. 2-4.] Isa. xxxviii. 5. 1 Kings viii. 37. &c. 2 Chron. vii. 12.

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. pp. 178, 179.]

[l] [Ibid., p. 179.]

His reason to the contrary,—that "no creature living can work any effect upon God[m]"—is most true; but neither pertinent to his purpose, nor understood by himself. It is all one as to the efficacy of prayer, if it work upon us, as though it had wrought upon God Himself; if it render us more capable of His mercies, as if it rendered Him more merciful. Though the sword and the crown hang immoveable, yet prayer translateth us from one capacity to another, from being under the sword to be under the crown.

Lastly, he telleth us in great sadness, that "though our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God
802 Almighty[n]." Prayers and thanksgiving are our acts, not God's acts; and have their distinction from us, not from God. Prayer respects the time to come, thanksgiving the time past. Prayer is for that we want, thanksgiving for that we have. All the ten lepers prayed, "Jesus, Master, have mercy on us;" but only one of them returned to give God thanks. St. Paul distinguisheth prayer and thanksgiving, even in respect of God. By granting the prayers of His people, God putteth an obligation upon them to give thanks. He might as well have said, that faith, hope, and charity, are the same thing.

Luke xvii. 13. and 18.

2 Cor. i. 11.

He passeth over the rest of this chapter in silence. I think him much the wiser for so doing. If he had done so by the rest likewise, it had been as much credit for his cause.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XVI.

Here are three things questionable in this section; first, whether "He who maketh all things, make all things necessary to be," or whether it be "a contradiction of" me to myself "to say so[o]?"—First, this is certain, there can be no formal contradiction where there is but one proposition; but here is but one proposition. Secondly, here is no implicit contradiction; first, because there is a vast difference between making all things "necessary to be," and making all things to be necessary agents. The most free or contingent agents in the

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 179.]

[n] [Ibid.]

[o] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. p. 183.]

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world, when they are, are necessarily such as they are; that is, "necessary to be;" but they are not necessarily necessary agents. And yet he is still harping upon this string, to prove such a necessity as no man did ever deny. Thirdly, I told him, that this which he contends for here, is but a necessity of supposition: as, supposing a garment to be made of the French fashion, when it is made, it is necessarily of the French fashion; but it was not necessary before it was made, that it should be made of the French fashion, nor of any other fashion; for it might not have been made at all.

T. H. still mistaketh necessity upon supposition.

He excepteth, that the burning of the fire is no otherwise necessary than upon supposition; that is, supposing fuel be cast upon the fire, the fire doth burn it necessarily[p]. But herein he is altogether mistaken. For that only is called necessary upon supposition, where the thing supposed is or was in some sort in the power of the free agent, either to do it or to leave it undone, indifferently; but it is never in the power of the fire to burn or not to burn indifferently. He who did strike the fire out of the flint, may be said to be a necessary cause of the burning that proceeded from thence upon supposition; because it was in his power either to strike fire or not to strike fire. And he who puts more fuel to the fire, may be said to be a necessary cause of the continuance of the fire upon supposition; because it was in his choice to put to more fuel or not. But the fire itself cannot choose but burn whilst it is fire, and therefore it is a necessary cause of burning, absolutely, and not upon supposition. What unseen necessity doth prejudice liberty, and what doth not, I have shewed formerly. How mean an esteem soever he hath of the tailor, either he or his meanest apprentice have more sense than himself in this cause. The tailor knows, that there was no necessity from eternity that he should be a tailor, or that that man for whom he made the garment should be his customer, and much less yet of what fashion he should make it. But he is still fumbling to no purpose upon that "old foolish rule[q]," as he pleased once to call it,—"whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is."

The second question is, whether there be any agents in the

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. p. 183.]

[q] [See above p. 264. note k.]

world which are truly free or truly contingent agents, according to his grounds. And it is easily demonstrated, that there are not: because he maintaineth, that all agents are necessary; and that those agents which we call free agents and contingent agents, do act as necessarily, as those agents which we see and know to be necessary agents; and that the reason why we style them free agents and contingent agents, is, because we do "not know whether they work necessarily or not[r]." He hath told us hitherto, that all agents act necessarily; otherwise there could not be an universal necessity. Now he telleth us, that there be sundry agents, which we "know not whether they work necessarily or not." If we do "not know whether they work necessarily or not," then we do not know whether there be universal neccssity or not. But we may well pass by such little mistakes in him. That which I deduce from hence is this,—that the formal reason of liberty and contingency according to his opinion doth consist in our ignorance or nescience; and then it hath
803 no real being in the nature of things. Hitherto the world hath esteemed nothing more than liberty; mankind hath been ready to fight for nothing sooner than liberty. Now if, after all this, there be no such thing as liberty in the world, they have contended all this while for a shadow. It is but too apparent, what horrible disorders there are in the world; and how many times right is trodden under foot by might; and how the worst of men do flourish and prosper in this world, whilst poor Hieremy is in the dungeon, or writing books of Lamentation. If there be true liberty in the world, we know well whereunto to impute all these disorders; but if there be no true liberty in the world, free from antecedent necessitation, then they all fall directly upon God Almighty and His providence.

Discourse II. There is more in contingency than ignorance.

The last question is, concerning his definition of contingents,—that "they are such agents as work we know not how[s]." Against which I gave him two exceptions in my Defence. One was this. Many agents work we know not how, as the loadstone draweth iron, the jet chaff; and yet they are known and acknowledged to be necessary and not

[T. H.'s definition of contingents.]

[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. p. 184.]

[s] [Ibid.]

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contingent agents[t]. Secondly, many agents do work we know how, as a stone falling down from a house upon a man's head; and yet we do not account it a necessary but a contingent event, by reason of the accidental concurrence of the causes[u]. I have given him other instances in other parts of this treatise; and if need be, he may have twenty more. And yet, though his definition was shewed formerly to halt downright on both sides, yet he, good man, is patient, and never taketh the least notice of it; but only denieth the consequence, and overlooketh the proofs.

[Indetermination of causes.]

His objection about the "indetermination" of the causes, —that indetermination "doth nothing," because "it maketh the event equal to happen and not to happen[x],"—is but a flash without any one grain of solidity. For by "indetermination" in that place is clearly understood, not to be predetermined to one by extrinsecal causes, but to be left free to its own intrinsecal determination, this way or that way, indifferently. So the first words—"by reason of the indetermination"—have reference to free agents and free events; and the other words—"or accidental concurrence of the causes"—have reference to casual events: and both together, *referendo singula singulis*, do include all contingents, as the word is commonly and largely taken by old philosophers.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XVII.

[The opinion of necessity taketh away the nature of sin.]

Reader, I do not wonder, now and then, to see T. H. sink under the weight of an absurdity in this cause. A back of steel were not able to bear all those unsupportable consequences which flow from this opinion of fatal destiny. But why he should delight to multiply needless absurdities, I do not know. Almost every section produceth some new monster. In this seventeenth section I demonstrated clearly, that this opinion of universal necessity doth take away the nature of sin. That which he saith in answer thereunto, is that which followeth.

First, "it is true, he who taketh away the liberty of doing

[t] [Defence, Numb. xvi. above p. 111; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[u] [Ibid.]

[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. p. 184.]

according to the will, taketh away the nature of sin; but he that denieth the liberty to will, doth not so[y]." This answer hath been sufficiently taken away already, both in the Defence[z] and in these Castigations[a]. Inevitable and unresistible necessity doth as much acquit the will from sin as the action.

Again, whereas I urged, that whatsoever proceedeth essentially by way of physical determination from the First Cause, is good and just and lawful[b], he opposeth, that I "might as well have concluded, that whatsoever man hath been made by God, is a good and just man[c]." So I might. What should hinder me to conclude, that every creature created by God is good *quâ talis*—as it is created by God? But, being but a creature, it is not immutably good, as God Himself is. If he be not of the same opinion, he must seek for companions among those old heretics, the Manichees, or Marcionites.

So he cometh to his main answer;—"Sin is not a thing really made; those things which at first were actions, were
804 not then sins, though actions of the same nature with those which were afterwards sins; nor was then the will to any thing a sin, though it were a will to the same thing which in willing now we should sin; actions became then sins first, when the Commandments came," &c.; "there can no action be made sin but by the law; therefore this opinion, though it derive actions essentially from God, it derives not sins essentially from Him, but relatively, and by the commandment[d]."

The first thing I observe in him is a contradiction to himself. Now he maketh the anomy, or the irregularity and repugnance to the law, to be the sin; before he conceiveth the action itself to be the sin:—"Doth not the Bishop think God to be the cause of all actions? and are not sins of commission actions? is murder no action? and doth not God Himself say, 'there is no evil in the city which I have not done?' and was not murder one of those evils," &c.? "I am of opinion, that the distinction of causes into efficient and deficient is Bohu, and signifieth nothing[e]."

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 188.]

[z] Defence, Numb. iii. [above pp. 30—32.]

[a] [Answ. to the] Stat. of Quest., [above pp. 221—223.]—Castig. [of Animadv.] Numbers i. and iii, [above pp. 258, 274.]

[b] [Defence, Numb. xvii. above pp. 113, 114.]

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 189.]

[d] [Ibid.]

[e] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xv.

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Sin in the world before the civil law.

This might have been pardoned to him; but his second slip is worse,—that the world was I know not how long without sin. I did demonstrate, that upon his grounds all sins are essentially from God, and consequently are lawful and just. He answereth, that the actions were from God, but the actions were not sins at the first, until there was a law. What is this to the purpose? It is not material when sin did enter into the world, early or late; so as, when it did enter, it were essentially from God; which it must needs be upon his grounds,—that both the murder, and the law against murder, are from God. And as it doth not help his cause at all, so it is most false. What actions were there in the world before the sin of the angel? "He charged the angels with folly;" and, "If God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to Hell;" and, "The angels which kept not their first estate." What were those 'first actions' that were before the sin of Adam? "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin."

Job iv. 18. 2 Pet. ii. 4. Jude 6. Rom. v. 12.

Thirdly, he erreth most grossly in supposing that the world at first was lawless. The world was never without the eternal law, that is, the rule of justice in God Himself, and that which giveth force to all other laws; as the Divine Wisdom saith, "By Me kings reign, and princes decree justice." And sin is defined to be "that which is acted, said, or thought, against the eternal law[f]." But to let this pass for the present, because it is transcendentally a law. How was the world ever without the law of nature? which is most properly a law, "the law that cannot lie, not mortal from mortal man, not dead, or written in the paper without life, but incorruptible, written in the heart of man by the finger of God Himself[g]." Let him learn sounder doctrine from St. Paul;—"For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or excusing one another." I pass by those commandments of God

Prov. viii. 15. Rom. ii. 14, 15.

p. 175. בֹּהוּ="Res vacua et inanis." Gen. i. 1.]

[f] [See above p. 80, note a.]

[g] [See above p. 329, note e.]

which were delivered by tradition from hand to hand, from father to son. This,—that mankind was ever without all law,—is the most drowsy dream that ever dropped from pen.

[The true nature of sin.]

Whereas he saith, that I "allow," that "the nature of sin doth consist in this, that it is an action proceeding from our will against the law," and thence inferreth, "that the formal reason of sin lieth not in the liberty of willing[h]," he doth wrong himself, and misinform his reader; for I never "allowed" it, nor never shall "allow" it in that sense, but said expressly the contrary. My words were these,—"which in our sense is most true, if he understand a just law and a free rational will[i];" and then I added further, that the law which he understandeth, is a most unjust law, and the will which is intended by him, an irrational necessitated will. Where did he learn to take that for granted, which is positively denied? He saith indeed, if the reader could trust him, that he hath "shewed that no law can be unjust[k]." But I expect arguments, not his own authority, which I value not. He neither "hath shewed," that all laws are just, nor ever will be able to shew it, until the Greek Calends. Likewise, where he seemeth not to understand what "the rational will" is[l], I do think there is scarcely any one author, who did ever write upon this subject, but he hath this distinction between the rational and the sensitive appetite; and hath, particularly, made this main difference between them, that the rational appetite is free, but the sensitive appetite is necessary. If he alone will not understand that which is so evident and universally received by all scholars, it is no great matter.

To command impossibilities is unjust.

It is as unjust to command a man to do that which is "impossible" for man to do, as to command him 'contradictions[m].' This silly evasion will not serve his turn. Those things are said to be impossible to us in themselves, which are not made impossible to us by our own defaults. And
805 those things which we make impossible by our defaults, are not impossible in themselves. Those impossibilities, and only those, which we by our defaults have made, may lawfully be

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 189.]
[i] [Defence, Numb. xvii. above p. 114; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 189.]
[l] [Ibid.]
[m] [Ibid., p. 190.]

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punished. Where he confesseth, that "law makers, not knowing the secret necessities of things to come," do "sometimes enjoin things that are made impossible from eternity[n]," it cometh every way short of the truth. First, in limiting it to *human* "law makers," who only know not the necessities of things to come; for my argument,—that law which commandeth impossibilities is an unjust law,—doth hold as well of God's law as of man's law: not that we believe any law of God can be unjust, God forbid; but to demonstrate to him undeniably, that all those things which he conceiveth to be impossible from eternity, are not impossible from eternity, because the contrary is commanded from God, and God never commandeth impossibilities. Secondly, he cometh short of the truth in this also, that he saith human law-givers "do *sometimes* enjoin impossibilities;" for, by his leave, upon his grounds, they do always enjoin either absolute impossibilities or absolute necessities, both which are equally ridiculous. Lastly, whereas I argued thus,—if the will of man be determined by God without the will of man, "then it is not man's will, but God's will,"—he denieth my "consequence," because "it may be both God's will and man's will[o]." I answer, it is God's will effectively, because He maketh it necessarily, and subjectively, because He willeth it; but upon his grounds, it is the will of man only subjectively, because he is necessitated to will it, but not effectively, because he had no hand in the production of it; and therefore, how faulty soever it may be, yet it cannot be imputed to man.

Concerning his instance in a civil judge;—

[T. H.'s instance of a civil judge.]

First, I shewed that it was "impertinent;" because "neither is a civil judge the judge of sin, nor the law of the land the rule of sin[p]." To my reasons he answereth nothing in particular; but in general,—that whereas I "said," that "the law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to say, that the judge looketh no higher than the will of the doer[q]." Here are so many imperfections, that I scarcely know where to begin. First, I never "said that the law cannot justly punish a crime that

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 190.]
[o] [Ibid.]
[p] [Defence, Numb. xvii. above p. 113.]
[q] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 190.]

proceedeth from necessity;" I always said, and do still say, that if it be antecedently necessitated, it is no crime, either punishable or unpunishable. Secondly, he did make the civil judge to be the judge of sin, and the law of the land to be the rule of sin, in express terms;—"a judge, in judging whether it be sin or not, which is done against the law[r]." Thirdly, that will which the law and the judge do regard, is not his brutish necessitated irrational appetite, but our free rational will, after deliberation determined intrinsecally by the agent himself.

Yet further against his silly distinction,—free to do if he will, not free to will.

Secondly, I shewed, that his instance in a civil judge was against himself; because "this which he saith, that 'the judge looketh no higher than the will of the doer,' doth prove that the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would[s]." To this he answers, that "it proveth indeed that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would, but it proveth not that he had the liberty [to have a will] to keep the law[t]." Hath not this silly senseless distinction been canvassed sufficiently yet, but it must once more appear upon the stage? Agreed. Thus I argue.—First, if "the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would," then the malefactor had liberty to have contradicted the absolute will of God, if he would; then he had liberty to have changed the unalterable decrees of God, if he would: but he had not liberty to have contradicted the absolute will of God, if he would; he had not liberty to have changed the unalterable decrees of God, if he would. The assumption is so evident, that it were great shame to question it. The consequence is as clear as the sun. For, upon Mr. Hobbes his grounds, it was the absolute will of God, and the unalterable decree of God, that the malefactor should do as he did, and not do otherwise. And, therefore, if the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law, and to have done otherwise if he would, he had liberty to have contradicted the will of God, and to have changed the decree of God, if he would. But this is too absurd. Secondly, to have "liberty to have kept the law if he would,"

[r] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xvii. p. 112.]

[s] [Defence, Numb. xvii. above p. 114.]

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 190.]

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implieth necessarily a conditional possibility. But the will of God and the decree of God, that the malefactor should do so as he did and not keep the law, implieth an absolute impossibility. Now, it is a rule in logic, that "*impossibile habet in se vim adverbii universaliter negantis*"—"an impossibility hath the force of an universal negative." But an universal negative and a particular affirmative are contradictory:—that it was impossible for the malefactor to have kept the law, and yet he had liberty to have kept the law if he would. There is not the least starting hole for him, through which he can endeavour to creep out of this contradiction, but by making this supposition—"if he would"—to signify nothing; and to affirm, that it was equally impossible for the malefactor to will otherwise and to do otherwise. Then see what a pretty liberty he hath left us, even a mere impossibility. If the sky fall, then we shall catch larks. Observe further the vanity of this distinction, between "liberty to do if we will," and "liberty to will;" when both the one liberty and the other are equally impossible, upon his own grounds. And yet, with this mock liberty, which signifieth nothing, he is fain to answer all the texts of Scripture which are brought against him, and all the absurdities which are heaped upon him. Lastly, to say a man is free to do any thing if he will, implieth that he hath power enough, and there is nothing wanting to the doing of it but his will. Otherwise, if there be not power enough to do it (as in this case upon his grounds there is not), it is as ridiculous to say, a malefactor was free to have kept the law if he would, as to say, a man is free to jump over the sea if he will, or to fly in the air if he will.

Yet still he saith, the will of the malefactor "did not determine itself[u]." Then, by his own confession, the malefactor had the more wrong, to be punished for that which was unavoidably and irresistibly imposed upon him. If the malefactor was necessitated from God by an essential determination of extrinsecal causes, both to will as he did and to do as he did, he was no more a malefactor than his judge.

Of monsters.

I have no reason to "retract" any one syllable of what I said concerning monsters[v]; but he had need to retract his ordinary

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. p. 190.]

[v] [Defence, Numb. xvii. above pp. 114, 115; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

falsifying, and dismembering, and misinterpreting of my sayings. I affirmed (as all sound philosophers do affirm), that nature never intendeth the generation of a monster, but that every monster is a deviation from the law of the first institution, that every creature should beget another in his own likeness; which proceedeth sometimes from the defect or inordinate force of the plastical or forming virtue, sometimes from the excess or defect of the matter, sometimes from the fault of the womb wherein the conception is perfected, sometimes from other lesser reasons; and therefore, that the universal causes, as God and the sun[x], are not to be blamed for monstrous births, but that particular cause from which the excess or defect or distortion did proceed[y]. What was herein to derogate from the God of nature? Who permitteth and disposeth of such irregularities in nature, as He doth of sins in morality; but with this difference, that moral aberrations are culpable and punishable, but aberrations in nature are only deformities, not sins. When philosophers do say that nature intendeth any end, they do not mean that nature doth deliberate or resolve this or that, but that nature doth act for an end; which no man can deny with any credit. The spider makes her webs to catch flies, there is nature's end. The ant gathers provision in summer for winter sustenance. The bee makes cells for a depository for honey, and receptacles for young bees. The vine brings forth leaves, flowers, and grapes, one in order to the production or preservation of another; and lastly followeth the wine, which is the end of all the rest; which, being the last, was the first or principal end of nature. It is not the part of a real scholar, to except against evident truth upon grammatical scruples.

Discourse II.

[Gen. i. 21, 24, 25.]

In the last Animadversion of this section, nothing is contained that is either new or requireth an answer.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XVIII.

I cited Lipsius[z], only to shew that the distinction of destiny into Christian and Stoical destiny was not mine.

[Lipsius.]

[x] [Compare e. g. Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. I. Qu. lxxix. art. 4. Respondeo;—"Non enim solus *sol generat hominem*, sed est in homine virtus generativa hominis."—&c. &c.]

[y] [Defence, Numb. xvii. above pp. 114, 115; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[z] [Defence, Numb. xviii. above pp. 116, 117.]

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And though Lipsius incurred some dislike by reason of some inusitate expressions, yet there is no cause why T. H. should please himself so much as to think that Lipsius was of his opinion. He was no such friend of any sort of destiny, as to abandon the liberty of the will. The Stoics themselves came short of T. H. his universal necessity. Yet I do not blame him, if he desire to have one partner in such a desperate cause as this is.

That which "concerneth" him in the second distinction, is 807
this; that though he acknowledge a mock liberty, that is, a will or an appetite of the object, yet he maintaineth, that this appetite is neither moved, nor excited, nor determined to its act or appetibility of this or that, less or more, by the free agent, but altogether by extrinsecal causes; and so the pretended free agent is no more free, than a bird which a man holdeth fast in his hand is free to fly whithersoever she will.

What is said to be "*in Deo*," and what "*extra Deum*." [Acts xvii. 28.]

I said, "those things which God wills without Himself He wills freely and not necessarily[a];" which he censureth in this manner;—"He says rashly and untruly; rashly, because there is nothing without God, Who is infinite, in Whom are all things, and in Whom 'we live, move, and have our being;' and untruly, because, whatsoever God foreknew from eternity, He willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily[b]." What should I do? Should I fall down and thank this great Mogul (as the Æthiopian slaves do their emperor when they are lashed) for thinking on me? Although I know his Thrasonical humour very well, that his animal spirits are mere bubbles of vain glory, and that he knoweth right well that he cannot reign securely whilst there is one of a different opinion surviving; yet I am persuaded, that if he had been so well read, or so much versed in the writings of other men, as to know how many he wounded "rashly and untruly," in this "rash and untrue" censure, he would have foreborne it for his own sake. Hath he never heard of a common rule in theology, that "*Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa*"—"The works or acts of the Trinity without Itself are undivided[c]?" Or

[a] [Defence, Numb. xviii. above p. 120; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xviii. p. 198.]

[c] [Borrowed from St. Augustin, In Johan. Evang., cap. xvi. Tract. xcv. § 1; Op. tom. iii. P. ii. p. 731. A. (and elsewhere);—"Sæpe diximus inseparabilia opera esse Trinitatis." And that "Alia a Se Deus non ex necessitate vult," see Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. I. Qu. xix. art. 3.]

hath he never heard of that common distinction between a necessary being and a necessary acting[d]? The most perfect manner of being is necessary, and therefore God is a necessary being; and that which He willeth within Himself, He willeth necessarily, because "whatsoever is in God is God[e]:" but the most perfect manner of acting without the Deity is freely; and therefore the Schools do agree, that God is a free agent without Himself. Discourse II.

These free acts are principally two. The first is the creation, whereby things created do pass from a not being to a being. The second is government, by which all things created are moved and ordered to their ends. All men acknowledge, that the Deity filleth all places by Its essence, by Its presence, by Its power; being within all places and things, but not included; and without all places and things, but not excluded. They acknowledge, that all things which have a real being, do depend upon God for their being, for their making, for their conservation. And therefore, when we speak of any thing that is without the Deity, we do not intend, that any thing is without the essence, or the presence, or the power, or the circumference of It. God is a circle, Whose centre is every where, the circumference no where. But by "the works of God without Himself," we understand the creation and the government of the world; which are not terminated in the Deity Itself, but in the creatures; which are from God as their efficient, and for God as their end, and in God or through God in respect of their necessary and perpetual dependance upon Him, Who is the original essence of all things,—"I am hath sent me unto you;"—yet they are not of God as particles of the Divine essence, nor in God in that sense wherein we use to say, "Whatsoever is in God is God;" and so they are His works "*ad extra*"—"without the Deity." [Free acts of God *extra Deum*; —Creation, and Government.] Exod. iii. 14.

To make good the second part of his censure,—that it was "untruly" said,—he produceth nothing but his old threadbare argument taken from the prescience of God, which hath been answered over and over. Neither the prescience of God,

[d] ["Necessitas essendi — necessitas operandi." See above in the Answ. to Animadv. upon Numb. iii. pp. 264, 265; and note l.]

[e] [See above p. 159. note f.]

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nor the will of God upon prescience, do imply any more than a mere hypothetical necessity[f], which will do his cause no good.

To will and do, in God, the same thing.—He willeth not all He could will.

In the conclusion of this section he confesseth, that "God doth not all things that He can do if He will;" but he saith, God "cannot will that which He hath not willed from eternity[g];" understanding by eternity an everlasting succession, whereas in eternity nothing is past or to come. I have shewed often in these Castigations, the falsity, uselessness, and contradiction, of this absurd silly senseless distinction, in respect of men. But being here applied by him to God, nothing can be imagined more absurd. For to will efficaciously, and to do, in God are the same thing. What He doth, He doth by His will. To imagine, that many things are free to God to do, which are not free to Him to will, 808 sheweth that his "meditations" upon this subject were either none at all, or worth nothing.

But it shall suffice for the present, to shew how absurd and how unappliable this exposition is to the two places by me produced. John Baptist told the Jews, that they might not flatter themselves with this, that they were the posterity of Abraham; that though all they should prove impenitent and unbelievers, yet "God was able to raise up children to Abraham of stones." If it were impossible for God to will the doing of any such thing, how was this truly said? And how could this afford any supply to the seed of Abraham, in case his carnal posterity should continue obstinate? In the other place, St. Peter drawing his sword in defence of his Master, Christ reprehended him and told him that He could have a better guard to secure Him from all the attempts of the Jews, if it pleased Him not to lay down His life freely;—

Luke iii. 8.

[Matt. xxvi. 53.]

"Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to My Father, and He shall give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" He saith not, I can if I would, but positively, "I can." Neither speaketh He of remote possibilities, but, "He shall give Me presently." Christ would shew by these words, that if it had not been His own will freely to suffer for the redemption of mankind, He could have "prayed to His Father," and He would have sent Him a guard of more

[f] [See above in the Defence, Numb. xxxvi. pp. 190—192; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xviii. p. 198.]

than "twelve legions of angels," and that "presently"— without delay. If it was impossible for God to will any such thing, then our Saviour's plea to St. Peter was but a vain pretence, and had nothing of reality in it. If T. H. regarded the honour and veracity of Christ, he would not impose such a juggling delusory sense upon His clear assertion; as if our Saviour should have said, 'Peter, I have no need of thy endeavours to defend Me, for I could pray to My Father, and He would immediately send Me a guard of twelve legions of angels; but to say the truth, He is not willing to do it, and to say the whole truth, it is not possible for Him to be willing.'

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XIX.

T. H. makes the will to be compelled.

He professeth, that he "never said the will is compelled, but doth agree with the rest of the world that it is not compelled[h]." But, to let us see that he understandeth not what "the world" meaneth, in saying, the will "is not compelled," twice or thrice in the same page he maketh it to be compelled. "Many things" (saith he) "may compel a man to do an action in producing the will[i]." If a man can be compelled to will, then the will can be compelled. This appeareth yet more plainly a little after, where he maketh the casting of one's goods into the sea in a storm to be a voluntary free elective act; and yet he confesseth, that "terror" was "a necessary cause of the election[k]." To which if we add what he saith in his Answer,—"A man is then only said to be compelled, when fear maketh him willing to it[l],"—it appeareth, that (according to his grounds) it is a compulsory action also. If voluntary actions may be compulsory actions, then the will may be compelled. To help to bear off this blow, he distinguisheth between the compulsion of the will and the compulsion of the voluntary agent[m], denying the former, but acknowledging the latter;—"that is, not a compulsion of the will, but of the man[n]." The very same he hath again in these words, "The necessitation of the will is the same thing

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.]
[i] [Ibid.]
[k] [Ibid.]
[l] [See above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xix. p. 122.]
[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.]
[n] [Ibid.]

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with the compulsion of the man[o]." If this be not plain "jargon," and "Bohu" (as he phraseth it[p]), let him tell me what is the compulsion of a man to will, but the compulsion of his will. Whether by the will he understand the soul as it willeth, or the faculty of the will, or the act of willing; every way, he that compelleth a man to will, compelleth his will. Let him call it what he please, either to compel a man to will or to compel the will; by his leave, it is a gross contradiction; for to compel implieth reluctance and opposition, and to will implieth inclination and appetition. To necessitate the will (as he doth) is to compel the will, so far as the will in the elicit acts of it is capable of compulsion.

[What is properly compulsion.]

That is properly said to be compelled, "which hath its beginning from an extrinsecal cause, that which suffereth contributing nothing to it," but "resisting as much as he can[q]." But he hath devised a new improper kind of compulsion, which is caused only by "fear[r]," which is not properly a compulsion; and such as it is, [is] common to many other causes with fear; as, to persuasion,—so Saul's servants "*compelled* him" to eat;—to command,—so, "the drinking was according to law, none did *compel*;"—to occasion,—so St. Paul saith, "I am become a fool in glorying, ye have *compelled* me."

1 Sam. xxviii. 23. Esth. i. 8. 2 Cor. xii. 11.

I pass by his uncouth term of "creation of the will[s]" in every single act of willing: and his extravagant exception,— 809
if "the same individual man who did choose to throw his goods overboard," might "choose not to throw his goods overboard," then "he might choose to throw overboard and not throw overboard[t]." As if the liberty to throw or not to throw and the liberty to throw and not to throw, that is, the liberty to do either part of the contradiction or to do both parts of the contradiction, were the same liberty. And, secondly, as if a man who hath actually chosen, were as free to choose now, as he was at the same time when he did choose. I see, if he cannot find a knot in a bulrush, he will do his endeavour to make it. If "a man" (saith he) "by

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.]

[p] [See above p. 368. note f.]

[q] Aristot., Eth., lib. III. c. i. [§ 12.—"Ἐοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιαζομένου ἢ πάσχοντος."]

[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 208.]

[s] [Ibid.]

[t] [Ibid., p. 209.]

force seize on another man's limbs" (as suppose his hand), "and move them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth, . . . the action so done is not the action of him that suffereth, but of him that useth the force[u]." But if he that useth the force shall give a third person a box on the ear with that hand which he forceth, then it is the action of both; but with this difference, that it is the voluntary action of the one, and the forced or compelled action of the other. But supposing the first man had the will of the second as much in his power as his hand (as God Almighty hath), and should necessitate him to beat the third person willingly; certainly the second person, being so necessitated, could be no more blamed for willing in such a case, than for striking unwillingly.

Motus primo primi, and antipathies.

That motions proceeding from "antipathies" are "*primo primi*[v]," such as surprise a man and prevent not only all actual deliberation but all advertence of reason, there is no doubt. But he who knoweth no other "*motus primo primos*" but only "antipathies," is like to prove some such rare divine or philosopher, as Megabyses shewed himself a painter by his ignorant discourse;—"Whilst thou wert silent (said Apelles) thou seemedst to be somebody, but now there is not the meanest boy that grinds ochre but he laughs at thee[x]." The difference between necessity upon antecedent supposition, and necessity upon a consequent supposition, hath been sufficiently cleared several times in these Castigations[y], and in my Defence in this very section[z], to which I remit the reader. Whosoever shall tell us, that he who hath chosen to himself the profession of a Romish Priest, is still no more necessitated to take the oath of celibate, than he was before he made choice of that office[a]; and that the action of him who runs away upon the first view of a cat, by reason of an antipathy "which he cannot help," before all advertence of reason, is as free as a man casting his goods into the sea to

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 209.]

[v] [Ibid., p. 210.—"I let it pass, noting only, that he expoundeth '*motus primo primi*,' which I understood not before, by 'antipathies.'"]

[x] [Plut., De Animi Tranquillitate, c. xii; and with a little variation, De Discrim. Adulat. et Amici, c. xv: Op. Moral. tom. ii. p. 629, and tom. i. p. 155. Megaby*ses* in the text should be Megaby*zus*.—Ælian (Hist. Var., ii. 2.) relates the same anecdote of *Zeuxis* and Megabyzus; and Pliny (Hist. Nat., xxxv. 12), of Apelles and *Alexander the Great*.]

[y] [Above Numbers i, iii; pp. 257, 258; 264—268.]

[z] [Above pp. 126, 127.]

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 210.]

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save his own life after a sad and serious deliberation[b]; and that he who takes physic out of wantonness, was as much necessitated to stay within doors, as he who lay bedrid of a hectic fever[c]; and that Balaam's blessing of Israel against his purpose and desire, and Caiaphas his prophecy, which he "spake not of himself," but necessarily, by the special determination of the Holy Ghost, were altogether as free as Jacob's blessing of his sons upon election[d]; I say, he who shall tell us all this in earnest upon his own word without any reason or authority, had need to meet with very credulous disciples, who judge of colours winking.

[Numb. xxiii. 12. &c.]

[John xi. 51.]

[Gen. xlix.]

To search too boldly into the nature of God is a fault.

It is true, we who "see but through a glass darkly," do not in this mortality comprehend exactly the nature of God and the Holy Angels; partly by reason of the weakness of our understanding,—the water can ascend no higher than the fountain's head,—and partly for want of revelation. Not to know what God hath not revealed, is a learned ignorance; and therefore, he who searcheth presumptuously into the majesty of God, is oppressed deservedly by His glory.

[1 Cor. xiii. 12.]

But the greater fault is negligence.

But the much greater offence doth lie on the other side,—that men do not endeavour to know God so much as they ought, and might, by the light of nature, the contemplation of the creatures, and the revelation of God's Holy Word, nor to serve Him according to their knowledge. How shall we serve God if we do not know God at all? The least means of the knowledge of God is by the contemplation of the creatures: yet even that doth render men "without excuse." No man but himself would have objected it as a presumption to any man to have said, that God was freer to do good than mortal man, and uncapable of doing evil. Yet this is that which those dreadful terms implied[e]. We measure liberty by the degree of rationability, and the power of reason over passion; he by the largeness or straitness of the prison. Ours is a liberty of men, his is a liberty of blackbirds. If I were disposed to cavil at words as he doth, I could shew him out of Scaliger, that one heat is not more intensive than another,

Rom. i. 20.

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 210.]

[c] [This instance, which is one of Bramhall's, is not mentioned by Hobbes in the passage here referred to.]

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. pp. 210, 211.]

[e] [Ibid., p. 211.—"He takes upon him to attribute to them" (viz. to God and to the good angels) "*liberty of exercise*, and to deny them *liberty of specification*."]

any more than one liberty is more intensive than another[f]. Both phrases are metaphorical. Intention is properly the drawing out of the two extremes, the one further from the other; as in the string of a bow by bending it, and in a cord by stretching it out. But I forbear.

T. H. his liberty, omnipotence in show, in deed nothing.

He had said in his first answer, "He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible, and he that cannot has none at all[g];" I answered, that he who can do what he will, hath not only a liberty but omnipotence[h]. To this he replieth, that "it is one thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another to say that a man hath power to do what he will[i]." This is very true, but it helpeth not him at all. He spake directly of power,—"he that can do what he will," and "he that cannot do what he will." Thus I argue;—either a man can do what he will, or he cannot do what he will; if he can do what he will, then he is not only free but omnipotent; if he cannot do what he will, then he hath no liberty at all. So he hath made men to be either almighty gods or senseless logs; both ways he erreth. If he that can do what he will be not omnipotent (in good English), I have forgot my mother's tongue. He that is bound hand and foot, may wish that he were loosed, and he that is so sick that he cannot stand, may wish that he were in health, that they might both be able to walk; but to elect walking in that state and condition wherein they are, without supposition of the loosing of the one, or the recovery of the other, they cannot; for both want power, and election is of things actually possible. There is only this difference, that in probability the bound man may be loosed, before the sick man recover his strength. But yet it may so fall out, that the sick man may be restored to his health, before the other be loosed from his bonds. Therefore he saith amiss, that the sick man wanteth power, not liberty; and the bound man liberty, not power[k]. If he understood the difference between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he would be able to judge of such cases better than he is. I have only one more advertisement to the reader, that after all this glorious ostentation—"he that can

[f] [Exercit. de Subtilitate &c.,] Exercit. xii. c. 2. [pp. 66, 67.]

[g] [T. H. Numb. xix. above p. 123.]

[h] [Defence, Numb. xix. above p. 128; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 211.]

[k] [Ibid.]

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do what he will, hath all liberty possible"—he leaveth man as poor and bare and helpless as a grasshopper in winter, without any liberty to will, and consequently without any liberty to do.

He dare not refer himself to his own witnesses.

He nameth two Schoolmen,—I think, by the matching of them, they be a great part of his store,—Suarez and "Johannes a Duns" (so he is pleased to call that honour of our nation, and one of the subtilest writers that these last ages have afforded), and four later divines, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Perkins, whom he "always much admired[l]." If he did so, they are the more beholden to him; for a man may see by his treatises, that unless he "meditated[m]" of them sometimes, he hath not been much acquainted with them. He dare not refer his two sorts of devils, or his temporary pains of Hell, or his lawless state of mankind by nature, or his necessity of active obedience to all human laws, or his inefficacy of prayer, or his infallible rule of moral goodness, or his universal necessity of all events by the physical determination of the second causes, or any one of his hundreds of paradoxes, to their determination.

Terms of art.

Room for a great censor, not an old Roman censor, but a new English censor, who cometh armed with his own authority, to reform not only authors, but the arts and sciences themselves, after he hath been dreaming (I should have said "meditating") some years upon the top of Parnassus, and now cometh forth suddenly

"Grammaticus, rhetor, geometres, pictor, aliptes[n]."

To stay there were to do him wrong; a pentameter added will not contain half his exploits; a poet, a logician, a philosopher natural and moral, an astronomer, a mathematician, a theologian. To what purpose did our universities nourish so many little professors? One great professor is best, as the cat in the fable said of one great way. But forget not Epictetus his rule, "Remember to distrust[o]." We have seen a mountebank, or quacksalver, or operator, or charlatan, call him what you will, vapour upon a stage, and slight

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 212. Johannes Duns Scotus became Theological Professor at Oxford in 1301, and at Paris in 1304; Suarez was a Spanish Jesuit, born 1548, died 1617.]

[m] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47.]

[n] [Juv., Sat., iii. 76.]

[o] [Epi*charmus*, ap. Cic., ad Attic., i. 19.]

the good old physicians for poring upon Galen and Hippocrates to learn a company of senseless aphorisms, whilst they by their own meditation and experience had found out remedies more easy, more effectual, more universal. We blame the Court of Rome for their *Index Expurgatorius*; it is a shrewd sign, when litigants are forced to cut out the tongues of their own witnesses: yet they purged out but words, or sometimes a sentence; rarely prohibited one of their own authors. Here words, and sentences, and whole authors, and arts, go to wrack together; much like the Mahometan reformation, when they sacrificed the most part of their interpreters of the Alcoran to the fire without ever reading them. Yet, what they did, they did by public authority, and spared some as genuine expositors. But what this our new censor doth, he doth upon his own head, and like death sparing none; so did not they.

811

Down goes all astrology and metaphysics. The moral philosopher must quit his means and extremes in order to virtue[p], his liberty of contradiction and contrariety[q], his necessity absolute and hypothetical[r], his proportion arithmetical and geometrical[s] (I hope the geometrician may have leave to hold it still), his *principia congenita* and *acquisita*[t], his ἑκούσιον and προαιρετὸν[u], and most of his terms of art, because Mr. Hobbes hath not read them. It is well if moral philosophy escape his censure. For if the law of the land be "the only infallible rule of right reason," then the knowledge of actions, morally good and morally bad, belongeth properly to the common lawyer. The moral philosopher may put up his pipes. The same arbitrary power he assumeth to himself in natural philosophy, rejecting all the common terms used by philosophers, *euphoniæ gratiâ*, because they sound not well in his ears, for other reasons he hath none. "Let the natural philosopher no more mention his intentional species, his understanding agent and patient, his receptive and reductive power of the matter, his qualities symbolical and dissymbolical, his temperament *ad pondus* and *ad justitiam*," &c.; "I would have him fling away his sympathies and antipathies, his anti-

[p] [Aristot., Ethic., II. vi. &c.]
[q] [See above in the Defence, Numb. iv. p. 36; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[r] [Aristot., Physic. Auscult., II. ix.]
[s] [Id., Ethic., V. iii. iv.]
[t] [Id., Analyt. Poster., II. xviii.]
[u] [Id., Ethic., III. iii, iv.]

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peristasis and the like[x]." Whether it was astronomy or astrology in my original, I do not know, nor have means to see[y]. Both may signify the same thing. I am sure, I neither said nor meant judiciary or genethliacal astrology, as my instances do evidence. The truth is, there are so many mistakes in that impression, that sometimes I scarcely know myself what to make of them.

But he is more propitious to the astronomer. His "apogæum and perigæum, arctic, antarctic, equator, zodiac, zenith, horizon, zones," are not so much as "terms of art," but are as intelligible "as a hatchet or a saw[z]." What? Imaginary circles, and lines, and poles, and points, and an imaginary axletree, and ram, and bull, and bears, and dragon, and yet no terms of art? What are they then? Let him put it to a jury of Malmsburians themselves, whether they understand these so well "as a hatchet or a saw," and he is gone.

The like favour he shews to logicians. Their words of the first and second intention, their abstracts and concretes, their subjects and predicates, their moods and figures, their method synthetic and analytic, their fallacies of composition and division, are no terms of art, but plain intelligible words. He that can say this without blushing, may dispute with any man. Porphyry[a] makes the five predicables to be five terms of art. Are not the predicaments and post-predicaments, and demonstrations *a priori* and *a posteriori*, terms of art? Who made a mood and a figure to signify what they do but artists? Let all the world hear them, or read them, who have not learned logic, and they shall understand no more of them than of his "jargon." Why is not an antecedent and hypothetical necessity as intelligible as a categorical and hypothetical syllogism? An *individuum vagum*, if it were not a term of art, should signify rather an atom, or a rogue, than an honest person. Though he be so favourable to logic here, he is as little beholden to it as to the other arts, who knows no better what are terms of art. One of the first distinctions which we meet withal in logic, is between the first and second notions. The second notions, such as all these are, are called

[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 213.]

[y] ["And for the astrologer (unless he means astronomer)," &c.—Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 213.]

[z] [Ibid.]

[a] [Viz. in his Εἰσαγώγη.]

expressly terms of art, or logical notions, or logical organs, which they define to be "images or representations, whereby the understanding doth form to itself real notions;" and they compare them to brazen weights, of no value in themselves, whereby nevertheless all sorts of gold are weighed. There can be nothing more certain and evident than this, that all these logical and astronomical terms be second notions, and terms of art.

812 Nay, so extremely blind and partial he is, that he approveth of "*Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio,*" which he maketh "terms of art," as a good invention to help "the apprehension of young men[b];" and yet, with the same breath, rejecteth these most excellent and most significant distinctions and expressions, which have been received in a manner universally, some of them for two thousand years, all of them for divers centuries of years, in the Church, and in the Schools, as well of theology as philosophy, which were invented for remedies against confusion, and helps to the clearer and more distinct understanding of high and difficult notions, upon this false and slanderous pretext, that they were "invented to blind the understanding[c]," because he presumed to condemn them before he took pains to understand them.

He addeth, that I "cite no terms of art for geometry," saying he "was afraid" I "would have put in lines, or perhaps equality and unequality, for terms of art[d]." To free him from this fear, I put in their numbers, numbering and numbered, their superficies, concave and convex, their triangles, amblygone and oxygone, their cones, cubes, cylinders, their parallels, and parallelograms, their proportions, superpartient and superbipartient, &c., their rules of algebra and helcataim, their integers, and numerators, and divisors, and denominators, and fabrical figures, their proportionality, arithmetical and geometrical, continual and discontinual, direct, conversed, alternative, inversed, compounded, parted. Geometry hath its words of art and proper expressions, as well as all other arts and sciences. So hath physic, chyrurgery, law. So have soldiers, mariners, hawkers, hunters.

But of all others he hath the least favour for the divine;

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 213.]
[c] [Ibid.]
[d] [Ibid.]

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whom he will not permit "to use a word in preaching, but such as his auditors, nor in writing, but such as his common readers, may understand[f]." I do not like it any more than he, that a divine should affect uncouth words, to make his ignorant auditors to gape. "I had rather speak five words in the Church with understanding," &c., "than ten thousand in an unknown tongue." But doth he make no distinction between the Church and the Schools? Doth he think, that theology, which hath the sublimest subject, doth not require as high, as learned, and as distinct expressions, as any art or science whatsoever? All hearers and readers are not novices, nor of the vulgar or common sort. There are those who have been "brought up at the feet of Gamaliel," and have been admitted into the innermost closet of the School learning. The Holy Scripture itself, though it affect plainness, is not always such a stranger either to learning or elegance. The only answer I shall give him to this, is, that he is "beyond his last."

1 Cor. xiv. 19.

[Acts xxii. 3.]

A contradiction.

In the last part of this section[g], he troubleth himself more than he needeth about a testimony, which I cited out of his book *De Cive;* not out of any esteem I had for it,—for I condemned it,—but to let him see his contradiction. There he made the ecclesiastical doctors to be infallible, here he maketh them to be fallible. There he made their infallibility to be a peculiar privilege derived to them by imposition of hands from the Apostles, whom they succeeded, and from the promise of Christ; here he attributeth it wholly to that power which is committed to them by the civil magistrate. And what if the civil magistrate commit no power to them? Then, by his doctrine, Christ breaketh His promise, and this privilege ceaseth. "*Infallibilitatem hanc promisit Servator noster* (*in iis rebus quæ ad salutem sunt necessariæ*) *Apostolis usque ad diem judicii, hoc est, Apostolis et Pastoribus ab Apostolis successive per manuum impositionem consecrandis*[h]." He answereth, that "the infallibility of ecclesiastical doctors..doth not consist in this, that they cannot be deceived, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them, when they are lawfully constituted doctors[i]." A pretty fancy. "If the

Matt. xv. 14.

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 214.]

[g] [Ibid., pp. 214, 215. See above in the Defence, Numb. xix. p. 130. note a.]

[h] [De Cive,] c. xvii., § 28. [p. 256. ed. 1642.]

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 214.]

blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch;" doctor and subject together. If the doctors be deceived themselves, they must needs deceive the subjects, who trust to their interpretation. Secondly, he waveth now the two grounds of their infallibility, that is, the promise of Christ and the privilege conferred by imposition of hands, and ascribeth all their infallibility to the constitution of the civil power; which may render their expositions legal, according to the municipal laws, but cannot render them infallible. Thirdly, if ecclesias-
813 tical doctors lawfully constituted, be so far infallible that they cannot deceive the subject, why did he vary so much (notoriously) from their expositions at that time, as he hath done in his book *De Cive*, when they had both imposition of hands and approbation from supreme authority? Why doth he now, wanting both the promise of Christ and imposition of hands, take upon him to be the tryer and examiner of the exposition, not only of single prophets, but of whole Convocations?

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XX.

Election and compulsion inconsistent.

If Mr. Hobbes did understand what true election and true compulsion is, it were evident, that election of one out of more than one cannot consist with antecedent determination to one; much less with compulsion or force, where he that is compelled opposeth and resisteth as much as he can. That the same act should be both voluntary, that is, with our will, and compulsory, that is, against our will, not in part but in whole, is impossible. But as the sepia, to preserve herself undiscovered, doth shed forth about her a quantity of black inky blood, to hide herself from the fisher; so T. H., for fear to be catched in palpable errors, doth confound and blunder all things, making a new election, a new compulsion, a new liberty. There is not a word of moment here that hath not been discussed formerly in this treatise. And I do not esteem his raw "meditations" worthy of repetition over and over. What is new in them, I shall cull out from the rest.

[T. H.'s instance of a stone falling.]

He telleth us, that when a stone is thrown upwards, "the external agent giveth it a beginning of motion[k]." So far we agree, whatsoever gives it the continuance. He saith further,

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 226.]

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that "when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the power of some other agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the eye, is not imperceptible to reason[l]." Herein we differ, wherein all the world hitherto have agreed. But it was very meet, that he should deny the stone the determination of its natural motion, who had denied the intellectual soul the determination of its own will. Yet, since he is pleased to conceal his new agent, I have no desire to scrape acquaintance with it; especially upon such terms,—to relinquish that intrinsecal principle which all the world hitherto hath received.

There are mixed actions.

So, passing by his "spiritual court[m]" unsaluted (he loves to shew his teeth, though he cannot bite), and leaving "counterfeiting" in hope of "quarter[n]" to himself as a person much more capable of that design, the next new subject that presenteth itself is, whether there be any mixed actions, partly voluntary, partly unvoluntary. He denieth it positively, upon this ground, that "one and the same action can never be both voluntary and unvoluntary[o]." I answer, first, to his argument, that voluntary and unvoluntary are not opposed contradictorily, so as to admit no mean, but privatively, which do admit a mean; as the dawning of the day, or the twilight, is a mean between light and darkness, when it may be truly said, it is partly light and partly dark. Melancthon hath an excellent rule to this purpose;—"*Privative opposita nequeunt esse in eodem subjecto gradibus excellentibus*"—"Privative opposites cannot be in the same subject in eminent degrees," but in remiss degrees they may. As, to avoid importunity, a man may do a free act with reluctance; all reluctance is a degree of unwillingness. When Nero, in the beginning of his quinquennium, was to sign the condemnation of a malefactor, he used to wish that he had never learned to write[p]; to shew, that though he did it willingly to satisfy justice, for otherwise he might have pardoned him, yet he did it unwillingly in his own nature. And with this Aristotle agreeth fully:—"There are some actions" which are neither properly voluntary nor unvoluntary, but "of a middle kind" (or "mixed"

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 226.]
[m] [Ibid., p. 227.]
[n] [Ibid.]
[o] [Ibid.]
[p] ["Quam vellem nescire litteras." Sueton., in Vitâ Neron., c. x.—Seneca, De Clement., lib. ii. c. 1. p. 614. ed. 1607.]

actions); "as things done for fear of a greater evil, or for some honest causes[q]." And he giveth two instances[r]. This is one, of a man who throws his goods into the sea, willingly in respect of the end—to save his life, but the action being simply considered in itself, unwillingly. The other instance, of one commanded to do some dishonest act by a tyrant, who hath his parents and children in his power. And so he concludeth truly, that "they are mixed actions, but participate more of the voluntary" than of the unvoluntary[s].

[Election of one out of more, inconsistent with determination to one.]

Whereas I urged, that election of one out of more could not consist with determination to one[t], he answereth, "that a man forced to prison may choose whether he will walk upon his feet or be haled upon the ground[u];" which, as it is false, as I have shewed in my former Defence[x], so it is wholly wide
814 from his purpose. There is no doubt but he who is necessitated in one particular, may be left free in another; as he who is appointed the time and place for a duel, may choose his weapon. But in that particular wherein he is necessitated, he cannot choose. If they will tie him to a horse-tail, he must be tied. If they will fasten him to a sled and draw him to prison, he must be drawn. There cannot possibly be any election, where there is, and so far as there is, an antecedent determination to one.

Rational will.

He disliketh the term of "rational will," saying "there is nothing rational but God, angels, and men[y]." I hope he is not in earnest. Surely he believeth there is a reasonable soul, or otherwise he deserts his Athanasian Creed; that is, the soul of a rational man, as a [rational] will is the will of a rational man. Whether he make the will to be a faculty of the reasonable soul, or to be the reasonable soul as it willeth, I am indifferent. As the appetite of a sensitive creature is called the sensitive appetite, so the appetite of a rational or intellectual creature is called the rational or intellectual will. He saith "he would not have excepted against this expression, but that everywhere" I "speak of the will and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men's bellies[z]." I do not confine the rea-

[q] Ethic., lib. III. c. i. [§ 4, 6.]
[r] [Id., ibid., § 4, 5.]
[s] [Id., ibid., § 10.]
[t] [Defence, Numb. xx. above p. 130.]
[u] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xx. above p. 132; and Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 228.]
[x] [Numb. xx. above p. 134; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 228.]
[z] [Ibid.]

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sonable soul to the "belly," but it is a spirit in a man's body. If it be not, let him say what it is. The will is either a faculty of the reasonable soul, or (which is all one) the reasonable soul itself, as it dischargeth the duties of such a faculty. Sometimes he confesseth as much himself;—"Indeed as the will is a faculty or power of a man's soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power[a]." He jesteth at my "five terrible things," saying, I "had no more reason for five than fifteen[b]." It seemeth that when he should have been reading authors, he was "meditating[c]" upon a dry summer. Let him consult with Aristotle[d] and his expositors. That which determined the three children, was no antecedent extrinsecal cause, but conscience and their own judgment, which dictated to them their duty to their God.

[Dan. iii. 16, &c.]

Passive obedience.

He seemeth to be troubled at sundry passages in my former Defence, as exempting subjects from active obedience to unjust laws; which (he saith) "makes it impossible for any nation in the world to preserve itself from civil wars[e]." Whether was it want of memory or rather subtlety in him, among these passages to omit that,—"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye?" It is hard, that we, who have formerly been accused to maintain blind obedience, should now be charged with seditious principles, which our souls abhor. But we sail securely between this Scylla and that Charybdis, by steering the ancient and direct course of passive obedience. We justify no defensive arms against a sovereign prince. We allow no civil wars for conscience' sake. When we are persecuted for not complying with the unlawful commands of a lawful sovereign, we know no other remedy but to suffer or to flee: according to that memorable example of the Thebæan legion, consisting wholly of Christians of unmatchable valour, and such as might in probability have defended themselves from the emperor's fury; yet, when Maximian commanded them to sacrifice to idols, they refused, suffering every

Acts iv. 19.

[a] [In the Defence, T. II. Numb. xx. above p. 133.]

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 228.]

[c] [illegible]

[d] Ethic., lib. III. cc. vi, vii, viii. [See above in the Defence, Numb. xx. p. 134, note f; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. [illegible]

tenth man of them to be slain without a blow smitten; and when the bloody emperor came among them again to renew his command, and to see them decimated the second time, they cried out with one voice, "*Cognosce, O Imperator,*" &c. —"'Know, O emperor, that we are all Christians, we submit our bodies to thy power, but our free souls flee unto our Saviour; neither our known courage nor desperation itself hath armed us against thee; . . because we choose rather to die innocents than to live nocents; . . thou shalt find our hands empty of weapons, but our breast armed with the Catholic Faith;' and so, having power to resist, yet they suffered themselves without resistance to be cut in pieces[f]." They are T. H. his own principles (which make no difference between just and unjust power, between a sword given by God and a sword taken by man), which do serve to involve nations in civil wars.

Compulsion, what it is.

He saith, "it seemeth that" I "call compulsion force," and he "calleth it a fear of force[g]." I called it as all the world called it, and as it hath been defined in the Schools for two thousand years. Yet I do not believe, that it is always necessary to all sorts of compulsion, that the force be actually exercised; as it is when a man is driven hither and thither with the wind (there is no fear in that case, yet there is compulsion). But it sufficeth sometimes to compulsion, if the force be present, such as cannot be resisted, and ready to be put in execution
815 if there be need. As a man that will not appear freely upon summons, is forced by poursuivants and serjeants, although they do not carry him upon their backs, nor drag him upon the ground. It sufficeth, that they be masters and able to compel him, "*καὶ δυνάμενοι κινεῖν μὴ βουλόμενον.*" But according to his heterodox principles, every remote fear doth make compulsion. As if a man should say, that a child was compelled to run away from a mouse, or a coward was compelled to wink when a man holds up his hand at him, or a man is compelled to throw his goods overboard; which he himself confesseth to be freely and deliberately elected[h].

From this first mistake of what compulsion is, proceedeth a second,—that "the actions of men compelled are neverthe-

[f] [Eucher., ap. Surium, Vit. Sanctor., 22 Sept. tom. iii. p. 222. ed. 1618.]

[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 229.]

[h] [See above T. H. Numb. viii.; in the Defence, p. 45.]

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less voluntary[l];" and a third,—that compulsion doth not justify the party compelled[k]: all which are mere logomachies or contentions about words, which he is fallen into, either ignorantly, by not understanding what compulsion is, or cunningly and deliberately, to have a pretext of excepting against former authors; although it be but like the dog's barking at the moonshine in the water. Force actually exercised did acquit Tamar and the betrothed damsel from all guilt. But Herod's fear of a successor did not excuse the murder of the Innocents; nor the fear of his Master's severity excuse the unprofitable servant's hiding of his talent in a napkin. But I leave these contentions about words, which signify not so much as "the shadow of an ass."

[2 Sam. xiii. 14.—Deut. xxii. 25-27.] [Matt. ii.] [Luke xix. 20-24.]

Fear of hurt doth not abrogate a law. [Gen. xx. 11.]

He hath plunged himself here into two real errors. The one is, that "if the fear be allowed, the action which it produceth is allowed also[l]." Abraham's fear was just; "The fear of God is not in this place, they will murder me for my wife's sake." But the action which it produced, that is, the denial of his wife, is not "allowed." Peter's fear was "allowed," but the denial of his Master was not allowable. The other and more dangerous error is, that fear doth abrogate a law, and make it to be no law in some cases[m]. Take the larger exposition of this, out of his book *De Cive*;—"No man is bound by any pacts or contracts whatsoever not to resist him who goeth about to kill him, or wound him, or to hurt his body"—"*Mortem vel vulnera vel aliud damnum corporis inferenti nemo pactis suis quibuscunque obligatur non resistere*[n]." So a scholar may resist his master when he goeth about to whip him; so a company of traitors or other capital malefactors may lawfully resist the sovereign magistrate. This is seditious indeed, and openeth a large window to civil war. This is directly contrary to what he said in his book *De Cive*;—"In every perfect commonwealth, the right of the private sword is excluded, and no subject hath right to use his power to the preservation of himself at his own discretion[o]." Judge, reader, whether we or he be better subjects;

[Matt. xxvi. 69-75, &c.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 229.]

[k] [Ibid.]

[l] [Ibid., p. 230.]

[m] [Ibid.]

[n] [De Cive,] cap. ii. § 18. [p. 20. The passage continues thus,—"Est enim in unoquoque gradus quidam timiditatis summus, per quem malum quod infertur apprehendit ut maximum, ideoque necessitate naturali quantum potest fugit." &c.]

[o] [Ibid.,] cap. vi. § 13. [p. 66.—"In omni civitate perfectâ, hoc est,

he, who holdeth that in case of extreme danger a subject hath no obligation to his sovereign, or we, who hold it better to die innocents than to live nocents. His reason—because we bind or guard capital malefactors[p]—sheweth a distrust of what they may do *de facto*, not a doubt of what they ought to do *de jure*. I alleged, that "the omission of circumcision in the wilderness was not sin[q];" to shew, that though no fear or necessity can justify the breach of the negative laws of God or nature, yet in some cases it may justify the transgression of the positive law, or the omission of a duty enjoined by affirmative precepts.

Natural agents act determinately;

To my instance of two servants[r], the one spending his master's money in a tavern, the other having it taken away from him by force, or yielding it up upon just fear, he answereth nothing; the scope of them being to shew, that strength of temptation doth not justify an act, so much as extrinsecal necessity. If "the second causes" were as "rackets," and men as "tennis-balls" or "foot-balls[s]," to what purpose did God give men reason to govern themselves, and to bridle their passions, who are tossed to and fro inevitably, irresistibly, as the rackets please? Reason had been a fitter gift for the rackets, than for the balls, if his opinion were true. That upon the planting of a cannon against a wall the battery is necessary before the bullet arrive[t], is true; but there is no such necessary connexion between free or contingent agents and their acts, as there is between the cannon and the battery; which he might have easily perceived, if he had been pleased to have enlarged his "meditation" a little further. It was in the power of the cannonier not to have charged the cannon, or to have given it but half a charge, or to have given
816 no fire, or to have turned the mouth of it another way, higher or lower, to the right hand or to the left. In all these cases, what had become of his battery?

Not voluntarily.

If he hath such a conceit, that no man doth or can deter-

ubi nulli civium jus est viribus suis ad propriam conservationem suo arbitrio utendi, sive ubi gladii privati jus excluditur."]

[p] [Ibid., c. ii. § 18. p. 21.—"Ei qui pacto tenetur, creditur; . . qui vero ad supplicium ducuntur, sive capitale sive capitali mitius, constringuntur vinculis, vel satellitibus custodiuntur: quod signum certissimum est non videri illos . . satis obligatos esse."]

[q] [Defence, Numb. xx. above p. 135; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[r] [Ibid., pp. 135, 136.]

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 230.]

[t] [Ibid., p. 231.]

himself, contrary to the sense of the whole world, let enjoy it. Some men have conceited themselves to be als, and suffered none to touch them for fear of breaking n. But he must not think to obtrude his phlegmatic cies upon all other men, who understand themselves ter. If he were not resolved to oppose all the world with-t any ground, he would never have denied a "moral" efficacy, metaphorical "motion," or have affirmed that motives, that to say, persuasives or reasons, weighed in the understanding, do determine the free agent naturally[u]. Is the persuading of a man to eat, and the thrusting of it down his throat, the same thing? Do an argument and a cannon bullet work after the same manner? Did he ever hear a bullet called a "motive" to the beating down of the wall, or flowers called "motives" to the production of the fruits, or meat a "motive" to nourishment? Natural efficacy is always necessary, and determinate, and active to the height of its power; but moral agents act not necessarily, nor determinately, nor always to the height of their power. The lawyer that he speaketh of[v], may refuse to plead, or delay his pleading, or plead better or worse; and when he hath done his uttermost, it may so fall out that he effecteth nothing for his client. I am ashamed of such silly verbal objections, contrary to the known principles of arts.

The more reason, the more liberty.]

He complaineth, that I put his notions oftentimes into mine own terms[x]. I had thought I had done him a favour to render him more intelligible, and put his sense into the common language of scholars. The understanding being the root of liberty, and the will being but "*intellectus extensus ad habendum aut faciendum quod cognoscit*"—"the understanding extended to enjoy or do that which it knoweth[y]," it must needs be, that the more reason, the less passion, the less reluctance, and consequently the more liberty. He saith, "When we mark not the force that moves us, we think . . that it is not causes but liberty, that produceth the action[z]." I rendered him thus,—"The ignorance of the true causes and . . power is the reason that we ascribe the effect to

[u] Numb. xx. [v] Scalig., [De Subtilitate &c.,] Exerc.

liberty[a]." Where lieth the fault? That which he calleth "force" and "strength," I call "power;" and for "that which moves us," I say "causes," as he himself doth express himself in the same place. Where I say "the will causeth," he saith "the man chooseth." As if there were any difference between these two, 'the eye seeth,' and 'the man seeth.' This, and a confounding of *voluntas* with *volitio*, the faculty of willing with the act of willing, and a young suckling contradiction which he hath found out,—that "the will hath power to refuse what [it] willeth[b]," that is, before it have willed it, not after,—is the substance of this Animadversion; which deserve no other answer, but that a man should change his risibility into actual laughter. Discourse II.

[True liberty, a freedom from necessity as well as from compulsion.]

I produced two reasons, to prove that true liberty is a freedom not only from compulsion but from necessity[c]: the former drawn from the nature of election, or the act of the will, which is always *inter plura;* the latter, which I called a "new" argument, because it had not formerly been touched in this treatise, taken from the nature of the faculty of the will, or of the soul as it willeth; which is not capable of any other compulsion but necessitation, and if it be physically necessitated, it is thereby acquitted from all guilt, and the fault transferred upon those causes that did necessitate it. This argument indeed began with a distinction, but proceeded to a demonstration, which was reduced by me into form in my Defence, to which he hath given no show of satisfaction, either in his first answer, or in these Animadversions, except it be a '*concedo omnia*,' or a granting of the conclusion.

The same ground which doth warrant the names of "tyrant, *præmunire*, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday[d]" (that is, use,

"Quem penes arbitrium est et vis et norma loquendi[e]"),

doth likewise justify these generally received terms of the "elicit" and "imperate acts of the will," there being scarcely one author, who hath written upon this subject in Latin, that doth not use them, and approve them. In the Council of Dort (which he himself mentioneth[f]) he may find this truth

[a] [Defence, Numb. xx. above p. 137; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 233.]

[c] [Defence, Numb. xx. above pp. 130, 138.]

[d] [Ibid., p. 138; and Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 234.]

[e] [Horat., A. P., 72.—"et *jus* et norma" &c.]

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 235.]

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positively maintained,—that "*voluntas elicit actum suum*[g]." Where he may likewise find, what "moral persuasives" or motives[h] are, if he have a desire to learn.

T. H. maketh God the cause of sin.

Although he be convicted, that it followeth from his principles, that God is the cause of all sin in the world, yet he is loth to say so much; for that is "an unseemly phrase, to say that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like a saying that God sinneth[i]." Yea, it is even as like it as one egg is like another; or rather it is not like it, for it is the very same. "*Nullum simile est idem.*" He that is the determining cause of sin in others, sinneth himself. It is as well against the eternal law, that is, the rule of justice which is in God Himself, to make another to sin, as to sin. Yet, though he will not avow such "an unseemly phrase,"—that "God is the cause of sin,"—yet he doth endeavour to prove it by four texts of Holy Scripture[j], which are altogether impertinent to his purpose. The first is that of the Prophet Amos,

Amos iii. 6.

—"Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?" But that is clearly understood of the evil of punishment, not of the evil of sin. To the three other places—

2 Sam. xvi. 10. 1 Kings xxii. 23. 1 Kings xii. 15.

that "the Lord said unto Shimei, curse David," and that "the Lord put a lying spirit into the mouth of" Ahab's "prophets," and that of Rehoboam's not "hearkening to the people,"—the reader may find a satisfactory answer formerly[k]. But because he seemeth to ground much upon those words which are added to the last place—"for the cause was from the Lord,"—conceiving some singular virtue to lie in them, and an ovation at least to be due unto himself ("I will not say, lest the Bishop exclaim against me"[l]), applauding himself like the fly upon the cart-wheel—"See what a dust I do raise,"—I will take the liberty to tell him further, that there is nothing of any "cause of sin" in the text, but of a cause of Jeroboam's advancement; as he might have perceived plainly by the words immediately following,—"The cause was from the

[1 Kings xii. 15.]

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[g] [Jo. Thom. Bruto, Britann. de III. et IV. Articulis Remonstrantium, De Conversione et Electione, Thesis xxiii. p. 171. Dordr. 1620.]

[h] [Ibid., p. 174. Thes. Heterod., thes. xx. Ibid., pp. 175, 176.]

[i] [Qu. Antonadv. upon Nicolb. xx. p. 231. "That which God sayeth of Himself 1 Kings xii. 15," &c., "I will not say, lest the Bp. exclaim against me; but leave it to be interpreted by

[j] [Ibid., p. 181.]

[k] [Answ. to] Fount of Arg., [above pp. 230, 231.]

Lord, that He might perform His saying, which the Lord spake by Ahijah the Shilonite unto Jeroboam the son of Nebat;" which saying was this, "I will rent the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee." [1 Kings xi. 31.] So he hath produced an evil effect of punishment for an evil effect of sin, and a cause of advancement for a cause of sin, and a permitting or ordering or disposing of sin for a necessitating or determining to sin.

Six witnesses for universal necessity answered.

Yet he produceth six witnesses, to prove that liberty is not opposed to necessity, but to compulsion;—Luther, Zanchy, Bucer, Calvin, Moulin, and the Synod of Dort[m].

First, reader, I desire thee to judge of the partiality of this man; who rejecteth all human authority in this cause (as he hath reason, for it were an easy thing to overwhelm and smother him, and his cause, with testimonies of Councils, Fathers, doctors, of all ages and communions, and all sorts of classic authors), and yet seeks for protection under the authority of a few neoteric writers. "A double weight and a double measure are an abomination." [Prov. xx. 10;—"*Divers* weights and *divers* measures," &c.]

> "Aut hæc cum illis sunt habenda, aut illa cum his amittenda sunt.
> "Harum duarum conditionum nunc utram malis vide[n]."

If he will reap the benefit of human authority, he must undergo the inconvenience also. Why may he use the testimony of Calvin against me in this cause, and I may not make use of the testimonies of all the ancients, Greek and Latin, against him? whom Calvin himself confesseth to have been for liberty against necessity;—"*Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen extitit; Græcos vero non puduit multo arrogantius usurpare vocabulum, siquidem αὐτεξούσιον dixerunt, ac si potestas suiipsius penes hominem fuisset*[o]." But I am able to give him that advantage in this cause.

Secondly, a man may see by his citing of these testimonies, that he hath taken them up upon trust, without ever perusing them in the authors themselves. I demand therefore, whether he will be tried by his own witnesses in this case in difference between him and me; that is, concerning universal necessity, in natural, civil, and external actions, by reason of a necessary connexion of second causes, and a natural determination of

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. 35.] p. 235.]

[n] [Terent., Heautontim., II. iii. 34, 35.]

[o] Calvin., Instit., lib. II. c. ii. dist. 4. [Op. tom. ix. p. 62. ed. Amst. 1667.]

e will. If he will not, he doth not deserve to have so much s one of his testimonies looked upon.

Thirdly, I answer, that supposing (but not granting) that ll his testimonies were true as he citeth them, yet none of them will advantage his cause at all. Luther his first witness disclaimed it, and recanted what he had said[p]; and the necessity which he speaketh of, is only "a necessity of immutability:" and the Synod of Dort speaketh only of "a necessity of infallibility[q]:" both which do imply no more than a consequent hypothetical necessity, which we also maintain. Zanchy[r], Bucer[s], Calvin[t], Moulin[u], speak of a necessity of sinning in 81 respect of our original corruption. This concerneth not the liberty of the will, whether it be free or not free, but the power of free will, whether it can without grace avoid sin and determine itself to moral or supernatural good; which is nothing to the question between him and me.

And for an essay what he may expect from his witnesses, Calvin, who is the least disfavourable to him of them all, saith no more but this;—"*Deum, quoties viam facere vult Suæ providentiæ, etiam in rebus externis hominum voluntates flectere et versare, nec ita liberam esse ipsorum electionem, quin ejus libertati Dei arbitrium dominetur*[v]"—"That God," (not always but) "as often as He will make way for His providence, even in external things doth bow and turn the wills of men; neither is their election so free, but that the good pleasure of God hath a dominion over their liberty." Calvin did know no universal determination of all external acts by God, but only in some extraordinary cases. He acknowledged, that the will of man was free to elect in external things, but not so free as to be exempt from the dominion of God; which two

[p] Visit. Saxon. [See above p. 218, notes u, y. The passage quoted by Hobbes (Quæ, Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 235) is in the tract De Servo Arbitrio (Op. tom. iii. p. 165. b.).]

[q] [Syn. Dordr. as quoted by T. H., ibid. The sentence quoted is not the doctrine of the Synod of Dort, but of the deputies from one of the Dutch provincial Churches there present; being taken from the Judic. Orthod. Eccles. Nassovio-Weteravicarum de III. et IV. Artt. Remonstr., thes. de Lib. Arb., ap. Act. Syn. Dordr. P. ii. p. 196.]

[r] [Tract. Theol., lib. I. c. vi. thes. 1. [sic] p. 90, ed. 1605); quoted by T. H., ibid.]

[s] [Lib. de Concordiâ (viz. De Verâ Eccles. in doctrinâ &c. Reconciliatione et Compositione, Respons. ad Alb. Pighium, Art. de Lib. Arb., p. 34. b.—"Non necessitas sed coactio libertati voluntatis adversatur"), quoted by T. H., ibid.]

[t] [Instit., lib. II. c. ii. § 6, Op. tom. ix. p. 63; quoted by T. H., ibid.]

[u] [Bouclier de la Foi, Art. ix. (Part. I. § xxi. p. 112. first ed. Genev. 1619); quoted by T. H., ibid.]

[v] Calvin. Instit., lib. II. c. iv. dist. 7. [Op. tom. ix. p. 77.]

things none of us doth deny. So we may conclude from Calvin, that God doth not ordinarily necessitate external events; that is as much as to say, there is no universal necessity.

He will yet have less cause to please himself with the Council of Dort, when he shall see what was said there by our British divines, and approved by the Synod:—"that God made our wills and endowed them with liberty[x];" that "He leaves to every thing its proper manner and motion in the production of acts," and "to the wills of men to act after their native manner, freely[y];" that "in vain are punishments threatened to malefactors by the laws of men, if no man could leave undone that which he doth[z]." They ask, "who in his right wits will say, that David could not but have committed adultery," or "after that could not but have murdered Uriah[z]." They condemn this opinion positively, as an error, "*hominem non posse plus boni facere quam facit, nec plus mali omittere quam omittit*"—"that a man cannot do more good, or leave more evil undone, than he doth[a]."

[Elicit and imperate acts of the will.]

Still he is about his old quarrel concerning the "elicit" and "imperate acts of the will;" not against the thing, for it is as clear as the day-light, that there is a ground in nature for such a distinction; and that external agents have not so much power over the will of man, to make him choose what they think fit, as over the locomotive faculty and other members, to make a man move them at their pleasure. But all his contention is still about the words,—"Imperate or commanded acts, as if" (saith he) "the faculties could speak one to another[b]." I answered him, that there were mental terms as well as vocal, by which the soul, being willing, may express itself to the locomotive and other inferior faculties[c]. As the angels do understand one another, not by speech, but as we behold one another in a glass. Here he is out again, quite mistaking the plain and obvious sense of my words, shewing that in his long and profound "meditations" he did never meet with this subject; and telling us, that by

Mental terms.

[x] Judic. Theol. Brit. de Lib. Arbit. [scil. De Convers. quâ denotat actionem hominis, &c., thes. ii; ap. Act. Syn. Dordr., P. ii. p. 171.]

[y] [Id., ibid.]

[z] [Id., ibid. Thes. Heterod.,] thes. iv. [ibid. p. 175.]

[a] [Id., ibid.]

[b] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xx. above p. 132.]

[c] [Defence, Numb. xx. above p. 139; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

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mental speech I understand only "an idea of the sound, and of the letters, whereof the word is made[d];" and charging me most untruly to say, "that when Tarquin commanded his son by striking off the tops of poppies, he did it by mental terms[d]." This I said truly, that "howsoever a superior doth intimate his commands to his inferior," whether it be by vocal terms, as ordinarily, or by mental terms, as it is among the angels, or by signs, as it was between Tarquin and his sons, "it is still a command[e]." And in this case of the soul's employing the inferior faculties, it is without dispute. But I never said, that the striking off the tops of the poppies with his rod was mental language, or the terms of his mind. It seemeth he hath never heard of mental terms, or mental prayer. The conceptions of the mind are the natural representations of things. Words are signs or symbols of the inward conceptions of the mind, by imposition. What way soever the inward conceptions are intimated, it is the same that speech is in effect, "*κοινωνίας ὄργανον*"—"an instrument or means of communication;" as a sign is an intimation to a traveller where he may find a harbour.

Metaphorical drawing.

He saith, "No drawing can be imagined but of bodies," and "whatsoever is **drawn out, is drawn out of one place into** another[f]." He knoweth **no drawing, but drawing of wire,** or drawing of water, or drawing of cars. St. James saith,

Jam. iv. 8. "*Draw* nigh to God, and He will *draw* nigh to you;" and, 515

John vi. 44. "No man can come to Me, except My Father *draw* him;"

John xii. 32. and, "If I be lifted up from the earth, I will *draw* all men unto Me." In all these "drawings," here is no "drawing out of one place into another." A fair object *draws* men's eyes; a good orator *draweth* them by the ears. There is

Prov. xx. 5. metaphorical "drawing." Take but one place more;—"Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep water, but a man of understanding will *draw* it out."

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judgment, but commonly out of pride and vain-glorious affectation of singularity, contrary to the common and received opinion of other men. Such paradoxes were the Stoical opinions (Stoics were fruitful in producing paradoxes), that "all sins are equal," and that "a wise man is all things," a good king, a good captain, a good cobbler[g]. I hope he will be better advised than to condemn all those of ignorance, who out of civility styled those new-fangled opinions "Stoical paradoxes," rather than Stoical errors. He saith, "Christian religion was once a paradox[h]." Never. A paradox is a private opinion contrary to the common opinion. Points of faith are more than opinions. Faith is a certain assent grounded upon the truth and authority of the revealer. Opinion is an uncertain assent grounded upon the probable conjectures of reason. We do not use to call Turkish, heathenish, or heretical errors, by the name of paradoxes. I confess there may be opinions, and consequently paradoxes, in religion; that is, in such points, the truth or falsehood whereof is grounded more upon the probable discussion of reason than upon the evidence of Divine revelation; but errors in essentials of faith are not paradoxes. He who disbelieves any article of his Creed, is not paradoxical but heretical. Such another mistake is his other,—"that but for paradoxes we should be now in that savage ignorance, which those men are in that have not, or have not long had, laws and commonwealth[i]." Politic precepts, and civil institutions, and practical instructions, which consist not in theory or speculation but in the application of practical truths, neither are, nor ever were called properly, either opinions or paradoxes. But to come to the purpose, I did not, I do not, deny, that there may be some true paradoxes; and rather in such things as are found out by reason, than in such as depend upon revelation, which are delivered from age to age by universal tradition. An able industrious person, by constant meditation, and the help of other men's experience and observations, may sometimes find out a latent truth, or vindicate one from the oppressive tyranny of prejudice or cus-

[g] [Cic., Paradoxa, § iii, v, vi.—Horat., Epist. I. i. 106, 107. &c.]

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxi. p. 239.]

[i] [Ibid.]

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tom. But this is rarely. God and nature do not give all their gifts to one man, lest he should grow proud. But when men are composed of paradoxes, that as Ovid could not express himself without a verse[j], so they cannot speak without a paradox; when they take upon them to censure all ancient truths in divinity and humanity, and seek to obtrude their brain-sick conceptions upon all other men as oracles; I think he who telleth them only of their "paradoxes," dealeth gently with them. Zaleucus was more severe against innovators; who enacted, that if any man made a proposition for a change in their policy, he should make it with a halter about his neck, that if he failed to justify it by reason, he should justify his attempt by suffering[k].

[T. H.'s subtlety,—that every thing is a cause of every thing.]

I leave his paradoxes, and come to his subtlety,—that "there is hardly any one action, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in *rerum naturâ*;" and that "there cannot be a motion in one part of the world, but the same must be communicated to all the rest of the world[l]:" that is to say, in plain English, that there is not a pie that chattereth, nor so much as an aspen leaf that waggeth, here in England, but it maketh some alteration in China and Peru, and the efficacy of it, like Drake or Cavendish, doth encompass the globe of the earth, and mounteth to heaven, and (if there be any such thing) helpeth to make the eighth sphere tremble. I thought

how drops of rain do wear the hard stones; and Pliny tell-eth, that "flints have been worn with the feet of ants[n]." But to think the chattering of a pie, or the shaking of an aspen leaf, should move the whole world, when the greatest earthquakes are not felt many leagues, is incredible. Neither do I believe, that the first touch of his feather doth make an anvil of diamond to yield. I believe the "scholar" put a fallacy of composition and division upon him. All the parts being conjoined do make the whole, and so have their proportionable part of the efficacy in the production of all effects which are produced by the whole, be it the breaking of an anvil of diamond or whatsoever else. But the parts being divided and subdivided into grains and lesser quantities, though they still have their proportionable weight towards the producibility of the same effect, if they were conjoined, yet it is not necessary that being so divided they shall actually produce the same part or proportion of the former effect. It is not universally true, that the patient suffers so much as the agent acts. The reason is, because '*quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*'—'that which receiveth,' doth not receive according to the force of that which makes the impression, but 'according to its own capacity of receiving.' The first drop of water taketh away part from a piece of clay; but a hundred drops fall before a stone doth yield, or actually lose the least particle, though the first drop may affect the stone and prepare it. Suppose one scale of a balance to have a weight in it of a pound, which depresseth the scale to the ground: put into the other scale a weight of two pounds, it lifteth up the other scale and sinketh that down; but take away the two pound weight, and put into the place of it a feather or a grain, and try if it will lift up the scale proportionably. Not at all, no more than if it were nailed to the ground. It were not well argued to say,—an elephant can carry a castle a league, therefore a fly can carry it such a proportion of the way. Yet I commend his discretion, for choosing such an instance, wherein he cannot be contradicted by experience. If a man could live until the revolution of Plato's year[o], and the feather not be consumed in all that

[n] [Hist. Nat., xi. 30.]

[o] [Viz. 36,000 ordinary years, according to Ficinus, In Platon. Rempubl. lib. x (Op. tom. ii. p. 1431. Basil. 1576), and Voss., De Theol. Gentil., lib. ii. c. 35; quoted by Brucker, Hist.

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time, he might still plead as he may do now, that the feather had worn the diamond something, but it was invisible.

Or a falling drop move the whole world.

To make his new paradox good, he telleth us a tale of a tub;—that if a great "tun" (suppose the great tun at Heydelberg) were filled with water, "one little particle" (suppose a drop, or the hundredth part of a drop) "being moved, all the rest would be moved also;" but "the greatness of the tun altereth not the case, and therefore the same would be true, if the whole world were the tun[p]." I answer, first, the case is not like. A tun of water is one continued body, apt for motion; but the world is full of contiguous bodies of all sorts, which are more apt to terminate an easy motion than to continue it. Secondly, I deny, that the least particle of water, suppose the hundredth part of a drop, falling into a great tun of water, doth move all the water in the tun. The first particle moves the second, but more weakly than itself was moved; the second moves the third, yet more weakly; the third moveth the fourth, still more weakly; and so successively, until the motive power cease altogether, before the hundredth, or it may be the thousandth, part of the water in the tun be moved. As we see in a stone thrown upwards: the motion is swifter or slower, of longer or of lesser continuance, according to the degree of the first impression of force and the figure of the thing cast upwards; which ceasing by continued diminution, the motion ceaseth. Violent motions are vehement in the beginning, remiss in the middle, and cease in the end. Lastly, I answer, that the case of a great tun and the whole world is not the same. The world is too large a sphere, and exceedeth the activity of poor little weak creatures; which are not able to leave such an impression of might, as should move upwards to the convex superficies of heaven, and downwards to the centre of the earth, and round about to the extremities of the world. If this were true, the fly might say in earnest, 'See what a dust I do raise.' 82 It hath been given out, that the burning of our heaths in England did hurt their vines in France. This had been strange, yet not so strange as his paradox,—that the least motions that are, "are communicated to the whole world;"—

[p] Phil., P. II. lib. ii. c. vi. sect. I. § [illegible] [p] Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxi.

but wise men looked upon this pretence as a mere scarecrow or made dragon; the hurt it did was nearer home,—to destroy the young moorpouts, and spoil some young burgess's game.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXII.

Power of objects concerneth the moral philosopher.

He "cannot imagine how the question—whether outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the will—can any way be referred to moral philosophy[q]." That is his fault. If the objects do necessitate the will, they take away both virtue and vice, that is, moral good and moral evil, which consist in preelection, and cannot stand with antecedent necessitation to one. To reform his error, let him consult with Aristotle; —"Those things that are fair and pleasant" do seem to be "violent" after a sort, "because, being without us, they move and necessitate" agents to act with their beauty and delight; but it is not so[r]. What he addeth—that "the principles of moral philosophy are the laws[s]"—is an absurd suppositious obtrusion of the municipal law in place of the law of right reason; which error hath formerly been sufficiently refelled[t]. And to his "horse" that "is lame from some cause that was not in his power[u]," I answer, that the lameness is a natural or accidental defect in the horse, but to instance in a horse as a fit subject of virtue or vice is a moral defect in him. If he desire to speak to the purpose, he must leave such impertinencies.

Still he seeketh to obtrude hypothetical necessity for absolute.

In the next Animadversion, I meet with nothing but a mere sawing of the wind, or an altercation about nothing. All the difference between him and me is concerning an antecedent necessity; but of a necessity of consequence—that when a thing is produced it must necessarily be so as it is—there can be no question between us. He himself confesseth as much,—"If the Bishop think that I hold no other necessity than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule—'Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is,'—he understandeth me not[x];"—and he confesseth, that the necessity which he maintaineth, is "an antecedent necessity derived from the beginning of time[y]."

[q] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 244.]
[r] [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. c. ii. [§ 11.]
[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 244.]
[t] [Above in Castig. of Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 345—347.]
[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 244.]
[x] [Ibid., Animadv. upon] Numb. i. [p. 26.]
[y] [Ibid., Animadv. upon] Numb. iii. [p. 36.]

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And yet, nevertheless, a great part of that altercation which he makes in these Animadversions, is about such a necessity. Socrates confesseth, that naturally he had vicious inclinations[z]. This is no more than a proclivity to evil. If by his own condescension he fall into sin, this is but a hypothetical necessity; yet he maketh it an antecedent necessity. Socrates, by his good endeavours, reformeth his vicious propensions, and acquireth the contrary habits or virtues. This is but a hypothetical necessity, yet he pretendeth it to be antecedent. Lastly, Socrates, by the help of these habits which he himself had acquired, doth freely do virtuous actions. Still here is no necessity but consequent, and still he pretendeth to antecedent. "Either" (saith he) "these habits do necessitate the will, or the will followeth not[a]." If these habits or somewhat else do not necessitate the will, it may follow freely. But, saith he, if they do only facilitate men to do such acts, "then what they do, they do not[b]." I deny his consequence. Acquired habits are not solitary, but social and adjuvant, causes of virtuous actions.

Hearing and speaking all one with T. H.

His next error is yet more gross, making the person of the preacher, and not the sound of his voice, to be the object of hearing; adding, that the preacher's "voice is the same thing with the hearing, and a fancy of the hearer[c]." Thus (as commonly errors spring from confusion) he confoundeth the images of sounds with sounds themselves. What then? Is the report of a cannon, or the sound of a trumpet, turned to a mere "fancy?" By the same reason he may say, that the preacher himself is nothing but a mere "fancy;" there is as much ground for the one as for the other. If he go on in this manner, he will move me beyond "smiling[d]," to laugh outright. In what sense the object of sight is the cause of sight, and in what sense it is not the cause of sight, I have shewed distinctly[e]. Here he setteth down another "great paradox," as he himself styleth it out of gallantry,—"that in all the senses the object is the agent[f]." If he had not said "*the* agent," which signifieth either the sole agent, or the principal agent, but

[z] [Cic., Tusc. Quæst., iv. 37; De Fato, c. 5.—Alex. Aphrod., De Fato, § vi. p. 31. 8vo. Lond. 1658.]

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 245.]

[b] [Ibid.]

[c] [Ibid.]

[d] [Ibid.]

[e] [Above in the Castig. of Animadv. Numb. vii, pp. 291, 292.]

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 245.]

only *an* agent, we had accorded so far. But the principal agent in all the senses is the creature endowed with sense, or the sensitive soul perceiving and judging of the object by the proper organ. The preacher's voice and the auditor's hearing have two distinct subjects; otherwise speaking should be hearing, and hearing speaking. I conclude this Castigation
822 with the authority of as good a philosopher as himself,—that "it is ridiculous to think external things either fair or delightful to be the causes of human actions, and not rather him who is easily taken with such objects[g]."

There are other motions than local.

In the latter part of this Animadversion his errors are greater and more dangerous than in the former. He affirmeth, that "the will is produced, generated, and formed, . . in such sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject," and yet "it" (the will) "cannot be moved[h]." As if generation, and augmentation, and alteration, were not kinds of motion or mutation[i]. But the last words—"because it goeth not from place to place[j]"—do shew plainly, that he acknowledgeth no motion but local motion. What? No other natural motion but only local motion? No metaphorical motion? That were strange. We read in Holy Scripture of those who have been "moved with fear"—"moved with envy"—"moved with compassion"—"moved with choler"—"moved by the Holy Ghost." In all these there is no local motion. Outward persuasives, inward suggestions, are all motions. God moveth a man to good by His preventing grace. The devil moveth a man to sin by his temptations. There are many kinds of motions besides moving from place to place. He himself confesseth in this section, that "we are moved to prayer by outward objects[k]."

[Heb. xi. 7.—Acts vii. 9; xvii. 5.—Matt. ix. 36; xiv. 14; xvii. 27: Mark i. 41; vi. 34.—Dan. viii. 7; xi. 11.—2 Pet. i. 21.]

Spirits moved as well as bodies.

In the next place, supposing there were no other motions than local motions, yet he erreth in "attributing no motion to any thing but bodies[l]." The reasonable soul is moved accidentally, according to the motion of the body. The angels are spirits or spiritual substances, no bodies, by his leave; and yet move locally from place to place. Jacob sees "the angels

[Gen. xxviii. 12.]

[g] [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. c. ii. [§ 11.]

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 245.]

[i] [According to Aristotle, *αὔξησις* and *ἀλλοίωσις* are species of *κίνησις* (Phys. Auscult., VII. ii. 1.), and *γένεσις* is a species of *μεταβολή* (ibid., V. i. 10.).]

[j] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 245.]

[k] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxii. above p. 144.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 245.]

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of God ascending and descending." The "angels came and ministered" unto Christ. The angels "shall gather the elect from the one end of Heaven to the other." The soul of Lazarus was borne by the angels "into Abraham's bosom." God sent His angel to deliver Peter out of prison; and every where useth His angels as "ministering spirits."

[Matt. iv. 11; Matt. xxiv. 31, &c.; Luke xvi. 22; Acts xii. 7-10; Heb. i. 14.]

Both bodies and spirits move themselves.

Thirdly, he erreth in this also, that "nothing can move, that is not moved itself[m]." If he mean, that all power to move is from God, he speaketh truly, but impertinently; but if he mean (as he must mean if he mean sense), that nothing moveth which is not moved of some second cause, he speaketh untruly. The angels move themselves. All living creatures do move themselves by animal motion. The inanimate creatures do move themselves; heavy bodies descending downwards, light bodies ascending upwards, according to their own natures; and therefore nature is defined to be "an internal cause or principle of motion and rest[n]," &c. And even they who held, that "whatsoever is moved, is moved by another," did limit it to natural bodies, and make the form to be the mover in natural motion, and the soul in animal motion[n].

Quality infused by God.

His last error in this Animadversion (and a dangerous one) is, that "it is not truly said, that acts or habits are infused by God, for infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies[o]." I wish, for his own quiet and other men's, that he were as great an enemy to errors and innovations, as he is to metaphors and distinctions. Affectation of words is not good, but contention about words is worse. By such an argument a man might take away all zones and zodiac in astronomy, moods and figures in logic, cones and cylinders in geometry; for all these are borrowed terms, as "infusion" is. What logician almost doth not distinguish between acquired habits and infused habits? If all "infusion" be of bodies, then he never "infused" any paradoxical principles into his auditors. When any difference doth arise about expressions, the only question is, whether there be any ground in nature

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 216.]

[n] ["Ὡς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν." Aristot., Phys. Auscult., II. i. 2.—"Απαν τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι."—Id., ibid., VII. i. 1.—And compare II. i. 8; and the De Animâ, I. iii. 1.]

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 216.]

for such an expression. He himself telleth us, that faith and repentance are the "gifts" of God[p]. To say they are "the gifts" of God, and to say they are "infused" by God is the same thing; saving that to say they are infused by God, is a more distinct and a more significant expression. I hope he will not control the language of the Holy Ghost,—"I will pour out My spirit upon all flesh." No (saith T. H.), that cannot be, nothing can be "poured out" but "bodies." Saint Peter telleth us otherwise;—"This Jesus, . . being exalted by the right hand of God, hath shed forth this, which ye now see and hear." That was the gift of tongues, an act or habit "infused." That which was shed forth or effused on God's part, was "infused" on their part. So saith Saint Paul;—"The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost;"—again,—"He saveth us by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which He shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ:"—"ἐξέχεεν"—the word
823 is still the same, signifying an *effusion* from God, and an *infusion* into us. All those graces freely given, which were infused by the Holy Ghost, and are recited by the Apostle to the Corinthians, are either permanent habits, or transient acts.

Discourse II.

Joel ii. [28.]

Acts ii. 33.

Rom. v. 5.

Tit. iii. 5, 6.

1 Cor. xii.

In the remainder of this section, is contained nothing but relapses, and repetitions of his former paradoxical errors; still confounding the intellectual will with the sensitive appetite, liberty with spontaneity, the faculty of the will with the act of willing, the liberty of reasonable creatures with the liberty of madmen and fools. Before, he told us, that he that can do what he will, hath no liberty at all[q]. Now he telleth us of "the liberty of doing what we will in those things we are able to do[r]." Before, he limited the power by the will; now he limiteth the will by the power. I affirmed most truly, that "liberty is diminished by vicious habits;" which he saith "cannot be understood otherwise, than that vicious habits make a man less free to do vicious actions[s]." There is little doubt but he would expound it so, if he were my interpreter; but my sense and my scope is evident to the contrary,—that vicious habits make a man less free to do

[T. H.'s reiterated paradoxes.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 178.]

[q] [Ibid., Animadv. upon] Numb. ix. [pp. 74, 75.]

[r] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 246.]

[s] [Ibid.]

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virtuous actions. He will take notice of no difference between the liberty of a man and the bias of a bowl.

Yet, in the midst of all these mistakes and paradoxes, he hath not forgotten his old Thrasonical humour. Where, I say, "liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost[t]," he telleth me, it is "a mere shift, to be thought not silenced[u]." I had not thought him such a dangerous adversary. "*Metuent omnes jam te, nec immerito.*" Well, if it be "a shift," it is such a shift as all conscionable men do find by experience to be true. And for his "silencing" of me, "*impavidum ferient ruinæ*[x]." I do not fear "silencing" by him, except his arguments have some occult quality, more than he or I dream of. If a fish could speak, a fish would not be "silenced" by him in this cause.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXIII.

The understanding and will two powers of the reasonable soul.

There is a double question discussed in this section: first, supposing that the will doth always follow the last judgment of the understanding, whether this do take away the liberty of the will; secondly, whether the will doth always follow the last judgment of the understanding: both which questions have formerly been discoursed of in this treatise[y]. For clearing of the former question, it ought to be considered, that although men do ordinarily speak of the understanding and of the will as of two distinct agents, or individual substances, subsisting by themselves, whereof the one understandeth and the other willeth, partly for the eminence of these two powers, and partly for the clearer and more distinct conception and comprehension of them, and although the practice of all former divines and philosophers do warrant us in so doing, yet, if we will speak properly and in rigour of speech, the understanding and the will are but two powers, flowing from the reasonable soul: and that the acts of willing and understanding are predicated most properly of the man, whilst the soul and body are united ("*actiones sunt suppositorum*"), and of the reasonable soul after its separation. And

[t] [Defence, Numb. xxii. above p. 146; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 246.]

[x] [Horat., Carm., III. iii. 8.]

[y] [Above, Castig. of Animadv. Numb. vii. pp. 288—291.]

because he suggesteth, that this is done for advantage, and that "it is not without cause men use improper language, when they mean to keep their errors from being detected[z]," to let him see that this is the sense of all men, and that this assertion will advantage his cause nothing, I am contented to answer his Animadversions upon this subject in the same phrase that he proposeth them.

[Election doth not necessarily follow the last judgment.]

He pleadeth, that the election of the free agent doth necessarily follow his last judgment, and therefore his election is not free[a].

My first answer to this is, that determination which he maintaineth, and which taketh away freedom and liberty, is extrinsecal and antecedent; but the determination of the agent's election by his judgment is intrinsecal, made by himself, and concomitant, being together in time with the election[b]. To this now he replieth, that the will and the last dictate of the understanding "are produced in the same instant," but "the necessity" of them both "was antecedent before they were produced; . . as, when a stone is falling, the necessity of touching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself, . . unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion, and then the stop is as necessary as the proceeding would have been[c]."

Man's willing is not like a falling stone.

To this I give three clear solutions. First, that his instance of the stone is altogether impertinent. The stone is a natural agent, the man is a voluntary agent; natural agents act necessarily and determinately, voluntary agents act freely and undeterminately. The stone is determined to its motion
824 downwards intrinsecally by its own nature, that is, by the weight or gravity of it; but he maketh the will of the free agent to be determined extrinsecally, by causes without himself. Secondly, there is not the like necessary or determinate connection between the will and its antecedent causes, as is between the stone falling and its touching the ground. It was in the power of the man to deliberate or not deliberate, to elect or not elect; but it is not in the power of the stone to fall or not to fall. So the motion of the stone was

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 246.]

[a] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxiii. above p. 149.]

[b] [Defence, Numb. xxiii. above pp. 149, 150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 253.]

rmined to one antecedently in its causes, but the elective of man is not determined to one antecedently in its ses, until the man determine himself by his choice. rdly, though the stone be not such a free undetermined ent as the man is, and therefore this concerneth not liberty, t he himself confesseth, that casually it may be hindered om touching the ground;—"unless it be hindered by some ontrary external motion[d]." So the stone's touching of the ground is necessary only upon supposition,—"unless it be hindered." But that necessity which he maintaineth, is a necessity antecedent, "which cannot possibly be otherwise[e]." But there is this difference between the man and the stone, that the thing supposed (to deliberate or not to deliberate) is in the power of the man, but the thing supposed (to be hindered or not hindered) is not in the power of the stone.

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He pleadeth further, that supposing the stone "be hindered," then "the stop is necessary[f]." So still there is necessity. Nay, by his favour, if the event be necessary to fall out this way upon one supposition, and necessary to fall out another way upon a contrary supposition, then there is no absolute or antecedent necessity at all; for absolute necessity admitteth no such contrary suppositions, absolute or antecedent necessity being that "which cannot possibly be otherwise."

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eason.

My second answer was negative, that the free agent in electing doth not always choose what is best or most convenient, in his judgment[g]. He affirmeth, that I "say this is but a probable" opinion[h]. Nay, I said it was probable at the least[i]; and if he press me further, I say it is but too evident. Otherwise there should be no sin against conscience; for what is conscience but "the practical judgment, or dictate of reason, concerning things to be done, or to be shunned, here and now, with these or those circumstances[j]." And such a man is truly "*αὐτοκατάκριτος*"—"condemned by himself." A man who hath two dishes of meat set before him, the one more agreeable to his health, the other more

Tit. iii. 11.]

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 253.]
[e] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
[f] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 253.]
[g] [See Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. above, p. 150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 253.]
[i] [Bramhall certainly did not say so. See above pp. 118, 150.]
[j] [See above p. 329, note e.]

pleasing to his palate, may and many times doth choose the latter and the worse, his judgment at the same time disallowing it. St. Paul confesseth, that 'he had done that which he allowed not.' He saith, "it is impossible for a man to will any thing which appeareth not first in his understanding to be good for him[k]." That is very true, but it cometh not home. If he would speak to the purpose, he should say, it is impossible for a man to will any thing which appeareth not in his understanding to be best for him. But this is false. As, suppose one thing appear to a man to be honest, that is one good; another thing appeareth to be delightful, that is another good: every man knoweth in his own judgment and conscience, that that which is honestly good, is better than that which is delightfully good: yet men often choose pleasure before honesty, their conscience at the same time accusing them for it.

Rom. vii. 15.

I said, a man is bound to follow his conscience, as the last practical dictate of reason[l]. There is no doubt of it. The Scripture is plain;—"He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith, for whatsoever is not of faith" (that is to say, is not done upon a firm resolution that it is lawful), "is sin." Reason is as plain;—all circumstances must concur to make an action good, but one single defect doth make it evil; the approbation of conscience is required to every good action, and the want thereof maketh it sinful; not simply in itself, but to that person, at that time. He excepteth, that "a man ought not to follow the dictate of his understanding when it is erroneous[m]." That is most true with this limitation—'wherein it is erroneous,' or, 'as it is erroneous.' But there is an expedient for this in case-divinity, which I easily believe he did never meet with. He who hath an erroneous conscience, is doubly obliged; first, to reform it, and then, to follow it. The dictates of right reason ought ever to be followed; and erroneous reason ought ever to be reformed, and made right reason.

An erroneous conscience obligeth first to reform it, then to follow it. Rom. xiv. 23.

825 I said, that "reason was the true root of liberty[n]." That is plain. The object of the will is good, either real or apparent;

Reason is the true root of liberty.

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 253.]

[l] [Defence, Numb. xxiii. above p. 150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 253.]

[n] [Defence, Numb. xxii. above p. 146; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

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and a man cannot will any thing as good, but that which he judgeth in his understanding to be good. Nothing can affect that which it doth not know. And therefore reason must of necessity be "the root of liberty." This he taketh to be contradictory to what I say here,—that "actions" and objects "may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance[o]." "How then" (saith he) "can a man leave that to liberty when his reason can give no sentence? And if by 'chance'" I "mean that which hath no causes," I "destroy providence; if that which hath causes," I "leave it to necessity[p]." So, where I say, that "reason cannot give a positive sentence," he maketh me say, that "reason can give no sentence." There is a great difference between these two. The judges name three men to the sheriffwick of a county; here is a nomination or judgment, but not yet positive. The king picks one of these three; then the nomination or judgment is positive. So reason representeth to the free agent, or the free agent judgeth in his understanding, three means to obtain one end, either not examining or not determining any advantage which one mean hath above another. Here is an indefinite judgment for three good means, though it be not positive for any one more than the rest. In this case the will or the free agent chooseth one of these three means as good, without any further examination which is best. Reason is "the root of liberty" in representing what is good, even when it doth give no positive or determinate sentence what is best. I am neither so vain to think there is any thing that hath a being which hath not causes; nor so stupid, on the other side, as to think that all causes are necessary causes. Chance proceedeth neither from the want, nor from the ignorance, but from the accidental concurrence of causes.

Actions may be equally circumstantiated.

His next charge is, that "it is false that actions may be so equally circumstantiated that reason cannot give a positive" (that is, a determinate) "sentence[q]." Yet he confesseth, that "in the things elected there may be an exact equality[r]." If he did not confess it, it is most evident in itself: as ap-

[o] [Defence, Numb. xxiii. above p. 150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 254.]
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [Ibid.]

peareth in my former instance of two plasters of equal virtue; or, if he please, in two pieces of gold of the same stamp, weight, and alloy, sent to one man upon condition to choose the one and leave the other. He judgeth them both to be good, and is not such a fool as they are who say, that he would hang in a perpetual equilibrium, and could choose neither, for want of determination which was best. Therefore he chooseth one of them, without more to do. But he saith, "there may be circumstances in him that is to elect," that he do not "spend time in vain," or lose both[s]. It is true there are reasons to move him to elect, because they are both good; but there are no reasons to move him to elect the one rather than the other, this rather than that, or that rather than this, but only the will of him that electeth, all things being so equally circumstantiated, that reason can give sentence for them both as good, but not for the one positively and determinately as better than the other. Whatsoever is good, is the object of the will, though it be not always the best.

I said, that "reason doth not weigh every individual" object or "action to the uttermost grain[t]." He pleadeth in answer, "True, but does it therefore follow a man gives no sentence? the will may follow the dictate of the judgment, whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed[u]." I acknowledge it, but he mistaketh the scope of my argument. The less exactly that reason doth weigh actions or objects, the less exactly it doth determine the free agent; but leaveth him, as in a case of indifferency, or having no considerable difference, to choose what he will, as being not much material, or not at all material, whether he choose the one part or the other.

"Passions and affections" (saith he) "prevail often against wisdom, but not against the judgment" or "dictate of the understanding; .. the will of a peevish passionate fool doth no less follow the dictate of" his "understanding, than the will" of a wiser man[v]. He must pardon me; passions prevail not only against wisdom, but against the dictates of reason. It

Passions often prevail against reason.

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 254.]

[t] [Defence, Numb. xxiii. above p. 150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 254.]

[v] [Ibid.]

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was Medea's passion which dictated to her, that to revenge herself upon her husband was more eligible than the lives of her children. Her reason dictated the contrary.

" ——— Aliudque cupido, 82
Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor[x]."

Jam. i. 14. It was St. Peter's fear, not his judgment, which dictated to him to deny his Master. "Every man is tempted when he is drawn aside of his own lust," not of his intellectual judgment. Jacob did not curse the misunderstanding of [Gen. xlix. 7.] Simeon and Levi, but their passion;—"Cursed be their anger, for it was fierce; and their wrath, for it was cruel." As "the law is silent among arms," so is reason silent among passions. Passion is like an unruly passenger, which thrusts reason away from the rudder for the time. Therefore they use to say, that the dominion of reason, or of a reasonable man, over his sensitive appetite, is not despotical, like the government of a master over his slave, but political, like that of a magistrate over the people, which is often disturbed by seditious tumults and rebellions. Passion is an eclipse of reason, "a short madness[y]" the metamorphosis of a man into a wild beast that is gored, which runneth upon every thing that comes in her way without consideration, or like a violent torrent descending down impetuously from a steep hill, which beareth down all respects before it, Divine and human. Whilst passion is at the height, there is no room for reason, nor any use of the dictates of the understanding, the mind for the time being like the Cyclopian cave[z], where no man heard what another said.

Man was created to be lord of the creatures.

The last part of this section is not concerning the fortunes of Asia, but the weighing of a horse-load of feathers[a], a light and trivial subject, wherein there is nothing but a contempt of School terms without any ground, bold affirmations without any proof, and a continued detraction from the dignity of the human nature, as if a reasonable man were not so considerable as a jackdaw. When God created man, He made him a mean lord under Himself, "to have dominion over all His Ps. viii. 6. creatures," and "put all things in subjection under his feet."

[x] [Ovid., Metam., vii. 19—21.]
[y] "Ira furor brevis est." Horat.,
[z] [Virg., Æn., viii. 416 sq.—&c.]
[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii.

And to fit him for this command, He gave him an intellectual soul. But T. H. maketh him to be in the disposition of the second causes: sometimes as a sword in a man's hand[b], a mere passive instrument; sometimes like "a top, that is lashed" hither and thither "by boys[c];" sometimes like "a football[d]," which is kicked hither and thither by every one that comes nigh it; and here to a pair of scales, which are pressed down, now one way then another way, by the weight of the objects[e]. Surely this is not that man that was created by God after His own image, to be the governor of the world, [Gen. i. 26.] and lord and master of the creatures. This is some man that he hath borrowed out of the beginning of an almanac, who is placed immovable in the midst of the twelve signs, as so many second causes. If he offer to stir, Aries is over his head ready to push him, and Taurus to gore him in the neck, and Leo to tear out his heart, and Sagittarius to shoot an arrow in his thighs.

How the understanding giveth to objects their proper weight.

Yet he tells us boldly, that "no man can understand, that the understanding maketh any alteration of weight or lightness in the object, or that reason lays objects upon the understanding[f]." What poor trifling is this, in a thing so plain and obvious to every man's capacity! There can be no desire of that which is not known in some sort. Nothing can be willed but that which is apprehended to be good either by reason or sense, and that according to the degree of apprehension. Place a man in a dark room and all the rarest objects in the world besides him, he seeth them not, he distinguisheth them not, he willeth them not; but bring in a light, and he seeth them, and distinguisheth them, and willeth them, according to their distinct worths. That which light is to visible objects, making those things to be actually seen which were only potentially visible, that is the understanding to all intelligible objects, without which they are neither known nor willed. Wherefore men define the understanding to be "a faculty of the reasonable soul, understanding, knowing, and judging, all intelligible things[g]." The

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 37.]
[c] [Ibid., p. 41.]
[d] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 230.]
[e] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 255.]
[f] [Ibid.]
[g] [See above p. 290, note z.]

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understanding then doth not "alter the weight of objects;" no more than the light doth change the colours, which without the help of the light did lie hid in the dark: but the light makes the colours to be actually seen; so doth the understanding make the latent value of intelligible objects to be apprehended, and consequently maketh them to be desired and willed according to their distinct degrees of goodness. This judgment, which no man ever denied to intelligible 327 creatures, is the "weighing of objects," or attributing their just "weight" to them, and the trying of them as it were by the balance and by the touchstone. This is not "the laying of objects upon the understanding." The understanding is not the patient but the judge; but this is the representing of the goodness or badness of objects to the will, or to the free agent willing, which relatively to the will giveth them all their weight and efficacy.

There may be difference between these two propositions, 'Repentance is not voluntary and by consequence proceedeth from causes,' and, 'Repentance proceedeth from causes, and by consequence is not voluntary[h],' if his consequence were well intelligible, as it is not. All acts both voluntary and involuntary do proceed from causes. He chargeth me to have "chopped in" these words, "and therefore[i]." The truth is, his words were, "and by consequence," which I expressed thus, "and therefore." "Therefore" and "by consequence" are the very same thing, neither more nor less. Is not this a doughty exception? But the other is his greater error,—that repentance is not voluntary[j]. No Schoolman ever said, that the faculty of the will was voluntary, but that the agent was a voluntary agent and the act a voluntary act.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXIV.

Blasphemy in the abstract and in the concrete differ much.

He accuseth me of "charging" him "with blasphemy and atheism[k]." If he be wronged in that kind, it is he who wrongeth himself by his suspicion. "*Spreta exolescunt; si irascare, agnita videntur*[l]." I accused him not either of blas-

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. p. 255.]
[i] [Ibid.]
[j] [Ibid.]
[k] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 262.]
[l] [Tacit., Annal., iv. 34.]

phemy or atheism, in the concrete. One may say a man's opinions are blasphemous and atheistical in the abstract, without charging the person with formal atheism or blasphemy. The reason is evident;—because it may be, that through prejudice he doth not see the consequences, which other men, whose eyes are not blinded with that mist, do see, and if he did see them, would abhor them as well as they. For this reason, he who chargeth one with speaking or writing implicit contradictions, or things inconsistent one with another, doth not presently accuse him of lying, although one part of a contradiction must needs be false, because it may be the force of the consequence is not evident to him.

A man may know a truth certainly, and yet not know the formal reason or the manner of it so certainly. I know that I see, and I judge probably how I see; yet the manner how I see, whether by sending out beams, or by receiving in the *species*, is not so evident as the thing itself,—that I do see. They who do not agree about the manner of vision, do all agree about the truth of vision. Every man knoweth certainly, that he can cast a stone up into the air; but the manner how the stone is moved after it is separated from the hand,—whether it be by some force or form or quality impressed into the stone by the casters or by the air; and if it be by the air, whether it be by the pulsion of the air following or by the cession of the former air,—is obscure enough; and not one of a thousand who knoweth the certainty of the thing, knoweth the manner how it cometh to pass. If this be true in natural actions, how much more in the actions of God, Who is an infinite Being, and not comprehensible by the finite wit of man? The water can rise no higher than the fountain's head. A looking-glass can represent the body, because there is some proportion between bodies; but it cannot represent the soul, because there is no proportion between that which is material and that which is immaterial. This is the reason why we can in some sort apprehend what shall be after the end of the world,—because the soul is eternal that way; but if we do but think of what was before the beginning of the world, we are as it were presently swallowed up into an abyss, because the soul is not eternal that way. So I know, that there is true liberty from necessity, both by Divine revelation,

A man may know a truth certainly, yet not know the manner.

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and by reason, and by experience. I know likewise, that God knoweth all events from eternity. The difficulty is not about the thing, but about the manner,—how God doth certainly know things free or contingent, which are to come in respect of us, seeing they are neither determined in the event itself, nor in the causes thereof. The not knowing of the manner, which may be incomprehensible to us, doth not at all diminish the certain truth of the thing. Yet even for the manner sundry ways are proposed, to satisfy the curiosities rather than the consciences of men; of which this is one way which I mentioned[m]. It were a great madness to reject a certain truth, because there may be some remote difficulty about the manner; and yet a greater madness, for avoiding a needless scruple, to destroy all the attributes of God, which 828
is by consequence to deny God Himself. His proof of necessity drawn from God's eternal knowledge of all events, hath been sufficiently discussed and satisfied over and over.

The doctrine of liberty an ancient truth.

I pleaded, that my doctrine of liberty is an ancient truth generally received; his opinion of universal necessity, an upstart paradox, and all who own it may be written in a ring; so I am an "old possessor," he is but "a new pretender[n]." He answereth, that he is "in possession of a truth derived" to him "from the light of reason," and "it is an unhandsome thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession from his ancestor[o]." I answer, that just possession is either by law or by prescription. I have all laws, Divine and human, ecclesiastical and civil, and a prescription of two thousand years, or at least, ever since Christianity came into the world, for liberty. His opinion of universal destiny by reason of a necessary connection of the second causes, was never the general, nor the common, nor the current opinion of the world; and hath been in a manner wholly buried for sixteen hundred years, and now is first conjured out of its grave by him, to disturb the world. If this be just possession, a highway-robber may plead possession so soon as ever he hath stripped an honest traveller. It is not only no "unhandsome thing," but it is a most comely

[m] [See the Defence, Numb. xxiv. above pp. 156, 157; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[n] [Ibid., pp. 155, 156.]
[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 263.]

and commendable thing, for a man to derive his religion by the universal approbation of the Christian world from the purest primitive times throughout all ages, and never to deviate further from the steps of his ancestors than they had first degenerated from their predecessors. And where he telleth us, that "the first Christians did not derive" Christianity "from their ancestors[p]," it is very true, but very impertinent. For they had not their religion from their own invention or presumption, as he hath his opinions, but by Divine revelation, confirmed with miracles. When he is able to produce as authentic proof for his paradoxes, as they did for their religion, he saith something.

That which he calleth my "scurrilous argumentation[q]," — "he that drinks well, sleeps well," &c.—is none of mine, but a common example used in logic, to shew the weakness of such forms of arguings as his is, when the dependance is not necessary and essential but contingent and accidental; as it is in his argument here. All actions are from God by a general power, but not determinately. The like contingent connection there is between "action" and "sense," sense and "memory," memory and "election[r]." This is enough to shew the weakness of his argument. But he hath one main fault more, he hath put more in the conclusion than there was in the premisses.

Liberty to will more reconcileable with prescience than liberty to do.

He sayeth, "If by liberty" I had understood only "liberty of action," and not "liberty of will," it "had been an easy matter to reconcile it with prescience and the decrees of God[s]." I answer, first, that "liberty of action" without "liberty of will" is but a mock liberty, and a new nothing, like an empty bottle given to a child to satisfy his thirst. Where there is no liberty to will, there is no liberty to act; as hath been formerly demonstrated[t]. Secondly, the liberty to will, is as reconcileable with the prescience and decrees of God as the liberty to act. God's decrees do extend at least as much to acting as to willing. Thirdly, this liberty of acting without a liberty of willing is irreconcileable with all the other attributes of God, His truth, His justice, His goodness, and His

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 263.]
[q] [Ibid., p. 264.]
[r] [Ibid., pp. 263, 264.]
[s] [Ibid., p. 264.]
[t] [See above p. 305. note k.]

ower; and setteth the decrees of God in opposition one with nother. How should a man have a liberty to act, and have o liberty to will, when he cannot act freely except he will reely, because willing is a necessary cause or means of acting? That which followeth about "God's aspect" and "intuition[u]," is merely a contention about words, and such words as are received and approved by all authors. God's intuition is not of the same nature with ours. We poor creatures do stand in need of organs; but God, Who is a pure simple infinite essence, cannot be made perfecter by organs, or accidents. Whatsoever He seeth or knoweth, He seeth or knoweth by His essence. The less T. H. understood the terms of "aspect" and "intuition," the more apt he was to blunder them.

he God ne- y of ings.

He pleadeth, "If liberty cannot stand with necessity, it cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which decrees necessity is a consequent;" and he citeth somebody without name, who said, "The will of God is the necessity of all things[v]." I deny his consequence. Liberty is consistent with God's decrees, though it be not consistent with universal necessity. The reason is plain;—because liberty is a con- 829
sequent of God's decrees as well as necessity. He who said, that "the will of God was the necessity of all things," was St. Austin[x]. I wish he would stand to his judgment, or to his sense of those words. The meaning of those words is not, that God doth will that all things should be necessary, but that whatsoever God doth will, that must necessarily be. If He will have all things necessary, then all things must be necessary. If He will have all things free, then all things must be free. If He will have some things necessary, and some things free, then some things must be necessary, and some things free. When God formed man of the dust of the earth, He might have formed him either a child or a man; but whether he should be formed the one or the other, "it was not in the condition of the creature, but in the pleasure of the Creator, Whose will is the necessity of all things[y]." What

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 264.]

[v] [Ibid., p. 265.—"If I had said it, been without authority of s are *often* *cessitas rerum.*'"]

[x] [De Genesi ad Litteram, lib. vi. c. 15. (§ 26; Op. tom. iii. P. i. p. 207. B.)]

[y] [Id., ibid.—"Hoc enim non erat

doth this concern the liberty of man? Nothing. It concerned him more to have understood St. Austin's distinction between God's will and His prescience in the same place,—"What God willeth, shall necessarily be" (that is, according to an absolute antecedent necessity); "what God foreknows, shall truly be[z]" (that is, only by a necessity of infallibility). I might produce the whole world against him in this cause; but because he renounced human authorities, I have been sparing to allege one testimony against him. But to free St. Austin from all suspicion of concurring in such a desperate cause, I will only cite one place of a hundred;—"Neither is that necessity to be feared, which the Stoics fearing, were careful to distinguish the causes of things so, that some they substracted from necessity, some they subjected to necessity; and in those which they would not have to be under necessity, they placed our wills, lest they should not be free if they were subjected to necessity; for if that be to be called our necessity, which is not in our power, but effecteth what it can although we will not, such as is the necessity of death, it is manifest, that our wills, whereby we live well or ill, are not under such a necessity[a]," &c. Here he may find the two sorts of necessity, which we have had so much contention about; the one in our power, which is not opposed to liberty; the other not in our power, that is, an antecedent extrinsecal necessity, which destroyeth liberty: but he saith, that "it is manifest, that our wills are not subject" to such antecedent "necessity." Here he may see, that his friends the Stoics, the great patrons of necessity, were not for universal necessity as he is, nor did countenance necessity to the prejudice of the liberty of the will.

[i. e. St. Augustin.]

"Only to permit," and, "to permit [barely[b]]," do not signify the same thing in this place[c]. "Only to permit," is op-

What it is to permit only and to permit barely.

Creatoris, Cujus voluntas rerum necessitas est."]

[z] [Id., ibid.,] c. 17; [ibid., p. 207. D—G.—"*Hoc* enim *necessario futurum est quod Ille vult*, et *ea vere futura sunt quæ Ille præscivit*. . . Secundum aliquas caussas inferiores jam vitam finierat" (Ezechias); "secundum illas autem quæ sunt in voluntate et præscientiâ Dei, Qui ex æternitate noverat quid illo tempore facturus erat (et hoc *vere* futurum erat), tunc erat finiturus vitam quando finivit vitam . . . Ideo *quod præsciebat*" (Deus), "*necessario futurum erat*."]

[a] [Id.,] De Civit. Dei, lib. v. c. 10. [Op. tom. vii. p. 124. F, G.]

[b] ["Liberty" in former editions, by a manifest misprint.]

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 285: from the Defence, Numb. xxiv. above p. 157; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

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posed to acting; "to permit barely," is opposed to disposing. There are many things which God doth not act, there is nothing which God doth not dispose. He acteth good, permitteth evil, disposeth all things both good and evil. He that cutteth the banks of a river, is the active cause that the water floweth out of the channel: he that hindereth not the stream to break the banks when he could, is the permissive cause; and if he make no other use of the breaking out, it is "*nuda permissio*"—"bare permission;" but if he disposeth and draweth the water that floweth out, by furrows, to water the meadows, then, though he permit it, yet he doth not "barely permit" it, but disposeth of it to a further good. So God "only permitteth" evil, that is, He doth it not; but He doth not "barely permit" it, because He disposeth it to good.

[Universals nothing but words, according to T. H.]

Here he would gladly be nibbling at the question, whether universals be nothing but only words;—"Nothing in the world," saith he, "is general, but the significations of words and other signs[d]:" hereby affirming unawares, that a man is but a word, and by consequence, that he himself is but a titular and not a real man. But this question is altogether impertinent in this place. We do not by a general influence understand some universal substance or thing, but an influence of indeterminate power, which may be applied either to good or evil. The influence is a singular act; but the power communicated is a general, that is, an indeterminate power, which may be applied to acts of several kinds. If he deny all general power in this sense, he denieth both his own reason, and his common sense.

Eternity is no successive duration.

Still he is for his old error,—that eternity is a successive everlasting duration[e]. But he produceth nothing for it, nor answereth to any thing which I urged against it:—that the eternity of God is God Himself; that if eternity were an everlasting duration, then there should be succession in God; then there should be former and latter, past and to come, 830 and a part without a part, in God; then all things should not be present to God; then God should lose something, namely, that which is past, and acquire something newly,

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 265.]

[e] [Ibid., pp. 265, 266.]

namely, that which is to come; and so God, Who is "without all shadow of change," should be mutable, and change every day[f]. To this he is silent, and silence argueth consent. Discourse II. [James i. 17.]

He saith, those "many other ways which are 'proposed by divines for reconciling eternal prescience with liberty and contingency,' . . are proposed in vain, if they mean the same liberty and contingency" that I do, "for truth and error can never be reconciled[g]." I do not wonder at his show of confidence. The declining sun maketh longer shadows; and when a merchant is nearest breaking, he maketh the fairest show, to preserve his reputation as long as may be. He saith, he "knoweth the loadstone hath no such attractive power[h]." I fear shortly he will not permit us to say, that a plaster or a plantain-leaf draweth. What doth the loadstone then, if it doth not draw? He "knoweth, that the iron cometh to it, or it to the iron[i]." Can he not tell whether? This is worse than "drawing," to make iron come or go. By "potentiality" he understandeth "power[k]" or might; others understand possibility or indetermination. Is not he likely to confute the Schoolmen to good purpose? [T. H.'s show of confidence.]

Whereas I said, "God is not just but justice itself, not eternal but eternity itself[l];" he telleth me, that "they are unseemly words to be said of God," he "will not say blasphemous and atheistical, that 'God is not just,' that 'He is not eternal[m].'" I do not fear, that any one scholar, or any one understanding Christian in the world, should be of his mind in this. If I should spend much time in proving of such known truths, approved and established by the Christian world, I should shew myself almost as weak as he doth shew himself, to talk of such things as he understandeth not in the least, to the overthrowing of the nature of God, and to make Him no God. If his God have accidents, ours hath none. If his God admit of composition and division, ours is Why God is said to be justice itself, &c.

[f] [Defence, Numb. xxiv. above pp. 157—159; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 266.]
[h] [Ibid.]
[i] [Ibid.]
[k] [Ibid.]
[l] [In the Defence, Numb. xxiv. above p. 153.]
[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 266.]

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a simple essence. When we say, "God is not just but justice," not wise but wisdom, doth he think that we speak of moral virtues? or that we derogate or detract from God? No, we ascribe unto him a transcendental justice and wisdom, that is not comprehended under our categories, nor to be conceived perfectly by human reason. But why doth he not attempt to answer the reasons which I brought?—that that which is infinitely perfect, cannot be further perfected by accidents; that God is a simple essence, and can admit no kind of composition; that the infinite essence of God can act sufficiently without faculties; that it consisteth not with Divine perfection to have any passive or receptive powers[n]. I find nothing in answer to these, but deep silence. Attributes are names; and justice and wisdom are moral virtues: but the justice, and wisdom, and power, and eternity, and goodness, and truth of God, are neither names nor moral virtues, but altogether do make one eternal essence, wherein all perfections do meet in an infinite degree. It is well, if those words of our Saviour do escape him in his next Animadversions,—"I am the truth;" or St. Paul, for making "*Deum*" and "*Deitatem*"—"God" and "the Godhead" or Deity, to be all one; or Solomon, for personating God under the name of "Wisdom" in the abstract.

John xiv. 6. Acts xvii. 29. Prov. viii. and ix.

God is indivisible.

To prove eternity to be no successive duration but one indivisible moment, I argued thus,—"the Divine substance is indivisible, but eternity is the Divine substance[o]."

In answer to this, in the first place, he denieth the major,—that "the Divine substance is indivisible[p]." If he had not been a professed Christian, but a plain Stoic, I should not have wondered so much at this answer; for they held, that God was corporal[q]. If the Divine substance be not indivisible, then it is material, then it is corporal, then it is corruptible, then the Anthropomorphites had reason to attribute human members to God. But the Scriptures teach us better, and all the world consenteth to it;—that "God is a Spirit,"—that He is "immortal and invisible,"—that He "dwelleth in

John iv. 24. 1 Tim. i. 17; [and vi. 16.]

[n] [Defence, Numb. xxiv. above pp. 157—159; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[o] [Ibid., p. 158.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 267.]

[q] [See Mosheim's edition of Cudworth's Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 1123: on the authority of Origen, contra Celsum, lib. i. p. 169.]

light which no man can approach unto, Whom no man hath seen nor can see." It is inconsistent with the nature of God to be finite; it is inconsistent with the nature of a body to be infinite. The speculations of philosophers, who had only the light of reason, were not so gross; who made God to be a most simple essence or simplicity itself[r]. All matter, which is the original of divisibility, was created by God; and therefore God Himself cannot be material nor divisible.

831 Secondly, he denieth the minor,—that the "eternity" of God "is the Divine substance[s]." I proved it from that generally received rule, "whatsoever is in God, is God." His answer is, that "this rule hath been said by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever is thought is understood[t]."—"Said by *some* men?" Nay, said and approved by *all* men, that ever had occasion to discourse upon this subject, and received without contradiction as a received principle of theology. They who say against it, do, wittingly or unwittingly, destroy the nature of God. That which followeth is equally presumptuous,—"thought by no man, for whatsoever is thought is understood." It was too much to censure all the Schoolmen for pies or parrots, prating what they did not understand; but to accuse all learned Christians, of all communions, throughout all ages, who have either approved it or not contradicted it, of not understanding themselves, is too high an insolence. God, being an infinite essence, doth intrinsecally include all perfection, and needeth not to have His defects supplied by accidents.

God is eternity itself.

Where I say, "To-day all eternity is coexistent with this day, and to-morrow all eternity will be coexistent with to-morrow[u]," he inferreth, "It is well, that his eternity is now come from a '*nunc stans*' to be a '*nunc fluens*,' flowing from this day to" to-morrow[v]. It were better, if he would confess that it is a mere deception of his sight; like that of fresh-water passengers when they come first to sea, "*terræque urbesque recedunt*[x]"—who think the shore leaveth them, when they

[Eternity a "*nunc stans*."]

[r] ["Μονάς—τὸ ἕν—τὸ ὑπερούσιον." κ. τ. λ. See Mosheim's Cudworth, vol. i. p. 303.]

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv p. 267.]

[t] [Ibid.]

[u] [Defence, Numb. xxiv; above p. 159; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[v] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 268.]

[x] [Virg., Æn., iii. 72.]

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leave the shore. It is time that floweth and moveth, not eternity.

"Non tellus cymbam, tellurem cymba relinquit."

Exod. iii. 14.

To conclude this point of eternity, and this section, God gave Himself this name, "I am that I am," to shew the truth, the simplicity, the independence, and immutability of His essence; wherein there is neither "*fuit*" nor "*erit*"—"hath been" nor "shall be," but only present, "I am." Eternity, only eternity, is, truly, simply, independently, immutably.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXV.

What a judge judgeth to be indeliberate, is impertinent.

His first contradictions have been handled before, whither I refer the reader[y]; but because he expresseth his sense more clearly here than there, I will take the liberty to add a few words. I charged him with contradictions, in making voluntary to presuppose deliberation, and yet making many voluntary acts to be without deliberation. He distinguisheth "between deliberation and that which shall be construed for deliberation by a judge;"—some voluntary acts are "rash and undeliberate" in themselves, yet the judge judgeth them to be deliberate, "because they ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to deliberate, whether the action were lawful or not[z]." First, this answer is a mere subterfuge. The question between us is not, what actions are punishable by law, and what are not, but what is deliberation in its own nature, and whether all voluntary actions be deliberate or not; not in order to a trial before a judge, but in order to the finding out of the truth. Secondly, many of these rash actions do imply no crime; nor are cognoscible before a judge, as tending only to the agent's particular prejudice, or perhaps no prejudice but advantage. In all these cases, the sentence of the judge cannot help to reconcile his contradiction. Thirdly, the ground of his distinction is not true. The judge doth not always judge of such rash acts to be de-

And his assertion false.

[y] [Castig. of Animadv.] Numb. viii; [above pp. 296—300.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 272.]

liberate acts, but judgeth them to have been indeliberate acts, whensoever he findeth them to have been justly destitute of all manner of deliberation: from whence did arise the well known distinction between manslaughter and wilful murder in our law. Murder committed upon actual deliberation is held to be done maliciously—"*ex malitiâ suâ*;" but if it proceed out of sudden passion, it is found only manslaughter. The same equity is observed in the judicial law. He who did kill another "suddenly without enmity," was allowed the benefit of the city of refuge. Lastly, in many cases the judge cannot judge, that the agent had sufficient time to deliberate, nor that it was his fault that he did not deliberate, for really he had not sufficient time to deliberate.

Numb. xxxv. [22.]

And where he talketh, that the judge supposeth "all the time" after the making of the law to have been "time of deliberation[a]," he erreth most pitifully. There needeth little or no time to deliberate of the law. All the need of deliberation is about the matter of fact, and the circumstances
32 **thereof. As, for example, a sudden affront is put upon a man, which he did not expect nor could possibly imagine, such as he apprehendeth that flesh and blood cannot endure, and conceiveth himself engaged in honour to vindicate it forthwith. This is that which required deliberation; the nature and degree of the affront, the best remedies how to procure his own reparation in honour, the inconveniences that may arise from a sudden attempt, and the advantage which he may make of a little forbearance, with all the circumstances of the accidents. How could he possibly deliberate of all these things, before any of these things were imaginable? He could neither certainly divine, nor probably conjecture, that ever such an accident should happen. And therefore it remaineth still a gross contradiction in him, to say, that voluntary always supposeth deliberation[b], and yet to confess, that many voluntary acts are undeliberate[c].**

A man cannot predeliberate perfectly of contingent events.

Whereas he saith, that he always used the word sponta- [Spontaneity.]

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. above p. 45.]

[b] [Ibid. Numb. xxv. above p. 159.]

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neous in the same sense[d], he must excuse me if I cannot assent unto it. In one place he telleth us, that "by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it[e]." In another place he telleth us, that to give out "money for merchandize" is a "spontaneous" action[f]. All the world knoweth, that to buy and sell doth require consideration.

[Liberty.]

He defineth "liberty" to be "the absence of all extrinsecal impediments to action[g]:" but extrinsecal causes are extrinsecal impediments, and no man is free (according to his grounds) from the determination of extrinsecal causes; therefore no man is free from extrinsecal impediments.

Endeavour is not of the essence of liberty.

His answer is, that "impediment or hindrance signifieth an opposition to endeavour,...and consequently extrinsecal causes that take away endeavour are not to be called impediments[h]." He is very seldom stable to his own grounds, but is continually interfering with himself. Now he telleth us, that an "impediment signifieth an opposition to endeavour;" elsewhere he telleth us, that a man "that is tied" is not free to walk, and that his bonds are "impediments," without any regard to his endeavour[i]. It were mere folly for him to endeavour to walk, who can neither stir hand nor foot. This is not all. He telleth us further, that an inward impediment is not destructive to liberty, as a man is free to go though he be "lame;" and men do "not say, that the river wants liberty to ascend, but the power," because the water cannot ascend[k]. And is not want of endeavour intrinsecal as well as lameness? Or did he ever hear of a river that endeavoured to ascend up the channel? It is not true, therefore, that endeavour is of the essence of liberty, or that impediment always "signifieth opposition to endeavour." Lastly, "extrinsecal causes" do not always "take away endeavour," but many times leave men free to endeavour to obtain those things, which they never do obtain. If extrinsecal causes do take away all endeavours but such as are successful, then there should never

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 273.]

[e] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xxviii. [above, p. 175.]

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 274.]

[i] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xxix. [above, p. 167.]

be any labour in vain. It remaineth, therefore, upon his own grounds, that extrinsecal causes whensoever they do not take away endeavours are extrinsecal impediments and destroy liberty.

There may be impediments before deliberation be done.

He saith, one "may deliberate of that which is impossible for him to do[l]." True, if he apprehend it as possible, and judge it to be possible; or, otherwise, he is stark mad to deliberate about it. 'The shutting of the door of the tennis-court' is "no impediment to play, until a man have a will to play, and that is not until he have done deliberating[m]." Yes, even in the act of deliberation, the finding of the door of the tennis-court shut determineth the deliberation, changeth the will, and may be the only impediment which hindereth a man from playing. One may have a will to play before deliberation, sometimes more absolute, out of humour, than after. Many times the last judgment is conditional; as, to play if the door be open, and if the court be not taken up beforehand; and if it be shut, or the place taken up, then to go to bowls, or some other exercise.

And liberty when it is ended.

Wheresoever the judgment is indifferent, to do either this or that, or conditional, to do this upon such conditions, it is not the deliberation or the last judgment that doth determine the liberty of the free agent, but leaveth him free to choose either part, or to suspend his consent to both parts, *pro re natâ*. So liberty may remain after deliberation is done. Although he did not use these words, "sensitive appetite—rational hope—rational fear—irrational passions," nor "confound" the terms of "sufficiency" and "efficiency," or "beginning of being" and "beginning of working[n]," yet he might confound the thing whereof these terms are but notions; and so he doth.

[Secret sympathies and antipathies.]

833 All men do understand well enough what secret sympathies and antipathies are, except such as are captious; though men understand not usually why they are, as why one man gapeth at a custard rather than at a pie, and runneth away from a cat rather than from a mastiff. When I say, "it is thus far true, that the action doth follow the thought necessarily" (namely in antipathies and violent passions, which admit no

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 274.]

[m] [Ibid.]

[n] [Ibid.]

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deliberation[o]), he demandeth, "how far it is false[p]." I answer, it is false in ordinary thoughts, which are not accompanied with such violent passions. A man thinketh a thousand things in a day accidentally, which he never putteth in execution; nor so much as thinketh them worthy of deliberation.

[Habits facilitate actions.]

No man would have denied, that habits do facilitate actions, and render them less difficult and cumbersome, and consequently more easy and more free[q], but he that meant to make himself ridiculous. He might even as well tell us, that he who gropeth in the dark for every step, is as free to walk as if it were fair day-light; or that a foundered horse, that is afraid to stumble every foot, is as free to go, as he which is sound and goeth on boldly without fear. But all this abuse groweth from the misunderstanding of liberty. I take it for a power to act or not to act, and he taketh it for "an absence of outward impediments." This confounding of words, and the heaping together of Scholastical terms with scorn, because he never understood them, are the chiefest ingredients in his discourse. I am not ashamed of "*motus primo primi*," or "*judicium practice practicum*," or "*actus elicitus*" and "*imperatus*[r]." But he hath great reason to be ashamed of his slighting them; which he would not do, but that he never learned them, and so would make a virtue of culpable necessity. He saith, he "will not contend with one who can use '*motus primo primi*,'" &c.[s] He is the wiser, to have as little to do with scholars as he can. His best play is in the dark, where there is no fencing.

Some undeliberated acts may be punishable.

We both agree, that some sudden undeliberated acts are justly punished. His reason is, because the agent "had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the law to the instant of his action[t]." But I have shewed the vanity of this reason, and that it was impossible to deliberate of sudden affronts and injuries which could not be expected or foreseen. But if the occurrences or accidents were such as were

[o] [Defence, Numb. xxv. above p. 161; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 275.]

[q] [Ibid.]

[r] [Ibid.—"For improprieties of speech, I will not contend with one that can use 'motus primo primi,' 'practicè practicum,' 'actus elicitus,' and many other phrases of the same kind."]

[s] [Ibid.]

[t] [Ibid., p. 276: from T. H. Numb. xxv. above in the Defence p. 160.]

foreseen, or whereof the agent was premonished, and he did deliberate of them, or if it was his own fault or improvidence that they were not foreseen nor deliberated of, then he is punishable, because his predeliberation about some such accident as might probably happen, was a virtual deliberation about this very act, which did afterward happen, though it were not then acted but only expected; or because he refused or neglected to fore-arm himself by deliberation against a surprise.

Virtual deliberation.

Here he cavilleth about terms of actual and virtual deliberation, as his manner is;—"If virtual deliberation be not actual deliberation, it is no deliberation;" adding, that I "call virtual deliberation, that which ought to have been and was not[u]." He mistaketh the matter. I call "virtual deliberation" a former deliberation about this very act, feared or expected out of providence or premonition before it was acted, or about some act of the like nature. So it was an actual deliberation, yet not about this very act. But it might have served to have prevented the agent's being surprised, and have had the same virtue as if it had been an actual deliberation about this very accident. Did he never learn nor hear of the distinction in philosophy between "*contactus verus*" and "*contactus virtualis*"—"true touching" and "virtual touching?"—"true touching," when the superficies of two bodies are together, so as they can move and be moved mutually; and "virtual touching," when the virtue of one body doth extend itself to another, as it is between the sun and the earth, the loadstone and the iron, the hand of the caster and the stone moving upwards in the air. His argument holdeth as much in all the[se] cases as in this of deliberation. If "virtual touching" be not "true touching," it is no touching; and if virtual motion be not true motion, it is no motion. I shall find English enough at all times to answer him[v].

Concerning my instance, which he saith, pleasantly, doth "stink to the nose of the understanding[x]," I desire him only to read the fifteenth chapter of Leviticus. I am sure he dare not call that a "stinking" passage.

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 276.]

[v] [Ibid.—"His reprehension here is a reprehension of himself, proceeding from that the custom of School-language hath made him forget the language of his country."]

[x] [Ibid.]

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Children not punishable with death.

He saith, "the Bishop would make but an ill judge of innocent children;" and that he "hopeth we shall never have 834 the administration of public justice in such hands as his, or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him[y];" because I said, that "if a child, before he have the use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion, yet, because he wanted malice to incite him to it and reason to restrain him from it, he shall not die for it, in the strict rules of particular justice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case[z]."

". . . . . Si ego dignus hac contumeliâ
"Sum maxime, at tu indignus qui faceres tamen[a]."—

If I deserved a reproof, he was a most unfit man to be my reprover; who maintaineth, that "no law can be unjust[b]," that in the state of nature it was lawful for any man to kill another[c], and particularly, for mothers to expose or make away their children at their pleasure—"*ita ut illum vel educare vel exponere suo arbitrio et jure possit*[d];"—that "parents to their children," and "sovereigns to their subjects," cannot be "injurious," whether they kill them or whatsoever they do unto them[e]. But what is it that I have said? I have delivered no judgment or opinion of mine own in the case. I know what hath been practised by some persons, in some places, at some times. I know what reasons have been pretended for such practices; sovereign dominion, the law of retaliation (Psalm cxxxvii. 8, 9.), the common safety, the satisfaction or contentment of persons or families injured. But if I have delivered any opinion of mine own, it was on the contrary;—though I affirm not but that it may be sometimes lawful to punish parents, for acts truly treasonable, in their posterity with lesser punishments, as loss of liberty, or the loss of the father's estate, which was at the time of the delinquency in the father's power to dispose, that they who will not forbear to offend for their own sakes, may forbear for their posterity's sakes;—though I know the practice of many countries, even in this, to be otherwise. But for death, I know no warrant.

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 277.]
[z] [Defence, Numb. xxv. above p. 162; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[a] [Terent., Eun., V. ii. 26, 27.]
[b] [In the Defence, T. II. Numb. xv. above p. 85.]
[c] [Ibid., p. 86.]
[d] De Cive, c. ix. § 2. [p. 96.]
[e] [Ibid., § 7. p. 98.]

Pliny observeth of the lion, that he preyeth first upon men, more rarely upon women, and not upon children, except he be extremely pressed with hunger[f].

[Private and public justice.]

Private right and private justice is between particular men; public right and public justice is either between commonwealths, as in foreign war, or between commonwealths and subjects, as in case of lawgiving or civil war. Many things are lawful in the way of public justice, which are not lawful in the way of private justice. But this inquisition hath no relation to our present controversy. My exception—"except there be some mixture of public justice in the case"—is as much as to say, unless there be something more in the case, that doth nearly concern the safety of the commonwealth. It is not impossible, but before the ordinary age of attaining to the perfect use of reason, a child may be drawn into very treasonable attempts, so far as to act a ministerial part; and in such cases there is a rule in law, '*Malitia supplet ætatem.*' He hath confessed here enough to spoil his cause, if it were not spoiled already;—that "want of reason takes away" both "crime" and "punishment, and maketh" agents "innocent[g]." If "want of reason" do it, without doubt antecedent extrinsecal necessity doth much more do it. How then hath he taught us all this while, that voluntary faults are justly punishable though they be necessary[h]? A child's fault may be as voluntary as a man's. How a child may justly be put to death to satisfy "a vow," or "to save a great number of people," or "for reason of state[i]," I know not. This I do know, that it is not lawful "to do evil, that good may come" of it. [Rom. iii. 8.]

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXVI.

He knoweth no reason but imagination.

It seemeth,—by the Animadversion which T. H. hath in this section, whercin he maketh "consideration, understanding, reason, and all the passions" (or affections) "of the

[f] [Hist. Nat., viii. 19.]
[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 277.]
[h] [In the Defence, T. H., Numb. xiv. above p. 86.—&c.]
[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 277.]

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mind," to be "imaginations[j];" and by some other passages in this treatise, where he attributeth to bees and spiders "not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near equal to that of mankind[k];" and where he denieth to man all "dominion over the creatures," making him like a "top," or a "football," or a pair of "scales," and his chiefest difference from brute beasts to consist in his language and in his hand, and his liberty to consist in "an absence of outward impediments," ascribing to brute beasts deliberation such as (if it were constant) "there were no cause to call men more rational than beasts[l];"—that he maketh the reason and understanding of men to be nothing else but refined and improved sense, or the sense of brute beasts to include reason. It was an old 835
Stoical opinion, that the affections were nothing else but imaginations; but it was an old groundless error. Imaginations proceed from the brain, affections from the heart. But to make "reason" and "understanding" to be "imaginations," is yet grosser. Imagination is an act of the sensitive phantasy, reason and understanding are proper to the intellectual soul. Imagination is only of particulars, reason of universals also. In the time of sleep or some raging fit of sickness, when the imagination is not governed by reason, we see what absurd and monstrous and inconsistent shapes and fancies it doth collect, remote enough from true deliberation. Doth the physician cure his patient by "imaginations?" Or the statesman govern the commonwealth by "imaginations?" Or the lawyer determine differences by "imaginations?" Are logical arguments, reduced into due form and an orderly method, nothing but "imaginations?" Is prudence itself turned to "imagination?" And are the dictates of right reason, which God hath given as a light, to preserve us from moral vices and to lead us to virtuous actions, now become mere "imaginations?" We see the understanding doth often contrary and correct the imaginations of sense. I do not blame the "puzzled Schoolmen[m]," if they dissented from such new-fangled speculations.

[And this upon the ground of imagination.]

And the ground of all these vain imaginations is imagina-

[j] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. p. 278.]

[k] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. viii. [above p. 46.]

[l] [See above pp. 416, 417. notes c, d, e; pp. 339, 341; and below pp. 441. note o, 445. note h.]

[m] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. p. 279.]

tion;—"As any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his own thoughts[n]." His argument may be thus reduced,—That which we imagine is true, but we imagine all these to be imaginations. I deny both his propositions. First, our imaginations are not always true, but many times such as are suggested to us by our working phantasies upon some slight grounds, or by our fond or deceitful instructers, or by our vain hopes or fears. For one Whittington, that found his imagination to prove true, when the bells rang him back to his master, "Turn again, Whittington, thou shalt be Lord Mayor of London," a thousand have been grossly abused by their vain imaginations. Secondly, no man can imagine any such thing, who knoweth the difference between the reasonable and the sensitive soul, between the understanding and the phantasy, between the brain and the heart; but confident assertions and credulity may do much among simple people. So we have heard or read of some, who were contented to renounce their eye-sight, and to affirm for company, that they saw a dragon flying in the air, where there was not so much as a butterfly; out of a mannerly simplicity, rather than to seem to doubt of the truth of that, which was confirmed to them by the testimony and authority of such persons, whose judgment and veracity they esteemed.

We have had enough of his "understanding understandeth," and "will willeth[o];" or too much, unless it were of more weight. What a stir he maketh every other section about nothing! All the world are agreed upon the truth in this particular, and understand one another well. Whether they ascribe the act to the agent, or to the form, or to the faculty by which he acteth, it is all one. They know, that actions properly are of *individuums*. But if an agent have lost his natural power or acquired habit (as we have instances in both kinds), he will act but madly. He that shall say, that natural faculties and acquired habits are nothing but the acts that flow from them, that "reason" and "deliberation" are "the same thing[p]" (he might as well say, that wit and discourse are the same thing), deserveth no other answer but to be slighted.

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. p. 279.]

[o] [Ibid. And see above p. 287; and Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.]

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. p. 279.]

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That a man, deliberating of fit means to obtain his desired end, doth "consider the means singly and successively[q]," there is no doubt. And there is as little doubt, that both the inquiry, and the result or verdict, may sometimes be definite, or prescribe the best means or the only means, and sometimes indefinite, determining what means are good, without defining which are the best, but leaving the election to the free agent.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXVII.

The faculty of willing is the will.

I do not know what the man would have done but for his trifling homonymy about the name of "will[r]," which affordeth him scope to play at fast and loose between the faculty and the act of willing. We ended with it in the last section, and we begin again with it in this section:—"The faculty of the will" (saith he) "is no will, the act only which he calleth volition is the will; as a man that sleepeth hath the power of seeing and seeth not, nor hath for that time any sight, so 836
also he hath the power of willing, but willeth nothing, nor hath for that time any will[s]."

"——— Quantum est in rebus inane[t]!"—

What profound mysteries he uttereth, to shew that the faculty of willing, and the act of willing, are not the same things!—did ever any creature in the world think they were?—and that the faculty doth not always act!—did ever any man think it did? Let him leave these impertinencies, and tell us plainly, whether the faculty of willing and the act of willing be not distinct things; and whether the faculty of the will be not commonly called the will by all men but himself; and by himself also, when he is in his lucid intervals. Hear his own confession;—"To will, to elect, to choose, are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is a faculty or power of a man's soul, so the will is an act of it according to that power[u]." That which he calleth the "faculty" here, he calleth expressly

[q] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. p. 279:—to prove, that "there is no such thing as an indefinite consideration of what are good and fit means."]
[r] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 281.]
[s] [Ibid.]
[t] [Pers., Sat., i. 1.]
[u] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xx. [above p. 133.]

"the will" there. Here he will have but "one will," there he admitteth two distinct wills—"to will is an act of the will." Here he will not endure, that the "faculty" should be the will; there he saith expressly, that "the will is a faculty." All this wind shaketh no oats. Whatsoever he saith in this section, amounteth not to the weight of one grain.

Of concupiscence. [Rom. vii. 8.—Col. iii. 5.—1 Thess. iv. 5.]

If he had either known what concupiscence doth signify, which really he doth not, or had known how familiar it is (both name and thing) in the most modest and pious authors, both sacred and profane, which he doth not know, he would have been ashamed to have accused this expression as unbecoming a grave person[x]. But he, who will not allow me to mention it once to good purpose, doth take the liberty to mention it six times in so many lines to no purpose[y]. There hath been an old question between Roman Catholics and Protestants, whether concupiscence without consent be a sin or not[z]. And here cometh he, as bold as blind, to determine the difference; committing so many errors, and so gross, in one short determination, that it is a shame to dispute with him; thrashing those doctors soundly, whom he professeth to honour and "admire," not for ill will, but because he never read them. He maintaineth that which the Romanists themselves do detest, and would be ashamed of: as, first, that concupiscence without consent is no sin[a], contrary to all his much "admired doctors[b];" secondly, that there is no "concupiscence without consent[c]," contrary to both parties, which we use to call the taking away the subject of the question; thirdly, that "concupiscence with consent" may be "lawful[d]," contrary to all men;—(though the Church of Rome do not esteem it to be properly a sin, yet they esteem it a defect, and not altogether lawful, even without consent, much less with consent[e];)—fourthly, that "concupiscence makes not the sin, but the unlawfulness of satisfying such concupiscence," or the "design to prosecute what he knoweth to be unlawful[f];"

[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 281.]

[y] [Ibid., pp. 281, 282.]

[z] [See Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. v. cc. 5—14.]

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 282.]

[b] [Viz. Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Perkins. See above p. 382, note l.]

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 282.]

[d] [Ibid.]

[e] [Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. v. c. 10; Op. tom. iii. p. 396. D.]

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvii. p. 282.]

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which last errors are so gross, that no man ever avowed them before himself. "When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin;" that is, when a man hath consented to the suggestion of his own sensuality. Though he scorn the Schoolmen, yet he should do well to advise with his doctors, whom he professeth to "admire[g]," before he plunge himself again into such a whirlypool.

Jam. i. 15.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXVIII.

Of the intellectual and sensitive appetite.

If I should give over the well known terms of the "rational" or intellectual "will[h]," so well grounded in nature, so well warranted by the authority and practice of all good divines and philosophers, to comply with his humour or distempered imaginations, I should right well deserve a bable[i]. The intellectual appetite and "the sensitive appetite" are both appetites, and in the same man they both proceed from the same soul, but by divers faculties, the one by the intellectual, the other by the sensitive; and proceeding from several faculties, they do differ as much as if they proceeded from several souls. The sensitive appetite is organical, the intellectual appetite is inorganical. The sensitive appetite followeth the judgment of the senses, the intellectual appetite followeth the judgment of the understanding. The sensitive appetite pursueth present, particular, corporal delights; the intellectual appetite pursueth that which is honest, that which is future, that which is universal, that which is immortal and spiritual. The sensitive appetite is determined by the object. It cannot choose but pursue that object which the senses judge to be good, and fly that which the senses judge to be evil. But the intellectual appetite is free to will, or nill, or 837
suspend, and may reject that which the senses say to be good, and pursue that which the senses judge to be evil, according to the dictate of reason.

Not the same thing.

Then,—to answer what he saith in particular,—"the appetite and the will" are not always "the same thing[j]." Every will is an appetite, but every appetite is not a will. Indeed, in

[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 212.]

[h] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 283.]

[i] [Bable=bauble. Nares' Glossary.]

[j] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.]

the same man, appetite and will is the same thing (secluding natural appetite, which concerneth not this question); but the sensitive appetite and the intellectual appetite are not the same thing; following several guides, pursuing several objects, and being endowed with several privileges. He demandeth, whether "sensual men and beasts do not deliberate and choose one thing before another, in the same manner that wise men do[k]?" Although he hath found out a brutish kind of deliberation, if we take the word in the right sense, beasts cannot deliberate. "Sensual men" may deliberate, but do not deliberate as they ought. And by consequence beasts act necessarily, and cannot choose; sensual men do choose, or may choose, but do not choose as they ought, nor as "wise men do." He saith, it "cannot be said of wills, that one is rational, another sensitive[l]." Not very properly; but it may be said of appetites, "that one is rational, another sensitive." And why not a rational will, as well as a rational discourse? The will of a rational creature, rationally guided, is a rational will; and so will be, when we are dead and gone.

His deliberation is no deliberation.

He concludeth, "If it be granted that deliberation is always (as it is not), there were no cause to call men rational more than beasts, for it is manifest by continual experience, that beasts do deliberate[m]." Such a deliberation as he fancieth is not worth contending for, good for nothing but to be thrown to the dogs or the swine;—"an alternate imagination, alternate hope and fear, an alternate appetite[n]." Here is a heap of "alternates," every one unlike another, and all of them as far distant from deliberation as reason is from sense. Imagination is seated in the head, fear and hope in the heart; appetite is neither the one nor the other. Yet this is all the deliberation, and all the reason, which he attributeth to man. And he attributeth the same to brute beasts, but not at all times;—if they had this deliberation at all times, "there were no cause to call men rational more than beasts[o]." So the

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.]

[l] [Ibid.]

[m] [Ibid.—The passage in the original stands as above printed, and Bramhall argues upon it accordingly; but the first clause manifestly should run thus,—"If it be granted that deliberation is always (as it is not) *rational*, there were" &c.; and Molesworth in his edit. of Hobbes (vol. v. p. 365) has so printed it.]

[n] [In the Defence, T. H., Numb. xxvi. above pp. 163, 164.]

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.]

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difference between a man and beast is this, that man, or rather some men, are reasonable creatures at all times, thanks to their own industry, and brute beasts are reasonable creatures at some times. If he had said, that some men are but reasonable creatures at some times, I should rather have believed him for this discourse.

His liberty no true liberty.

He is beholden to his catachrestical expressions for all the rest of his discourse in this section. I take liberty to be a power of the rational soul, or of the free agent, to choose or refuse indifferently, upon deliberation. And he maketh liberty to be no more than the bias of a bowl, a strong inclination to one side, affixed by deliberation. And by this abusive expression he thinketh to avoid the two arguments which were brought against him in this section.

The former argument was this, "If every agent be necessitated to act what [he] doth act by extrinsecal causes, then he is no more free before deliberation than after;" which is demonstratively true of true liberty; but applying it to his new-fangled acception of liberty, he answereth, "He is more free" but "he is no less necessitated[p]." Yet withal he confesseth, that he is necessitated to deliberate as he doth, and to will as he doth[q]; that is to say, he is necessitated to be free. This is a freedom of a free stone, not of a free man. If this be all the freedom which a man hath, we must bid adieu to all election. Then there is neither freedom of our will, nor of our actions, more than an inclination extrinsecally necessitated; and then all those absurdities which he hath sought so carefully to avoid, tumble upon his head thick and threefold.

The second argument was this,—"Deliberation doth produce no new extrinsecal impediment, therefore either the agent is free after deliberation, or he was not free before[r]." He answereth, that he "cannot perceive any more force of inference in these words than of so many words put together at adventure[s]." I wonder at his dulness. He defineth liberty to be an "absence of extrinsecal impediments[t]." If this definition

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.]

[q] [Ibid.]

[r] [Defence, Numb. xxviii. above p. 166; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.—"Of so many *other* words," &c.]

[t] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxix. above p. 166.]

be true, then, wheresoever there is the same absence of extrinsecal impediments, there is the same liberty; but if deliberation produce no new extrinsecal impediments, there is the same absence of extrinsecal impediments after deliberation, which was before; therefore, upon his grounds, there is the same liberty after deliberation, which was before.

838 What he telleth of "thoughts" that "arise in him that deliberateth[u]," is nothing to the purpose. The last judgment is more than bare "thoughts." But this maketh but an intrinsecal determination, and a necessity upon supposition, not an extrinsecal determination, and an antecedent necessity, of which the question is between him and me. A man cannot "have liberty to do, or not to do, that which at the same time is already done[v]." But a man may do that which he doth freely from all antecedent necessity; and necessity upon supposition is not destructive to liberty. He "profaneth the Name of God[x]," who maketh Him to be corporal and divisible, to be compounded of substance and accidents, to be mutable, and to acquire and lose daily; not he who argueth soberly and submissively from the attributes or works of God.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXIX.

His definition of liberty.

He hath given a proof lately of his theology, now he pretendeth to shew his skill in logic and philosophy. He needeth not to tell us, that he acquired his knowledge by his own "meditation[y];" he is so long fumbling and spelling of every word. In the first place, he giveth us the definition of a definition;—"A right definition is that" (what? a right definition without a genus?) "which determineth the signification of the word defined[z]." This definition agreeth as much to a lexicon as to a definition. By his leave, a right definition is an explication of the thing defined by the essential terms; those are, the genus and the difference. His definition is but a poor description.

He "confesseth," that "the rule is good" in defining to

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 285.]
[v] [Ibid.]
[x] [Ibid.]
[y] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47.]
[z] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. p. 287.]

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"use first some general term and then to restrain the signification" thereof[a], &c. He is but learning to spell in logic, and yet is already censuring. It is no marvel if he never thrive of the trade. It is not only "good," but a necessary rule, that in every perfect definition there be two notions; the one more common, wherein the thing defined doth agree with other things, the other more distinct, wherein it differs from all other things. This was Plato's doctrine and Aristotle's, and received by all logicians ever since; and now he taketh upon him to be judge of it, as Midas judged of Apollo's music.

He dislikes the terms "genus" and "difference," as too obscure for "English readers," and fitter for "Schoolmen[b]," comprehending all logicians old and new under the name of "Schoolmen." Then why doth he himself use the term of "logic" and not rather witcraft, or "definition" and not rather declaring? The vulgar reader will understand his "general term[c]" no better than "genus," nor his new "restraint[d]" better than the old "difference;" but be ready to mistake his "restraint of a general term," for the imprisonment of some commander in chief. But thus it must be done; first, to render the people more benevolent to a man who studieth nothing but their edification, and then to hide his own ignorance.

He pleadeth, that "some words are so general, that they cannot admit a more general[e]." Yea, hath he found out that with his "meditation[f]?" Every freshman in the University could have told him that, and much more,—that "*omne quod perfecte definitur est species.*" He saith, I "shall give" him "leave to cite" some passages out of his "book, *De Corpore*[g];" and he shall "give me leave" to slight them and let them alone. If he will admit of human authority, I am ready to bury him and his destiny in a heap of authorities. But for his own authority, I do not esteem it (more than he produceth reason) the value of a deaf nut.

At length he hath found us out a genus and a difference in his definition of liberty, but that I am such a beetle that I

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. p. 287.]
[b] [Ibid.]
[c] [Ibid.]
[d] [Ibid.]
[e] [Ibid., p. 288.]
[f] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 47.]
[g] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. p. 288.]

cannot see them. His genus is "absence of impediments to action[h]." Let him peruse all the tables of the predicaments and predicables; and if he find any such genus there, either *summum* or *subalternum*, "he shall be my great Apollo[i]." To make a genus of a privation, that is, an "absence," nay, "an absence of impediments," was never heard of before; unless it be true in this cause, "*bina venena juvant;*" unless two privatives make one positive and two negatives one affirmative. His difference or "restriction" is worse, if worse may be,—"not contained in the nature of the agent[k]." So the essential difference is a negative also. His liberty must needs be a rare jewel, which consisteth altogether of negatives.

Analogical matter.

He chargeth me, that I "require the matter and the form of the thing in the definition," but "matter is a corporeal substance," and cannot be "part of a definition[l]." Whensoever he meddleth with these things, he doth but shew his weakness. It were better for him to let them alone. I do not say, that *genus* and *materia* are all one; but I say, that genus hath a great analogy with the first matter, and so may be "*materia* 839 *analogica;*" which Porphyry upon the Predicables[m] might have taught him. The first matter is indeterminate to any form, so is the genus to any difference. The matter is susceptible of opposite forms, so is the genus of opposite differences. His reason,—that "matter is corporeal,"—is as silly as his exception, and sheweth what a novice he is in logic. There is intelligible matter, as well as sensible: as three lines are the matter of a triangle, and three propositions of a syllogism.

He telleth us confidently, that "a very absence is as real as a very faculty[n]." If he told it twice so confidently, we could not believe it;—that a privation, which is nothing, and out of all predicaments, should be as real as a quality. Potential qualities ought to be defined by their efficients and proper acts, not by privations. But, saith he, what "if the word defined do signify absence or negation[n]?" Then it cannot

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. p. 288.]

[i] ["Eris mihi magnus Apollo." Virg., Ecl., iii. 104.]

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. p. 288.]

[l] [Ibid.]

[m] [Porph., Εἰσαγωγὴ seu De Predicab.,] c. iii. § 7. ["'Ο ἄνθρωπος ὁ κοινός τε καὶ εἰδικὸς, ἐξ ὕλης μὲν ἀναλόγου συνέστηκε τοῦ γένους, ἐκ μορφῆς δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς."]

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. p. 288.]

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be defined, but only described. And this description must not be by heaping together mere negatives or privations but by mentioning the habits or powers whereof they are privations. What is this to liberty, which is a potential quality?

By his definition a stone is free to ascend.

I urged, that by his definition of liberty "a stone is free to ascend into the air, because there is no outward impediment to hinder it[o]." He answered, that "the stone is stopped by external impediments," otherwise "it would either go upwards eternally, . . or it must stop itself;" but it doth not ascend eternally, and I "have confessed that nothing can move itself;" and therefore he "doubts not" but I "will confess, that nothing can stop itself[p]." First, his memory is very slippery. I never said, that "nothing can move itself;" but, if that will do him any good, I have often said the contrary. Secondly, he doth but flatter himself with vain hopes to think, that I will say "nothing can stop itself." Although there were no resistance in the air, when the caster's force is ceased, the weight of the stone alone is sufficient to stop it. Thirdly, there have been those, who have thought themselves as good philosophers as he, who affirmed that the stone did find no resistance in the air, but was driven forwards by the following air towards the air before it to prevent a vacuum[q]: that is far from resistance. Fourthly, why might not I say as well, that upon his grounds a stone is free to ascend into the air, because there is no outward impediment to hinder it, as he might say, that "the water is free to ascend up the channel?" —"Men never say that the water wanteth liberty to ascend, but power[r]." Yet the water hath greater impediments to ascend up the channel, than the stone hath to ascend in the air. Lastly, this is without all doubt, that though a stone be not capable of moral liberty, yet, if liberty were such a thing as he imagineth, by his definition, a stone hath as much liberty to ascend up the air contrary to its natural appetite, as it hath to descend downwards according to its natural appetite, there being no extrinseeal impediment in the one motion more than in the other, the air being more easily or at least as easily driven upwards as downwards. Yet the

stone stoppeth in its ascent, but not in its descent (except it be accidentally) until it come to the earth. Discourse II.

To the rest of this section he maketh an easy reply,—that I "talk so absurdly of the current of rivers, and of the motion of the seas, and of the weight of water, that it cannot be corrected otherwise than by blotting it all out[s]." He mistaketh but one word. It should have been, it cannot be *answered* by him "otherwise than by blotting it all out."

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Although his paradoxes be contrary to the opinion of the whole world, yet in these five last sections he hath not brought one argument to prove them, but only explained his meaning, as if his own authority were proof sufficient. Now at last he bringeth two silly arguments. The first is this:—"Nothing taketh beginning from itself;" therefore 'the will taketh not beginning from itself, but from something without itself[t].' I answered, by distinguishing a beginning into a beginning of being and a beginning of working or action. No creature taketh its beginning of being from itself, because the being of all creatures is a participated being, derived from the infinite and original being of God, "in Whom we live and move and have our being." But if he understand a beginning of action, it is a gross error to say, that nothing hath a beginning of its own actions or operations within itself[u]. This is all I said, and this I said constantly. Then how uningenuously did he charge me in the last section to have confessed, that "nothing can move itself[x]?" and in this section accuse me of 'contradiction,' for "saying, that when a stone descendeth, the beginning of its motion is intrinseca[y]." Now, to justify himself, he saith, that from this which I did say,—"that finite things cannot be produced by themselves,"—he "can conclude that the act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing[z]." If he could do as much as he saith, yet it was not ingenuously done, to feign that I had confessed all

Beginning of motion from the mover.

[Acts xvii. 28.]

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. p. 289.]

[t] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxx. above p. 168.]

[u] [Defence, Numb. xxx. above pp. 169, 170; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[x] [Above p. 446, note q.]

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p. 292.]

[z] [Ibid.]

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that which he thinketh he can prove, and that I contradicted myself, when I contradicted his conclusions.

The same faculty willeth or nilleth.

But let us see how he goeth about to prove it. "He that hath the faculty of willing, hath the faculty of willing something in particular[a]."—In good time. This looketh not like a demonstration. But let that pass.—"And at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same[b]." How? two faculties, the one of willing, the other of nilling? Hola. He hath but one faculty, and that is a faculty of willing or nilling something in particular, not of willing and nilling. He proceedeth;—"If therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he willeth any thing whatsoever, for the same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it; and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time, which is absurd[c]." I deny his consequence. It doth not follow, that because the agent hath power to will or nill indifferently, therefore he hath power to will and nill contradictorily. He may choose indifferently whether he will write or not, but he cannot choose both to write and not to write at the same time contradictorily. It doth not follow, that because the agent hath power to will or nill indifferently, before he do actually either will or nill, therefore, when he doth will actually, he hath power to nill at the same time. Hath he forgotten "that old foolish rule[d], 'Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is?'" How often must I tell him, that in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity he seeketh to obtrude upon us hypothetical necessity?

[Matter and power indifferent to contrary forms.]

He proceedeth, "It seems the Bishop had forgotten, that matter and power are indifferent to contrary forms and contrary acts[e]." No, *I* had not forgotten it, but he had forgotten it. To say, that the matter is "indifferent to contrary forms" and yet necessitated antecedently to one form, or that power is "indifferent to contrary acts" and yet necessitated antecedently to one act, is a rattling contradiction.

Other causes concur with the will.

He saith, that "it is somewhat besides the matter that determineth to a certain form, and something besides the power that produceth a certain act[f]." I acknowledge it, and

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p. 26.]

[c] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p. 292.]

it is the only piece of sense that is in this section. I made this objection to myself in my Defence, and answered it in these words.—"Yet I do not deny, that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do concur with the will: some outward, as the First Cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility; some inward, as the understanding by directing; so passions and acquired habits. But I deny, that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one, except God alone, Who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases: and where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty[g]." Discourse II.

Where he maketh "the beginning of motion" in a stone thrown upwards and a stone descending downwards to be both "in the stone[h]," it is but a poor trifling homonymy; as the most part of his treatise is. The beginning of motion in a stone ascending is in the stone subjectively but not effectively, because that motion proceedeth not from the form of the stone. But in the descent of the stone, the beginning of motion is both subjectively and effectively in the stone. And what he telleth us of "a former motion in the ambient body, air or water," to make the stone "descend[i]," is needless and frustraneous. Let him but withdraw the pin that holdeth the slate upon the house against its natural inclination, and he shall see presently there needeth no "motion in the ambient body" to make the stone drop down.

He adviseth me to "consider, with what grace" I "can say, that necessary causes do not always produce their effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced[j]." Rather let him "consider, with what grace" he can misrecite that which I say, by leaving out the word "necessary." I said, "necessary causes do not always produce *necessary* effects[k];" and I can say that with better grace than he can deny it. When necessary agents and free agents are conjoint in the production of the same effect, the effect is not Necessary causes do not always act necessarily.

[g] [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p. 170; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p. 292.]
[i] [Ibid.]
[j] [Ibid., p. 293.]
[k] [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p. 170.]

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antecedently necessary. I gave him an instance. Protagoras writ a book against the Gods,—"*De Dis, utrum sint utrum non sint, nihil habeo dicere;*" the senate ordered his 841
book to be burned for it[l]. Although the fire be a necessary agent, yet, because the senators were free agents, the burning of his book was not antecedently necessary.

[The will not a necessary cause of its particular acts.]

Where I say, that "the will is not a necessary cause of what it willeth in particular actions[m]," he inferreth, that there are no "universal actions," and if it be not "a necessary cause of particular actions," it is the necessary cause of no actions[n]; and again, he "would be glad" to have me "set down what voluntary actions (not particular) those are" which are "necessitated[o]." It is scarcely possible for a man to express himself more clearly than I did; but clearly or unclearly, all is one to him, who is disposed to cavil. I did not oppose "particular acts" to "universal acts," but to a collection of all voluntary acts in general, '*qua tales*'—as they are voluntary. It is necessary, that all acts generally which proceed from the will, should be voluntary; and so the will is "a necessary cause of voluntary acts," that is, of the voluntariness of them. But the will is not a necessary cause of the particular acts themselves. As, upon supposition that a man be willing to write, it is necessary that his writing be voluntary, because he willeth it; but put the case without any supposition, and it is not necessary that he should write, or that he should will to write, because it was in his own power whether he would write or not. So the voluntariness of all acts in general, proceeding from the will, is necessary; but the acts themselves were not necessary before the free agent had determined himself, and then but upon supposition.

His excepting against these common expressions, "the will willeth," or, "the will may either will or suspend its acts[p]," is but seeking of a knot in a bulrush. It is all one, whether one say "the will willeth," or, "the man willeth," or, "the will may will or suspend its act," or, "the man may will or suspend his acts." Scaliger saith, that "*volo velle*" is a "proper" speech,—"I will will,"—and "received by the common

[l] [See above p. 158. note h.]
[m] [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p. 170; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[n] [Ibid., p. 293.]
[o] [Ibid., p. 294.]
[p] [Ibid., p. 293.]

consent of all nations[q]." If he had any thing of moment to insert into his Animadversions, he would not make use of such leptologies. "Canting[r]" is not chargeable upon him, who useth common and known terms of art, but upon him who deviseth new terms, as canters do, which die with their inventors. He asketh, "how can he that willeth at the same time suspend his will[s]?" Rather, why doth he insert into his demand "at the same time?" It is enough to liberty, if he that willeth could have suspended his will. All this answer of mine to his second argument was illustrated by the instance of the election of a Pope; to which he opposeth nothing but, "It may be," and, "It doth not follow," and, "I would be glad to know by what arguments he can prove" that "the election" was "not necessitated[t]." I have done it sufficiently all over in this treatise. I am now answering to what he produceth, not 'proving.' If he have any thing to demand, let him go to the Cardinals, and inquire of them, whether they be such fools to keep such a deal of needless stir, if they were antecedently necessitated to choose one certain man Pope and no other.

Discourse II.

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I join these two sections together, because they concern one and the same thing: namely, whether every sufficient cause do necessarily effect whatsoever it is sufficient for; or, which is the same in effect, whether a free agent, when all things are present which are needful to produce an effect, can, nevertheless, not produce it. Which question may be understood two ways, either inclusively or exclusively: either including and comprehending the will of the agent under the notion of sufficiency and among things requisite to the producing of the effect, so as the cause is not reputed to be sufficient, except it have both ability and will to produce the effect, and so as both requisite power and requisite will do

Two sorts of sufficiency.

[q] [See above p. 287. note o.]
[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p. 293.]
[s] [Ibid.]
[t] [Ibid.]

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concur; and then there is no question but the effect will infallibly follow;—"*positâ causâ ponitur effectus*;"—or else it may be understood exclusively, not comprehending the will under the notion of sufficiency, or not reckoning it among the necessary requisites to the production of the effect, so as the agent is supposed to have power and ability to produce the effect, but no will; and then it is as infallibly true on the other side, that the effect cannot be produced. Thus far this question is a mere logomachy or contention about words, without any real difference. And T. H. doth but abuse his readers, to keep a jangling and a stir about nothing. But in truth "the water stoppeth" not here. If he should speak to the purpose, he should leave 842
these shallows. If the will of the free agent be included under the notion of sufficiency, and comprehended among those things which are requisite to the production of the effect, so as both sufficient ability and sufficient will are required to the making a sufficient cause, then it cometh to be considered, in the second place, whether the will in things external be (under God) in the power and disposition of the free agent himself, which is the common opinion of all men, who understand themselves; and then the production of the effect is only necessary hypothetically, or upon supposition that the free agent is willing; or else, whether the will of the free agent be not in his own power and disposition, but determined antecedently by extrinsecal causes, which is the paradoxical opinion of T. H.; and then the production of the effect is absolutely and antecedently necessary. So still the question is where it was, and all his bustling about "sufficiency" and "efficiency" and "deficiency[u]" is but labour in vain. If he would have spoken any thing at all to the purpose, he should have attempted to prove, that every sufficient cause (excluding the will), that is, every cause which hath sufficient power and ability, doth necessarily produce whatsoever it is able to produce, though the agent be unwilling to produce it; or that the will of the agent is not in his own power and disposition. We expect proofs, not words. But this he could not do; for he himself, in this very treatise, hath several times distinguished between liberty and power: telling us, that a

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. pp. 296, 297.]

"sick man" hath "liberty to go," but "wanteth power;" and that "a man who is bound" hath "power" to go, but "wanteth liberty[x]." If he that is bound hath "power to go," then he hath sufficient power to go; for unsufficient power cannot produce the effect: and so, by his own confession, an agent may have sufficient power, and yet cannot necessarily nor yet possibly produce the effect.

[A sufficient cause not a necessary cause.]

I urged, that "God is sufficient to produce many worlds, but He doth not produce them;" therefore a sufficient cause doth not necessarily produce all those effects which it is sufficient to produce[y]. He answereth, that "the meaning" is, "that God is sufficient to produce them if He will[z]." Doth he not see, that it followeth inevitably from hence, that there may be a sufficient cause without will? Doth he not see likewise from hence plainly, that for those things which are within the power of man, he is "sufficient" also "to produce them if he will?" So still he would obtrude a necessity of "supposition" —"if a man will"—for an absolute necessity. That which is but necessary conditionally—"if a man will"—is not necessary absolutely. And he confesseth, that "without this supposition—'if he will'—a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action[a]."

I added other instances; as this, that the Passion of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind, and so is acknowledged by all Christians, yet all mankind shall not be saved by virtue of His Passion, therefore there may be a sufficient cause without production of the effect[b]. This is the language of Holy Scripture;—"Which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have *sufficient* to finish it[c]?" that is, as our Saviour expoundeth Himself in the next verse, whether he be "*able* to finish it." So St. Paul saith, "Who is *sufficient* for these things?" that is, who is *able* for these things? When God saith, "What could I have done more for My vineyard, that I have not done?"—God had given them "sufficient" means, and could

Luke xiv. 28.

2 Cor. ii. 16.

Isai. v. 4.

[x] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxix. above p. 167; and Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 211.]

[y] [Defence, Numb. xxxi. above p. 172; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. p. 297.]

[a] [Ibid.]

[b] [Defence, Numb. xxxi. above p. 172.]

[c] ["Sufficient" is added in the English Version to complete the sense:—"εἰ ἔχει τὰ πρὸς ἀπαρτισμόν."]

ave given them more, if they had been more capable; but because they were wanting to themselves, these sufficient means were not efficacious. "I looked for grapes," saith God; how could God "look for grapes," if He had not given them sufficient means to bring forth grapes? yet these sufficient means were not efficacious.

These things being premised, do answer whatsoever he saith; as this, "The Bishop thinks two horses may be sufficient to draw a coach, though they will not draw[d]," &c. I say they "may be sufficient" in point of power and ability, "though they will not draw." Many men have sufficient power to do what they will not do. And if the production of the effect do depend upon their wills, or upon their contingent and uncertain endeavours, or if their sufficiency be but conditional, as he maketh it,—"if they be not lame or resty[e]," —then the production of the effect is free or contingent, and cannot be antecedently necessary. For otherwise all these conditions and suppositions are vain.

Where he chargeth me to say, that "the cause of a monster is unsufficient to produce a monster[f]," he doth me wrong, and 843
himself more. I never said any such thing. I hope I may have leave to speak to him in his own words:—"I must take it for an untruth, until he cite the place[g]," where I have said so. I have said, and I do say, that the cause of a monster was unsufficient to produce a man, which nature and the free agent intended, but it was sufficient to produce a monster, otherwise a monster had not been produced. When an agent doth not produce what he and nature intend, but produceth a monster instead of a man, it is proof enough of his insufficiency to produce what he should, and would have produced, if he could. Where he addeth,—that "that which is sufficient to produce a monster, is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a man, no more than that which is sufficient to produce a man is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a monster[h]"—is even as good sense, as if a man should say, he who hath skill sufficient to hit the white, is insufficient to miss the white.

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. p. 296.]

[e] [Ibid., p. 297.]

[g] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxii. p. 301.]

[h] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. p. 297.]

He pretendeth, that *sensus divisus* and *compositus* "is non-sense[l]" (though they be logical terms of art); and what I say of "the power of the will to forbear willing," or "the dominion of the will over its own acts," or "the power of the will *in actu primo*[k]," he saith "are as wild words as ever were spoken within the walls of Bedlam[l];" though they be as sad truths as the founders of Bedlam themselves could have uttered, and the authors who used them the greatest wits of the world, and so many that ten Bedlams could not hold them. But it may be he would have the scene changed, and have the wisest sort of men thrust into Bedlam, that he might vent his paradoxes more freely. So Festus accused Saint Paul of madness,—"Paul, Paul, much learning hath made thee mad." [Acts xxvi. 24.] Discourse II. [T. H.'s mistakes.]

In the definition of a free agent,—"which, when all things needful to the production of the effect are present, can nevertheless not produce it[m]"—they understood all things needful in point of ability, not will.

He telleth us gravely, that "act and power differ in nothing but in this, that the former signifieth the time present, the latter the time to come[n]." As if he should tell us, that the cause and the effect differ nothing, but that the effect signifieth the time present, and the cause the time to come.

Lastly, he saith, that except I shew him "the place where" he "shuffled out effects producible and thrust into their place effects produced," he will "take it for an untruth[o]." To content him, I shall do it readily, without searching far for it. My words were these;—"The question is, whether effects producible be free from necessity; he shuffles out 'effects producible,' and thrusts in their places 'effects produced[p].'" Now, that he doth this, I prove out of his own words in the section preceding;—"Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily; for whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been[q]." Let the reader judge, if he have not here

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. p. 297.]
[k] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxii. p. 301.]
[l] [Ibid.]
[m] [See above p. 173. note y.]
[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxii. p. 301.]
[o] [Ibid.]
[p] [Defence, Numb. xxxii. above p. 175; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[q] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxi. above p. 171.]

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shuffled "effects producible" out of the question, and thrust into their places "effects produced." The question is, whether effects producible be necessarily produced; he concludeth, in the place of the contradictory, that effects actually produced are necessary.

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Our conceptions are not the touchstone of truth.

He saith, that "to define what spontaneity, deliberation, will, propension, appetite, a free agent, and liberty, is, and to prove that they are well defined, there can be no other proof offered but every man's own experience and memory, what he meaneth by such words[r]." I do readily believe all this to be true in order to his own opinions;—that there neither is nor can be any proof of them but imagination. But his reason was shot at random;—"For definitions, being the beginning of all demonstration, cannot themselves be demonstrated, that is, proved to another man[s]." Doth he take all his particular imaginations to be so many definitions or demonstrations? He hath one conception of spontaneity, of deliberation, of a free agent, of liberty; I have another. My conception doth not prove my opinion to be true, nor his conception prove his opinion to be true; but our conceptions being contrary, it proveth either his, or mine, or both, to be false. Truth is a conformity or congruity of the conceptions of the mind with the things themselves, which are without the mind, and of the exterior speech as the sign, with the things and conceptions as the things signified. So there is a threefold truth: the first is objective, in the things themselves; the second is conformative, in the conceptions of the mind; the third is signative or significative, in speech or writing. It is a good proceeding, to prove the truth of the inward conceptions of the mind from their conformity with the things themselves; but it is vain and ridiculous, to prove the truth of things from their agreement with the conceptions of my mind or his mind. The clocks may differ, but the course of the sun is certain. A man's words may not agree

[r] [Qu. Animadv. upon Numb. [s] [Ibid.]

with his thoughts, nor his thoughts agree with the things themselves. DISCOURSE II.

But I commend his prudence in this, and in this only, that he hath chosen out a way of proof that cannot be confuted without his own consent, because no man knoweth another man's inward conceptions but himself. And the better to secure himself, he maketh his English reader judge of Latin words, and his ignorant readers judge of words of art. These are the fittest judges for his purpose. But what if the terms be obscure? He answereth, "If the words be unusual," the way must be "to make the definition" of "their signification" by "mutual consent[t]." What "mutual consent?" The signification of these words was settled by universal consent and custom; and must they be unsettled again, to satisfy the humour of every odd paradoxical person, who could find no way to get himself reputation but by blundering all things? He telleth us, that "the Schoolmen use not to argue by rule, but as fencers use to handle weapons, by quickness of the hand and eye[u]." The poor Schoolmen cannot rest quietly in their graves for him, but he is still persecuting their ashes, because they durst presume to soar a pitch above his capacity. The Schoolmen were the most exact observers of rules in the whole world, as if they had been composed altogether of rules. But they observed not his rule,—that whatsoever any man imagineth a word to be, that it is. Much good may his Lesbian rule do him, which he may bend this way or that way at his pleasure. It is just such another rule as the parish-clerk's rule of the time, who preferred the clock before a dial, because he set it according to his own imagination.

He asketh me (for he is much better at making knots than loosing them), "what" I "will answer, if" he "shall ask" me how I "will judge of the causes of things, whereof" I "have no idea or conception in" mine "own mind[x]?" As if there were no mean, but either a man must want all inward notions and conceptions, or else he must make his own imaginations to be the touchstone of truth. "*Nulla lux*" and

[t] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. pp. 306, 307.]

[u] [Ibid., p. 307.]

[x] [Ibid.]

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"*nimia lux*"—no light and too much light—are both enemies to the sight; so, to take away all inward conceptions, and to ground the true being and nature of things upon our fallible conceptions, are both enemies to the truth.

Albeit he "dare" say (as he is bold enough, whilst the danger is but in words), that if one should "ask an ordinary person" whether our antipodes should have their heads upwards or downwards, they would "tell him as significantly as any scholar," that their heads were upwards, because they are "towards heaven;" and that when they say there is nobody in that room, they mean no more but "there is nobody that can be seen;" or when they say that vessel is "empty," they do apprehend it to be full of air[y]; yet neither I, nor these "ordinary persons" themselves, do believe him. How should they apprehend such things rightly, until they be better informed both of the figure of the earth, and the nature of the air, than they are by their senses? He saith, "the question is not, whether such and such tenets be true, but whether such and such words can be well defined without thinking on the things they signify[z]." I should be glad to find him once stating of a question truly. The question is not, "whether such and such words can be well defined without thinking on the things they signify;" but whether every thought or every imagination of every odd fantastic person, or of the common people, be a right determination of the true sense and signification of every word. They who do not understand the distinct natures of things signified, cannot understand the right significations of words, which are but signs of things.

"Right discipline," or learning and good instruction, doth not only enable a man to "reason truly in more numerous or various matters[a]," but to reason more truly and exactly in all matters; yea, even in those things which we have learned from our own "senses and memories[b]." As I shewed him before in the instance of the sun; which sense judgeth to be no greater than a ball, but learning and reason do convince us, that it is many times greater than the globe of the earth. If

[y] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 307.]
[z] [Ibid.]
[a] [Ibid., p. 308.]
[b] [In the Defence, T. II. Numb. xxxiii. above p. 175.]

he will not admit this to be "matter of fact[c]," let him try if he can persuade us, that it is matter of right. A man's "sense and memory" doth teach him, that the lightning is long done before the thunderclap begin; but being better instructed, we know it to be otherwise. In vain were so many
845 rules and precepts in logic, if they did not teach us to reason better, as well as to "reason in more numerous and various matters."

He inveigheth against impostors, as bad "masters, deceivers or deceived, that teach for truth all that hath been dictated to them by their own interest[d];" and doth not see, or will not see, that no man is so much concerned in this reprehension as himself, who without these paradoxes had continued still a cypher and signified nothing. If there be any "changelings," it is no other than himself, not by any "enchantment of words not understood[e]," but by his own overweening and vain-glorious conceits. He reciteth it as a saying of mine, that "matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory but by arguments[f]." I never said so; and 'until he produce my words,' I must put it into the catalogue of his "untruths[g]." Neither did I, nor any Schoolman, ever say, that "the testimony of a witness is the only verifier of matter of fact," or that it doth "not consist in sense and memory," or that it doth "consist in arguments and syllogisms[h]." These are his own collections and consequences, which hang together like ropes of sand.

He asketh, "how can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he speaks ought to signify, when he speaks sincerely, any thing else but that which he himself meaneth by them[i]?" Right, he cannot "be brought to think" that they do signify otherwise than they do signify. But although he meant never so sincerely, he may be "brought to think," that the signification by him used was improper, and that which he said according to the right sense of the words was untrue. As a man might say, sincerely enough, that water is moister or more humid than air, by the seeming warrant of his

[c] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 308; and in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxiii. above p. 175.]
[d] [Ibid.]
[e] [Ibid.]
[f] [Ibid.]
[g] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxii. p. 301.]
[h] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 308.]
[i] [Ibid.]

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sense; and yet, upon better instruction, reform his judgment, and acknowledge that then he did not understand truly what moist or humid did signify.

To that which I urged,—that "to love any thing and to think it good" is not the same thing[k],—he answereth no more but this, that he "doth not think" so[l]; as if he were some oracle of truth, or some great lawyer declaring his opinion to his poor ignorant clients. Let him reserve his thoughts for his credulous scholars.

His gross mistakes about eternity.

His next mistake is much worse. This was but in a word, but that is in a thing, eternity. He would have his reader believe, that somebody holdeth, that "eternity is this present instant of time," and that "the next instant" is eternity after this, "and consequently that there are as many eternities as there be instants in time[m]." He doth but dream waking. Surely never any man since the beginning of the world did hold any part of this;—that eternity should be a part of time. Time is but the measure of motion, eternity was before motion. Time succeeding doth repair the losses of time passing; but God, Who is infinite, can acquire nothing, can lose nothing. Suppose a body to be infinite actually, it could have no middle, no extremities, but every point of it should be a centre. So, in the infinite eternity of God, there can be no extremities of past or to come, but a present interminable possession of life. His ignorance is his best plea. Let him learn to cite his adversary's sayings more ingenuously, or hold his peace for ever, and keep his paradoxes to himself; and not shew himself like the Athenians, who being well beaten by the Cretans, and having no other way to revenge themselves, invented feigned stories of bulls and minotaurs.

[Of spontaneity.]

Being taken tripping in an apparent contradiction about spontaneity, making it to be considerate proceeding, and "inconsiderate proceeding or nothing[n]," he hath no more mind to meddle with it, but quitteth his hands of it in these terms;—it is no "English," but "let it signify what it will, provided it be intelligible, it would make against" me[o]. Had not this

[k] [Defence, Numb. xxxiii. above p. 177; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 308.]

[m] [Ibid.]

[n] [See above, pp. 429, 430.]

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 309.]

man need to have credulous readers, who, before he knoweth what the word signifieth, knoweth by instinct that it "would make against" me? Just like that mountebank, who having made a long oration to his hearers of the rare virtues of a feather, which he affirmed to have dropt from the wing of Michael the Archangel; and the feather being stolen from under his sleeve out of drollery, and a cinder put in the place of it, to try his humour, he went on confidently with his discourse; telling them, that though it was not the feather which he had mentioned, yet it was one of the coals which St. Lawrence was broiled with, and had all those virtues which he had formerly ascribed to the feather. So, whether spontaneity be a feather or a coal, it hath still the same
846 virtue; and "if it be any thing, it would make against" me. Discourse II.

If it be "all one" to consider of the fittest means to obtain a desired end or object, and "consider of the good and evil sequels of an action to come[p]," why did he change the definition generally received, to make a show of difference where there is none by his own account?

I was willing to have brought him to his right wits, that he might have acknowledged himself a reasonable man: but seeing he is so peremptory, that all "the reason and understanding" which man hath, is but "imagination[q];" and weighing his ground,—that he "finds it so" in himself, "by considering" his own thoughts and "ratiocinations[r];" and (which worketh with me more than all his confidence) finding his writings more full of fantasy than of judgment; I begin to relent, and am contented to come to an accord with him, that he, and such as he can gain to be of his mind, shall have the privilege of fantastics, provided that other men may still retain their old reason. Moreover, I confess, that when I left other "business" to examine his writings, I did meet with greater "trifles[s]" than I did before.

I would gladly save his credit, but he plungeth himself into so many gross errors, that "*ipsa si cupiat salus servare, prorsus non potest.*" Now he telleth us, that "deliberation is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed[t];" as What is his deliberation.

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 309.]
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [Ibid.]
[s] [Ibid.—"When he is about those trifles he calleth business," &c.]
[t] [Ibid., p. 310.]

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if deliberation was but the measuring of a rod by inches with his thumbs "alternatively,"—he wills, he wills not, he wills, he wills not, &c.,—and as the last thumb-breadth happeneth, so the agent either willeth or nilleth. Before, he made but one will; now he maketh I know not how many alternate wills. Before, he made deliberation to be a "consideration of the good or evil sequels of an action." The will is an appetite, not a "consideration." The will is blind, and cannot "consider." Wise men use to look before they leap, and "consider" *before* they "will." But he may have the privilege to have his will stand for his reason;—"*Stat pro ratione voluntas*[u]." So, whilst the bias of his bowl is changing from the one side to the other alternatively by extrinsecal causes, the bowl is deliberating.

Man is free to will, or he is not free to do.

I confess, I "wondered" at his definition of a free agent,—"He that can do if he will, and forbear if he will[x]:" not that I did not foresee what paradoxical sense he would give it, but why he should retain the ancient terms. I remember well his distinction between freedom to do if a man will and forbear to do if he will, and freedom to will if he will and to nill if he will; and have made bold now and then to represent, what a vain, false, useless, contradictory distinction it is: and I believe it lieth at the last gasp. But I might have saved my labour. I used but one short argument in this place;—"Either the agent can will and forbear to will, or he cannot do and forbear to do[y];"—and it driveth him into a contradiction,—"There is no doubt, a man can will one thing or other, and forbear to will it[z]." If a man can will and forbear to will the same thing, then he can will if he will and forbear if he will. Where he maketh the state of the question to be, whether a man "to-day can choose to-morrow's will[a]," either he feigneth or mistaketh grossly. I will never trust him with stating of questions, or citing of testimonies.

He maketh a stone as free to ascend as descend.

Although it be his turn now to prove, and mine to defend myself and my cause from his objections, yet he is still calling for proofs; and (which is worse) would have me to prove

[u] [Juv., vi. 223.—"*Sit* pro ratione," &c.]

[x] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxiii; above p. 175.]

[y] [Defence, Numb. xxxiii. above p. 178; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 310.]

[a] [Ibid.]

negatives, when he himself cannot prove affirmatives:— "How doth it follow" (saith he), "that a stone is as free to ascend as descend, unless he prove there is no outward impediment to its ascent? which cannot be proved, for the contrary is true;" or "how proveth he, that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of the loadstone, which placeth itself towards the north, from turning [to] the south[b]?" First, for the stone, the case is clear: there is no other extrinsecal impediment to the stone ascending or descending, but the medium through which it passeth; now the medium is supposed to be the same, that is, the air equally disposed; the air is as easily driven upwards as downwards; and therefore, though the air give some impediment to the motion upwards, yet it giveth the same impediment at least to the motion downwards; and therefore, the impediment being as vincible upwards as downwards, if the cause of motion were the same, and the presence or absence of extrinsecal impediments being the same, it followeth clearly, upon his grounds, that the stone is as free to ascend as descend. Next, for the loadstone, I prove, that there is no extrinsecal
847 impediment which holdeth it from turning to the south, by sense and reason, both mine own and all other men's, by the common consent of the world, and by his silence, who is not able to pretend any impediment that is probable, without the stone, except it be in some other body far distant, which will render the difficulty the same.

A hawk, saith he, is free to fly when her wings are plucked.

His next passage is ridiculous:—A hawk wants "liberty to fly when her wings are tied," but it is "absurd to say, she wants liberty to fly when her wings are plucked[c]." So she wanted no liberty to fly when she was naked and newly hatched. So he himself wanteth no liberty to fly from hence to China. He saith, "Men that speak English use to say, when her wings are plucked, that she cannot fly[d]." So they "use to say" likewise, "when her wings are tied." He demandeth, whether it be not "proper language, to say a bird or a beast are set at liberty from the cage, wherein they were imprisoned[e]?" What it may be at another time, when men

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 311.]
[c] [Ibid.]
[d] [Ibid.]
[e] [Ibid.]

PART III. are discoursing upon another subject, is not material at this time; and as to this subject which we are about, it is most impertinent and "improper." He himself, as partial as he is, cannot think, that this liberty is any thing to that moral liberty which renders a man capable of reward or punishment; any more than a tailor's measure is to the measure of motion.

A beginning of being and acting.

I said, and say again, that nothing can "begin to be without a cause," and that "nothing can cause itself:" yet I say, many things do "begin to act of themselves[f]." This (he saith) is to "contradict" myself, because I make "the action" to "begin without a cause[g]." This is not the first time that he hath noted this for a 'contradiction.' I shall sooner salve the contradiction, than he save his credit. As if the agent and the action were the same thing. Or as if the agent was not the cause of the action. Or as if there were any consequence in this,—the agent cannot begin to be of himself, therefore he cannot begin to act of himself,—or,—he cannot cause himself, therefore he cannot cause his action. Nothing can cause itself; but that which is caused by one thing, may cause another. Whereas he addeth, that it "hath been proved" formerly, that every "sufficient cause" is a "necessary" cause, and that [it] is but "jargon" to say "free causes determine themselves[h]," it is but a puff of his vain-glorious humour. He hath made nothing to appear but his own ignorance and mistakes.

His answer to some demands.

In the latter end of this section, I made bold to make some serious demands to Mr. Hobbes, which did not at all reflect upon him in particular, but at those "natural notions" which are common to all mankind.

The first demand was, "whether he doth not find by experience that he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would[i]," &c. He answereth, Yes, if he would; but he maketh it impossible for him to have had any other will[k]. So he doth as good as tell us, that he might have done them upon an impossible condition or supposition; as he himself

[f] [Defence, Numb. xxxiii. above p. 179; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 312.]
[h] [Ibid.]
[i] [Defence, Numb. xxxiii. above p. 180; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 312.]

might have flown over sea if he had had a pair of wings. This is a contradiction indeed, implied; first, to say he might have done otherwise, and then to add an impossible condition which makes his proposition negative. I am sure it is not fairly done to avoid the scope and meaning of the demand.

The second question was, "whether he do not some things out of mere animosity and will without regard to the direction of right reason[k]," &c. He answereth, "this question was in vain, unless" I "thought" myself his "confessor[l]." No, it is enough, I desire not to intrude into his secrets.

My third demand (as he saith) was, whether he "writ not this defence of necessity against liberty, only to shew that" he "will have a dominion over" his "own actions[m]." He answereth, "No, but to shew that" he "had no dominion over" his "will, and this at" my "request[n]." My request was, that what he did upon this subject, should rather be in writing than by word of mouth[o]. It seemeth, that I had the dominion over his will. So might I come to be questioned for all his paradoxes. The truth is, this was no distinct question, but a corollary of the second question.

My third demand was, "whether he be not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires; and why he is angry with them (if they be necessitated to do what they do), any more than he is angry with a sharp winter[p]," &c. This is wholly omitted by him.

The last demand was, "whether he do not sometimes blame himself and say, O what a fool was I, to do thus or thus; or
848 wish to himself, O that I had been wise:" and why he doth this, "if he were irresistibly necessitated to do all things that he doth; he might as well have wished, O that I had not breathed, or, O what a fool was I to grow old[q]." To this he answereth nothing but, "subtle questions, and full of Episcopal gravity;" and that he "thinks, in this question," I "will appear the greater fool[r];" supposing that I meant to put the fool upon him, which I profess myself to be innocent

[k] [Defence, Numb. xxxii. above p. 180; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p. 312.]
[m] [Ibid.—from the Defence, ibid.]
[n] [Ibid.]
[o] [See Qu., Occas. of Controv., p. 2: and the Defence, Numb. xxxvii. above p. 192; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[p] [Defence, Numb. xxxiii. above p. 180.]
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. pp. 312, 313.]

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of; as he might have found by these words inserted among the questions,—which "wise men find in themselves sometimes[s]." Though I jest sometimes with his cause, or his arguments, I do not meddle with his person; further than to condemn his vain-glorious presumption, to arrogate so much to himself. Though I have not half so great an opinion of him as he hath of himself, yet I wish his humility were answerable to his wit. Thus, of four questions, he hath quite omitted one, neglected another, refused to answer a third, and answered the fourth contrary to the scope of the question.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;— NUMBER XXXIV. &c.

[T. H.'s boasts and blunders.]

His bragging humour will not leave him; he still forgetteth Epictetus his sheep[t]. He saith, "When" I "shall have read over his Animadversions, Numb. xxxi," I "will think otherwise, whatsoever" I "will confess[u]." "*Male ominatis parcito verbis*[v]." I should sooner turn Manichee, and make two Gods, one of good, the other of evil, than to make the true God to be the cause of all evil. But there is no danger either of the one or of the other. I have "read over his Animadversions, Numb. xxxi;" I have weighed them; and I profess I find nothing in them worthy of a divine, or a philosopher, or an ingenuous person, who made a sad inquisition after truth; nor any thing that doth approach within a German mile of the cause in controversy. And so I leave him to the Castigations.

That "his two instances, of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow, are impertinent[x]," appeareth by these two reasons: first, the question is of free actions, these two instances are of contingent actions; secondly, the question is of antecedent necessity, these instances are of a hypothetical necessity. And though I used the beauty of the world as a medium to

[s] [Defence, Numb. xxxiii. above p. 180; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[t] [Enchirid., c. xlvi. § 2. p. 222. ed. Schweig. See above in the Defence, Numb. ii. p. 26. note c; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 320.]

[v] [Horat., Carm., III. xiv. 11, 12.]

[x] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 181; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

prove liberty[y], wherein contingency is involved, yet this doth not warrant him to give over the principal question, and to start and pursue new questions at his pleasure. But let him be of good comfort; be they pertinent or impertinent, they shall not be neglected. Discourse II.

Because I would not blunder as he doth, I distinguished actions into four sorts: first, the actions of free agents; secondly, the actions of free and natural agents mixed; thirdly, the actions of brute beasts; fourthly, the actions of natural inanimate causes[z]. Of these four sorts, the first only concerneth the question, and he according to his custom quite omitteth it; yet it was of more moment and weight than all he saith in this section put together. "A man proportioneth his time each day, and allotteth so much to his devotions, so much to his study, so much to his diet, so much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visit, so much to his rest; he that will seek for I know not what necessary causes of all this without himself (except that good God, Who hath given him a reasonable soul), may as well seek for a necessary cause of the Egyptian pyramids among the crocodiles of Nilus[a]." This distinction of a man's time is an act of dominion, done on purpose to maintain his dominion over his actions against the encroachments of sensual delights. [Four sorts of actions.]

He saith here plainly, that he "knoweth no action that proceedeth from the liberty of man's will[b];" and again, "A man's will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing[c]." Yet he hath often told us, that a man is free to do if he will, and not to do if he will[d]. If no action proceed from the liberty of the will, then how is a man free to do if he will? Before, he told us, "He is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear it if he have the will to forbear it[e]." If the liberty of the will be nothing, then this supposition—"If he have the will"—is nothing but an impossibility. And here, to all that I have said formerly against that frivolous distinction, I shall add an undoubted rule both 1. [The acts of free agents.]—Free to do if he will, yet not free to will, is against law and logic.

[y] [Defence, Numb. xvi. above p. 109; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[z] [Ibid., pp. 181—183.]
[a] [Ibid., p. 182.]
[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 321.]
[c] [Ibid.]
[d] [See above p. 305, note k.]
[e] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. iii. [above p. 27.]

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in law and logic;—"A conditional proposition, having an impossible condition annexed to it, is equipollent to a simple negative." He who is "free to write if he will," if it be impossible for him to will, is not free to write at all, no more than he is free to will. But this castle in the air hath been beaten down often enough about his ears.

Where I say, that "contingent actions do proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes[f]," my intention was not to exclude contingent determination, but necessary determination according to an antecedent necessity; which he hath been so far from proving unanswerably, that he hath as good as yielded the cause, in his case of ambs-ace, by making the necessity to be only upon supposition[g]. 849

2. [Concerning mixed actions.]—A necessary effect requires all necessary causes.

Concerning mixed actions, partly free and partly necessary, he saith, that "for proof of them," I "instance in a tile falling from a house, which breaketh a man's head[h]." How often must I tell him, that I am not now 'proving,' but answering that which he produceth? He may find "proofs" enough to content him, or rather to discontent him, in twelve sections together, from the fifth to the eighteenth[i]; and upon the by, throughout the whole book. He who proveth, that election is always *inter plura* and cannot consist with antecedent determination to one, proveth, that that man who did elect or choose to walk in that street, at that very time when the stone fell, though he knew not of it, was not antecedently necessitated to walk there; and if any one of all those causes, which concur to the production of an effect, be not antecedently necessary, then the effect is not antecedently necessary; for no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause.

He saith, I "should have proved, that such contingent actions are not antecedently necessary by a concurrence of natural causes, though a little before" I "granted they are[j]." First, he doth me wrong, I never granted it, either before or after. It is a foul fault in him to mistake himself or his adversary so often. Secondly, it is altogether improper and

[f] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 181; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb. iii. [p. 37:—See above pp. 270, 271.]

[h] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 322; from Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 182.]

[i] [Above pp. 37—114.]

[j] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 322.]

impertinent to our present controversy. Let him remember what he himself said;—"If they" (the instances of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow) "be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of man's will, he doth impertinently to meddle with them[k]." Not so neither, by his leave. Though I refuse to prove them formally or write volumes about them, yet I do not refuse to answer any thing which he doth or can produce. Such is his argument which followeth immediately;—"Whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence, though contingent concurrence[l]." He addeth, that though I "perceive" it not, "concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one[m]." It may be in his dialect, which differs from the received dialect of all scholars, but not in the dialect of wiser and learneder men. To his argument (pardoning his confounding of natural and voluntary causes), I answer, that if he speak of the immediate adequate cause as it is a cause in act, without doubt he saith truth. "*Causâ proximâ in actu positâ, impossibile est non sequi effectum.*" But he told us of a necessary connexion of all causes from eternity; and if he make not this good, he saith nothing. If he intend it in this sense, I deny his assertion,—that "whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determined" from eternity: as, for instance, that the generation of a monster, which nature or the agent never intended, was necessary from eternity, or necessary before the contingence was determined.

DISCOURSE II.

3. [The individual acts of brute beasts not antecedently necessitated.]

Concerning the individual actions of brute beasts, that they should be necessitated to every act they do from eternity;—as the bee (for example), how often she shall hum in a day, and how often she shall fly abroad to gather thyme, and whither, and how many flowers precisely she must suck and no more, and such like acts;—I had reason to say, "I see no ground for it[n]." Yet the least of all these acts is known to God, and subject to His disposition. He telleth us, that he "hath pointed out the ground in the former discourse[o]."

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 321.]

[l] [Ibid., p. 322.—"though, *as he calls it*, contingent concurrence."]

[m] [Ibid.]

[n] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 182; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 322.]

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If he have, it is as the blind senator (of whom I told him formerly) pointed the wrong way[p]. All his intimations have received their answers. But whereas I made an objection to myself,—"Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father,"—he doth not deal clearly, to urge mine own objection and conceal my answer:—"He doth not say, 'which your Father casteth not down,'" or, 'which your Father doth not necessitate to fall,' but "without your Father;" that is, without your Father's knowledge, without His protection, "without the influence of His power, or, which is exempted from your Father's disposition[q]."

Matt. x. 29.

4. [The natural acts of inanimate creatures necessary.]

The last sort of actions are the natural actions of inanimate creatures; which have not the least pretence to liberty, or so much as spontaneity; and therefore were declined by me as impertinent to this question[r]. Out of my words concerning these, he argueth thus;—"If there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt but that all things happen necessarily;" but there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning[s]. 850

First, I deny his consequence; and by it, he (who is so busy to "take" other men's "heights in logic[t]," wherein he never meddled yet but he was baffled) may have his own "height taken" by them that are so disposed. There is scarce a freshman in the University, but could have taught him the difference between "*causa efficiens physica*," and "*voluntaria*;" the one acting by necessity of nature, the other freely according to deliberation. The former cannot defer nor moderate its act, nor act opposite actions indifferently; but the latter can. So, though a necessary connexion of all natural causes were supposed, yet it inferreth not a necessary connexion of all voluntary causes.

Secondly, I deny his assumption,—that there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning;—for proof whereof he produceth nothing, nor is able to pro-

[p] [Juv., Sat., iv. 119—121. See above, Answer to Relat. of the Occas. of the Controversy, p. 218.]

[q] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above pp. 182, 183; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[r] [Ibid., p. 183.]

[s] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 323.]

[t] [Ibid., p. 324.]

duce any thing. All he saith he allegeth out of me,—that it deserveth "further examination[u];" and from thence, according to his wild roving "imaginations," he draweth consequences from the staff to the corner, that have not the least grain of salt or weight in them. As these,—"Hitherto he knows not whether it be true or no, and consequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor hath he shewed any thing to.. prove that elective actions are not necessitated[v]." Thus his pen runneth over without rhyme or reason. He that would learn to build castles in the air, had best be his apprentice. The truth is, I was not willing to go out of mine own profession, and therefore desired to hold myself to the question of liberty, without meddling with contingency; but yet, with the same reservation that the Romans had in their military discipline, "*nec sequi nec fugere*[x]," not to seek other questions, nor yet to shun them if they were put upon me. Discourse II.

His instance of ambs-ace.

And now we are come to his two famous instances, of casting ambs-ace, and raining or not raining to-morrow. I said, that I had already "answered" what he produceth to prove "all sufficient causes" to be "necessary causes[y]." Now, saith he, "it seemeth, that distrusting his" former "answer he answereth again[z]." O memory! he did not urge them in that place, neither did I answer them at all in that place. But though he had urged them and I answered them there, yet he repeating them or enforcing them here, would he not have me to answer him? It is true, that in another section, upon the by, he hath been gravelled about his ambs-ace[a]; and therefore he treadeth tenderly still upon that foot.

He saith, I "bring no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown, but this, that" the caster did "not deliberate[b]." By his leave, it is not truly said. I shewed undeniably, that the necessity upon which he buildeth is only hypothetical: I enumerated all the causes which were, or could be recited, to make the necessity; as, the dice, the

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 323: from the Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 183; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[v] [Qu., ibid.]

[x] [Vegetius, De Re Militari, lib. ii. c. 17.]

[y] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 181; and see also] Numbers xxxi, xxxii. [pp. 171—175: Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[z] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 323.]

[a] [Defence,] Numb. iii. [above pp. 29, 30.]

[b] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 323.]

posture of the caster's hand, the measure of the force, the posture of the table, &c.; and shewed clearly, that there was not the least grain of antecedent necessity in any of them[c]: which he is not able to answer, and therefore he doth well to be silent. But if I had urged nothing else, this alone had been sufficient to prove the caster a free agent from his own principles. A "free" agent (saith he) "is he that hath not done deliberating[d]." He who never began to deliberate, "hath not done deliberating." There can be no necessity imaginable, why the caster should throw these dice rather than those other, or cast into this table rather than that, or use so much force and no more, but the caster's will, or mere chance. The caster never deliberated, nor so much as thought, of any one of these things. And therefore it is undeniably apparent, that there was no necessity of casting ambs-ace but only upon supposition; which is far enough from antecedent necessity.

But he pleadeth further, that "from our ignorance of the particular causes, that concurring make the necessity," I "infer that there was no such necessity at all; which is that indeed which hath deceived" me, "and all other men, in this question[e]." Whose fault was it then, first to make this an instance, and then to plead "ignorance?" Before, he was bold to reckon up 851
all the causes of the antecedent necessity of this cast; and now, when he is convinced that it is but a necessity upon supposition, he is fain to plead "ignorance." He who will not suffer the loadstone to enjoy its attractive virtue without finding a reason for it in a fiddle-string[f] (as Scoggin sought for the hare under the leads, as well where she was not as where she was), is glad to plead ignorance about the necessary causes of ambs-ace. Whereas my reasons did evince, not only that the causes are unknown, but that there are no such causes antecedently necessitating that cast. Thus, if any causes did necessitate ambs-ace antecedently, it was either the caster,—but he thought not of it;—or the dice,—but they are square, no more inclinable to one cast than another; —or the posture of the table,—but the caster might have

[c] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. [f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv.

thrown into the other table;—or the posture of the hand,—but that was by chance;—or the measure of the force,—but that might have been either more or less;—or all of these together,—but to an effect antecedently necessary all the causes must be antecedently determined; where not so much as one of them is antecedently determined, there is no pretence of antecedent necessity;—or it is some other cause that he can name, but he pleadeth "ignorance." Yet I confess the deceit lieth here; but it is on the other side, in the "ignorant" mistaking of a hypothetical necessity for absolute antecedent necessity.

And here,—according to the advice of the poet,

> "Nec Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus
> "Inciderit[g],— . . . . . ."

he calleth in the foreknowledge of God to his aid; as he doth always when he findeth himself at a loss; but to no purpose. He himself hath told us, that "it cannot be truly said, that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the thing known[h]." God seeth not future contingents in an antecedent certainty which they have in their causes, but in the events themselves, to which God's infinite knowledge doth extend itself. In order of time, one thing is before another, one thing is after another; and accordingly, God knoweth them in themselves to be one before another. But His knowledge is no beginning, no expiring act. Nothing is past, nothing is to come, but all things present, to His knowledge; even those things which are future, with the manner of their futurition.

His other instance of raining or not raining to-morrow.

His casting ambs-ace hath been unfortunate to him; he will speed no better with his shower of rain. In the entrance to my answer, and as it were the stating of the cause, I shewed, that rain was more contingent in our climate than in many other parts of the world, where it is almost as necessary as the seasons of the year[i];—I do not find so much weight in his discourse, as to occasion me to alter one word;—for which I could have produced authors enough, if I had

[g] [Horat., A. P., 191, 192.]
[h] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xi; [above pp. 58, 59.]
[i] [Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 184; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

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thought it needful; but I alleged only the Scriptures, mentioning "the former and the latter rain." And even this is objected to me as a defect or piece of ignorance;—"I thought" (saith he) "he had known it by experience of some travellers, but I see he only gathereth it from that place in Scripture[k];"—as if the Scripture alone were not proof good enough, except it be confirmed by the "experience of travellers."

Deut. xi. 14. Jer. v. 24. Hos. vi. 3.

From this preparatory discourse he frameth two arguments, and puts them into my character, as if they were my reasons:—"In our climate, the natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily at set times, as in some Eastern countries; therefore they do not produce rain necessarily in our climates, then when they do produce it: again, we cannot say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow; therefore it is not necessary, either that it should rain, or that it should not rain, to-morrow[l]." Such reasons as these do become him better than me. I disclaim them, and (to use his own phrase) "must take them for untruths, until he cite the place[m]," where I have made any such ridiculous inferences; which conclude against hypothetical necessity, which we ourselves do establish.

But I come to his arguments, which I shall set down in his own words, for it cannot be worse disposed, to let us see the great skill of this new controller in logic:—"It is necessary, that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain; if therefore it be not necessary that it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise it is not necessary that the proposition—it shall rain or it shall not rain—should be true[n]." To this I answered, that it was "most false," that the proposition "could 852
not be necessarily true except one of the members were necessarily true;" which is a truth evident and undeniable. This answer I illustrated thus;—"a conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the proposition be true; as, 'If the sun shine, it is day,' is a true proposition at midnight." Logicians use to give another example;—'If an ass fly, then

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 323.]
[l] [Ibid., p. 324.]
[m] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxii. p. 301.]
[n] [In the Defence, T. II. Numb. xxxiv. above p. 181.]

he hath wings.' The proposition is true, but both the parts are false; neither doth the ass fly, neither hath he wings. To my direct answer he replieth not a word, either by denial or distinction; and so by his silence yieldeth the controversy. But to my illustration he excepteth thus. First, "What hath a conjunct proposition to do with this in question, which is disjunctive[o]?" By his good favour, there are two propositions in his argument: the former is disjunctive, which is not questioned at all by either party, either for the truth of it or the necessity of it, namely, "Either it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow;" his second proposition is conjunctive, and not disjunctive, namely, "If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary that it shall not rain." This conjunctive proposition I deny; and I deny it upon this evident ground,—because, as in a conjunctive proposition, both parts of the proposition may be false and yet the proposition true, or both parts true and yet the proposition false, because the truth or falsehood of the proposition dependeth not upon the truth or falsehood of the parts, but only of the consequence, so in a disjunctive proposition, the disjunction may be necessarily true, and yet neither member of the disjunction be necessarily [true], because the truth or falsehood of a disjunctive proposition dependeth not upon the necessary truth of either member distinctly considered, but upon the necessary truth of the disjunction. The reason is evident. In a disjunctive proposition, nothing is affirmed or denied, either of the one member or the other, but only the necessary truth of the disjunction; according to that rule in logic, "*In propositione disjunctivâ affirmatio et negatio æstimatur ex solâ conjunctione disjunctivâ, cui necesse est addi negationem, si debet negativa esse propositio.*" Now the disjunction of contradictories is most necessary,—"either it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow;"—though neither part of the contradiction be necessarily true. As, for example, a man is to pay a sum of money; 'either he will pay it in gold or he will not pay it in gold,' is necessarily true; but it is not necessary that he shall pay it in gold, neither is it necessary that he shall not pay it in gold, seeing he hath it in his choice to pay it in gold or in silver,

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 324.]

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or any other coin which is current. This is so clear, that no man can seriously oppose it, without his own discredit. Secondly, he saith, that a conjunctive proposition "is not made of two propositions, as a disjunctive is[p]." What then? First, this is altogether impertinent, and nothing to his purpose. Secondly, it is also false. Every compounded proposition (such as a conjunct proposition is) doth either actually or virtually include two propositions. Indeed, a hypothetical proposition may sometimes be reduced to a categorical: that is, when there are but three terms; for when there are four terms, it is hardly reducible. What is this to the question? or to any difference between us? Just, "Which is the way to London? A sack full of plums." He might do well, for his reputation' sake, to reduce his argument into any scholar-like form; either categorical, or hypothetical, or disjunctive, or any thing. But then the ugliness of it would straight appear. This is the nearest to his sense that I can contrive it;—Either it is necessary that it shall rain to-morrow, or it is necessary that it shall not rain to-morrow, or this proposition—'either it will rain or it will not rain to-morrow'—is not necessarily true. I deny the disjunction. '*Pono quartum*,'—or the one of these two (raining or not raining) will happen contingently. The disjunction is always necessarily true, before either of the members be determinately or necessarily true.

Whether this proposition—"I know that either it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow[q]"—be a disjunctive proposition or not, is not material. It includeth a disjunctive proposition in it; and sheweth plainly, that the certainty of a disjunctive proposition doth not depend upon the certainty of either of the members determinately, but upon the certainty of one of them indifferently.

God's decrees considered act[ive]ly and passively.

He taketh great exception at my manner of expression,—that God made His own decrees freely,—because "whatsoever was made had a beginning, but God's decrees are eternal: besides, God's decree is His will; and the Bishop said formerly, that the will of God is God[r]." Although God, 853

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. p. 324.]

[q] [Ibid., p. 325.—from the Defence, Numb. xxxiv. above p. 186; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[r] [Qu., ibid.]

being a simple and infinite essence (to speak properly), is not capable of any manner of composition, or of being perfected any further than He is; yet, to help our conception, we use to attribute to God such acts and qualities and perfections, which being spoken after the manner of men are to be understood according to the majesty of God. Such is the notion of God's decrees. More particularly, "the decrees of God" may be taken, and is taken in the Schools, two ways, actively or passively: actively, as it is an act immanent in God; and so the decree of God is nothing else but "*Deus decernens*"—"God decreeing;" or else the decree of God may be taken passively, for the execution of this decree, or the order set by God for the government and disposition of the world; which is an act done in time, and "*ad extra*" or without the Deity. This executive decree was that which I intended; as he might easily have perceived, if he had pleased. He himself saith the same which he dislikes in me;—"This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God[s]." What difference is there, whether one say this decree was "made," or it was "set and ordered," as he himself saith? My argument holds as well the one way as the other. God was not necessitated to "set" this "order;" and yet this disjunctive[t] proposition was always necessarily true, —Either God will order it thus or He will not order it thus.

God knows all future possibilities.

To my last argument used in this section he answereth nothing but this;—"If God had made either causes or effects free from necessity, He had made them free from His own prescience, which had been imperfection[u]." Which reason, besides all the inconsequences thereof, and all the other absurdities which flow from it, doth deny to the infinite knowledge of God the knowledge of possibilities and future contingents; whereas it is most certain, that God doth perfectly know, not only all future contingents (not in their causes only, but in themselves), but also all possibilities, upon sup-

[s] [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xi. [above p. 58.]

[t] ["Distinctive" in former editions, by an obvious misprint.]

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. pp. 325, 326.]

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position of a condition, such as were never to be actually produced. "Woe unto thee Chorazin, woe unto thee Bethsaida; for if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." To know certainly future possibilities which shall never come into act, is more than to know future events, though never so contingent and void of necessity. Take another instance;—"Will the men of Keilah deliver me up?—will Saul come down?—he will come down,—they will deliver thee up:"—and again,—"He was speedily taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding."

Matt. xi. 21.

1 Sam. xxiii. 11, [12.]

[Wisdom iv. 11.]

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—NUMBER XXXV.

His argument to prove universal necessity answered.

His first endeavour in this section is to reduce his argument into better form; and when all is done, it proveth but a sorites. The only commendation that I can give it is this, that the matter and form are agreeable, both stark naught. Thus he argueth;—"That which is an agent, worketh; that which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action; .. and consequently is thereof a sufficient cause; and if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary cause[v]." I deny his first proposition,—that every "agent worketh." There are causes and agents in power, as well as in act. But it may be, he meaneth an agent in act; then he proveth the same by itself. 'That which acteth, worketh;' and, 'when they returned, then they came home again.' He taketh pains to prove that, which no man in his right wits can doubt of. His second proposition containeth such another sublime point of apodeictical learning, called "*idem per idem*"—"the same by the same;"—"that which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action, or the effect it produceth." It may want much that is requisite to the production of that which it ought to produce. But it can want nothing to produce that which it doth produce. "Whatsoever acteth, when it acteth, doth necessarily act what it doth act." He is still stumbling upon that "old foolish rule[w]."

[v] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxv. p. 327.]

[w] [See above p. 257. note u.]

What is all this to his antecedent necessity? His third proposition follows,—"And consequently is thereof a sufficient cause." Yes, in his "canting[x]" language, which makes "deficience" and "sufficience[y]" to be all one. Whereunto tendeth all this? Hitherto he hath not advanced one hair's breadth; but now he uniteth all his force, to pull down the castle of liberty:—"And if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary cause." I denied his consequence, and gave him a reason
854 for it:—"otherwise God Himself should not be all-sufficient[z]." He replieth, that God's "all-sufficience signifieth no more .. than" His "omnipotence, and omnipotence signifieth no more than the power to do all things that He will[a]." Yes; God's infinite power and sufficience ought not to be limited to those things which He doth actually will, or which have actual being; no more than His eternity is commensurable by time. He was sufficient to raise up children to Abraham of stones, which He never did, and probably never will do. If God did all which He could do, and could justly do, "who" was able to "abide it?" we were in a wretched condition. A covetous person may have more than sufficient for his back and his belly, and yet no will to bestow it upon himself. So he hath proved himself a "sufficient" agent; sufficient to make this sorites, though very unsufficient to prove his intention.

[Luke iii. 8.]

[Ps. cxxx. 3. Prayer-book version.]

Possible and impossible all one with T. H.

But I took pity on him, to see him toil himself to no purpose; and was contented, out of grace and courtesy, to admit these two things: first, that every effect in the world hath sufficient causes; secondly, that supposing the determination of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the world is necessary, that is, necessary upon supposition. But this will do him no good. Necessity upon supposition is far enough from antecedent necessity. He objecteth, that "necessity is only said truly of somewhat in future[b]." I deny it. He proveth it thus;—"'Necessary' is that which cannot possibly be otherwise; and possibility is always understood of some future time[c]." Good: where are his eyes that he can-

[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p 293.]

[y] [See Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. p. 297.]

[z] [Defence, Numb. xxxv. above p. 189; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxv. p. 328.]

[b] [Ibid.]

[c] [Ibid.]

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not distinguish between 'possible' and 'not possible'? If necessary had been that which *could* possibly be otherwise, or if *im*possibility had always reference to the future as well as possibility, he had said something. By this argument he might prove, that yesterday is not past but to come; because it is not possible to bring back yesterday, and possibility "is always understood" of the time to come.

But out of pure necessity he is contented to make use of my courtesy:—"Seeing he granteth so favourably, that sufficient causes are necessary causes, I shall easily conclude from it, that whatsoever those causes do cause are necessary antecedently[d]." He may "easily" prove it, if he can make possible and impossible all one. I gave him an inch, and he takes an ell. I admitted, that every effect in the world is necessary upon supposition; and he taketh it for granted, that they are necessary without supposition: but that is more than I can yield him. If that be his meaning, he had best stick to his own grounds. But they will afford him no more relief than my concession. Howsoever, thus he argueth.—

Remote causes are not together with the effect.

"If the necessity of the thing produced, when produced, be in the same instant of time with the existence of its immediate cause, then also that immediate cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately produced. The same may be said of the cause of this cause, and backward eternally. From whence it will follow, that all the connexion of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the world, are altogether existent in one and the same instant[e]." It is well that I meet with a "beginning of the world," for I was afraid of those words—"and so backwards eternally." If his mathematical engines be such as these, he will never prove so terrible an enemy as Archimedes. He proveth, that all immediate causes and their particular distinct effects successively were together in time at the very instant of their causation successively since the beginning of the world: but he lets the question alone, as bad archers do the butt, whether the first cause did determine the second to every individual act which it doth, necessarily

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxv. [e] [Ibid.]

and without any supposition, and the second the third, and so downward to the last; of this he saith not a word. Where there is no need of proof, he swelleth with arguments; where the question is, he is silent. I will shew him the palpable absurdity of his argument in an instance. When Mr. Hobbes made his Leviathan, his Leviathan and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time. So likewise, when his father did beget him, his father and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time. The like may be said of his grandfather and his great grandfather; and so upwards to the beginning of the world. Therefore, Adam's begetting of Seth had a necessary connexion with his writing of his Leviathan, so as to necessitate him antecedently and inevitably to write it, and stuff it with paradoxes. Or thus; —a man kindles a fire to warm himself; the fire and he are necessarily coexistent, and there is necessary connexion between them; another man steals part of the fire and burns
855 a house with it; the fire and the conflagration are together and have a necessary connexion; therefore the kindling of the fire had a necessary connexion with the burning of the house, to render it inevitable. See with what doughty arguments they use to catch dotterels.

Discourse 11.

From hence he concludeth, that "consequently all the time from the beginning of the world, or from eternity to this day, is but one instant[f]." Better and better. Why doth he not infer likewise, that the sea burneth? His premisses will sustain the one as well as the other. Why will he lose his cause for want of confidence? If God, Who is an infinite essence, be free from all "variableness" and succession of time, must he, who is but a turning shadow upon the old exchange of this world, challenge the same privilege? Because eternity is a "*nunc stans*," must successive parts of time make "one instant or '*nunc stans*'?" But he addeth, that "by this time" I "know it is not so[g]." He hath been spinning a fair thread, and now like a curst cow casts down his meal with his foot:— first, to endeavour to prove that it is so; and then confess, that it "is not so." Neither can he say, that he proceedeth upon my grounds, whilst his own grounds are so much higher than

Nor doth all time make one instant.

[James i. 17.]

[f] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxv. p. 328.—"but one instant, or a '*nunc stans*.'"]

[g] [Ibid.]

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mine. I make but a hypothetical necessity, which implieth only an accidental connexion; he maketh an absolute antecedent necessity, which implieth a necessary connexion of the whole conjoint series of causes and effects.

CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;— NUMBER XXXVI.

T. H. admitteth no absurdities but impossibilities.

I cited his sense, that "he could add other arguments if he thought it good logic[h]." He complaineth, that I "misrecite" his "words; which are, 'I could add, if I thought it good logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity, as that it destroys both the decrees and prescience of God Almighty[i].'" And are not these reasons, drawn from the decrees and prescience of God, "arguments?" Or are they not his prime arguments? How glad would this man be to find any little pretence of exception? He distinguisheth "absurdities" and "inconveniences;"—"absurdities" (he saith) "are impossibilities," and it is a "good form of reasoning to argue from absurdities," but not "from inconveniences[j]." If all "absurdities" be "impossibilities," then there are no absurdities *in rerum naturâ;* for there can be no impossibilities. This it is, to take the sense of words, not from artists in their own arts, but from his own "imaginations[k]." By this reason there never was an absurd speech or absurd action in the world; otherwise absurdities are not "impossibilities." But he hath confuted himself sufficiently in this treatise. One absurdity may be greater than another; and one inconvenience may be greater than another; but 'absurd' and 'inconvenient' is commonly the same thing. That is absurd, which is incongruous, unreasonable, not fit to be heard. Truth itself may accidentally be said in some sense to be inconvenient to some persons at some times. But neither absurdities nor inconveniences in themselves do flow from truth. Now let us see, what are those inconveniences which he mentioneth here. To

[h] [Defence, Numb. xxxvi. above p. 190; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[i] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxvi. above p. 189; and Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxvi. p. 331.]

[j] [Qu., ibid., p. 332.]

[k] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. p. 278.]

"destroy the decrees and prescience of God Almighty." There can be no greater "absurdities" imagined, than these things which he calleth "inconveniencies." He himself hath at the least ten several times drawn arguments in this treatise from the prescience of God. Where was his logic then? or his memory now? And in this very place, where he condemneth it as "no good form of reasoning to argue from inconveniences[l]," yet he himself doth practise it, and argues from inconveniences. But he hath worn this subject so thread-bare, without adding either new matter or new ornament, that I will not weary the reader with a needless repetition, but refer him to my Defence; which I dare well trust with his Animadversions. Discourse II.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;—
NUMBER XXXVII.

It is vain to talk any longer of keeping this controversy secret[m]. Neither do I regard whether it was made public by his fault or his friend's[n], or who it was that hanged out the ivy-bush before it, to beg custom and procure utterance for his first fardel of paradoxes. He thinketh it is great "confidence in" me to say, that "the edge of his discourse was so abated, that it could not easily hurt any rational man, who was not over much possessed with prejudice[o]." But I have much more reason to wonder at his transcendent 'confidence.' The people of China did use to brag, that they only had two eyes, the Europeans one eye, and all the rest of the world no eyes; but he maketh himself to be a very Argus, all eye, better sighted than "either eagle or serpent[p]," and all the rest of the European world to be as blind as moles or beetles, like so many "changelings[q]" or 'enchanted[q]' persons that had lost their senses. For my part, I am more confident since I see
856 his Animadversions, than before. And why should I not be confident in this cause? Grant me but that there is a God; that He is just, and true, and good, and powerful; that there [Little harm in the publication of T. H.'s arguments.]

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxvi. p. 332.]
[m] [See above p. 192. note o.]
[n] [See above p. 251. notes r, t.]
[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxvii. p. 333. — Defence, Numb. xxxvii. above p. 192; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[p] ["Cur in amicorum vitiis tam cernis acutum Quam *aut aquila aut serpens* Epidaurius." Horat., Sat. I. ii. 26, 27.]
[q] [See above p. 459. note c.]

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is a Heaven, and a Hell, and a Day of Judgment, that is, rewards and punishments; that good and evil, virtue and vice, holiness and sin, are any thing more than empty names; that there is any election in the world; that admonitions and reprehensions, and praises and dispraises, and laws and consultations, do signify any thing; that care, and good endeavours, are to be cherished; that all motives to godliness and religious piety are to be maintained: and I cannot fall in this cause. There is no doubt but the best doctrines may be abused; as the doctrine of God's providence to idleness, and His patience to procrastination, and His mercy to presumption. But such abuses do not flow necessarily and essentially from good doctrines, as they do from universal necessity. He telleth us, how God dealeth with those whom He "will bring to a blessed end," and how He "hardeneth" others[r]; but he telleth us of nothing that is in man's power under God to do, either to prevent this "hardening," or to attain this "blessed end." He talketh of a man's "examining" his ways[s]; but he teacheth withal, that a man is either necessitated unresistibly to examine his ways, or otherwise it is impossible for him to examine them. He mentioneth some who "reason erroneously, If I shall be saved, I shall be saved, whether I walk uprightly or not[t];" but he teacheth also, that they are necessitated to reason erroneously, and to walk uprightly or not uprightly; and that they cannot avoid it by all the endeavours which are in their power. For, according to his principles, nothing at all is in their power, either to do, or to leave undone; but only to cry patience, and shrug up their shoulders; and even this also is determined antecedently and inevitably to their hands. So he maketh man to be a mere "foot-ball" or "tennis-ball[u]," smitten to and fro by the second causes, or a "top, lashed" hither and thither[v]. If the watch be wound up by the artist, what have the wheels to do to be solicitous about any thing, but only to follow the motion which it is impossible for them to resist? When he first broached this opinion, he did not foresee all those absurd consequences which did attend it; which might easily happen to

Abuses do not flow essentially from good doctrines, as [they do] from universal necessity.

[r] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxvii. p. 334.]
[s] [Ibid.]
[t] [Ibid.]
[u] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 230.]
[v] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 41.]

a man, who buildeth more upon his own "imaginations" than other men's experience: and being once engaged, he is resolved to wade through thick and thin, so long as he is able. Discourse II.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE POST-SCRIPT;—NUMBER XXXVIII.

Solid reasons work soonest upon solid judgments.

We are now come to his last section, which is as full of empty and unsignificant vaunts as any of the former. True real worth useth not to send forth so many bubbles of vain-glory. The question is not, whether persons "once publicly engaged[x]" in the defence of an opinion, be more tenacious of their errors, than those who have no such prejudice; which his own example doth confirm sufficiently, and no rational man can doubt of; but whether solid substantial proofs do work sooner upon persons of wit and learning, than upon those who are ignorant, whose judgments are confused and unable to distinguish between feigned shows and real truths. How should he, who understandeth not the right state of the question, be so likely to judge what reasons are convincing and what are not, as he who doth understand it? Or he who knoweth not the distinction between that necessity which is absolute and that which is only upon supposition, be a competent judge, whether all events be absolutely necessary? He might even as well tell us, that a blind man is more likely to hit the mark, or judge rightly of colours, than he that hath his sight. He himself doth half confess as much; —"I confess, the more solid a man's wit is, the better will solid reasons work upon him[y]." What is it then that disgusteth him? It is the addition of that which I "call learning, that is to say, much reading of other men's doctrines, without weighing them with his own thoughts[z]." When did either I or any man else ever call that learning,—to "read" authors "without weighing them?" Such extravagant expressions become none but blunderers, who are able to say nothing to the question when it is truly stated. But I wonder what it is which *he* calleth learning. Nothing but a fantastic *opiniâstreté*, joined with a supercilious contempt of all other men

[x] [Qu., Animadv. upon Answ. to Postscript, Numb. xxxviii. p. 338.]

[y] [Ibid.]

[z] [Ibid.]

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that are wiser or learneder than himself, making the private thoughts of ignorant persons to be the standard and public seal of truth. As the scholar thinketh, so the bell clinketh. If there were nothing else, this alone—to except against them who should be both his jurors and his judges—were enough to render him and all his paradoxes suspected. Let him re- 857
member who said, "Learning hath no enemy but ignorance." If he had ever read those authors whom he condemneth, namely, "the Fathers and doctors of the Church[a]," his presumption had been somewhat more tolerable, though too high; but to condemn them all before he ever read any of them, requireth a prophetical light, to which he is no pretender. In the mean time he would have his readers believe, that what is done by him upon design, merely to hide his own ignorance, is done out of depth of judgment[b]. Like the fox in the fable, which having lost his tail by mischance, persuaded all his fellows to cut off theirs, as unprofitable burdens.

Three sorts of men.

The philosopher divided men into three ranks: some, who knew good and were willing to teach others; these he said were like Gods amongst men: others, who though they knew not much, yet were willing to learn; these he said were like men among beasts: and lastly, some who knew not good, and yet despised such as should teach them; these he esteemed as beasts among men[c].

Whereas he talketh of such as "requite those who endeavour to instruct them at their own intreaty with reviling" terms[d], although he dictate more willingly than dispute, where no man may contradict him; yet neither do I take him to be of the rank of 'instructors,' before he himself hath first learned; nor is he able to bring so much as one instance of any "reviling," or so much as discourteous lan-

[a] [Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 194; Disc. i. Pt. iii.—Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 339.]

[b] [Qu., ibid.—"By reading others, men commonly obstruct the way to their own exact and natural judgment, and use their wit, both to deceive themselves with fallacies, and," &c.]

[c] ["Οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, Φρασσάμενος τά κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ἧσιν ἀμείνω· Ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται· Ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων Ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὁ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήϊος ἀνήρ." Hesiod., Op. et Dies, 291—295: quoted by Aristot., Ethic., I. iv. 7; Cic., Pro A. Cluentio, c. xxxi; Liv., xxii. 28; and others. And see Sigonius' note upon Liv., xxii. 28, in Drakenborch's edition; and Grævius, Lectt. Hesiod., in Op. et Dies, c. xiii.]

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 339.]

guage, throughout my Defence. If his back was galled before, and that make him over sensible and suspicious of an affront where none was intended, who can help it? But now, he himself having shewed so much scorn and petulance in his Animadversions, though I have abstained from all "reviling" terms, yet I have tempered my style so as to let him plainly see, that he is not so much regarded, nor half so formidable an adversary, as he vainly imagineth.

The doctrine of liberty maketh no man careless or thankless.

In the next place, he setteth down eight conclusions, which he dreameth that he hath proved in this treatise[e]. It is good beating of a proud man. Though he be thrown flat upon his back at every turn, yet he hath the confidence to proclaim his own achievements with a silver trumpet, when they do not deserve to be piped upon an oaten reed. I will make him a fair offer. If he have proved any one of them, or be able to prove any one of them, I will yield him all the rest. Besides the notorious falsehood of them all, the two last are apparently ridiculous;—that the doctrine of liberty is "an error, that maketh men, by imagining they can repent when they will, neglect their duties;" and, moreover, "makes them unthankful for God's graces, by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will[f]." The doctrine of liberty from superstoical necessity doth neither make men "*truncos*" nor "*sacrilegos*" —neither stupid blocks void of all activity, nor yet sacrilegiously to rob God of His honour. We know and acknowledge, that both free will, and the good use of free will in repentance and all other acts of gratitude towards God, is from God, and proceedeth from grace. These inferences which he makes, are no consequences of our doctrine, but his own drowsy dreams. All men that are not blinded with prejudice, do see clearly, that it is his desperate doctrine of inevitable necessity, which "maketh men to neglect their duties," by teaching them to believe, that though they be impenitent or unthankful, yet it was not at all in their power to have been otherwise; they are as they must be, and as God hath ordained and necessitated them to be.

God hath no faculties.

He taketh me up for "saying unskilfully, that they who

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 339.]

[f] [Ibid.]

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dispute philosophically of God, ascribe unto Him no proper faculties[g]." Indeed I do not wonder, if he who ascribes to God "potentialities" and "successive duration[h]," who denies that the Divine substance is indivisible[i], and saith that "'*actus simplicissimus*' signifieth nothing[j]," who makes an "incorporeal substance" to be a "contradiction[k]," do make Him likewise to be compounded of substance and faculties. But they who penetrate deeper into the ugly consequences of these bold and blind assertions, who consider, that whatsoever is truly infinite is not capable of any "variation or shadow of turning by change," and that whatsoever is infinitely perfect in itself cannot be further perfected by the supplemental addition of any faculties or accidents, will not judge my assertion to be "unskilful," but his paradoxes to be dishonourable to the Divine nature, and derogatory to the majesty of God.

[James i. 17.]

His reason of this reprehension is, because "to dispute philosophically is to dispute by natural reason and from principles evident by the light of nature, and to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the subject whereof they treat[l]." What? Whether they have any faculties or no? That were very hard. It seemeth, that Christian philosophers are not philosophers with him. And why may not a philosopher make use of Divine revelation? But let him not trouble himself about this. This truth hath been sufficiently cleared already by the light of natural reason. Either the Divine essence is infinitely perfect in itself, or God is not God; and if it be infinitely perfect in itself, it cannot be further perfected by any faculties.

He saith, he "would fain know of" me "what improper faculties" I "ascribe to God[m]." I ascribe no faculties at all to God, except it be anthropopathetically; as the Scripture ascribes eyes and hands to God; which must be understood as is beseeming the majesty of God. He addeth, that I "know not how to make it good that the will and understanding of God are faculties, and yet will have these words—'His

[g] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. pp. 339, 340.]
[h] [Ibid., Animadv. upon] Numb. xxiv. [p. 266.]
[i] [Ibid., p. 267.]
[j] [Ibid.]
[k] Leviath., [Pt. iii.] c. xxxiv. [p. 214. ed. 1651.]
[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 339.]
[m] [Ibid., p. 340.]

understanding and His will are His very essence'—to pass for an axiom of philosophy[n]." It is true, I "know not how" to make them faculties in God, speaking properly; and yet I doubt not of this truth, that God's understanding and His will are His very essence. And this very objection sheweth clearly, that he neither understandeth me nor himself. This axiom,—that the will and the understanding of God are His very essence,—is a fit medium to prove they are no faculties. "*Quicquid est in Deo est ipse Deus*[o]"—"Whatsoever is in God, is God." If he have any thing to say against it, why is he silent?

God is incomprehensible.

That God is incomprehensible, and that His nature can neither be expressed nor conceived perfectly by mortal men, is a truth undeniable, not to be doubted of[p]. How should finite reason be able to comprehend an infinite perfection? And therefore they who do search too curiously into the majesty of God, or define His nature too saucily and presumptuously, are justly to be reprehended. The pipe can convey the water no higher than the fountain's head. But, on the other side, seeing "the invisible things of Him, that is, His eternal power and Godhead," are "clearly seen from the creation of the world," and seeing He hath given us His word to be "a light unto our feet and a lanthorn unto our paths," not to endeavour soberly and humbly to know God, so far as He is represented to us by the creatures and revealed unto us in the Scriptures, to the end we may glorify Him as God and help others to know Him and glorify Him aright, is inexcusable ingratitude. It is not then simply the inquiring into or the discoursing of the nature of God, but the transgressing of the right manner and due bounds of our inquiry, which is unlawful. The Fathers disputed well from the nature of God against the Anthropomorphites[q]. So did St. Paul against the idolatrous Athenians;—"Forasmuch as we are the offspring of God, and live and move and have our being in Him and from Him, we ought not to think, that the Godhead is like unto gold and silver or stone graven with art." I acknowledge, that though all possible perfection

Yet, so far as we can, we are obliged to search after Him. Rom. i. 20. Ps. cxix. [105.]

Acts xvii. [28, 29.]

[n] [Ibid.—from the Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 194; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[o] [See above p. 159. note f.]

[p] ["Whereas I had said, that we ought not to dispute of God's nature, and that He is no fit subject of our philosophy, he denies it not." Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 340.]

[q] [See Fleury, Hist. de l'Egl., liv. xxi. § 1.]

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To admit that God is infinite, is enough to confute T. H.

ought to be ascribed to God, yet the safest way to express Him is by negative attributes. Admit but one negative attribute, which all men must admit, and do admit, that believe a God; and I will easily evince all the rest from thence: that is, that He is actually infinite, or an indivisible unity of infinite perfection. If God's Being be infinite, then it is not by successive duration. In successive duration, something is added every minute; but to that which is infinite, nothing can be added. Again, if God be actually infinite, then He is not divisible nor materiate nor corporal, nor hath parts without parts: an aggregation of finite parts cannot make up an infinite being. If God be actually infinite, then His understanding and His will are not distinct faculties; then His goodness and His wisdom and His justice and His truth are not distinct qualities. For if His will be without His understanding, or His justice without His wisdom, then His understanding and His wisdom are not infinite; for that only is infinite, without which nothing is or can be. It is not therefore enough to ascribe unto God whatsoever is "honourable[r]," unless we do it in an honourable manner, that is, infinitely; and that we can never do, but by making Him "an indivisible unity of infinite being and perfection:" not accidental, but essential, or transcendent perfection. He who calleth God "most perfect" (though T. H. see it not), comes short of that honour which is due to God. "Most perfect" 859
is but a degree of comparison. But he who calleth Him perfection itself, acknowledgeth, that all the perfection of the creatures is by participation of His infinite perfection. Such errors as these formerly recited, do deserve another manner of refutation. And when he is in his lucid intervals, he himself acknowledgeth what I say to be true,—that God is incomprehensible and immaterial;—and he himself proveth so much from this very attribute of God, that He is infinite[s]; —"Figure is not attributed to God, for every figure is finite; neither can He be comprehended by us, . . for whatsoever we

[r] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxviii. above p. 193.]

[s] De Cive, c. xv. § 14. [pp. 183, 184.—Non igitur Deo tribuetur figura, omnis enim figura finita; neque dicetur concipi sive comprehendi imaginatione vel quâcunque facultate nostrâ, quicquid enim concipimus finitum est. . . . Neque dici de Deo honorificè, ... quod habeat partes, aut quod sit totum aliquid, quæ attributa sunt finitorum. . . . Neque plures esse Deos, quia nec plura infinita."]

conceive is finite; . . . nor hath He parts, which are attributed only to finite things; . . nor is He more than one, there can be but one infinite." Discourse II.

Whereas I called Hell "the true Tophet[t]," he telleth us gravely, that "Tophet was a place not far from the walls of Hierusalem, and consequently on the earth[u];" adding, after his boasting manner, that "he cannot imagine what" I "will say to this in" my "answer to" his "Leviathan, unless" I "say that by the true Tophet in this place is meant a not true Tophet[u]." Whosoever answereth his Leviathan, will be more troubled with his extravagancies than with his arguments. Doth he not know, that almost all things happened to them as figures? There may be a true mystical Tophet as well as a literal; and there is a true mystical Gehenna or valley of Hinnom as well as a literal. He that should say, that Christ is the true Paschal Lamb, or the Church the true Hierusalem, or John Baptist the true Elias, may well justify it without saying, that by the true Paschal Lamb is meant no true Paschal Lamb, or by the true Hierusalem no true Hierusalem, or by the true Elias no true Elias. What poor stuff is this! Tophet. [i. e. to the Jews.]

And so he concludeth his Animadversion with a rapping paradox indeed:—"True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain[v]." That sovereign princes are God's lieutenants upon earth, no man doubteth; but how come they to be "Christ's lieutenants" with him? who teacheth expressly, that the kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the general Resurrection[x]. His errors come so thick, that it is difficult to take notice of them all; yet if he had resolved to maintain his paradox, it had been ingenuously done to take notice of my reasons against it in this place. True religion consisteth not in obedience to princes.

First, "what if the" sovereign "magistrate shall be no Christian himself[y]?" Is a heathen or Mahometan prince the "lieutenant of Christ," or a fit infallible judge of the contro-

[t] [Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 195; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[u] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 340.]

[v] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxviii. above p. 193.—Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. pp. 340—342.]

[x] Leviath., [Pt. III.] c. xlii. [pp. 269, 317.]

[y] [Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 196; Disc. i. pt. iii.]

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versies of Christian religion? Are all his Christian subjects obliged to sacrifice to idols or blaspheme Christ upon his command? Certainly he giveth the same latitude of power and right to heathen and Mahometan princes that he doth to Christian; there is the same submission to both;—"I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man[a];"—whom he maketh to be "a mortal God[a]." To him alone he ascribeth the right to allow and disallow of all doctrines[a], all forms of worship, all miracles, all revelations[b]. And most plainly in the forty-second and forty-third chapters of his Leviathan, where he teacheth obedience to infidel princes in all things, even to the denial of Christ, to be necessary by the law of God and nature[c].

My second reason in this place was this:—"what if the magistrate shall command contrary to the law of God? must we obey him rather than God[d]?" He confesseth, that Christ "ought to be obeyed rather than .. His lieutenant upon earth[e]." This is a plain concession, rather than an answer. But he further addeth, that "the question is not who is to be obeyed, but what be his commands[e]." Most vainly. For if true religion do consist in obedience to the commands of the sovereign prince, then to be truly religious it is not needful to inquire further than what he commandeth. "*Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora.*" Either he must make the sovereign prince to be infallible in all his commands concerning religion; which we see by experience to be false, and he himself confesseth, that they may command their subjects to deny Christ[f]: or else the authority of the sovereign prince doth justify to his subjects whatsoever he commands; and then they may obey "Christ's lieutenant" as safely without danger of punishment as Himself.

My third reason was this;—if true religion do consist in obedience to the commands of the sovereign prince, then the sovereign prince is "the ground and pillar of truth," not the Church[g]; but the Church is "the ground and pillar of

[a] Leviath., [Pt. II.] c. xvii. [p. 87.]
[b] [Ibid., Pt. II.] c. xviii. [p. 91:—Pt. III. c. xlii. pp. 295—300.]
[c] [Ibid., Pt. III. cc. xlii, xliii. pp. 270, 271. 330, 331.]
[d] [Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 196; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 341.]
[f] Leviath., [Pt. III.] c. xlii. [p. 271.]
[g] [Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 196; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

860 truth," not the sovereign prince:—"These things write I unto thee," &c., "that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of truth." What the Church signifieth in this place, may be demonstratively collected, both from the words themselves,—wherein he calleth it "the house of God," which appellation cannot be applied to a single sovereign, much less to a heathen prince, as their sovereign then was,—and likewise by the things written, which were directions for the ordering of ecclesiastical persons.

Discourse II.

1 Tim. iii. 14, [15.]

The last argument used by me in this place was *ad hominem*, —"why then is T. H. of a different mind from his sovereign and from the laws of the land concerning the attributes of God[h]," and the religious worship which is to be given to Him? The canons and constitutions and Articles of the Church of England, and their discipline, and form of Divine worship, were all confirmed by royal authority. And yet Mr. Hobbes made no scruple to assume to himself, that which he denieth to all other subjects, "the knowledge of good and evil[i]," or of true and false religion, and a judgment of what is consonant to the law of nature and Scripture, different from the commands of his sovereign and the judgment of all his fellow-subjects; as appeareth by his book *De Cive*, printed in the year 1642. Neither can he pretend, that he was then a local subject to another prince[k]; for he differed more from him in religion, than from his own natural sovereign.

This paradox hath been confuted before[l], and some of those gross absurdities which flow from it represented to the reader; to all which he may add these following reasons.—

First, true religion cannot consist in any thing which is sinful; but obedience to sovereign princes may be sinful. This is proved by the example of Jeroboam, who established idolatry in his kingdom. And the text saith, "This thing became a sin." It may be he will say, this idolatrous wor-

1 Kings xii. 30.

[h] [Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 196; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[i] [De Cive, c. xii. § 1. p. 126.—"Doctrinarum quæ ad seditionem disponunt, prima hæc est, *Cognitionem de bono et malo pertinere ad singulos.*"]

[k] [Scil. of the King of France, in which kingdom Hobbes resided from 1641 until the latter part of the year 1651. See the Biogr. Brit.]

[l] [Castig. of Animadv.] Numb. xiv. [above pp. 325—332.]

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ship was a sin in Jeroboam, not in the people, who obeyed him. But the text taketh away this evasion, branding him ordinarily with this mark of infamy, "Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, who made Israel to sin."

1 Kings xxii. 52.

Secondly, true religion cannot consist in obedience to contradictory commands; but the commands of sovereign princes are often contradictory one to another. One commandeth to worship Christ, another forbiddeth it. One forbiddeth to offer sacrifice to idols, another commandeth it. Yea, the same person may both forbid idolatry in general, and yet authorize it in particular; or forbid it by the public laws of the country, and yet authorize it by his personal commands.

Thirdly, true religion is always justified in the sight of God; but obedience to the commands of sovereign princes is not always justified in the sight of God. This is clearly proved out of his own express words;—"Whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power, is as to the subject (though not so always in the sight of God) justified by their command [m]." Whence it is evident, by his own confession, that the wicked commands of sovereign princes are not justified by their own royal authority, but are wicked and repugnant to the law of God. And consequently that of the Apostle hath place here,

Acts iv. 19.

—"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." True religion hath always reference unto God.

Fourthly, true religion doth not consist in obedience to any laws whatsoever which are repugnant to the moral law of God or to the law of nature. This proposition is granted by himself;—"The laws of nature are immutable and eternal [n];" and, "All writers do agree that the law of nature is the same with the moral law [o];" again, "Sovereigns are all subjects to the law of nature, because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man or commonwealth be abrogated [p];" and, "In all things not contrary to the moral law, that is to say, to the law of nature, all subjects are bound to obey that of Divine law, which is declared to be so by the laws of the common-

[m] Leviath., [Pt. II.] c. xxii. [p. 117.]

[n] De Cive, c. iii. § 29. [p. 38.—"Leges naturæ immutabiles et æternæ sunt."]

[o] [Ibid.,] § 31. [p. 38.—"Legem naturalem eandem esse cum lege morali consentiunt omnes scriptores."]

[p] Leviath., [Pt. II.] c. xxix. [p. 169.]

wealth[q]." But the commands of a sovereign prince may be repugnant not only to the moral law or the law of nature, but even to the laws of the commonwealth. This assumption is proved four ways. First, by his own confession;—"It is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is God's, he ought to obey that and not the other[r]." If there can be no such contrary
861 commands, then it is not "manifest," nor yet true. Secondly, this is proved by his resolution of two queries. The first is this,—"whether the city" (or the sovereign prince) "be to be obeyed, if he command directly to do any thing to the contumely of God, or forbid to worship God;"—to which he answereth directly, "*non esse obediendum*"—that "he ought not to be obeyed;" and he gives this reason,—because the subjects, "before the constitution of the commonwealth, had no right to deny the honour due unto God, and therefore could transfer no right to command such things to the commonwealth[s]." The like he hath in his Leviathan;—"Actions which do naturally signify contumely, . . cannot by human power be made a part of Divine worship[t]." As if the denial of Christ upon a sovereign's command (which he justifieth) were not contumelious to Christ; or as if subjects, before the constitution of the commonwealth, had any right themselves to deny Christ. But such palpable contradictions are no novelties with him. How doth true religion consist in obedience to the commands of a sovereign, if his commands may be contumelious to God, and deny Him that worship which is due unto Him by the eternal and immutable law of nature, and, if he "be not to be obeyed" in such commands? His second question is,—"If a sovereign prince should command himself to be worshipped with Divine worship and attributes, whether he ought to be obeyed;" to which he answereth, that "although kings should command it, yet we ought to abstain from such attributes as signify his independence upon God, or immortality, or infinite power, or the like, and from

[q] Leviath., [Pt. II.] c. xxvi. [p. 149.]

[r] Ibid., [Pt. III.] c. xliii. [p. 321.]

[s] De Cive, c. xv. § 18. [p. 190.—"Primo, an non sequatur obediendum civitati esse, si directè imperet Deum contumeliâ afficere, vel prohibeat colere. Dico non sequi neque esse obediendum . . . Neque etiam habuit quisquam ante civitatem constitutam, eorum qui Deum regnare agnoverunt, jus negandi honorem Ipsi inde debitum, neque ergo jus talia imperandi in civitatem transferre potuit."]

[t] [Leviath., Pt. II.] c. xxxi. [p. 192.]

such actions as do signify the same; as, to pray unto him being absent, to ask those things of him which none but God can give, as rain and fair weather, or to offer sacrifice to him[u]." Then true religion may sometimes consist in disobedience to the commands of sovereign princes. Thirdly, that the commands of sovereign princes in point of religion may be contrary to the law of nature (which needeth no new promulgation or reception), doth appear by all those duties, internal and external, which by his own confession nature doth enjoin us to perform towards God, and all which may be and have been countermanded by sovereign princes; as, to acknowledge the existence of God, His unity, His infiniteness, His providence, His creation of the world, His omnipotence, His eternity, His incomprehensibility, His ubiquity; to worship Him and Him only, with Divine worship, with prayers, with thanksgivings, with oblations, and with all expressions of
. iii. 4. honour[x]. Lastly, this is proved by examples. Nebuchad-
h. vi. 7. nezzar commanded to worship a golden image. And Darius made a decree, that no man should "ask any petition of any God or man for thirty days save of the king only." Yet the transgression of both these commands of sovereign princes was justified by God as true religion.

Fifthly, Christ will deny no man before His Father for true religion; but those who deny Christ before men, to fulfil
Mat. x. 33 and 28. the commands of an earthly prince, "He will deny before His Father Which is in Heaven." And therefore Christ encourageth His disciples against these dangers, which might fall upon them by disobedience to such unlawful commands; —"Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him, Which is able to destroy both body and soul in Hell." But Mr. Hobbes hath found out an evasion for such renegadoes:—"Whatsoever a sub-

[u] Ibidem. [scil., De Cive, c. xv. § 18. p. 191.—"Si is homo vel curia, cui commissa est summa potestas civitatis, jubeat se coli attributis et actionibus illis quibus colendus est Deus, quæri potest an obediendum sit." And [illegible] 192.—"Attributis . . . quibus [illegible] quam jubeant reges, abstinendum est; sicut et actionibus idem significantibus, ut precari absentem, rogare ea quæ solus Deus dare potest, ut pluvias et serenitatem, offerre ei quæ solus Deus accipere potest, ut holocausta, vel cultum exhibere quo major exhiberi non potest, ut sacrificium."]

ject is compelled to in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his but his sovereign's; nor is it he, that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his governor, and the law of his country[y]." If this fig-leaf would have served the turn, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego needed not to have been cast into the fiery furnace. For though they had worshipped the golden image, by this doctrine they had not been idolaters, but Nebuchadnezzar only and his princes. If this were true, Daniel might have escaped the lions' den. If he had foreborne his praises to God, Darius had been faulty, and not he. But these holy saints were of another mind. I hope, though he might in his haste and passion censure the blessed Martyrs to be "fools[z]" (which were so many, that there were five thousand for every day in the year, except the Calends of January, when the heathens were so intent upon their devotions, that they neglected the slaughter of the poor Christians[a]), yet he will not
862 esteem himself wiser than Daniel. "Behold thou art wiser than Daniel," was a hyperbolical or rather an ironical expression. "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth is confession made unto salvation." If a man deny Christ with his mouth, the faith of the heart will not serve his turn.

Discourse II.

[Dan. iii.]

[Dan. vi.]

Ezek. xxviii. 3.

Rom. x. 10.

Sixthly, Christ denounceth damnation to all those, who for saving of their lives do deny their religion, and promiseth eternal life to all those, who do seal the truth of their Christian faith with their blood, against the commands of heathenish magistrates. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever will lose his life for My sake shall find it." Christ doth not promise eternal life for violation of true religion.

[Luke ix. 24.—Matt. x. 30.]

Lastly, no Christian sovereign or commonwealth did ever assume any such authority to themselves, never any subjects did acknowledge any such power in their sovereigns, never any writer of politics, either waking or dreaming, did ever

[y] [Leviath., Pt. III. c. xlii. p. 271.]
[z] [See above p. 330. note g.]
[a] Hieron., Epist. ad Chromat. [P. II. Tract. vi. Epist. 49. inter Epist. Hieron. fol. Basil. 1492. It is a spurious letter, of not the slightest authority. See Dodwell's Dissert. Cyprian., Diss. xi. § 2.]

PART III.

fancy such an unlimited power and authority in princes, as this which he ascribeth to them;—not only to make, but to justify, all doctrines, all laws, all religions, all actions of their subjects, by their commands:—as if God Almighty had reserved only sovereign princes under His own jurisdiction, and quitted all the rest of mankind to kings and commonwealths. [Matt. xv. 9.] "In vain ye worship Me, teaching for doctrine the commandments of men;" that is to say, making true religion to consist in obedience to the commands of men. If princes were heavenly angels, free from all ignorance and passions, such an unlimited power might better become them. But being mortal men, it is dangerous; lest Phaeton-like, by their violence or unskilfulness, they put the whole empire into a flame. It were too much, to make their unlawful commands to justify their subjects. [Matt. xv. 14.] "If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch." He who imposeth unlawful commands, and he who obeyeth them, do both subject themselves to the judgments of God. But if true religion do consist in active obedience to their commands, it justifieth both their subjects and themselves. True religion can prejudice no man.

Active and passive obedience.

He taketh upon him to refute the distinction of obedience into active and passive:—"as if a sin against the law of nature could be expiated by arbitrary punishments imposed by men[b]." Thus it happeneth to men, who confute that which they do not understand. Passive obedience is not for the expiation of any fault, but for the maintenance of innocence. When God commands one thing and the sovereign prince another, we cannot obey them both actively; therefore we choose to "obey God rather than men," [Acts v. 29.] and yet are willing, for the preservation of peace, to suffer from man rather than to resist. If he understood this distinction well, it hath all those advantages which he fancieth to himself in his new platform of government, without any of those inconveniences which do attend it. And whereas he intimateth, that our not obeying our sovereign actively is "a sin against the law of nature," meaning by the violation of our promised obedience, it is nothing but a gross mistake; no subjects ever did nor ever could make any such pact, to obey the commands

[b] De Cive, c. xiv. [§ 23. p. 172.—"Quasi pœnis humano arbitrio positis expiari possit quod peccatum est contra legem naturalem, quæ est lex Dei."]

of their sovereign actively contrary to the law of God or nature.

This reason drawn from universal practice was so obvious, that he could not miss to make it an "objection;"—"The greatest objection is that of the practice, when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged[c]." A shrewd "objection," indeed; which required a more solid answer than to say, that "though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be[d]." As if there were no more difficulty in founding and regulating a commonwealth, than in distinguishing between a loose sand and a firm rock; or as if all societies of men, of different tempers, of different humours, of different manners, and of different interests, must of necessity be all ordered after one and the same manner. If all parts of the world after so long experience do practise the contrary to that which he fancieth, he must give me leave to suspect, that his own grounds are the quicksands, and that his new commonwealth is but a castle founded in the air. Universal practice against him.

That a sovereign prince within his own dominions is '*custos utriusque tabulæ*'—'the keeper of both the tables' of the law, to see that God be duly served, and justice duly administered between man and man, and to punish such as transgress in either kind with civil punishment; that he hath an architectonical power, to see that each of his subjects do their duties in their several callings, ecclesiastics as well as seculars; that the care and charge of seeing, that no doctrine be taught his subjects but such as may consist with the general peace, and the authority to prohibit seditious practices and opinions, do reside in him; that a sovereign prince oweth no account of his actions to any mortal man; that the kings of England in particular have been justly declared by Act of Parliament "supreme governors in their own kingdoms, in all causes, over all persons, as well ecclesiastical as civil;"—is not denied, nor so much as questioned, by me. Otherwise, a kingdom or a commonwealth should be destitute of necessary means for its own preservation. To all this I do readily assent; all this I have vindicated upon surer grounds, than The just power of princes.

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[c] Leviath., [Pt. II.] c. xx. [p. 107.] [d] [Ibid.]

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those desperate and destructive principles which he supposeth. But I do utterly deny, that true religion doth consist in obedience to sovereign magistrates; or that all their injunctions ought to be obeyed, not only passively but actively; or that he is infallible in his laws and commands; or that his sovereign authority doth justify the active obedience of his subjects to his unlawful commands. Suppose a king should command his judges to "set Naboth on high among the people," and to "set two sons of Belial before him, to bear witness against him, saying, thou didst blaspheme God and the king, and then carry him out and stone him, that he may die;" the regal authority could neither justify such an unlawful command in the king, nor obedience in the judges. Suppose a king should set up a golden image, as Nebuchadnezzar did, and command all his subjects to adore it; his command would not excuse his subjects from idolatry, much less change idolatry into true religion.

1 Kings xxi. 9, [10.]

[Dan. iii.]

His answer to the words of Peter and John do signify nothing[e]. The High Priest and his Council "commanded the Apostles not to teach in the Name of Jesus;" here was sufficient human authority; yet say the Apostles, "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." The question was not "what were the commands;" that was clear enough,—what God commanded, and what man commanded;—but "who was to be obeyed:" which could admit no debate.

Acts iv. [18,] 19.

He confesseth, that ecclesiastical persons have a privilege above himself.

He asketh, "What has the Bishop to do with what God says to me when I read the Scriptures, more than I have to do with what God says to him when he reads them? unless he have authority given him by him whom Christ hath constituted His lieutenant[f]." First, I answer his question with a question,—What if "the Bishop" have such authority, and *he* hath not? He cannot deny but "the Bishop" *had* such authority, when he had not. And yet he doubted not even then to interpret the Scriptures contrary to both "the Bishop" and to

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. pp. 340, 341.—"No; but (saith he) Christ is the Supreme Judge, and we are not to 'obey men rather than God.' Is there any Christian man that does not acknowledge that we are to be judged by Christ, or that we ought not to obey Him rather than any man that shall be His lieutenant upon earth? The question therefore is not of who is to be obeyed, but of what be His commands."]

[f] [Ibid., p. 341.]

"Christ's lieutenant." Secondly, I answer, that by his own confession there is a great difference between him and me in this particular:—"Our Saviour hath promised this infallibility (in those things which are necessary to salvation) to the Apostles, until the Day of Judgment; that is to say, to the Apostles, and to pastors to be consecrated by them by imposition of hands: therefore the sovereign magistrate, as he is a Christian, is obliged to interpret the Holy Scriptures, when there is question about the mysteries of faith, by ecclesiastical persons rightly ordained[g]." Unless he have such "ordination" by "imposition of hands," I am better qualified than he is for the interpretation of Scripture, by his own confession.

But he "supposeth," that "a Bishop or a synod of Bishops should be set up for our civil sovereign[h]." A likely thing indeed. Suppose the sky fall, then we shall have larks. But to gratify him, let us "suppose" it. What then? "Then that which" I "object against" him, he "could object in the same words against" me[i]. So he might, if I should be so fond as to say that true religion did consist in obedience to that single Bishop, or that synod of Bishops; as he saith, that it doth consist in obedience to the sovereign prince. He deceiveth himself, and mistaketh us, if he think that we hold any such ridiculous opinions. If he could shew, that Bishops do challenge an infallibility to themselves by Divine right, and (which is more than infallibility) a power to authorize all their commands for true religion, he said something to the purpose.

He telleth us, that he "remembers there have been books written to entitle the Bishops to a Divine right underived from the civil sovereign[k]." Very likely, if the law of nature do make a Divine right. Perhaps a locomotive faculty, or a
864 liberty of respiration, which all other men do challenge as well as Bishops. But he meaneth in religion. Why not? They have their holy orders by succession from the Apostles,

[g] De Cive, c. xvii. [§ 28. p. 256.—"Infallibilitatem hanc promisit Servator Noster (in iis rebus quæ ad salutem sunt necessariæ) Apostolis usque ad Diem Judicii, hoc est, Apostolis, et pastoribus ab Apostolis successive per impositionem manuum consecrandis: obligatur ergo, quatenus Christianus, is qui habet civitatis imperium, Scripturas Sacras, ubi quæstio est de mysteriis Fidei, per ecclesiasticos ritè ordinatos interpretari."]

[h] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 341.]

[i] [Ibid.]

[k] [Ibid.]

PART III. not from their civil sovereigns. They have the power of the keys by the concession of Christ;—"Whose sins ye remit they are remitted, whose sins ye retain they are retained." None can give that to another, which they have not themselves. Where did Christ give the power of the keys to the civil magistrate?

[John xx. 23.]

[The primitive Christians obeyed God rather than man.]

I was far enough from thinking of "odes[l]," when I writ my Defence of Liberty. That which he calleth my "ode," was written about a thousand years before I was born. I cited it only to shew the sense of the primitive Christians concerning obedience to the unlawful commands of sovereign princes,—that "we ought to obey God rather than" them. And to that it is full.—

"Jussum est Cæsaris ore Gallieni,
"Princeps quod colit ut colamus omnes;
* * *
"Æternum colo Principem, dierum
"Factorem, Dominumque Gallieni[m]."

This put him into such a fit of versifying, that he could not forbear to make a "parode[n]," such as it is, wherein out of pure zeal (if it were worth taking notice of) he retaineth the errors of the press.

[T. H.'s wise principles.]

And so, confounding regal supremacy with a kind of omnipotence, and the external regiment of the Church with the power of the keys and jurisdiction in the inner court of conscience, and foreign usurpations with the ancient rights and liberties of the English Church, and a stipendiary "schoolmaster" (who hath neither title nor right but the mere pleasure of the master of the family) with Bishops, who are the successors of the Apostles in that part of their office which is of ordinary and perpetual necessity, and the king's proper council in ecclesiastical affairs[o], he concludeth his Animadversion with this fair intimation to Dr. Hammond and me,—that if we "had gone upon these" his "principles, when we

[l] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 342.]

[m] [See the Defence, Numb. xxxviii. above p. 196. note n; Disc. i. Pt. iii. Prudentius was born in 348, and wrote the poem containing these lines probably about the year 405:—See Chalmers' Biogr. Dict.]

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 342.—In the first edition of Bramhall's Defence (in 1655) the third line of the quotation was misprinted thus,—"Æternum *colemus* Principem dierum,"—so as to destroy the metre; which error Hobbes in his Questions (as printed in 1656) retained.]

[o] [Ibid., pp. 342, 343.]

did write in defence of the Church of England against the imputation of schism, quitting our own pretences of jurisdiction and *jus Divinum*, we had not been so shrewdly handled as we have been by an English Papist[p]." I hope neither the Church of England nor any genuine son of the English Church hath complained to him, that the Church hath suffered any disadvantage by our pains; nor our adversaries in that cause boasted to him of any advantage they have gained. I do rather believe, that it is but his own "imagination," without ever reading either party. Why should he interrupt his sadder "meditations" with reading such trifles? But for his "principles" (as he calleth them), I thank him, I will have nothing to do with them, except it be to shew him how destructive they are both to Church and commonwealth. But this I believe in earnest, that if we had "gone upon" his "principles," we should not have made ourselves the object of our adversaries' pity, but well of their scorn. Discourse II.

In his conclusion, or in his postscript (choose whether you will call it), first, he setteth down his "censure" of my Defence[q]; with the same ingenuity and judgment that he hath shewed hitherto, that is, none at all: which I esteem no more than a deaf nut; let the book justify itself. And to the "manner" of writing, he bites first, and whines; doth an injury and complains. The reader will find no "railing[r]" in my treatise, nor any of those faults which he objecteth. I rather fear, that he will censure it as too complying with such an adversary. But he had not then given me so much occasion as he hath done since, to make him lose that pleasure in reading which he took in writing. [His postscript.]

In the next place, he presenteth to the reader's view a large muster of terms and phrases, such as are used in the Schools, which he calleth "nonsense," and the "language of the kingdom of darkness[s];" that is all the confutation which he vouchsafeth them. He hath served them up often enough before, to the reader's loathing. Let him take it for a warning; wheresoever he reneweth his complaint, I shall make bold to renew my story of old Harpaste, who com-

[p] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 343.]
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [Ibid.]
[s] [Ibid.]

PART III.

plained that the room was dark, when the poor beldam wanted her sight[t]. There is more true judgment and solid reason in any one of the worst of those phrases which he

It is certain, that by the force of a man's arm a stone is thrown upwards; and yet the certain manner how to reconcile this with another truth,—that 'whatsoever acteth upon another body, acteth by a touching,'—is not so easily found out. The Incarnation of Christ is certain, yet the certain manner passeth both my capacity and his. Lastly, I do not say (as he suggesteth), that that truth which is demonstrable by reason, passeth my capacity, but the "certain" and exact "manner" how to reconcile this truth with another truth. Yet there are sundry ways of reconciling of them; and I have shewed him one in the same section, which he is not able to refute. See how his discourse hangs together like ropes of sand;—The prescience and decrees of God pass the capacity of mortal man; therefore the liberty of the will is not demonstrable by reason.

From the "hard words" and "nonsense" of the Schools, he passeth to my "little logic" and "no philosophy[a]." It skilleth not much what he saith, unless he were a greater clerk. He hath passed over a great part of my Defence untouched: but I have not omitted one sentence throughout his Animadversions, wherein I could find any one grain of reason; and among the rest, have satisfied his silly censures or ignorant exceptions in their proper places; and the splinters of those broken reeds stick in his own fingers.

Before he concludes, he draweth up a summary of what he and I have maintained[b]; very confusedly, most imperfectly, and in part falsely. Methinks it resembleth that unskilful painter, who durst not leave his pictures to the free judgment of the beholders, unless he writ over their heads, 'This is a dog,' and, 'This is a bear[c].' We had such a summary or draught of the controversy in his "Fountains of Arguments," before his Animadversions, as a proem. And now we have such another breviate in the conclusion, by way of epilogue, after his Animadversions. He is very diffident of his cause, who standeth in need of such proems and epilogues; and dare not trust the indifferent reader to choose his own diet, unless he do first chop it and chew it for him, and then thrust it down his throat. The last word may be effica-

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 344.]

[b] [Ibid., pp. 344—346.]

[c] [Ælian., Hist. Var., lib. x. c. 10.]

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cious with an ignorant multitude: who are like a ship at hull[d]; every wave puts it into a new posture. But more accurate palates do nauseate and loath such thrice-sodden coleworts. I leave the reader to compare plea with plea, and proof with proof; and let truth overcome.

Thus he concludeth, with a short apology,—lest "the reader should think, that" he "hath not used" me "with that respect which" he "ought or might have done without disadvantage to" his "cause[e]." His only reason is, because "divers in their books and sermons, without answering any of" his "arguments, have exclaimed against" him, "and reviled" him for some things delivered by him in his book *De Cive*[f]. What doth this concern me? No more than the man in the moon. Yes; he saith,—"whereof the Bishop of Derry is one[g]." Most falsely. I never preached against him; nor writ against his book *De Cive*, but privately to himself[h], and then with more respect than either he or it deserved. But his meaning was not, by this apology, to make me any reparation, but to deter others from meddling with him, lest he should "make examples" of them, as he boasteth that he hath done of me[i]. Beware, reader, "he beareth hay on his horn[k]." If he have gained any thing by his disrespect, much good may it do him. I do not envy him. Let the reader judge. And if he have any spark of ingenuity left in him, let himself judge, whether he hath "made an example" of me or of himself. Or if he like it better, let him thrust his head into a bush, and suppose that no body seeth his errors, because he is not willing to take notice of them himself.

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[d] [Viz. riding to and fro upon the water. Compare Shakspeare, Hen. VIII, ii. 4. in fine,—"Thus *hulling* in the wild sea of my conscience."]

[e] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. pp. 346, 347.]

[f] [Ibid., p. 347.]

[g] [Ibid.]

[h] [See above in the Defence, Advert. to the Reader, p. 20; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[i] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 348.]

[k] ["Fœnum habet in cornu, longe fuge;" &c. Horat., Sat., I. iv. 34.]

DISCOURSE III.

THE CATCHING OF LEVIATHAN

OR

THE GREAT WHALE:

DEMONSTRATING,

OUT OF MR. HOBBES HIS OWN WORKS,

THAT NO MAN, WHO IS THOROUGHLY A HOBBIST,

CAN BE

A GOOD CHRISTIAN OR A GOOD COMMONWEALTH'S MAN,

OR RECONCILE HIMSELF TO HIMSELF;

BECAUSE HIS PRINCIPLES

ARE NOT ONLY DESTRUCTIVE TO ALL RELIGION,

BUT TO ALL SOCIETIES;

EXTINGUISHING THE RELATION

BETWEEN

PRINCE AND SUBJECT, PARENT AND CHILD,
MASTER AND SERVANT, HUSBAND AND WIFE;

AND

ABOUND WITH PALPABLE CONTRADICTIONS.

BY JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.,

AND

BISHOP OF DERRY.

"THE LIP OF TRUTH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED FOR EVER, BUT A LYING TONGUE IS BUT FOR A MOMENT."—Prov. xii. 19.

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CHRISTIAN READER, this short treatise was not intended, or sent to the press, as a complete refutation of all Mr. Hobbes his errors in theology and policy; but only as an Appendix to my Castigations of his Animadversions, to let him see the vanity of his petulant scoffs and empty brags, and how open he doth lie to the lash, whensoever any one will vouchsafe to take him in hand to purpose. But some of my good friends have prevailed with me to alter my design, and to make this small treatise independent upon the other[a]. He who clasheth ordinarily with all the Churches in the world, about the common principles of religion; he who swerveth so often, so affectedly, from the approved rules, and healthful constitutions, of all orderly commonwealths; he who doth not only disturb, but destroy, all human society, and all relations between man and man; he who cannot preserve unity with himself, but ever and anon is interfering and tripping up his own heels by his contradictions; needeth no just confutation, or single or other adversary, than God, and himself, and all mankind.

If he did ground his opinions upon any other authority than his own dreams; if he did interpret Scripture according to the perpetual tradition of the Catholic Church, and not according to his private distempered phantasies; if his discourse were as full of deep reasons as it is of supercilious confidence, so that a man might gain either knowledge or reputation by him; a great volume would be well bestowed upon him. "*Digna res esset ubi quis nervos intenderet suos*[b]." But to what purpose is it to draw the cord of contention with

[a] [i. e. to make it a distinct treatise, with a separate title-page, although bound up in the same volume and printed continuously with the former treatise, the Castigations; of which it had been at first intended to form an additional "two or three chapters." See above in the Answ. to Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader, p. 252. note d, Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]

[b] ["Digna res est ubi tu nervos intendas tuos." Terent., Eun., II. iii. 20.]

such a man, in such a cause, where it is impiety to doubt, much more to dispute?

> " Quid cum illis agas, qui neque jus neque bonum aut æquum sciunt?
> " Melius pejus, prosit obsit, nihil vident nisi quod lubet[c]."

For mine own part, as long as God shall furnish me with ability and opportunity, I will endeavour to bestow my vacant hours upon a better subject, conducing more to the advancement of primitive piety and the reunion of Christendom, by disabusing the hood-winked world[d], than this;—this doth tend to the increase of atheism and destruction of ancient truth;—unless the importunity of T. H. or some other divert me to look to my own defence. I desire thy Christian prayers, that God, Who hath put this good desire into my mind by His preventing grace, will help me by His assisting grace to bring the same to good effect.

[c] [Id., Heautontim., IV., i. 29, 30.]

[d] [For the probable explanation of the design here alluded to, see Bramhall's Vindication of himself against Baxter, c. v, in vol. iii. p. 539; Disc. iii. Pt. ii: which was *written* in 1659, the year after the publication of the present tract.]

THE PREFACE.

HITHERTO I have made use only of a buckler to guard myself from Mr. Hobbes his assaults. What passed between him and me in private had been buried in perpetual silence, if his flattering disciples (not without his own fault, whether it were connivance or neglect is not material to me) had not published it to the world to my prejudice[e]. And now, having carved out mine own satisfaction, I thought to have desisted here, as not esteeming him to be a fit adversary, who denieth all common principles, but rather to be like a pillar of smoke, breaking out of the top of some narrow chimney, and spreading itself abroad like a cloud, as if it threatened to take possession of the whole region of the air, darkening the sky, and seeming to pierce the heavens; and after all this, when it hath offended the eyes a little for the present, the first puff of wind, or a few minutes, do altogether disperse it. [Reason for the author's answering T. H.'s book.]

I never nourished within my breast the least thought of answering his Leviathan; as having seen a great part of it answered before ever I read it[f], and having moreover received it from good hands that a Roman Catholic was about it[g]: but being braved by the author in print, as giving me a title for my answer—"Behemoth against Leviathan[h]"—and at other times being so solicitous for me, "what" I "would say" to such a passage in my "answer to" his "Leviathan[i]," imagining his silly cavils to be irrefragable demonstrations; I will take the liberty (by his good leave) to throw on two or

[e] [See above pp. 19, 251. notes e, r.]

[f] [Viz. by] D. R. C.—[Of the numerous opponents whom the publication of the Leviathan called forth, these initials suit none of the long list given in the Vitæ Hobbianæ Auctarium (pp. 193—214. 8vo. 1681) except Dr. Ralph Cudworth; and he is excluded by the date of the present tract (1658), his Intell. System not having been published until 1678, and his Discourse of Moral Good and Evil (which was an express reply to Hobbes—see Mosheim's Pref. to his edition of the Intell. System) being still in MS.]

[g] [Viz.] P. I. S. [These initials also are unintelligible to the Editor.]

[h] Qu., [Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader,] p. 20.

[i] Ibid., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii.] p. 340.

three spadefuls of earth towards the final interment of his pernicious principles and other mushroom errors. And, truly, when I ponder seriously the horrid consequences of them, I do not wonder so much at his mistaken exception to my civil form of valediction—"So God bless us,"—miscalling it "a buffoonly abusing of the Name of God to calumny[k]." He conceived me amiss,—that because, in times less scrupulous and more conscientious, men used to bless themselves after this form at the naming of the devil, therefore I did intend it as a prayer for the deliverance of all good Christians from 870
him and his blasphemous opinions.

I do believe there never was any author, sacred or profane, ancient or modern, Christian, Jew, Mahometan, or Pagan, that hath inveighed so frequently and so bitterly against all "feigned phantasms," with their first devisers, maintainers, and receivers, as T. H. hath done; excluding out of the nature of things the souls of men, angels, devils, and all "incorporeal substances," as "fictions," "phantasms," and groundless "contradictions[l]." Many men fear the meaning of it is not good;—that God Himself must be gone for company, as being an "incorporeal substance," except men will vouchsafe by God to understand nature. So much T. H. himself seemeth to intimate;—"This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God[m]." If God's eternal decree be nothing else but "the concourse" of all natural causes, then Almighty God is nothing else but nature. And if there be no spirits or incorporeal substances, He must be either nature or nothing. T. H. defieth the Schools; and therefore he knoweth no difference between immanent and emanant or transient actions, but confoundeth the eternal decrees of God before all time with the execution of them in time; which had been a foul fault in a Schoolman.

Leviathan a mere phantasm.

And yet his Leviathan, or "mortal God[n]," is a mere

[k] Qu., [Animadv. upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader,] p. 20.

[l] [Leviath., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. pp. 208, 214.—Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 160.—&c.]

[m] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xi. above p. 58.]—Qu., [T. H. Numb. xi.] p. 80.

[n] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.]

phantasm of his own devising; neither flesh nor fish, but a confusion of a man and a whale, engendered in his own brain; not unlike Dagon the idol of the Philistines, a mixture of a God and a man and a fish. The true literal Leviathan is the whale-fish;—"Canst thou draw out Leviathan with a hook?"—whom "God hath made to take his pastime in the great and wide sea." And for a metaphorical Leviathan, I know none so proper to personate that huge body as T. H. himself. The Leviathan doth not "take his pastime" in the deep with so much freedom, nor behave himself with so much height and insolence, as T. H. doth in the Schools; nor domineer over the lesser fishes with so much scorn and contempt, as he doth over all other authors; censuring, branding, contemning, proscribing, whatsoever is contrary to his humour; bustling, and bearing down before him whatsoever cometh in his way; creating truth and falsehood by the breath of his mouth, by his sole authority without other reason, a second Pythagoras at least. There have been self-conceited persons in all ages, but none that could ever "king" it like him "over all the children of pride[o]." "*Ruit, agit, rapit, tundit, et prosternit*[p]."

Job xli. 1. Ps. civ. 26. T. H. the true Leviathan. Job xli. 34. [speaking of the Leviathan.]

Yet is not his Leviathan such an absolute sovereign of the sea as he imagineth. "God hath chosen the weak things of this world to confound the mighty." The little mouse stealeth up through the elephant's trunk to eat his brains, making him die desperately mad. The Indian rat creepeth into the belly of the gaping crocodile, and gnaweth his bowels asunder. The great Leviathan hath his adversaries; the sword-fish, which pierceth his belly beneath, and the thrasher-fish, which beateth his head above: and whensoever these two unite their forces together against him, they destroy him. But this is the least part of his Leviathan's sufferings. Our Greenland fishers have found out a new art to draw him out of his castle, that is, the deep, though not with a fish-hook, yet with their harping irons; and by giving him line and space enough to bounce and tumble up and down, and tire himself right out, and try all his arts, as spouting up a sea of water

Leviathan no sovereign of the sea. 1 Cor. i. 27.

[o] [Applied by Hobbes to his own "Leviathan," Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxviii. pp. 166, 167.]

[p] ["Post hæc præcipitem darem; Cæteros ruerem, agerem, raperem, tunderem, et prosternerem." Terent., Adelph., III. ii. 20, 21.]

out of his mouth to drown them, and striking at their shallops with his tail to overwhelm them, at last to draw this formidable creature to the shore, or to their ship, and slice him in pieces, and boil him in a cauldron, and tun him up in oil.

I have provided three good harping-irons for myself to dart at this monster, and am resolved to try my skill and fortune, whether I can be as successful against this phantastic Leviathan, as they are against the true Leviathan.

[Division of the argument.] My first dart is aimed at his heart, or theological part of his discourse; to shew that his principles are not consistent either with Christianity or any other religion.

The second dart is aimed at the chine, whereby this vast body is united and fitted for animal motion, that is, the political part of his discourse; to shew that his principles are pernicious to all forms of government, and all societies, and destroy all relations between man and man.

The third dart is aimed at his head, or rational part of his discourse; to shew that his principles are inconsistent with themselves, and contradict one another.

Let him take heed. If these three darts do pierce his Leviathan home, it is not all the dittany which groweth in Crete[q], that can make them drop easily out of his body, without the utter overthrow of his cause.

"——— hærebit lateri lethalis arundo[r]."

[q] [Virg., Æn., xii. 411—419.—Plin., Hist. Nat., viii. 27. xxv. 8.]
[r] [Virg., Æn., iv. 73.]

DISCOURSE III.

THE CATCHING OF LEVIATHAN

OR

THE GREAT WHALE.

[FIRST PRINTED AT LONDON, A.D. 1658.]

CHAP. I.

THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE DESTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY AND ALL RELIGION.

Nature dictates the existence and worship of God.

THE Image of God is not altogether defaced by the fall of man, but that there will remain some practical notions of God and goodness; which, when the mind is free from vagrant desires and violent passions, do shine as clearly in the heart, as other speculative notions do in the head. Hence it is, that there never was any nation so barbarous or savage throughout the whole world, which had not their God. They who did never wear clothes upon their backs, who did never know magistrate but their father, yet have their God, and their religious rites and devotions to Him. Hence it is, that the greatest atheists in any sudden danger do unwittingly cast their eyes up to Heaven, as craving aid from thence, and in a thunder creep into some hole to hide themselves. And they who are conscious to themselves of any secret crimes, though they be secure enough from the justice of men, do yet feel the blind blows[a] of a guilty conscience, and fear Divine vengeance. This is acknowledged by T. H. himself in his lucid intervals:—"That we may know what worship of God natural reason doth assign, let us begin with His attributes; where it is manifest, in the first place, that existency is to be attributed to Him[b]." To which he addeth, "infiniteness—in-

[a] ["Quos diri conscia facti Mens habet attonitos et *surdo verbere* cædit." Juv., Sat., xiii. 193, 194.]

[b] De Cive, c. xv. § 14. [p. 182.—"Ut sciamus autem quem cultum Dei assignet ratio naturalis, incipiamus ab attributis; ubi imprimis manifestum attribuendam Ei esse existentiam."]

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comprehensibility—unity—ubiquity[e]." Thus for attributes, next for actions:—"Concerning external actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped, the most general precept of reason is, that they be signs of honour; under which are contained prayers—thanksgivings—oblations and sacrifices[d]." Yet, to let us see how inconsistent and irreconcileable he is with himself, elsewhere, reckoning up all the laws of nature at large, even twenty in number[e], he hath not one word that concerneth religion, or that hath the least relation in the world to God. As if a man were like the colt of a wild ass in the wilderness, without any owner or obligation. Thus, in describing the laws of nature, this great clerk forgetteth the God of nature, and the main and principal laws of nature, which contain a man's duty to his God and the principal end of his creation. Perhaps he will say, that he handleth the laws of nature there, only so far as may serve to the constitution or settlement of a commonwealth. In good time; let it be so. He hath devised us a trim commonwealth; which is neither founded upon religion towards God, nor justice towards man, but merely upon self-interest and self-preservation. Those rays of heavenly light, those natural seeds of religion, which God Himself hath imprinted in the heart of man, are more efficacious towards the preservation of a society, whether we regard the nature of the thing or the blessing of God, than all his "pacts[f]," and "surrenders[g]," and "translations of power[h]." He who unteacheth men their duty to God, may make them 'eye-servants,' so long as their interest doth oblige them to obey, but is no fit master to teach men conscience and fidelity.

T. H. no friend to religion.

[Eph. vi. 6. —Col. iii. 22.]

Without religion, societies are but like soapy bubbles, quickly dissolved. It was the judgment of as wise a man as T. H. himself (though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it), that Rome owed more of its grandeur to religion than either to strength or stratagems;—"We have not exceeded the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the

[e] [De Cive, c. xv. § 14. pp. 183, 184.]

[d] [Ibid., p. 185.—"Circa actiones externas quibus Deus colendus est, . . generalissimum rationis præceptum est, ut sint signa animi honorantis; sub quo continentur, primo, preces, . . . secundo, gratiarum actio, . . . tertio, dona, id est oblationes et sacrificia."]

[e] [Ibid., c. ii. § 3: c. iii. § 1—25: pp. 14, 24—36.]

[f] ["Pacta:" ibid., c. ii. § 9. p. 17; and passim.]

[g] ["Donationes:" ibid., § 8. p. 16.]

[h] ["Translationes juris:" ibid., § 4. p. 14; and passim.]

Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians in art," &c., "but we have overcome all nations by our piety and religion[i]."

Among his laws he inserteth "gratitude" to man, as "the third precept of the law of nature[j];" but of the gratitude of mankind to their Creator, there is a deep silence. If men had sprung up from the earth in a night, like mushrooms or excrescences, without all sense of honour, justice, conscience, or gratitude, he could not have vilified the human nature more than he doth.

From this shameful omission or preterition of the main
872 duty of mankind, a man might easily "take the height[k]" of T. H. his religion. But he himself putteth it past all conjectures. His principles are brimfull of prodigious impiety. "In these four things, opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion[l];" the "culture" and improvement whereof, he referreth only to "policy,"—"human" and "Divine politics[l]" are but politics. And again,—"Mankind hath this from the conscience of their own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the most part of men believe that there is an invisible God, the Maker of all visible things[m]." And a little after he telleth us, that "superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason, and atheism from an opinion of reason without fear[n];" making atheism to be more reasonable than superstition. What is now become of that "Divine worship" which "natural reason did assign unto God," the "honour" of "existence—infiniteness—incomprehensibility—unity—ubiquity[o]?" What is now become of that dictate or "precept of reason," concerning "prayers, thanksgivings, oblations, sacrifices?" if uncertain "opinions, ignorance, fear," mistakes, the "conscience" of our "own weakness," and "the admiration of natural events," be the only "seeds of religion[o]."

[i] Cic., De Harusp. Respons., Orat. in P. Clod., [c. ix.]

[j] De Cive, c. iii. § 8. [pp. 28, 29.]

[k] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. pp. 323, 324.—"By this argument a man may easily take the height of the Bishop's logic."]

[l] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xii.] p. 54.

[m] De Cive, c. xvi. § 1. [p. 194.—Habet hoc humanum genus ab imbecilitatis propriæ conscientiâ et admiratione eventuum naturalium, ut plerique credant esse omnium rerum visibilium Opificem invisibilem Deum."]

[n] [Ibid.—"Hæc enim" (superstitio) "a metu sine rectâ ratione, ille" (atheismus) "a rationis opinione sine metu proficiscitur."]

[o] [See above notes b, c, d.]

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Excuseth atheism.

He proceedeth further;—that atheism itself, "though it be an erroneous opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbered among the sins of imprudence or ignorance[p]." He addeth, that "an atheist is punished, not as a subject is punished by his king, because he did not observe laws, but as an enemy by an enemy, because he would not accept laws[q]." His reason is, because the atheist never submitted his will to the will of God, Whom he never thought to be[r]. And he concludeth, that man's obligation to obey God proceedeth from his weakness;—"*Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandum ipsi*" (*Deo*) "*obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem*[s]." First, it is impossible that should be a sin of mere "ignorance" or "imprudence," which is directly contrary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature need no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of man. "The law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent[t];" or rather, "the law of nature is the assent itself[u]." Then if nature dictate to us, that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such manner, it is not possible that atheism should be a sin of mere "ignorance." Secondly, a rebellious subject is still a subject *de jure*, though not *de facto*, by right though not by deed; and so the most cursed atheist that is, ought by right to be the subject of God, and ought to be punished, not as a just "enemy," but as a disloyal traitor: which is confessed by himself;—"This fourth sin" (that is, of those who "do not by word and deed confess one God the Supreme King of Kings") "in the natural Kingdom of God is the crime of high treason, for it is a denial of Divine power, or atheism[v]." Then an atheist is a traitor to God, and

[p] De Cive, c. xiv. § 19. [pp. 168, 169. —"Dicet" (atheus), . . "'quamquam opinio sua erronea esset, ideoque etiam peccatum, numerandum tamen esse inter peccata imprudentiæ sive ignorantiæ.' . . Oratio hæc eo usque admittenda esse videtur."]

[q] [Ibid., p. 169.—"Punitur enim atheus, . . non ut subditus punitur a rege, propterea quod leges non observaverit; sed ut hostis ab hoste, quod leges noluerit accipere."]

[r] De Cive, [c. xiv. § 19. p. 168.—"Si quidem peccatum non sit quod non sit contra aliquam legem, neque lex ulla sit quæ non sit mandatum ejus qui summum habet imperium, neque quisquam summum imperium habeat *quod non sit ei nostro consensu delatum*, quomodo peccare dicetur is, qui vel non existere Deum vel non gubernare mundum affirmaverit." &c.]

[s] [Ibid.,] c. xv. § 7. [p. 178.]

[t] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 136.]

[u] [Ibid.,] p. 137.

[v] De Cive, c. xv. § 19. [pp. 192, 193.—"Quarto" (peccare subditos),

punishable as a disloyal subject, not as an "enemy." Lastly, it is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our obedience to God to depend upon our weakness,—because we cannot help it; and not upon our gratitude,—because we owe our being and preservation to Him. "Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? Or who feedeth a flock and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" And again,— "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power, for Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are, and were created." But it were much better (or at least not so ill) to be a downright atheist, than to make God to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust Him into the devil's office, to be the cause of all sin.

Discourse III.

1 Cor. ix. 7.

Rev. iv. 11.

For T. H. his God is not the God of Christians, nor of any rational men. Our God is everywhere; and seeing He hath no parts, He must be wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly everywhere. So nature itself dictateth. "It cannot be said honourably of God, that He is in a place, for nothing is in a place but that which hath proper bounds of its greatness[x]." But T. H. his God is not wholly everywhere. "No man can conceive, . . that any thing is all in this place and all in another place at the same time; . . for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense[y]." So far well, if by "conceiving" he mean comprehending; but then follows, that these "are absurd speeches taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen[z]." Thus he denieth the
873 ubiquity of God. A circumscriptive, a definitive, and a repletive being in a place, is some heathen language to him.

Destroys God's ubiquity.

Our God is immutable, "without any shadow of turning by change;" to Whom all things are present, nothing past, nothing to come. But T. H. his God is measured by time, losing something that is past, and acquiring something that doth come, every minute. That is as much as to say, that

His eternity. [Jam. i. 17.]

"si non confiteantur coram hominibus verbis et factis, unum esse Deum Optimum, Maximum, Beatissimum, totius mundi mundanorumque regum Regem supremum; hoc est, si Deum non colunt. Quartum hoc peccatum in Regno Dei naturali . . læsæ Divinæ majestatis crimen est: est enim negatio Divinæ potestatis, sive atheismus."]

[x] De Cive, c. xv. § 14. [pp. 183, 184.—"Neque dici de Deo honorificè, . . quod in loco aliquo sit; in loco enim non est nisi quod undequaque fines et terminos habeat magnitudinis."]

[y] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. iii.] p. 11.

[z] [Ibid.]

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our God is infinite, and his God is finite; for unto that which is actually infinite, nothing can be added, neither time nor parts. Hear himself;—"Nor do I understand, what derogation it can be to the Divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that is, in English, power" (so little doth he understand what potentiality is), "and successive duration[a]." And he chargeth it upon us as a fault; that "will not have eternity to be an endless succession of time[b]." How? "Successive duration," and "an endless succession of time," in God? Then God is finite. Then God is elder to-day than He was yesterday. Away with blasphemies. Before, he destroyed the ubiquity of God; and now he destroyeth His eternity.

His simplicity.

Our God is a perfect, pure, simple, indivisible, infinite essence; free from all composition of matter and form, of substance and accidents. All matter is finite; and He, Who acteth by his infinite essence, needeth neither organs, nor faculties, nor accidents, to render Him more complete. But T. H. his God is a divisible God, a compounded God, that hath matter, and qualities, or accidents. Hear himself. I argue thus:—"The Divine substance is indivisible, but eternity is the Divine substance; the major is evident, because God is '*actus simplicissimus*;' .. the minor .. is confessed by all men,—that 'whatsoever is attributed to God, is God[c].'" Now listen to his answer:—"The major is so far from being evident, that '*actus simplicissimus*' signifieth nothing; the minor is said by some men, thought by no man; whatsoever is thought, is understood[d]." The major was this,—"The Divine substance is indivisible." Is this "far from being evident?" Either it is indivisible or divisible. If it be not indivisible, then it is divisible; then it is materiate, then it is corporeal, then it hath parts, then it is finite, by his own confession;—"*Habere partes aut esse totum aliquid sunt attributa finitorum*[e]." Upon this silly conceit he chargeth me for saying, that "God is not just but justice itself, not eternal but eternity itself;" which he calleth "unseemly words to be

[a] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 266.]
[b] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.] p. 374.
[c] [Defence, Numb. xxiv, above pp. 158, 159; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[d] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv.] p. 267.
[e] De Cive, c. xv. § 14. [p. 184.]

said of God[f]." And he thinketh he doth me a great courtesy, in not adding "blasphemous and atheistical[g]." But his bolts are so soon shot, and his reasons are such vain imaginations and such drowsy phantasies, that no sad man doth much regard them. Thus he hath already destroyed the ubiquity, the eternity, and the simplicity, of God. I wish he had considered better with himself, before he had desperately cast himself upon these rocks.

His existence.

But "*paulo majora canamus*[h]." My next charge is, that he destroys the very being of God, and leaves nothing in His place but an empty name. For by taking away all incorporeal substances he taketh away God Himself. The very name (saith he) of an "incorporeal substance" is a "contradiction;" and "to say that an Angel or Spirit is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect, that there is no Angel or Spirit at all[i]." By the same reason, to say that God is an incorporeal substance, is to say there is no God at all. Either God is incorporeal, or He is finite, and consists of parts, and consequently is no God. This—that there is no incorporeal spirit—is that main root of atheism, from which so many lesser branches are daily sprouting up. When they have taken away all incorporeal spirits, what do they leave God Himself to be? He, Who is the fountain of all being, from Whom and in Whom all creatures have their being, must needs have a real being of His own. And what real being can God have among bodies and accidents? For they have left nothing else in the universe. Then T. H. may move the same question of God, which he did of devils;—"I would gladly know in what classis of entities the Bishop ranketh[j]" God? Infinite being and participated being are not of the same nature. Yet, to speak according to human apprehension—(apprehension and comprehension differ much,—T. H. confesseth, that "natural reason" doth dictate to us, that God is "infinite," yet natural reason cannot comprehend the infiniteness of God),—I place Him among incorporeal substances or spirits, because He hath been pleased to place Himself in

[f] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv.] p. 266.
[g] [Ibid.]
[h] [Virg., Bucol., iv. 1.]
[i] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 214. [—"incorporeal in that sense," viz. as meaning "not body."]
[j] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xv.] p. 160.

PART III. John iv. 24.

that rank. "God is a Spirit." Of which place T. H. giveth his opinion, that it is unintelligible, and all others of the same nature, "and fall not under human understanding[k]."

They who deny all incorporeal substances, can understand 87
nothing by God, but either nature (not "*naturam naturantem*," that is, a real author of nature, but "*naturam naturatam*[l]," that is, the orderly concourse of natural causes), as T. H. seemeth to intimate, or a fiction of the brain without real being, cherished for advantage and politic ends, as a profitable error, howsoever dignified with the glorious title of "the eternal causes of all things[m]."

[T. H.'s opinions concerning] the Trinity.

We have seen what his principles are concerning the Deity; they are full as bad or worse concerning the Trinity. Hear himself:—"A person is he that is represented, as often as he is represented; and therefore God, Who has been represented (that is, personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons, though neither the word Person nor Trinity be ascribed to Him in the Bible[n]:"—and a little after;—"To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this,—that the God Who is always one and the same, was the Person represented by Moses, the Person represented by His Son incarnate, and the Person represented by the Apostles; as represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spake is God; as represented by His Son, that was God and Man, the Son is that God; as represented by Moses and the High Priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: from whence we may gather the reason, why those names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament; for they are Persons, that is, they have their names from representing, which could not be till divers men had represented God's person in ruling or in directing under Him[o]."

Who is so bold as blind Bayard? The emblem of a little boy attempting to lade all the water out of the sea with a

[k] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 208.

[l] [A short explanation of these terms may be found in Coleridge's Aids to Reflection, p. 185. note. 4th edit.; and a discussion of the subject, in Cudin his Intell. System (vol. i. pp. 147 sq. ed. Mosh.), with Mosheim's notes upon it.]

[m] [See above p. 516. note m.]

[n] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 268.

[o] [Ibid. pp. 268, 269.]

cockleshell, doth fit T. H. as exactly as if it had been shaped for him; who thinketh to measure the profound and inscrutable mysteries of religion by his own silly, shallow conceits. What is now become of the great adorable mystery of the Blessed Undivided Trinity? It is shrunk into nothing. Upon his grounds there was no Trinity; and we must blot these words out of our Creed, "The Father eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Ghost eternal[p];" and these other words out of our Bibles, "Let us make man after Our image;" unless we mean, that this was a consultation of God with Moses and the Apostles. What is now become of the Eternal Generation of the Son of God, if this Sonship did not begin until about four thousand years after the creation were expired? Upon these grounds, every king hath as many "persons" as there be justices of peace and petty constables in his kingdom. Upon this account, God Almighty hath as many "Persons" as there have been sovereign princes in the world since Adam. According to this reckoning, each one of us, like so many Geryons, may have as many "persons" as we please to make procurations. Such bold presumption requireth another manner of confutation.

[Gen.i.26.]

Concerning God the Son, forgetting what he had said elsewhere, where he calleth Him "God and Man[q]," and, "The Son of God incarnate[r]," he doubteth not to say, that the word "hypostatical" is "canting[s]." As if the same Person could be both "God and Man," without a personal, that is, a "hypostatical" union of the two natures of God and man. He alloweth every man, who is "commanded" by his "lawful" sovereign, to deny Christ "with his tongue" before men[t]. He deposeth Christ from His true kingly office, making His "kingdom not to commence or begin before the Day of Judgment[u]." And, "The regiment, wherewith Christ governeth His faithful in this life, is not properly a kingdom, but a pastoral office, or a right to teach[x]." And a little after, "Christ

[Concerning God the Son.]

[p] [Athanasian Creed.]
[q] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii. p. 269.]
[r] [Ibid.]
[s] [Ibid., Pt. I. c. v.] p. 21.
[t] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 271.
[u] De Cive, c. xvii. § 5. [p. 219.—"Regnum autem Dei cujus restituendi causâ Christus a Deo Patre missus est, non ante initium sumit quam ab adventu Ejus secundo, nimirum a Die Judicii."]
[x] [Ibid.,] § 6. [p. 222.—"Regimen quo fideles Suos in hâc vitâ Christus regit, non est proprie regnum, sive imperium, sed munus pastoritium sive jus docendi."]

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[Of His Priestly office.] He taketh away His Priestly or propitiatory office:—"And although this act of our redemption be not always in Scripture called a sacrifice and oblation, but sometimes a price, yet by price we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof He could claim right to a pardon for us from His offended Father, but that price which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand[z];"—and again,—"Not that the death of one Man, though without sin, can satisfy for the offences of all men in the rigour of justice, but in the mercy of God, that ordainted such sacrifices for sin as He was pleased in mercy to accept[a]." He knoweth no difference between one who is mere man, and one who was both God and Man, between a Levitical sacrifice and the all-sufficient Sacrifice of the Cross, between the blood of a calf, and the precious Blood of the Son of God.

[Of His prophetical office.] And touching the Prophetical Office of Christ, I do much 875
doubt whether he do believe in earnest, that there is any such thing as prophecy in the world. He maketh very little difference between "a prophet" and "a madman" and "a demoniac[b];" and "if there were nothing else" (saith he) "that bewrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough[c]." He maketh the "pretence of inspiration" in any man to be, and always to have been, "an opinion pernicious to peace," and tending to "the dissolution of all civil government[d]." He subjecteth all Prophetical revelations from God to the sole pleasure and censure of the sovereign prince, either to authorize them or to exauctorate them: so as, two prophets prophesying the same thing at the same time in the dominions of two different princes, the one shall be a true prophet, the other a false; and Christ, Who had the approbation of no sovereign prince, upon his grounds, was to be reputed a false prophet every where.—"Every man therefore ought to consider who is the

[y] [Ibid., p. 223.—"Non ergo habuit Christus a Patre Sibi commissam authoritatem Regiam aut imperatoriam in mundo, sed consiliariam et doctrinalem tantum."]

[z] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] p. 248.

[a] Ibid., [c. xli.] p. 261.

[b] Ibid., [Pt. I. c. viii. pp. 37—39.]

[c] [Ibid.,] p. 36.

[d] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.

sovereign prophet, that is to say, who it is that is God's vice- Discourse III.
gerent upon earth, and hath next under God the authority of governing Christian men; and to observe for a rule that doctrine which in the name of God he hath commanded to be taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines, which pretended prophets, with miracle or without, shall at any time advance," &c.; "and if he disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a part of the spirit of their sovereign[e]." Upon his principles, the case holdeth as well among Jews and Turks and heathens as Christians. Then he that teacheth Transubstantiation in France, is a true prophet; he that teacheth it in England, a false prophet. He that blasphemeth Christ in Constantinople, a true prophet; he that doth the same in Italy, a false prophet. Then Samuel was a false prophet, to contest with Saul a "sovereign prophet." So was the man of God, who submitted not to the more Divine and prophetic spirit of Jeroboam. And Elijah, for reproving Ahab. Then Micaiah had but his deserts, to be clapt up in prison, and "fed with bread of affliction, and water of affliction," for daring to contradict "God's vicegerent upon earth." And Jeremiah was justly thrown into a dungeon for prophesying against Zedekiah his liege lord. If his principles were true, it were strange indeed, that none of all these princes, nor any other that ever was in the world, should understand their own privileges; and yet more strange, that God Almighty should take the part of such rebellious prophets, and justify their prophecies by the event, if it were true, that "none but the sovereign in a Christian" (the reason is the same for Jewish) "commonwealth can take notice what is or what is not the word of God[f]."

1 Sam. xv. 1 Kings xiii. 1 Kings xviii. 2 Chron. xviii. Jer. xxxviii.

Neither doth he use God the Holy Ghost more favourably than God the Son. Where St. Peter saith, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit," he saith, "By the Spirit is meant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural[g];" which dreams or visions he maketh to be no more than "imaginations, which they had in their sleep or in an extacy, which in every true prophet were super-

[Concerning God the Holy Ghost.] [2 Peter i. 21.]

[e] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxvi.] p. 232.
[f] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xl.] p. 250.
[g] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 214.

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natural, but in false prophets were either natural or feigned[h]," and more likely to be false than true. "To say, God hath spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say, he dreamed that God spake to him," &c.; "to say he hath seen a vision or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking[i]." So St. Peter's "Holy Ghost" is come to be their own "imaginations," which might be either feigned, or mistaken, or true. As if the Holy Ghost did enter only at their eyes and at their ears, not into their understandings, nor into their minds; or as if the Holy Ghost did not seal unto their hearts the truth and assurance of their prophecies. Whether a new light be infused into their understandings, or new graces be inspired into their heart, they are wrought, or caused, or created, immediately by the Holy Ghost; and so are his "imaginations," if they be supernatural.

But he must needs fall into these absurdities, who maketh but a jest of inspiration.—They "who pretend Divine inspiration to be a supernatural entering of the Holy Ghost into a man, .. are" (as he "thinks") "in a very dangerous dilemma; for if they worship not the men whom they conceive to be inspired, they fall into impiety; .. and if they worship them, they commit idolatry[j]:" so mistaking the Holy Ghost to be corporeal, something that is "blown into" a man, and the graces of the Holy Ghost to be corporeal graces. "And the words impoured" (or infused) "virtue, and inblown" (or inspired) "virtue, are as absurd and insignificant as 'a round quadrangle[k].'" He reckons it as a common error, that "faith and sanctity are not attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion;" and layeth this for a firm ground;— 876
"Faith and sanctity are indeed not very frequent, but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways[l]." I would see the greatest Pelagian of them all fly higher.

Why should he trouble himself about the Holy Spirit? who acknowledgeth no spirit but "either a subtle fluid invisible body, or a ghost or other idol or phantasm of imagination[m];"

[h] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxvi.] p. 227.
[i] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxii.] p. 196.
[j] Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xlv.] p. 361.
[k] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. iv.] p. 17.
[l] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.
[m] [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 208.]

who knoweth no inward grace or intrinsecal holiness. "'Holy' is a word, which in God's kingdom answereth to that, which men in their kingdoms use to call 'public,' or 'the king's';" and again,—"Wheresoever the word 'holy' is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety gotten by consent[n]." His 'holiness' is a relation, not a quality; but for inward sanctification, or real infused holiness, in respect whereof the Third Person is called the Holy Ghost, because He is not only Holy in Himself, but also maketh us holy, he is so great a stranger to it, that he doth altogether deny it and disclaim it.

[Concerning the Holy Catholic Church.]

We are taught in our Creed to believe the Catholic or universal Church. But T. H. teacheth us the contrary:— that "if there be more Christian Churches than one, all of them together are not one Church personally[o];" and more plainly,—"Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one commonwealth, they are not one person, nor is there an universal Church, that hath any authority over them[p];" and again,—"The universal Church is not one person, of which it can be said, that it hath done, or decreed, or ordained, or excommunicated, or absolved[q]." This doth quite overthrow all the authority of General Councils.

[T. H. maketh Church and commonwealth the same thing.]

All other men distinguish between the Church and the commonwealth; only T. H. maketh them to be one and the same thing:—"The commonwealth of Christian men and the Church of the same are altogether the same thing, called by two names, for two reasons; for the matter of the Church and of the commonwealth is the same, namely the same Christian men; and the form is the same, which consisteth in the lawful power of convocating them[r]:"—and hence he concludeth, that "every Christian commonwealth is a Church endowed with all spiritual authority[s];" and yet more fully,—"The

[n] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxv.] p. 220.

[o] De Cive, c. xvii. § 22. [p. 240.—"Si plures sint civitates Christianæ, eas simul omnes Ecclesiam personaliter unam non esse."]

[p] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiii.] p. 206.

[q] De Cive, c. xvii. § 26. [p. 251.—"Ecclesia universalis non est una persona, de quâ possit dici quod fecerit, decreverit, statuerit, excommunicaverit, absolverit, et similia personalia."]

[r] Ibid, c. xvii. § 21. [p. 239.—"Civitatem Christianorum hominum, et Ecclesiam eorundem, prorsus eandem rem esse, duobus nominibus propter duas causas appellatam; nam materia civitatis et Ecclesiæ eadem est, nimirum iidem homines Christiani; forma autem, quæ consistit in legitimâ potestate eos convocandi, eadem quoque est."]

[s] Ibid., c. xviii. § 1. [p. 258.—"Ci-

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Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with the commonwealth of Christians; called a commonwealth, because it consisteth of men united in one person, their sovereign; and a Church, because it consisteth in Christian men united in one Christian sovereign[t]." Upon which account there was no Christian Church in these parts of the world for some hundreds of years after Christ, because there was no Christian sovereign.

[His opinions concerning the Holy Scriptures.]

Neither is he more orthodox concerning the Holy Scriptures.—"Hitherto" (that is, for the books of Moses) "the power of making the Scripture canonical was in the civil sovereign[u]." The like he saith of the Old Testament, made "canonical" by Esdras[x]. And of the New Testament,—that "it was not the Apostles which made their own writings canonical, but every convert made them so to himself[y];" yet with this restriction, that until "the sovereign ruler" had "prescribed" them, "they were but counsel and advice, which, whether good or bad, he that was counselled might without injustice refuse to observe, and being contrary to the laws established, could not without injustice observe[z]."—(He maketh the primitive Christians to have been in a pretty condition. Certainly the Gospel was "contrary to the laws" then "established.")—But most plainly,—"The word of the interpreter of the Scripture is the Word of God;" and "the same is the interpreter of the Scripture and the sovereign judge of all doctrines," that is, the sovereign magistrate, "to whose authority we must stand no less than to theirs, who at first did commend the Scripture to us for the canon of faith[a]." Thus, if Christian sovereigns of different communions do clash one with another in their interpretations (or misinterpretation) of Scripture (as they do daily), then the Word of God is contradictory to itself; or that is the Word of God in one commonwealth, which is the word of the devil in another commonwealth; and the same thing may be true and not

vitatem omnem Christianam esse Ecclesiam hujusmodi" (scil. spirituali) "authoritate præditam."]

[t] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiii.] pp. 205, [206.]

[u] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 283.

[x] [Ibid.,] p. 284.

[y] Ibid.

[z] [Ibid.,] pp. 284, [285.]

[a] De Cive, c. xvii. [§ 17. p. 235.—"Verum est, verbum interpretis Scripturarum esse Verbum Dei."]—§ 18. [p. 237.—"Interpres canonicus, . . cujus . . authoritate standum non minus sit, quam eorum qui Scripturam ipsam pro canone Fidei primi nobis commendaverunt; idemque sit interpres Scripturæ et doctrinarum omnium judex supremus."]

true at the same time; which is the peculiar privilege of T. H.,—to make contradictories to be true together.

[Concerning the efficacy of the Holy Sacraments.]

All the power, virtue, use, and efficacy, which he ascribeth to the Holy Sacraments, is to be "signs or commemorations[b]." As for any sealing, or confirming, or conferring, of grace, he acknowledgeth nothing. The same he saith particularly of Baptism[c]. Upon which grounds a Cardinal's red hat, or a sergeant-at-arms his mace, may be called Sacraments as well as Baptism or the Holy Eucharist, if they be only "signs or commemorations" of a benefit. If he except, that Baptism and the Eucharist are of Divine institution, but a Cardinal's
877 red hat or a sergeant-at-arms his mace are not; he saith truly, but nothing to his advantage or purpose, seeing he deriveth all the authority of the Word and Sacraments in respect of subjects, and all our obligation to them, from the authority of the sovereign magistrate, without which "these words—'Repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus'—are" but "counsel," no "command[d]." And so a sergeant-at-arms his mace, and Baptism, proceed both from the same authority. And this he saith upon this silly ground, that nothing is a command, the performance whereof tendeth to our own "benefit[e]." He might as well deny the Ten Commandments to be commands, because they have an advantageous promise annexed to them:—"Do this and thou shalt live;" and, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all the words of this law to do them."

[Acts ii. 38.]

[Luke x. 28.—Deut. xxvii. 26; —"that *confirmeth* not all the words," &c. —Gal. iii. 10.]

[Concerning Holy Orders.]

Sometimes he is for Holy Orders, and giveth to the pastors of the Church the right of ordination and absolution, and infallibility, too much for a particular pastor or the pastors of one particular Church:—"It is manifest, that the consecration of the chiefest doctors in every Church, and imposition of hands, doth pertain to the doctors" of the same Church[f]; and, "It cannot be doubted of, but the power of binding and loosing was given by Christ to the future pastors after the same manner as to His present Apostles[g];"

[b] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxv.] p. 221.

[c] De Cive, c. xvii. § 7. [p. 236.]

[d] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxv.] p. 133.

[e] [Ibid., p. 132.—viz. to the benefit of the person commanded. The Ten Commandments are affirmed to be "commands," ibid., p. 133.]

[f] De Cive, c. xvii. § 24. [p. 244.—"Constat, . . ecclesiasticorum omnium ordinationem, sive consecrationem quæ fit per orationem et manuum impositionem, ad Apostolos et doctores spectasse."]

[g] [Ibid., § 8. p. 214.—"De potes-

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and, "Our Saviour hath promised this infallibility (in those things which are necessary to salvation) to His Apostles until the Day of Judgment, that is to say, to the Apostles, and pastors to be consecrated by the Apostles successively by the imposition of hands[h]."

But at other times he casteth all this meal down with his foot:—"Christian sovereigns . . are , . the supreme pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak from God, except such as God speaketh to in these days supernaturally[i]." What is now become of the promised "infallibility?" And, "It is from the civil sovereign, that all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and all other functions pertaining to that office; and they are but his ministers, in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, or judges in courts of justice, and commanders of armies[j]." What is now become of their ordination? Magistrates, judges, and generals, need no precedent qualifications. He maketh "the pastoral authority of sovereigns" to be "*jure Divino*," of all "other pastors *jure civili*[k]." He addeth,—"Neither is there any judge of heresy among subjects but their own civil sovereign[l]." Lastly, "The Church excommunicateth no man but whom she excommunicateth by the authority of the prince[m];" and, "The effect of excommunication hath nothing in it, neither of damage in this world nor terror," upon "an apostate," if "the civil power did persecute or not assist the Church; . . and in the world to come," leaves them "in no worse estate than those who never believed; the damage rather redoundeth to the Church[n]:" neither "is the excommunication of a Christian subject, that obeyeth the laws of his own sovereign, of any effect[o]." Where is now their "power of binding and loosing?"

tate solvendi et ligandi, id est, peccata remittendi et retinendi, dubium esse non potest, quin ea data sit a Christo futuris tunc pastoribus eodem modo quo præsentibus Apostolis: data autem est Apostolis omnis potestas remittendi peccata quam Ipse habuit Christus."]

[h] Ibid., § 28. [p. 256.—"Infallibilitatem hanc promisit Servator Noster (in iis rebus quæ ad salutem sunt necessariæ) Apostolis usque ad Diem Judicii, id est, Apostolis, et pastoribus ab Apostolis successive per impositionem manuum consecrandis."]

[i] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 323.

[j] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 296. [—"*and other* functions," &c.]

[k] [Ibid.]

[l] [Ibid., p. 317.]

[m] De Cive, c. xvii. § 26. [p. 250.—"Neminem igitur excommunicat ecclesia nisi quem excommunicat authoritate Principis."]

[n] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 227.

[o] Ibid., p. 278.

It may be some of T. H. his disciples desire to know, what hopes of heavenly joys they have upon their master's principles. They may hear them without any great contentment. —"There is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in reason," of "the *cœlum empyreum*[p]," that is, the Heaven of the Blessed, where the Saints shall live eternally with God. And again, "I have not found any text" that can probably be "drawn" to prove any ascension of the Saints into Heaven, that is to say, into any "*cœlum empyreum*[q]." But he concludeth positively, that salvation shall be "upon earth," when God shall reign at the coming of Christ in Jerusalem[r]; and again, "In short, the kingdom of God is a civil kingdom," &c., "called also the Kingdom of Heaven," and "the Kingdom of Glory[s]." All the Hobbians can hope for, is, to be restored to the same condition which Adam was in before his fall. So saith T. H. himself;—"From whence may be inferred, that the elect, after the resurrection, shall be restored to the estate wherein Adam was before he had sinned[t]." As for "the beatifical vision," he defineth it to be a word "unintelligible[u]."

[Concerning Angels.]

But considering his other principles, I do not marvel much at his extravagance in this point. To what purpose should a "*cœlum empyreum*," or Heaven of the Blessed, serve in his judgment? who maketh the blessed Angels, that are the inhabitants of that happy mansion, to be either "idols" of the "brain[v]," that is, in plain English, nothing, or thin, "subtle, fluid bodies[v]:" destroying the angelical nature. "The universe being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also body[x]." And elsewhere:—"Every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body, is no part of the universe; and because the universe is all, that
878 which is no part of it, is nothing, and consequently nowhere[y]." How? By this doctrine, he maketh not only the Angels, but God Himself, to be "nothing." Neither doth he salve it at all by supposing erroneously Angels to be corporeal spirits, and by attributing the name of "incorporeal" Spirit to God, "as being a name of more honour; . . in Whom

[p] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] p. 240.
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [Ibid.,] p. 241.
[s] [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxv. p. 219.]
[t] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 345.
[u] [Ibid., Pt. I. c. vi.] p. 30.
[v] [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 208.]
[x] Ibid., p. 207.
[y] Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.] p. 371.

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we consider not what attribute best expresseth His nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour Him[z]." Though we be not able to comprehend perfectly what God is, yet we are able to comprehend perfectly what God is not: that is, He is not imperfect; and therefore He is not finite, and consequently He is not corporeal. This were a trim way to "honour" God indeed, to honour Him with a lie. If this that he say here be true,—that "every part of the universe is a body, and whatsoever is not a body, is nothing,"—then, by this doctrine, if God be not "a body," God is "nothing;" not an incorporeal spirit, but one of the "idols of the brain," a mere "nothing:" though they think they dance under a net, and have the blind of God's incomprehensibility between them and discovery.

[Concerning the immortality of the soul.]

To what purpose should a "*cœlum empyreum*" serve in his judgment? who denieth the immortality of the soul;—"The doctrine is now, and hath been a long time, far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal[a]:"—who "supposeth," that "when a man dieth, there remaineth nothing of him but his carcase[b]:"—who maketh the word "soul in Holy Scripture" to "signify always either the life or the living creature[c];" and expoundeth the "casting of body and soul into Hell-fire" to be the casting of "body and life" into Hell-fire[d]:—who maketh this orthodox truth—"that the souls of men are substances distinct from their bodies,"—to be an error contracted "by the contagion of the demonology of the Greeks," and a "window that gives entrance to the dark doctrine of eternal torments[e]:"—who expoundeth these words of Solomon—"Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God that gave it"—thus, "God only knows what becomes of a man's spirit, when he expireth[f]." He will not acknowledge, that there is a spirit, or any substance distinct from the body[g]. I wonder what they think doth keep their bodies from stinking.

Eccles. xii. 7.

[Concerning the devils.]

But they, that in one case are grieved, in another must be relieved. If perchance T. H. hath given his disciples any

[z] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.] p. 371.
[a] Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 339.
[b] [Ibid.]
[c] [Ibid.]
[d] [Leviath., Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 340.
[e] [Ibid.]
[f] Ibid., p. 344.
[g] [Ibid., p. 340.]

discontent in his doctrine of Heaven, and the Holy Angels, and the glorified souls of the Saints, he will make them amends in his doctrine of Hell, and the devils, and the damned spirits. First, of the devils. He fancieth, that all those devils which our Saviour did cast out were frenzies, and all "demoniacs" (or persons possessed) no other than "madmen[h];" and to justify our Saviour's speaking to a disease as to a person, produceth the example of "enchanters[i]." But he declareth himself most clearly upon this subject in his Animadversions upon my reply to his defence of fatal destiny:—"There are in the Scripture two sorts of things which are in English translated devils; one is that which is called 'Satan,' 'Diabolus,' 'Abaddon,' which signifieth in English an enemy, an accuser, and a destroyer of the Church of God; in which sense the devils are but wicked men; the other sort of devils are called in the Scripture '*dæmonia*,' which are the feigned gods of the heathen, and are neither bodies nor spiritual substances, but mere fancies and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned by the Greeks and other heathen people, which St. Paul calleth 'nothings[k].'" So T. H. hath killed the great infernal Devil and all his black angels, and left no devils to be feared but devils incarnate, that is, "wicked men."

[Rev. ix. 11.]

[1 Cor. x. 19.]

And for Hell, he describeth the kingdom of Satan, or "the kingdom of darkness," to be "a confederacy of deceivers[l]." He telleth us, that the places which set forth "the torments of Hell" in Holy Scripture, "do design metaphorically a grief and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they themselves, through their own incredulity and disobedience, have lost[m]." As if 'metaphorical' descriptions did not bear sad truths in them, as well as literal; as if final desperations were no more than a little fit of "grief" or "discontent;" and a guilty conscience were no more than a transitory passion; as if it were a loss so easily to be borne, to be deprived for evermore of the beatifical vision; and, lastly, as if the damned, besides that unspeak-

[Concerning Hell.]

[h] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. viii.] p. 38.
[i] [Ibid., p.] 39.
[k] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xv.] p. 160.
[l] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 333.
[m] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] p. 244.

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able loss, did not likewise suffer actual torments, proportionable in some measure to their own sins and God's justice.

[Concerning the damned spirits.]

Lastly, for the damned spirits, he declareth himself every where, that their sufferings are not eternal:—"The fire shall 879
be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting; but it cannot be thence inferred, that he who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them, so as to be eternally burnt and tortured, and yet never be destroyed nor die: and though there be many places, that affirm everlasting fire, into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever, yet I find none that affirm, that there shall be an everlasting life therein of any individual person[n]." If he had said, and said only, that the pains of the damned may be lessened as to the degree of them, or that they endure not for ever, but that after they are purged by long torments from their dross and corruptions, as gold in the fire, both the damned spirits and the devils themselves should be restored to a better condition, he might have found some ancients (who are therefore called the merciful doctors[o]) to have joined with him; though still he should have wanted the suffrage of the Catholic Church.

[Concerning eternal punishment.]

But his shooting is not at rovers, but altogether at random, without either precedent or partner. All that "eternal fire," all those "torments," which he acknowledgeth, is but this, —that "after the resurrection, . . the reprobate shall be in the estate that Adam and his posterity were in after the sin committed, saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam . . and not to them[p]:" adding, that they "shall live as they did" formerly, "marry and give in marriage; . . and consequently engender children perpetually after the Resurrection, as they did before[q];" which he calleth "an immortality of the kind, but not of the persons, of men[r]." It is to be presumed, that in those their second lives, knowing certainly from T. H. that there is no hope of redemption for them from corporal death upon their well-doing, nor fear of any torments after death for their ill-doing, they will pass their times here as

[n] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] p. 245.
[o] [See above in the Castigations, Numb. xv. p. 354. note j; Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]
[p] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 345.
[q] Ibid., pp. 345, 346.
[r] [Ibid.,] p. 346.

pleasantly as they can. This is all the damnation which T. H. fancieth. DISCOURSE III.

In sum, I leave it to the free judgment of the understanding reader, by these few instances which follow, to judge what the Hobbian principles are in point of religion. "*Ex ungue leonem.*"—

First, that no man needs to put himself to any hazard for his faith, but may safely comply with the times:—"And for their faith, it is internal and invisible; they have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it[s]." [1. T. H. alloweth compliance with heresy.]

Secondly, he alloweth subjects, being commanded by their sovereign, to deny Christ.—"Profession with the tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture whereby we signify our obedience: and wherein a Christian, holding firmly in his heart the faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman," &c.; who, "by bowing before the idol Rimmon, denied the true God as much in effect, as if he had done it with his lips[t]."—(Alas! why did St. Peter weep so bitterly for denying his Master? out of fear of his life or members? It seemeth he was not acquainted with these Hobbian principles.)—And in the same place he layeth down this general conclusion:—"This we may say, that whatsoever a subject . . is compelled to in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his but his sovereign's; nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his governor and the law of his country[u]." His instance, in a Mahometan commanded by a Christian prince to be present at Divine service[x], is a weak mistake, springing from his gross ignorance in case-divinity, not knowing to distinguish between an erroneous conscience, as the Mahometan's is, and a conscience rightly informed. 2. [And outward denial of Christ.] [2 Kings v. 18, 19.] [Matt. xxvi. 75.—Mark xiv. 72.—Luke xxii. 62.]

Thirdly, if this be not enough, he giveth licence to a Christian to commit idolatry, or at least to do an idolatrous act, for fear of death or corporal danger.—"To pray unto a king voluntarily for fair weather, or for any thing which God only 3. [And licence to commit idolatry for fear of death.]

[s] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 331.
[t] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 271.
[u] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii. p. 271.]
[x] [Ibid.]

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can do for us, is Divine worship, and idolatry; on the other side, if a king compel a man to it by the terror of death or other great corporal punishment, it is not idolatry[y]." His reason is, because it "is not a sign that he doth inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himself from death or from a miserable life[z]." It seemeth T. H. thinketh there is no Divine worship but internal; and that it is lawful for a man to value his own life or his limbs more than his God. How much is he wiser than the three children, or Daniel himself! who were thrown, the first into a fiery furnace, the last into the lions' den, because they refused to comply with the idolatrous decree of their sovereign prince.

[Dan. iii, vi.]

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4. [And denieth the natural supremacy of Divine law.] [Acts v. 29.]

A fourth aphorism may be this,—"That which is said in the Scripture—'It is better to obey God than man,'—hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature[a]." Why? Nature itself doth teach us, that it is better "to obey God than men." Neither can he say, that he intended this only of obedience in the use of indifferent actions and gestures, in the service of God, commanded by the commonwealth; for that is to obey both God and man. But if Divine law and human law clash one with another, without doubt it is evermore better to obey God than man.

[5. And maketh the sovereign magistrate supreme arbiter of theological truth.]

His fifth conclusion may be, that the sharpest and most successful sword, in any war whatsoever, doth give sovereign power and authority to him that hath it, to approve or reject all sorts of theological doctrines concerning the kingdom of God; not according to their truth or falsehood, but according to that influence which they have upon political affairs. Hear him:—"But because this doctrine . . will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it, maintaining nothing in this or any other paradox of religion, but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the authority (not yet amongst my countrymen decided) by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved or rejected," &c.: "for the points of doctrine concerning the kingdom of God have so great influence upon the kingdom of man, as not to be determined but by them that under God have the sovereign power[b]."

[y] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xlv.] p. 360.
[z] [Ibid.]
[a] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxxi.] p. 193.
[b] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] pp. 241, [242.]

" — Careat successibus opto,
" Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat[c]."—

Disc
II

"Let him evermore want success, who thinketh actions are to be judged by their events." This doctrine may be plausible to those, who desire to fish in troubled waters; but it is justly hated by those which are in authority, and all those who are lovers of peace and tranquillity.

The last part of this conclusion smelleth rankly of Jeroboam:—"Now shall the kingdom return to the house of David, if this people go up to do sacrifice in the House of the Lord at Jerusalem; . . whereupon the king took counsel, and made two calves of gold, and said unto them, It is too much for you to go up to Jerusalem, Behold thy Gods, O Israel, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt." But, by the just disposition of Almighty God, this policy turned to a sin, and was the utter destruction of Jeroboam and his family. It is not good jesting with edge-tools, nor playing with holy things. Where men make their greatest fastness, many times they find most danger.

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His sixth paradox is a rapper:—"The civil laws are the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; and therefore, what the lawgiver commands, that is to be accounted good; what he forbids, bad[d]:"—and a little after; —"Before empires were, just and unjust were not, as whose nature is relative to a command; every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it is just or unjust, proceedeth from the right of him that commandeth: therefore lawful kings make those things which they command just, by commanding them, and those things which they forbid unjust, by forbidding them[e]." To this add his definition of a sin; —"that which one doth or omitteth, saith or willeth, contrary to the reason of the commonwealth, that is the" (civil) "laws[f]:" where, by "the laws," he doth not understand the

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[c] [Ovid., Heroid., ii. 85, 86.]

[d] De Cive, c. xii. § 1. [p. 126.—"Regulas boni et mali, justi et injusti, honesti et inhonesti, esse leges civiles; ideoque quod legislator præceperit, id pro bono, quod vetuerit, id pro malo habendum esse."]

[e] [Ibid., p. 127.—"Ante imperia justum et injustum non exstitere, ut quorum natura ad mandatum sit relativa; actioque omnis suâ naturâ adiaphora est; quod justa vel injusta sit, a jure imperantis provenit: reges igitur legitimi, quæ imperant justa faciunt imperando, quæ vetant vetando injusta."]

[f] Ibid., c. xiv. § 17. [p. 168.—"Ut culpa, id est, peccatum, sit, quod

PART II. written laws, elected and approved by the whole commonwealth, but the verbal commands or mandates of him that hath the sovereign power; as we find in many places of his writings;—"The civil laws are nothing else but the commands of him that is endowed with sovereign power in the commonwealth, concerning the future actions of his subjects[g];"—and,—"The civil laws are fastened to the lips of that man, who hath the sovereign power[h]." Where are we? In Europe or in Asia? where they ascribed a divinity to their kings, and, to use his own phrase, made them "mortal Gods[i];" i. iii. 4, —"O King, live for ever." Flatterers are the common moths of great palaces, where "Alexander's friends" are more numerous than "the king's friends[k];" but such gross palpable pernicious flattery as this is, I did never meet with, so derogatory both to piety and policy. What deserved he, who should do his uttermost endeavour to poison a common fountain, whereof all the commonwealth must drink? He doth the same, who poisoneth the mind of a sovereign prince. Are "the civil laws the rules of good and bad, just and unjust, honest and dishonest?" And what I pray you are the rules of the civil law itself? Even the law of God and nature. If the civil laws swerve from these more authentic laws, they are Lesbian rules[l]. "What the lawgiver commands, is to be 881
accounted good; what he forbids, bad." This was just the garb of the Athenian sophisters, as they are described by Plato; whatsoever pleased "the great beast" (the multitude), they called holy, and just, and good; and whatsoever "the great beast" disliked, they called evil, unjust, profane[m]. But he is not yet arrived at the height of his flattery.—"Lawful kings make those things which they command just, by commanding them, and those things which they forbid unjust, by forbidding them." At other times, when he is in his right wits, he talketh of "suffering," and "expecting their reward in

quis fecerit, omiserit, dixerit, vel voluerit, contra rationem civitatis, id est, contra leges."]

[g] De Cive, c. vi. § 9. [p. 64.—"Leges Civiles (ut eas definiamus) nihil aliud sunt, quam ejus qui in civitate summâ potestate præditus est, de civium futuris actionibus mandata."]

[h] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109.

[i] [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.]

[k] [Vide Plutarch., Apophthegm. Reg., in Alexand. num. 29, Op. Moral., tom. i. p. 505. ed. Wyttenb.]

[l] ["Τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολύβδινος κανών . . πρὸς τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει." Aristot., Ethic., V. xiv. 7.]

[m] [Plat., De Republ., lib. vi. c. 7.—"θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ," κ. τ. λ.]

Heaven[n]," and "going to Christ by martyrdom[o]," and, "if he had the fortitude to suffer death he should do better[p]." But I fear all this was but said in jest. How should they "expect their reward in Heaven," if his doctrine be true, that there is no reward in Heaven? Or how should they be martyrs, if his doctrine be true, that "none can be martyrs but those who conversed with" Christ "upon earth[q]?" He addeth, "Before empires were, just and unjust were not." Nothing could be written more false in his sense, more dishonourable to God, more inglorious to the human nature;—that God should create man, and leave him presently without any rules to his own ordering of himself, as the ostrich leaveth her eggs in the sand. But in truth there have been empires in the world ever since Adam; and Adam had a law written in his heart by the finger of God, before there was any civil law. Thus they do endeavour to make goodness, and justice, and honesty, and conscience, and God Himself, to be empty names without any reality, which signify nothing, further than they conduce to a man's interest. Otherwise he would not, he could not say, that "every action," as it is invested with its circumstances, "is indifferent in its own nature[r]." Discourse III.

Something there is which he hath a confused glimmering of, as the blind man sees "men walking" like "trees," which he is not able to apprehend and express clearly. We acknowledge, that though the laws or commands of a sovereign prince be erroneous, or unjust, or injurious, such as a subject cannot approve for good in themselves, yet he is bound to acquiesce, and may not oppose or resist, otherwise than by prayers and tears, and at the most by flight[s]. We acknowledge, that the civil laws have power to bind the conscience of a Christian *in* themselves, but not *from* themselves[t], but from Him Who hath said, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." Either they bind Christian subjects to do their sovereign's commands, or to suffer for the testimony of a good conscience. We acknowledge, that in doubtful cases [The true doctrine of passive obedience.] [Mark viii. 24.] [Rom. xiii. 1.]

[n] [Leviath., Pt. III. c. xliii. p. 331.]
[o] [De Cive, c. xviii. § 13. p. 272.—"Eundum ad Christum per martyrium."]
[p] [Leviath., Pt. IV. c. xlv. p. 362.]
[q] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 272.
[r] [De Cive, c. xii. § 1. p. 127.]
[s] [See Bramhall's sentiments upon this question at greater length, above in Serpent Salve, sect. xi. vol. iii. pp. 348—364; Disc. ii. Pt. ii.]
[t] [See above in the Answer to La Millet., vol. i. p. 62. note e; Disc. i. Pt. i.]

PART III.

"*semper præsumitur pro rege et lege*"—'the sovereign and the law are always presumed' to be in the right; but in plain evident cases, which admit no doubt, it is always better to obey God than man. Blunderers, whilst they think to mend one imaginary hole, make two or three real ones. They who derive the authority of the Scriptures, or God's law, from the civil laws of men, are like those who seek to underprop the heavens from falling with a bulrush. Nay, they derive not only the authority of the Scripture, but even of the law of nature itself, from the civil law:—"The laws of nature[u] (which need no promulgation) "in the condition of nature . . are not properly laws, but qualities, which dispose men to peace and to obedience; when a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before[u]." God help us! Into what times are we fallen! when the immutable laws of God and nature are made to depend upon the mutable laws of mortal men; just as if one should go about to control the sun by the authority of the clock.

[A bundle of T. H. his religious errors.]

But it is not worthy of my labour, nor any part of my intention, to pursue every shadow of a question which he springeth. It shall suffice to gather a posy of flowers (or rather a bundle of weeds) out of his writings, and present them to the reader; who will easily distinguish them from healthful plants by the rankness of their smell. Such are these which follow.—

1. "To be delighted in the imagination only, of being possessed of another man's goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of the law which saith, 'Thou shalt not covet[x].'"

2. "If a man by the terror of present death be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused, because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation; . . nature compelleth him to the fact[y]." The like doctrine he hath elsewhere:—"When the actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenants to obey him, not he, but the author, breaketh the law of nature[z]."

[u] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvi.] p. 138.
[x] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 151.
[y] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 157.
[z] Ibid., [Pt. I. c. xvi.] p. 81.

882 3. It is a "doctrine repugnant to civil society, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin[a]."

4. "The kingdom of God is not shut but to them that sin; that is, to them, who have not performed due obedience to the laws of God: nor to them, if they believe the necessary Articles of the Christian Faith[b]."

5. "We must know, that the true acknowledging of sin is repentance itself[c]."

6. "An opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy; nor the sovereign princes that authorize the same, heretics[d]."

7. "Temporal and spiritual government are but two words . . to make men see double, and mistake their lawful sovereign," &c.; "there is no other government in this life, neither of state nor religion, but temporal[e]."

8. "It is manifest, that they" who permit (or tolerate) a contrary doctrine to that which themselves believe, and think necessary, "do against their conscience; and will, as much as in them lieth, the eternal destruction of their subjects[f]."

9. "Subjects sin, if they do not worship God according to the laws of the commonwealth[g]."

10. "To believe in Jesus"—"*in Jesum*"—"is the same as to believe that Jesus is Christ[h]."

11. "There can be no contradiction between the laws of God and the laws of a Christian commonwealth[i]." Yet we see "Christian commonwealths" daily contradict one another.

12. "No man giveth but with intention of good to himself; . . of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good[k]." Moses, St. Paul, and the Decii, were not of his mind.

[a] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 168.

[b] De Cive, c. xviii. § 2. [p. 259.—"Non enim clauditur Regnum Dei nisi peccantibus, id est, iis qui debitam legibus Dei obedientiam non prestiterunt; neque illis, si credant articulos necessarios Fidei Christianæ.]

[c] Ibid., c. xvii. § 25. [p. 245.—"Sciendum igitur . . peccati veram agnitionem esse ipsam pœnitentiam."]

[d] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 318.

[e] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxix.] p. 248.

[f] De Cive, c. xiii. § 5. [p. 142.—"Manifestum est facere eos" (scil. qui "talem doctrinam et talem cultum quem ipsi civibus ad salutem æternam necessario conducere credunt, non faciant doceri et exhiberi, vel contrariam doceri vel exhiberi permittant") "contra conscientiam; et velle quantum in se est, æternam civium perditionem."]

[g] Ibid., c. xv. § 19. [p. 192.—"Colligitur . . peccare subditos, . . si non colant Deum κατὰ τὰ νόμιμα."]

[h] Ibid., c. xviii. § 10. [p. 269.—"Credere autem in Jesum (ut ibidem —Joh. xx. 31.—explicatur) idem est quod credere Jesum esse Christum."]

[i] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 330.

[k] Ibid., [Pt. I. c. xv.] p. 75.

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18. "There is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death, much less of the reward which is then to be given to breach of faith; but only a belief, grounded upon other men's saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally[l]."

14. "David's killing of Uriah was no injury to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself[m]."

15. "To whom it belongeth to determine controversies which may arise from the diverse interpretation of Scripture, .. he hath an imperial power over all men which acknowledge the Scriptures to be the Word of God[n]."

16. "What is theft, what is murder, what is adultery, and universally what is an injury, is known by the civil law; that is, the commands of the sovereign[o]."

17. He admitteth the incestuous "copulations of the heathens according to their heathenish laws" to have been "lawful marriages[p]:" though the Scripture teach us expressly, that for those abominations the land of Canaan "spewed out" her inhabitants.

[Levit.] xviii. 28.

18. "I say, that no other article of faith besides this, that Jesus is Christ, is necessary to a Christian man for salvation[q]."

[John xviii. 36.]

19. Because "Christ's 'kingdom is not of this world,' therefore neither can His ministers, unless they be kings, require obedience in His name[r];" they "have no right of commanding, no power to make laws[s]."

20. I pass by his errors about oaths, about vows, about the resurrection, about the kingdom of Christ, about the power of the keys, binding, loosing, excommunication, &c., his

[l] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xv.] p. 74.

[m] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109.

[n] De Cive, c. xviii. § 14. [p. 273.—"Cujus enim est controversias quæ ex diversâ Scripturarum interpretatione oriri possunt determinare, ejus est omnes simpliciter controversias determinare; cujus autem est hoc, ejusdem est imperium in omnes qui agnoscunt Scripturas esse Verbum Dei."]

[o] De Cive, c. vi. § 16. [p. 69.—Quid igitur furtum, quid homicidium, quid adulterium, et in universum quid sit injuria, cognoscitur ex lege civili, hoc est, ex mandatis ejus qui in civitate cum summo imperio est."]

[p] Ibid., c. xiv. § 10. [p. 162.—"Similiter ethnicorum copulationes sexuum secundum leges suas conjugia erant legitima."]

[q] Ibid., c. xviii. § 6. [p. 265.—"Dico autem alium articulum Fidei præter hunc—Jesum esse Christum—homini Christiano, ut necessarium ad salutem, requiri nullum.]

[r] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 269.

[s] Ibid., p. 270.

ignorant mistake of "*meritum congrui*" and "*condigni*," active and passive obedience, and many more; for fear of being tedious to the reader. His whole works are a heap of misshapen errors, and absurd paradoxes, vented with the confidence of a juggler, the brags of a mountebank, and the authority of some Pythagoras, or "third Cato," lately "dropped down from heaven[t]." Discourse III.

Thus we have seen, how the Hobbian principles do destroy the existence, the simplicity, the ubiquity, the eternity, and infiniteness of God; the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, the hypostatical union; the kingly, sacerdotal, and prophetical offices of Christ; the being and operation of the Holy Ghost; Heaven, Hell; Angels, Devils; the immortality of the soul; the Catholic, and all national Churches; the Holy Scriptures, Holy Orders, the Holy Sacraments; the whole frame of religion, and the worship of God; the laws of nature, the reality of goodness, justice, piety, honesty, conscience, and all that is sacred. If his disciples have such an implicit faith that they can digest all these things, they may feed with ostriches.

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CHAP. II.

THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES DO DESTROY ALL RELATIONS BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, AND THE WHOLE FRAME OF A COMMONWEALTH.

The first harping iron is thrown at the heart of this great whale; that is, his religion; for "with the heart a man believeth unto righteousness." Now let him look to his chine; that is, his compage or commonwealth. My next task is to shew, that he destroyeth all relations between man and man, prince and subject, parent and child, husband and wife, master and servant, and generally all society. [T. H.'s political principles.] [Rom. x. 10.]

It is enough to dash the whole frame of his Leviathan or commonwealth in pieces, that he confesseth it is without example; as if the moulding of a commonwealth were no more than the making of gunpowder, which was not found [T. H.'s commonwealth confessedly a novelty.]

[t] ["Tertius e cœlo cecidit Cato." Juv., Sat., ii. 40.]

out by long experience but by mere accident. "The greatest objection" (saith T. H.) "is that of practice, when men ask when and where such power has by subjects been acknowledged[u]." It is a "great objection" indeed. Experience, the mistress of fools, is the best and almost the only proof of the goodness or badness of any form of government. No man knoweth where a shoe wringeth so well as he that weareth it. A new physician must have a new churchyard, wherein to bury those whom he killeth. And a new unexperienced politician commonly putteth all into a combustion. Men rise by degrees from common soldiers to be decurions, from decurions to be centurions, from centurions to be tribunes, and from tribunes to be generals, by experience, not by speculation. Alexander did but laugh at that orator who discoursed to him of military affairs[v]. The Locrian law was well grounded,—that whosoever moved for any alteration in the tried policy of their commonwealth, should make the proposition at his own peril, with a halter about his neck[x]. New statesmen promise golden mountains; but like fresh flies, they bite deeper than those which were chased away before them. It were a strange thing to hear a man discourse of the philosopher's stone, who never bestowed a groat's worth of charcoal in the enquiry. It is as strange to hear a man dictate so magisterially in politics, who was never officer nor counsellor in his life, nor had any opportunity to know the intrigues of any one state. If his form of government had had any true worth or weight in it, among so many nations, and so many succeeding generations from the creation to this day, some one or other would have light upon it. His Leviathan is but an "idol" of his own "brain."

Neither is it sufficient to say, that "in long lived commonwealths . . the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign's power[y]." Power may be moderated, where it is not "disputed" of. And even in those kingdoms where it was least disputed of, as in Persia, they had their fundamental laws, which were not alterable at the pleasure of the present prince; whereof one was, as we find in the story of Esther and the book of

[u] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xx.] p. 107.

[v] [Such an anecdote is related of Hannibal when at Antiochus' court, by

[x] [Zaleuc., Proœm. Leg., ap. Stobæum, Serm. xlii.]

[y] Ibid. [scil. Leviath., Pt. II. c. xx.

Daniel, that the law of the Medes and Persians altered not: much less was it alterable by the only breath of the prince's mouth, according to T. H. his principles. DISCOURSE III.

He urgeth, that "though in all places of the world men should lay the foundations of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be[z]." He was ashamed to make the application. So, suppose all the world should be out of their wits and he only have his right understanding. His supposition is a supposition of an impossibility, which maketh an affirmative proposition to turn negative: much like this other supposition, 'If the sky fall, we shall have larks;' that is, in plain English, we shall have no larks. His argument had held much more strongly thus; —All the world lay the foundation of their houses upon firm ground, and not upon the sand; therefore he who crosseth the practice of the whole world, out of an overweening opinion that he seeth further into a mill-stone than they all, is he that builds upon the sand, and deserveth well to be laughed out of his humour.

[Theory insufficient without experience.]

But he persisteth still,—like one that knows better how to hold a paradox than a fort,—"The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry," and "not, as tennis-play, on practice only; which rules neither poor men had the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity or the method, to find out[a]." O excellent! "How
884 fortunate are we, if we knew our own happiness[b]," to have this great discovery made in our days? What pity it is, that this new Mercury did not live in the days of the old Mercury,

> "Qui feros cultus hominum recentum
> "Voce formavit catus[c],"

that the art of preserving the world in perpetual tranquillity should not be discovered until the evening of the world. May we not hope (since he pleased to tell us, that after the resurrection mankind shall be eternally propagated[d]), that these monuments of his may escape the last fire, as well as

[z] Ibid. [scil. Leviath., Pt. II. c. xx. p. 107.]
[a] Ibid.
[b] ["O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona nôrint," &c. Virg., Georg., ii. 458.]
[c] [Horat., Carm., I. x. 2, 3.]
[d] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 346. [See above p. 538. notes q, r.]

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some others are supposed to have escaped the general deluge, for the good of those successive generations, they being his own invention as well as this frame of government? Yet his argument is most improper, and most untrue. State policy, which is wholly involved in matter, and circumstances of time, and place, and persons, is not at all like "arithmetic and geometry," which are altogether abstracted from matter, but much more like "tennis-play." There is no place for liberty in "arithmetic and geometry," but in policy there is, and so there is in "tennis-play." A game at tennis hath its vicissitudes, and so have states. A tennis-player must change his play at every stroke, according to the occasion and accidents; so must a statesman move his rudder differently, according to the various face of heaven. He who manageth a commonwealth by general rules, will quickly ruin both himself and those who are committed to his government. One man's meat is another man's poison; and those which are healthful rules for one society at one time, may be pernicious to another society, or to the same society at another time. Some nations are like horses, more patient of their riders than others; and the same nations more patient at one time than at another. In sum, general rules are easy, and signify not much in policy; the quintessence of policy doth consist in the dexterous and skilful application of those rules to the subject-matter.

[T. H.'s principles destructive to public peace.—He teacheth, that an oath doth not bind more than a "naked" covenant.]

But I will not rest in presumptions. Concerning foreign states,—and, first, such as are not only neighbours but allies of a commonwealth, such as have contracted friendship and confederated themselves together by solemn oaths with invocation of the Holy Name of the great God of Heaven and earth,—he teacheth, that "such an oath doth bind no more than *nudum pactum*"—a "naked covenant[e]." It is true, that every covenant is either lawful or unlawful. If it be unlawful, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity; if it be lawful, it bindeth in conscience, though it were never confirmed by oath. It is true, further, that he who can release a naked promise, can release the same promise confirmed by an oath; because it was not made or intended as a vow to

[e] De Cive, c. ii. § 22. [p. 22.—"Ex potest, pactum nudum non minus obli-

God, but as a promise to man. But yet, to say, that "a naked covenant bindeth no less than an oath," or that an oath addeth nothing to the obligation, or that the mere violation of a covenant is as great a sin as perjury and covenant-breaking twisted together[f], is absurd, and openeth a large gap to foreign war.

[And that confidence between princes and states is impossible.]

Secondly, he teacheth, that "in all times kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another[g]." It is good for a sovereign prince to have his sword always by his side, to be ready to protect his subjects and offend those who dare invade him; but to put princes in "the posture of gladiators," watching continually where they may hit one another, or do one another a mischief, is dangerous. There can be no firm amity, where there is no mutual confidence. T. H. his perpetual diffidence and causeless jealousies, which have no ground but an universal suspicion of the human nature (much like the good woman's fear, that the log would leap out of the fire and knock out the brains of her child), do beget perpetual vexations to them that cherish them, argue a self-guiltiness, teach them who are suspected often to do worse than they imagined, and ordinarily produce hostility and war. "The state of commonwealths among themselves is natural, that is, hostile: neither if they cease to fight, is it peace, but a breathing space; wherein the one enemy, observing the motion or countenance of the other, doth esteem his security not from pacts but from the forces and counsels of his adversary[h]."

[And that unconfederate states are as enemies, and in a state of nature.]

He maketh confederacies to be but empty shows without any reality; but for all other neighbour commonwealths, which are not confederates, but exercise commerce one with another by the law of nations, he reckons them all as enemies and in a state of nature (the Hobbian nature of man is worse
885 than the nature of bears, or wolves, or the most savage wild

[f] [De Cive, c. ii. § 22. p. 22.]

[g] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xiii.] p. 63.

[h] De Cive, c. xiii. § 7. [p. 143.—"Status enim civitatum inter se naturalis, id est, hostilis, est; neque si pugnare cessant, iccirco pax dicenda est, sed respiratio; in quâ hostis alter alterius motum vultumque observans, securitatem suam non ex pactis sed ex viribus et consiliis adversarii æstimat."]

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beasts), and maketh it lawful to destroy them, nocent or innocent, indifferently.—"All men that are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have ceased from being so by some precedent covenants; but against enemies, whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war, wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent and innocent[l]." Here is no precedent injury supposed, no refusal to do right ("*omnia dat qui justa negat*[k]"), nor the least suspicion of any will to wrong them; but only, that "the commonwealth" (that is, the prince) "judge" them "capable to do them hurt."

[And may make war upon each other without any warning.]

Neither doth he hold it needful to denounce war in such cases, but maketh it lawful to suppress them and cut their throats without any warning.—"From this" (natural) "diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him; and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed[l]:" for, "in the state of mere nature, . . the laws of nature are silent" as to the actual exercise of them[m]. And this he may do, "*vel palam vel ex insidiis*"—either by force or treachery. What is now become of the law of nations? How much were the old Romans better neighbours than these new Hobbians? They did not so easily fall to the shedding of human blood, but sent their legate, first, to demand justice, and after three and thirty days' expectation in vain, to proclaim aloud upon the confines of the enemy's country, "Hear, O Jupiter, and thou Juno, Quirinus thou, and all ye gods, that this people is unjust," &c.[n]; and then the herald or fecial lanced his javelin into the enemy's country, as a defiance, and beginning of war.

[His principles destructive to the commonwealth itself.]

Thus destructive are his principles to the public peace and tranquillity of the world, but much more pernicious to the

[l] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 165.

[k] [Lucan., Pharsal., i. 349.]

[l] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xiii.] p. 61.

[m] De Cive, c. v. § 2. [p. 52.—"Tritum est 'inter arma silere leges;' et verum est, non modo de legibus civilibus, sed etiam de lege naturali, si non ad animum sed ad actiones referatur, et bellum tale intelligatur ut sit omnium contra omnes; qualis est status naturæ meræ."]

[n] Liv., [i. 32.]

commonwealth itself. He did prudently, to deny that virtue did consist in a mean[o]; for he himself doth never observe a mean. All his bolts fly over or under, but at the right mark it is in vain to expect him. Sometimes he fancieth an omnipotence in kings, sometimes he strippeth them of their just rights. Perhaps he thinketh, that it may fall out in politics as it doth sometimes in physic; "*Bina venena juvant*"—"two contrary poisons" may become a cordial to the commonwealth. I will begin with his defects, where he attributeth too little to regal power.

[He teacheth, that no man is bound to go to warfare.]

First, he teacheth, that no man is bound to go to warfare in person, except he do voluntarily undertake it.—"A man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, . . may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice[p]." Of these "many cases," he setteth down only two: first, "when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place, for in this case he deserteth not the service of the commonwealth;" secondly, "there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness, . . or men of feminine courage[q]." This might pass as a municipal law, to exempt some persons at some time in some places; but to extend it to all persons, places, and times, is absurd, and repugnant to his own grounds; who teacheth, that "justice and injustice do depend upon the command of the sovereign," that "whatsoever he commandeth, he maketh lawful and just by commanding it[r]." His two cases are two great impertinencies; and belong to the sovereign to do or not to do, as graces,—"Who is timorous or fearful, let him depart;"—not to the subjects as right. He forgetteth, how often he hath denied "all knowledge of good and evil" to subjects, and subjected their will absolutely to the will of the sovereign;—The sovereign "may use every man's strength and wealth at his pleasure[s]." His acknowledgment,—that the "sovereign hath right enough to punish his refusal with death[t]"—is to no purpose. The question is not, whether his refusal be punishable or not, but whether it be just or not. Upon his principles, a sovereign may "justly

Judg. vii. 3.

[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 213.]
[p] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 112.
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [De Cive, c. xii. § 1. p. 127. See above p. 541. notes d, e.]
[s] De Cive, c. vi. § 13. [p. 66.—"Ut possit . . viribus et opibus omnium suo arbitrio uti."]
[t] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxi. p. 112.]

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enough" put the most innocent subject in the world to death; as we shall see presently[u]. And his exception—"when the defence of the commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms[x],"—is no answer to the other case, and itself a case never like to happen. He must be "a mortal God[y]" indeed, that can bring all the hands in a kingdom to fight at one battle.

[And that self-defence supersedes all duties.]

Another of his principles is this:—"Security is the end for which men make themselves subjects to others; which, if it be not enjoyed, no man is understood to have subjected himself to others, or to have lost his right to defend himself at his own discretion: neither is any man understood to 886 have bound himself to any thing, or to have relinquished his right over all things, before his own security be provided for[z]." What ugly consequences do flow from this paradox, and what a large window it openeth to sedition and rebellion, I leave to the reader's judgment. Either it must be left to the sovereign's determination, whether the subject's security be sufficiently provided for; and then "in vain is any man's sentence expected against himself:" or to the discretion of the subject (as the words themselves do seem to import); and then there need no other bellows to kindle the fire of a civil war, and put a whole commonwealth into a combustion, but this seditious article.

We see the present condition of Europe what it is,—that most sovereigns have subjects of a different communion from themselves, and are necessitated to tolerate different rites, for fear lest, whilst they are plucking up the tares, they should eradicate the wheat; and he that should advise them to do otherwise, did advise them to put all into fire and flame. Now hear this merciful and peaceable author:—"It is manifest, that they do against conscience, and wish (as much as is in them) the eternal destruction of their subjects, who do not cause such doctrine and such worship to be taught and exhibited to their subjects, as they themselves

[u] [See below pp. 561, 562.]

[x] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxi. p. 112.]

[y] [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.]

[z] De Cive, c. vi. § 3. [p. 62.—"Securitas enim finis est propter quem homines se subjiciunt aliis; quæ si non habeatur, nemo intelligitur se aliis subjecisse aut jus se arbitrio suo defendendi amisisse: neque ante intelligendus est quisquam se obstrinxisse ad quicquam, vel jus suum in omnia reliquisse, quam securitati ejus sit prospectum."]

do believe to conduce to their eternal salvation, or tolerate the contrary to be taught and exhibited[a]." Did this man write waking or dreaming?

[And admitteth resistance to the sovereign in deed, although he denieth it in words.]

And howsoever in words he deny all resistance to the sovereign, yet in deed he admitteth it.—"No man is bound by his pacts, whatsoever they be, not to resist him, who bringeth upon him death or wounds or other bodily damage[b]."—(By this learning the scholar, if he be able, may take the rod out of his master's hand, and whip him.)—It followeth;—"Seeing therefore no man is bound to that which is impossible, they who are to suffer death or wounds or other corporal damage, and are not constant enough to endure them, are not obliged to suffer them[c]." And more fully:—"In case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty to join together and assist and defend one another? certainly they have, for they do but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent: there was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act[d]." Why should we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebels' Catechism? Observe the difference between the primitive spirit and the Hobbian spirit. The Thebæan legion, of known valour in a good cause, when they were able to resist, did choose rather to be cut in pieces to a man than defend themselves against their emperor by arms, because they would "rather die innocent than live nocent[e]." But T. H. alloweth rebels and conspirators to make good their unlawful attempts by arms. Was there ever such a trumpeter of rebellion heard of before? Perhaps he may say, that he alloweth them not to justify their un-

[a] De Cive, c. xiii. § 5. [p. 142.—See the passage quoted, above p. 545. note f.]

[b] De Cive, c. ii. § 18. [p. 20.—"Mortem vel vulnera vel aliud damnum corporis inferenti nemo pactis suis quibuscunque obligatur non resistere."]

[c] [Ibid., pp. 20, 21.—"Cum igitur nemo teneatur ad impossibile, illi quibus mors (quod maximum naturæ malum est) vel quibus vulnera aut alia corporis damna inferuntur, nec ad ea ferenda constantes satis sunt, ea ferre non obligantur."]

[d] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] pp. 112. [113.]

[e] [Eucher., ap. Surium, Vit. Sanctor., Sept. 22. tom. iii. p. 222. ed., 1618.]

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lawful acts, but to defend themselves. First, this is contrary to himself; for he alloweth them "to maintain what they had" unjustly "done." This is too much, and too intolerable, but this is not all. Secondly, if they chance to win the field, who must suffer for their faults? or who dare thenceforward call their acts unlawful?

Will you hear what a casuist he is?—"And for the other instance, of attaining sovereignty by rebellion, it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet, because it cannot reasonably be expected but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason[f]." And had he no other reasons indeed against horrid rebellion but these two? It seemeth he accounteth conscience, or the bird in the breast, to be but "an idol of the brain[g];" and the Kingdom of Heaven (as he hath made it), not valuable enough to be balanced against an earthly kingdom. And as for Hell, he hath expunged it, and all the infernal fiends, out of the nature of things[h]; otherwise he could not have wanted better arguments against such a crying sin.

[And holdeth no man bound to accuse himself, under any circumstances, by any pacts.]

Another of his theorems is, that "no man is obliged by any pacts to accuse himself[i]:"—which in some cases is true; but in his sense, and in his latitude, and upon his grounds, it is most untrue. When public fame hath accused a man before-hand, he may be called upon to purge himself or suffer. When the case is of public concernment, and the 887
circumstances pregnant, all nations do take the liberty to examine a man upon oath in his own cause; and where the safety and welfare of the commonwealth is concerned, as in cases of high treason, and for the more full discovery of conspiracies, upon the rack: which they could not do lawfully, if no man was bound in any case to discover himself. His reason is silly;—"For in vain do we make him promise, who when he hath performed, we know not whether he have performed or not[k]:"—and makes as much against all examination of witnesses, as delinquents. "In vain do we make"

[f] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xv.] p. 73.
[g] [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 208.]
[h] [See above in c. i. pp. 536—538.]
[i] De Cive, c. ii. § 19. [p. 21.—"Similiter neque tenetur quisquam pactis ullis ad se accusandum."]
[k] [Ibid.,—"Frustra enim promittere cum facimus, qui cum præstiterit, nescimus an præstiterit necne."]

them give testimony, "who when they have" testified, "we know not whether they have given" right testimony "or not." Discourse III.

But his next conclusion will uncase him fully, and shew us what manner of man he is.—"If the commonwealth come into the power of its enemies, so that they cannot be resisted, he who had the sovereignty before, is understood to have lost it[l]." What "enemies" he meaneth, such as have the just power of the sword or such as have not; what he meaneth by "the commonwealth," the whole kingdom or any part of it; what he intendeth by "cannot be resisted," whether a prevalence for want of forces to resist them or a victory in a set battle or a final conquest; and what he meaneth by "losing the sovereignty," losing it *de facto* or *de jure*, losing the possession only or losing the right also;—he is silent. It may be, because he knoweth not the difference. "*Qui pauca considerat, facile pronuntiat*"—"He that considers little, giveth sentence" more "easily" than truly. We must search out his sense somewhere else.—"The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long and no longer than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them," &c.; "wheresoever a man seeth protection, either in his own or in another's sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it[m]." By his leave, this is right dogs' play, which always take part with the stronger side. But yet this is general. The next is more particular:—"When in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies get a final victory, so as (the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer) there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty, then is the commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him[n]." Yet these words—"final victory"—are doubtful. When David's forces were chased out of the kingdom, so that he was not able to protect his subjects in their loyalty, could this be called a "final victory?" The next place is home:—"He who hath no

[And that the loss of sovereignty *de facto* voideth all duty of allegiance.]

[2 Sam. xvii. 22.]

[l] De Cive, c. vii. § 18. [p. 87,—"Si civitas venerit in potestatem hostium, ita ut resisti eis non possit, intelligitur is qui prius summam habebat potestatem, eam jam amisisse."]

[m] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 114.

[n] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix. p. 174.]

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Where these principles prevail, adieu honour, and honesty, and fidelity, and loyalty; all must give place to self-interest. What? For a man to desert his sovereign upon the first prevalence of an enemy, or the first payment of a petty contribution, or the first appearance of a sword that is more able to protect us for the present? Is this his great law of nature, "*pactis standum*"—"to stand to" what we have "obliged" ourselves[s]? Then kings, from whom all men's right and property is derived, should not have so much right themselves in their own inheritance as the meanest subject. It seemeth T. H. did "take" his sovereign "for better," but not "for worse." Fair fall those old Roman spirits, who gave thanks to Terentius Varro, after he had lost the great battle of Cannæ by his own default, because "he did not despair of the commonwealth[t];" and would not sell the ground that Hannibal was encamped upon, one farthing cheaper than if it had been in time of peace[u]; which was one thing that discouraged that great captain from continuing the siege of Rome.

[Marriage Service.]

[His many errors against the

His former discourse hath as many faults as lines. First,

[o] Leviath., [Review and Conclusion,] p. 390.
[p] [Ibid.]
[q] [Ibid., p. 391.]
[r] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.] p. 137.
[s] [De Cive, c. iii. § 1. p. 23.]
[t] [Liv., xxii. 61.]
[u] [Ibid., xxvi. 11.]

888 all sovereignty is not from the people. He himself acknowledgeth, that "fatherly empire or power" was "instituted by God in the creation," and "was monarchical[v]." Secondly, where the application of sovereign power to the person is from the people, yet there are other ends besides protection. Thirdly, protection is not a condition, though it be a duty. A failing in duty doth not cancel a right. Fourthly, protection ought to be mutual. The subject ought to defend his king, as well as the king his subject. If the king be disabled to protect his subject by the subject's own fault, because he did not assist him as he ought, this doth not warrant the subject to seek protection elsewhere. Fifthly, he doth not distinguish between a just conqueror, who hath the power of the sword though he abuse it, and him that hath no power at all. I will try if he can remember whose words these are;—"They that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant among themselves to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission; and therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, . . nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man[x]." This is home, both for right and obligation. Sixthly, there are other requisites to the extinction of the right of a prince and the obligation of a subject, than the present prevalence or conquest of an enemy. Seventhly, nature doth not dictate to a subject to violate his oaths and allegiance, by "using his endeavours to maintain protection wheresoever he seeth it, either in his own sword or another man's." Eighthly, "total submission" is not as lawful as "contribution." Ninthly, actual submission doth not take away the sovereign's right or the subject's obligation. Tenthly, to live under the command or protection of a conqueror doth not necessarily imply allegiance. Lastly, much less doth it imply an assent to all his laws, and an obligation to obey them.

Discourse III. right and authority of monarchs.]

These are part of T. H. his faults, on the one hand, against monarchs; opposite enough to peace and tranquillity; which

[His ten times grosser errors in favour of monarchs.]

[v] De Cive, c. x. § 3. [p. 108.—"Quod imperium paternum institutum a Deo in creatione monarchicum fuerit."]

[x] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xviii.] p. 88.

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none can approve, who either have a settlement, or wish one. But his faults are ten times greater and grosser for monarchs, on the other hand; insomuch as I have thought sometimes, that he observed the method of some old cunning Parliament-men, who, when they had a mind to cross a bill, were always the highest for it in the House, and would insert so many and so great inconveniences into the Act, that they were sure it could never pass.

"Tuta frequensque via est per amici fallere nomen[y]."

So he maketh the power of kings to be so exorbitant, that no subject, who hath either conscience or discretion, ever did or can endure; so to render monarchy odious to mankind.

I pass by his accommodating of the four first Commandments of the Decalogue to sovereign princes[z], which concern our duty to Almighty God. Let his first paradox of this kind be this:—"A monarch doth not bind himself to any man by any pacts for the empire which he receiveth[a]:" and, "It is vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenants; the opinion, that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition" (learnedly expounded!) "proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants being but words and breath" (mark that) "have no force to oblige," &c., "but from the public sword[b];" What is now become of all our coronation oaths, and all our liberties and great Charters?

Another paradox is this:—"Every monarch may make his successor by his last will; and that which one may transfer to another by testament, that he may by the same right give or sell whilst he is living: therefore, to whomsoever he disposeth it, either for love or money, it is lawfully disposed[c]:" and, "There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign[d]." The whole body of the kingdom of England were of another mind in King John's case; and if he had disposed the

[y] [Ovid., Art. Amat., i. 585.—"per amic*um* fallere nomen."]

[z] [Leviath., P. II. c. xxx.] pp. 177, [178.]

[a] De Cive, c. vii. § 11. [p. 81.—"Neque ergo Monarcha ullis se pactis cuiquam ob receptum imperium obstringit."]

[b] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xviii.] p. 89.

[c] De Cive, c. [ix.] § [13, 14. p. 102.—"Quare Monarcha omnis potest successorem sibi testamento facere. Quod autem quis testamento transferre in alium potest, id eodem jure donare vel vendere vivens potest; cuicumque ergo is summum imperium tradiderit, sive dono sive pretio, jure traditur."]

[d] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xix.] p. 99.

sovereignty to a Turk, as some of our historiographers relate that he made an overture[e], it is not likely that they would have turned Turkish slaves. DISCOURSE III.

Hear a third paradox.—The sovereign "hath so much power over every subject by law, as every one who is not subject to another hath over himself, that is, absolute; to be limited by the power of the commonwealth, and by no other thing[f]." What? Neither by the laws of God, nor nature,
889 nor nations, nor by the laws of the land, neither co-actively nor directively? Would not this man have made an excellent guide for princes[g]? But more of this anon.

I proceed.—"When the sovereign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the law[h]." Parliaments may shut up their shops; there is no need of them to repeal former laws.

His fifth excess is a grievous one:—that "before the institution of a commonwealth every man had a right.. to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation, subduing, hurting, or killing any man, in order thereunto;" and "this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in every commonwealth[i]." And his sentence in brief is this;—that if the magistrate do examine and condemn the delinquent, then it is properly punishment; if not, it is a "hostile act;" but both are justifiable[k]. Judge, reader, whether thou wilt trust St. Paul or T. H. St. Paul telleth us, that the magistrate is "the ordinance of God—the minister of God—the revenger of God"—the swordbearer of God "to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." No, saith T. H.; punishment is not an act of the magistrate as he is a magistrate, or as he is an officer of God to do justice, or a "revenger" of evil deeds; but as he is the only private man, who hath not laid down his natural right to kill any man at his own dis- Rom. xiii. 2—4.

[e] [To "Miramoulin, Emperor of Africa, Morocco, and Spain;" according to Matt. Paris., Hist. Angl., p. 243. in an. 1213.]

[f] De Cive, c. vi. § 18. [p. 70.—"Potentiam in cives singulos jure habet tantam, quantam extra civitatem unusquisque habet in seipsum, id est, summam sive absolutam, viribus civitatis neque ullâ alia re limitandum."]

[g] [Hobbes was at one time tutor to Charles II. (see the Biogr. Brit.); and wrote his Leviathan under the delusion that Charles might perchance act upon its principles (see Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxxi. p. 193).]

[h] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 157.

[i] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] pp. 161, [162.]

[k] [Ibid., pp. 162, 163.]

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cretion, if he do but suspect that he may prove noisome to him, or conceive it necessary for his own preservation. Who ever heard of such a right before, so repugnant to the laws of God and nature? But observe, reader, what is the result of it;—that the sovereign may lawfully kill any of his subjects, or as many of them as he pleaseth, without any fault of theirs, without any examination on his part, merely upon suspicion, or without any suspicion, of the least crime, if he do but judge him to be hurtful or noisome; as freely as a man may pluck up a weed, because it hinders the nourishment of better plants. "Before the institution of a commonwealth, every one may lawfully be spoiled and killed by every one; but in a commonwealth, only by one[l]," that is, the sovereign; and, "By the right of nature, we destroy without being unjust all that is noxious, both beasts and men[m]." He makes no difference between a Christian and a wolf. Would you know what is "noxious" with him? Even "whatsoever he thinketh can annoy him[n]." Who would not desire to live in his commonwealth, where the sovereign may lawfully kill a thousand innocents every morning to his breakfast? Surely this is a commonwealth of fishes, where the great ones eat the lesser.

It were strange, if his subjects should be in a better condition for their fortunes, than they are for their lives; no, I warrant you; do but hear him;—"Thy dominion and thy property is so great, and lasteth so long, as the commonwealth" (that is, the sovereign) "will[o]." Perhaps he meaneth in some extraordinary cases? Tush, in all cases, and at all times. When thou didst choose a sovereign, even in choosing him thou madest him a deed of gift of all thou hast, "*et tu ergo tuum jus civitati concessisti*"—"and therefore thou hast granted all thy right to the commonwealth[p]."

Yet some may imagine, that his meaning is only that property may be transferred by laws or Acts of Parliament from one to another; as "the Lacedæmonians, when they per-

[l] De Cive, c. x. § 1. [p. 106.—"Extra civitatem quilibet a quolibet jure spoliari et occidi potest, in civitate ab uno tantum."]

[m] [In the Defence, T. II. Numb. xiv. above p. 86.]—Qu., [T. II. Numb. xiv.] p. 116.

[n] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.] p. 140.

[o] De Cive, c. xii. § 7.—[p. 132.—"Dominium ergo et proprietas tua tanta est et tamdiu durat, quanta et quamdiu ipsa" (civitas) "vult."]

[p] Ibid.

mitted children to steal other men's goods," they transferred the right from the owners to the children[q]. No, no; T. H. is not for general laws, but particular verbal mandates:— "The king's word is sufficient to take any thing from any subject, if there be need; and the king is judge of that need[r]." If by "need" he did understand extreme necessity, for the preservation of the commonwealth, it might alter the case. But this "need" is like Ahab's "need" of Naboth's vineyard. There is neither necessity nor commonwealth in the case. The Lacedæmonian thefts were warranted by a general law, not only consented to universally, but sworn unto. And if it had been otherwise, the value was so small, and the advantage apprehended to be so great to the commonwealth, that no honest subject would contradict it. Right and title may be transferred by law; and there can be no wrong, where consent is explicit and universal; such consent taketh away all error. But if the consent be only implicit, to the making or admitting of just laws, and unjust laws be obtruded in the place of just; the subject suffers justly by his own act, but he or they that were trusted, sin: and if he be a sovereign, oweth an account to God; if subordinate, both to God and man. But he justifieth the taking away of men's estates, either in part or in whole, without precedent law, or precedent necessity, or subsequent satisfaction; and maintaineth, that not only the subject is bound to submit, but that the sovereign is just in doing it.

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[1 Kings xxi.]

I cannot pass by his good affection to the nobility of Europe:—"In these parts of Europe it hath been taken for a right of certain persons to have place in the highest council of state by inheritance;" but, "Good counsel comes not by inheritance," and "the politics is a harder study than geometry[s]." I think he mistakes the "council of state" for the Parliament. And who more fit to concur in the choice of laws, than they who are most concerned in the laws? than they, who must contribute most, if there be occasion, to the maintenance of the laws? No art is hereditary more than politics. A

[His grudge against the nobility.]

[q] De Cive, c. xiv. § 10. [p. 162.—"Nam Lacedæmonii olim, cum permitterent pueris certâ lege surripere bona aliena, ea bona non aliena sed propria surripientis esse censuerunt."]

[r] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xx.] p. 106.

[s] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxx.] p. 184.

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musician doth not beget a musician. Yet we see the father's eminence in any art begets a propension in his posterity to the same; and where two or three successive generations do happily insist in the steps one of another, they raise an art to great perfection. I do easily acknowledge, that "politics are a harder study than geometry," and the practice more than the theory, gained more by experience than by study. Therefore our parliaments did prudently permit the eldest sons of barons to be present at their consultations, to fit them by degrees for that person which they must one day sustain. But he had a mind to shew the statesmen his teeth, as he had done to all other professions.

[What is meant by a mixed form of government.]

There are many other errors and mistakes in his politics; as this,—that "sovereignty cannot be divided[t]," or that "there cannot be a mixed form of government[u]." Which is a mere mistaking of the question. For though it be sometimes styled a "mixed" monarchy, because it doth partake of all the advantages of aristocracy and democracy without partaking of their inconveniences, yet, to speak properly, it is more aptly called a temperated or moderated sovereignty, rather than "divided" or "mixed." Neither did any English monarch communicate any essential of sovereignty to any subject or subjects whatsoever. All civil power, legislative, judiciary, military, was ever exercised in the name of the king, and by his authority. The three estates of the kingdom assembled in Parliament, were but suppliants to the king, to have such or such laws enacted[x]. What is it then that hath occasioned this mistake? Though the king hath not granted away any part of his sovereign power, yet he hath restrained himself by his coronation oath, and by his great charters[x], from the exercise of some part of it, in some cases, without such and such requisite conditions (except where the evident necessity of the commonwealth is a dispensation from Heaven for the contrary). So he hath restrained himself in the exercise of his legislative power, that he will govern his subjects by no new laws other than such as they should assent unto. It is not then any legislative

[t] De Cive, c. vii. § 4. [p. 78.]

[u] [De Cive, ibid.]—Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] pp. 171, [172.]—&c.

[x] [See above in Serpent Salve, sect. xii. vol. iii. pp. 369—375; Disc. ii. Pt. ii.]

power, which the two Houses of Parliament have, either ex- D
clusively without the king, or inclusively with the king, but
a receptive or rather a preparative power, "*sine quâ non*"—
'without which' no new laws ought to be imposed upon
them; and as no new laws, so no new taxes or impositions,
which are granted in England by a statute law.

By this it is evident, how much his discourse of "three souls animating one body[y]" is wide from the purpose, and his supposition of "setting up a supremacy against the sovereignty, canons against laws, and a ghostly authority against the civil[z]," weigheth less than nothing; seeing we acknowledge, that the civil sovereign hath an architectonical power, to see that all subjects within his dominions do their duties in their several callings, for the safety and tranquillity of their commonwealth, and to punish those that are exorbitant with the civil sword, as well those who derive their habitual power immediately from Christ, as those who derive it from the sovereign himself. Then the constitution of our English policy was not to be blamed; the exercise of the power of the keys, by authority from Christ, was not to be blamed: but T. H. deserveth to be blamed, who presumeth to censure before he understands.

Another of his whimsies is, that "no law can be unjust."— [1
"By a good law I mean, not a just law, for no law can be b
unjust," &c.; "it is in the laws of the commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming; whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them[a]." An opinion absurd in itself, and contradictory to his own ground. There may be laws tending to the contumely of God, to atheism, to denial of
891 God's providence, to idolatry; all which he confesseth to be crimes of high treason against God[b]. There may be laws against the law of nature, which he acknowledgeth to be the "Divine law, . . eternal, immutable, . . which God hath made known to all men by His eternal word born in themselves, that is to say, natural reason[c]." But this question—whether

[y] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxix. pp. 171, 172.]

[z] [Ibid., p. 171.]

[a] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxx.] pp. [181,] 182.

[b] De Cive, [c. xv. § 17—19. pp. 188—193.]

[c] Ibid., [c. iii. § 29. p. 38.—"Leges Naturæ immutabiles et æternæ sunt."] —c. xiv. § 4. [p. 158.—"Lex Naturalis ea est, quam Deus omnibus hominibus patefecit per verbum Suum æternum ipsis innatum, nimirum rationem ipsam."]

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any law can be unjust—hath been debated more fully between him and me in my answer to his Animadversions[d]. The true ground of this, and many other of his mistakes, is this,—that he fancieth no reality of any natural justice or honesty, nor any relation to the law of God or nature, but only to the laws of the commonwealth. So, "from one absurdity being admitted, many others are apt to follow[e]."

[T. H. his œconomics no better than his politics.—He teacheth, that parents may kill their children.]

His œconomics are no better than his politics. He teacheth parents, that "they cannot be injurious to their children, so long as they are in their power[f]." Yes, too many ways, both by omission and commission. He teacheth mothers, that "they may cast away their infants or expose them at their own discretion lawfully[g]." He teacheth parents indifferently, that "where they are free from all subjection," they "may take away the lives of their children" or kill them, and this justly[h]. What horrid doctrines are these!

[His dream of a "state of mere nature."]

It may be he will tell us, that he speaketh only of the "state of mere nature:" but he doth not; for he speaketh expressly of commonwealths[i], and paralleleth fathers with kings and lords[k], to whom he ascribeth absolute dominion; who have no place in his "state of mere nature." Neither can he speak of "the state of mere nature;" for therein, according to his grounds, the children have as much privilege to kill their parents as the parents to kill their children, seeing he supposeth it to be a "state of war of all men against all men[l]." And if he did speak of "the state of mere nature," it were all one. For, first, his "state of mere nature" is a drowsy dream of his own feigning, which "looketh upon men as if they were suddenly grown out of the ground like mushrooms[m]." The primogenious and most natural state of man-

[d] [Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb. xiv. [pp. 133—139.]—[Castig., Numb. xiv. above pp. 321—327; Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]

[e] ["Posito uno absurdo sequuntur mille."]

[f] De Cive, c. ix. § 7. [p. 98.—"Neque posse parentem, quamdiu in ejus potestate est, filio injurium esse."]

[g] De Cive, c. ix. § 2. [p. 96.—"Manifestum autem est, eum qui modo nascitur, prius esse in potestate matris quam cujusquam alterius, ita ut illum vel educare vel exponere suo arbitrio et jure possit."]

[h] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.] p. 137.

[i] [In the De Cive, c. ix. § 2, Hobbes is speaking of the "state of nature:" in § 7, he is not.]

[k] [De Cive, c. ix. § 7. p. 98.—"Servi dominis"—"subditi illi qui summum habet imperium in civitate."]

[l] [Ibid., c. i. § 12. p. 9.—"Bellum omnium in omnes."]

[m] Ibid., c. viii. § 1. [p. 89.—"Ut redeamus iterum in statum naturalem,

kind was in Adam before his fall, that is, the state of innocence. Or suppose we should give way to him to expound himself of the state of corrupted nature, that was in Adam and his family after his fall. But there was no such "state of mere nature" as he imagineth. There was religion, there were laws, government, society. And if there ever were any such barbarous savage rabble of men as he supposeth, in the world, it is both untrue, and dishonourable to the God of nature, to call it "the state of mere nature," which is the state of degenerated nature. He might as well call a hydropical distemper, contracted by intemperance, or any other disease of that nature, the natural state of men. But there never was any such degenerate rabble of men in the world, that were without all religion, all government, all laws, natural and civil; no, not amongst the most barbarous Americans[n], who (except some few criminal habits, which those poor degenerate people, deceived by national custom, do hold for noble) have more principles of natural piety, and honesty, and morality, than are readily to be found in his writings. As for the times of civil war, they are so far from being without all pacts and governors, that they abound overmuch with pacts and governors, making policy not only to seem, but to be, double. This evident truth may be demonstrated from his own grounds.—"All those places of Holy Scripture, by which we are forbidden to invade that which is another man's, as 'Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery,' do confirm the law of distinction of mine and thine: for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away[o]." How can that be, when he confesseth every where, that these are the eternal laws of God and nature? But (that which is much more true) they both suppose and demonstrate, that there never was any such "right of all men to all things." Let him call them "laws" or "theorems[p]," or what he please; they

consideremusque homines, tanquam si essent jamjam subito e terrâ (fungorum more) exorti et adulti sine omni unius ad alterum obligatione."]

[n] [Among whom Hobbes affirmed his state of nature to be then existing; Leviath., Pt. i. c. xiii. p. 63.]

[o] De Cive, c. iv. § 4. [p. 43.—"Legem de distinctione nostri et alieni confirmant omnia illa Scripturæ Sacræ loca, quibus invasio in alienum prohibetur; ut 'non occides,' 'non furaberis,' 'non mæchaberis;' supponunt enim jus omnium in omnia sublatum esse."]

[p] [Leviath., Pt. I. c xv. p. 80.]

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confute that "state of mere nature," which he maketh the foundation of his commonwealth.

[And yet that the parent hath no natural right over the child.]

Hitherto he hath been too high for the parents. Now they must expect a cooling card. "The question who is the better man, hath no place in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal[q]." Are the parent and child equal? Yes: "they are equal, who can do equal things one against another; but they who can do the greatest things, that is to kill, can do equal things; therefore all men by nature are equal among themselves[r]." If the son have as strong an arm and as good a cudgel as his father, he is as good a man as his father.

Another of his aphorisms is,—"Paternal dominion is not so derived from generation, as if therefore the parent had 892
dominion over his child because he begat him, but by the child's consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared[s]." And will you see how this consent is gained? "The attaining to sovereign power is by two ways, one by natural force, as when a man maketh his children submit themselves and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse[t]." These principles are so false, that the very evidence of truth doth extort the contrary from him at other times. "The Bishop saw there was paternal government in Adam, which he might do easily, as being no deep consideration[u];" and again, "To kill one's parent is a greater crime than to kill another; for the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign (though he have surrendered his power to the civil law), because he had it originally by nature[x]." "Great is truth, and prevaileth." If this were "no deep consideration," the more he deserveth to be blamed; who at some times robbeth both parents of their honour, some other times the man only: as, "By the right of nature the dominion over an infant doth belong first to him who hath him first in his power; and it is manifest, that he that is born is sooner in the power of his mother than of any other, so that she might either bring him up, or cast him

["*Magna est veritas et prævalet.*" 3 Esdras iv. 41.]

[q] [Leviath., Pt. I. c. xv. p. 76.]

[r] [De Cive, c. i. § 3. p. 5.—"Æquales sunt qui æqualia contra se invicem possunt. At qui maxima possunt, nimirum occidere, æqualia possunt. Sunt igitur omnes homines naturâ inter se æquales."]

[s] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xx.] p. 102.

[t] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xvii.] p. 88.

[u] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.] p. 139.

[x] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 160.

out, at her pleasure, and by right[y];"—(never without the father's licence;)—again, "In the state of nature it cannot be known who is father of an infant but by the relation of the mother; therefore he is his, whom the mother would have him to be; and therefore the mother's[z]." Doth this man believe in earnest, that marriage was instituted by God in Paradise, and hath continued ever since the creation? He might as well tell us, in plain terms, that all the obligation which a child hath to his parent, is because he did not take him by the heels and knock out his brains against the walls, so soon as he was born. Though this be intolerable, yet there is something of gratitude in it, and in that respect it is not altogether so ill, as his forced "pacts[a]."

[Gen. ii. 22-24.—Mal. ii. 15.—Matt. xix. 4-6.—&c.]

How repugnant is this which he saith of the mother's dominion over her children to the law of nations! By the law of the twelve tables a father might sell his child twice;—"*bis venum duat*[b]." The mother had no hand in it. Neither doth the judicial law of the Jews dissent from this;—"If *a man* sell his daughter to be a maid-servant." So likewise a child's vow might be invalidated by the authority of a father, but not of a mother.

Exod. xxi. 7.

Num. xxx. 4, [5.]

He aboundeth every where with such destructive conclusions as these:—"As to generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be always two that are equally parents; the dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both, and he be equally subject to both; which is impossible, for 'no man can obey two masters[c].'" Whether had he forgotten the Commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother," or thinketh he that obedience is not a branch of "honour?"

[Matt. vi. 24.—Luke xvi. 13.]

In the next place, his principles destroy the subordination of a wife to her husband. "The inequality of natural strength is less than that a man can acquire dominion over a woman without war[d]." And he giveth this reason, why

[His principles destroy the subordination of a wife to her husband.]

[y] De Cive, c. ix. § 2. [p. 96.—"Jure igitur naturæ dominium infantis ad eum primum pertinet qui primus in potestate suâ ipsum habet. Manifestum autem est," &c. See above p. 566, note g.]

[z] Ibid., § 3. [p. 96.—"Adde quod in statu naturæ sciri non potest cujus esse; et proinde matris est."]

[a] [See above note t.]

[b] [The law stood thus—"Si pater filiom ter venumduit, filius a patre liber esto." See the fragments of the XII. Tables, Tab. iv.; ap. Gothofred., De Fontibus Quatuor Juris Civilis, 4to. Genev. 1653.]

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the contrary custom prevaileth;—because "commonwealths" were "constituted by fathers of families, not by mothers of families," and from hence it is that "the domestical dominion belongs to the man[e]." The Scriptures assign another reason of the subjection of the woman, and the rule of the man; namely, the ordinance of Almighty God. And St. Paul secondeth it: —"Women are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law;"—I trow that law was not made "by fathers of families:"—"Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord;"—why? because of "the civil law?" no such thing;—"for the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the Head of the Church:" and, "The man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man; for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man, neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman for the man." He would not "suffer a woman . . to usurp authority over a man;" much less over her own husband. I might cite St. Peter to the same purpose; but I am afraid, lest he should accuse both St. Peter and St. Paul of partiality, as well as the first founders of commonwealths.

Gen. iii. 16. 1 Cor. xiv. 34. Eph. v. 22. [Eph. v. 23.] 1 Cor. xi. 7, 8, 9. 1 Tim. ii. 12. [1 Peter iii. 1-6.]

[And justify adultery.]

Upon his principles, no man is sure of his own wife, if the sovereign please to dispose her to another:—"For although the law of nature do prohibit theft, or adultery," &c., "yet, if the civil law command a man to invade any thing, that is not theft or adultery[f]." And what is "the civil law" in his sense? "The command of the lawgiver; and his command is the declaration of his will[g]." So, if the lawgiver do but declare his pleasure that any one shall enjoy such a man's wife, or that she shall no longer be his wife, according to his grounds, husband and wife must both obey. "What is theft, what is murder, what is adultery, is known by the civil law; that is, by the commands of him that is sovereign in the commonwealth[h]." And without the sovereign's command, if either party do but suspect one another,

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"Inæqualitas virium naturalium minor est quam ut mas in fœminam imperium sine bello acquirere possit."]

[e] De Cive, § 6. [p. 98.—"In omnibus civitatibus, scilicet constitutis a patribus, non a matribus familias, imperium domesticum viri est."]

[f] Ibid., c. xiv. § 10. [p. 162.—"Nam etsi naturæ lex prohibeat furtum, adulterium, &c., si tamen lex civilis jubeat invadere aliquid, non est illud furtum, adulterium, &c."]

[g] Ibid., § 13. [p. 163.—"Est enim lex legislatoris mandatum; mandatum autem est declaratio voluntatis."]

[h] Ibid., c. vi. § 16. [p. 69. See above p. 546. note o.]

the party suspected is disobliged;—"for there is no pact, where credit is not given to him that maketh the pact; neither can faith be violated, where it is not had[i]." Disc I

The next political relation is between the master and the servant, which the Hobbian principles do overthrow as well as the rest. One of these principles is, that "a master cannot do any wrong to his servant, because the servant hath subjected his will to the will of his master[k]." In all such submissions there is evermore either expressed or implied a *salvo*, or a saving of his duty to God and his allegiance to his prince. If his master shall punish him for not doing contrary to these, or by menaces compel him to do contrary to these, he doth him wrong. No man can transfer that right to another, which he hath not himself. The servant, before his submission to his master, had no right to deny due obedience to God, or due allegiance to his prince. [An throu relat a ser his n

Another of his paradoxes is, that "whosoever is obliged to obey the commands of any other, before he know what he will command, is bound to all his commands simply and without restriction; now he that is obliged, is called a servant; he to whom he is bound, a master[l]." What if the master's command be contrary to the laws of God or nature? or the laws of the commonwealth? 'In the presence of a greater authority, a lesser authority ceaseth.' Such implicit obligations are ever to be understood "*quantum jus fasque fuerit*"—"according to law and equity."

Hitherto servants have been grieved, but now they shall be relieved, if T. H. his authority can do it.—"Servants who are holden in bonds, are not comprehended in the definition of servants, because they serve not by pact, but to avoid beating; and therefore if they fly away, or kill their master, they do nothing contrary to the laws of nature: for to bind them is a sign, that the binder did suppose them not sufficiently bound by any other obligation[m]." His conse-

[i] De Cive, c. viii. § 9. [p. 93.—"Non enim existit pactum nisi ubi paciscenti creditur, nec violari potest fides quæ non est habita."]

[k] Ibid., c. viii. § 7. [p. 92.—"Quod is qui summum civitatis imperium habet, nullam iis" (subditis) "injuriam facere potest, verum quoque de servis est; propterea quod voluntatem suam domini voluntati subjecere."]

[l] Ibid., c. viii. § 1. [p. 90.—"Nam qui mandatis cujusquam obedire ante obligatur quam quid imperaturus sit sciat, tenetur ad omnia mandata simpliciter et sine restrictione; jam qui sic tenetur servus, is cui tenetur dominus, appellatur."]

[m] Ibid., c. viii. § 4. [pp. 90, 91.—

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quence is infirm,—because the master binds his servant, therefore he distrusts him, therefore there were no "pacts." A man may give his parole for true imprisonment, and having given it to a just enemy is obliged to hold it. What if his conqueror or master did spare his life, upon condition that he should be true prisoner, until he could find out a fit exchange for him? This was a lawful "pact." Then doth not T. H. instruct the prisoner well, to cut his conqueror's throat, who spared his life upon a lawful condition?

But to dispel these umbrages, he teacheth, that "a servant who is cast into bonds, or any way deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed from that other obligation which did arise from his pact[n]." So as, according to his principle, if a servant (that is more than a captive), having not only had his life spared by a just conqueror, but also contracted and engaged himself to be a loyal servant, as firmly as may be, shall nevertheless be cast into any bonds by his master, or be restrained of his corporal liberty, upon delinquency, or just suspicion, he is acquitted of all his "pacts" and obligations, and as free to run away, or cut his master's throat, as if he had never "pacted" or engaged at all.

[A bundle of T. H. his political errors.]

His defaults come so thick, I am weary of observing them. Take a hotchpotch together.—

1. "In the state of nature, profit is the measure of right[o]."

2. "Every one is an enemy to every one, whom he neither commandeth nor obeyeth[p]."

3. "Not only to contend against one, but even this very thing—not to consent,—is odious; for not to consent with one in some thing, is tacitly to accuse him of error in that thing; as to dissent in many things, is to hold him for a fool[q]." In the Name of God, what doth he hold the whole

"Servi itaque hujusmodi, qui carceribus, ergastulis, vinculisve cohibentur, non comprehenduntur definitione servorum supra traditâ; quia serviunt hi, non pacto, sed ne vapulent; ideoque si aufugerint vel dominum interfecerint, nihil faciunt contra leges naturales; etenim vinculis ligari signum est, illum qui ligat, supponere ligatum nullâ aliâ obligatione satis teneri."]

[n] Ibid., § 9. [p. 93.—"Servus qui in vincula conjicitur, vel quoquo modo libertate corporali privatur, alterâ illâ obligatione pactitiâ liberatur."]

[o] Ibid., c. i. § 10. [p. 8.—"Ex quo etiam intelligitur, in statu naturæ mensuram juris esse utilitatem."]

[p] Ibid., c. ix. § 3. [p. 96.—"Hostis autem est quisque cuique cui neque paret neque imperat."]

[q] Ibid., c. i. § 5. [p. 6.—"Etenim non modo contra contendere, sed etiam

world to be? I am sure *he* "dissenteth" from them all "in many things." Disec II

4. "It is not reasonable, that one perform first, if it be likely that the other will not perform afterwards; which whether it be likely or no, he that feareth shall judge[r]." It is true he addeth, that "in the civil state, where both parties may be compelled, he who is to perform first by the contract, ought to perform first[s]." But what if the civil power be not
894 able to compel him? What if there be no witnesses to prove the contract? Then the civil power can do nothing. May a man violate his faith in such cases, upon general suspicions of the fraud and unfaithfulness of mankind?

5. "If a people have elected a sovereign for term of life," and he die, neither the people before election, nor he before his death, having ordained any thing about a place of meeting for "a new election," it "is lawful for every one, by equal, that is, natural right, to snatch the sovereignty to himself if he can[t]." His opinion of the "state of nature" is a very bundle of absurdities.

6. "When a master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger, if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey, but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation, and therefore could not injure him[u]." True, according to his principles; who maketh neither conscience, nor honesty, nor obligation from any one to any one, but only by "pacts" or promises. All just men are of another mind.

7. "Those men, which are so remissly governed, that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce a new opinion, are

hoc ipsum non consentire, odiosum est; etenim non consentire alicui in re aliquâ est eum erroris in eâ re tacite accusare, sicut in valde multis dissentire idem est atque pro stulto eum habere."]

[r] De Cive, c. ii. § 11. [p. 17.—"Rationis enim non est, ut aliquis præstet prior, si verisimile non sit alterum esse præstiturum post; quod utrum verisimile sit necne, is qui metuit judicabit."]

[s] [Ibid., pp. 17, 18.—"Cæterum in statu civili, ubi est qui utrumque cogere potest, is qui per contractum prior est ad præstandum, prior præstare debet."]

[t] Ibid., c. vii. § 16. [pp. 83, 84.—"Supponamus jam populum tradidisse summum imperium alicui uni homini pro tempore tantum vitæ suæ; quod cum fecisset, putemus primo e cœtu unumquemque ita discessisse, ut de loco, ubi (post mortem ejus) ad novam electionem congregarentur, nihil omnino ordinatum sit. In hoc casu manifestum est, . . populum non esse amplius personam sed multitudinem dissolutam, quorum cuilibet cum quibuslibet convenire diverso tempore et loco quo libuerit, vel imperium sibi rapere si potuerit, æquo jure, nimirum naturali, licitum est."]

[u] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xv.] p. 74.

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still in war; and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms, for fear of one another[v]." Why is the fault rather imputed to the 'remissness' of the 'governor,' than to the sedition of the people? and a state of war feigned, where none is? The reason is evident;—because he had no hand in the government, but had a hand in the introduction of new opinions.

8. "In a sovereign assembly, the liberty to protest is taken away: both because he that protesteth there, denieth their sovereignty; and also, whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power, is as to the subject justified by the command, though not so always in the sight of God[w]." That is not "taken away," which all sovereigns do allow, even in the competition for a crown; as was verified in the case of the King of Spain, and the House of Braganza, about the kingdom of Portugal[x]. It is no 'denial of sovereignty,' to appeal humbly from a sovereign misinformed to himself better informed[y]. The commands of a sovereign person or assembly are so far "justified by the command," that they may not be resisted; but they are not so far justified, but that a loyal subject may lawfully seek with all due submission to have them rectified.

9. "If he whose private interest is to be debated and judged in" a sovereign "assembly, make as many friends as he can, it is no injustice in him; . . and though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express law against it, yet it is no injustice[z]." It is to be feared, that such provocations as this are not very needful in these times. Is it not unlawful to "blind the eyes of the wise" with bribes, and make them pervert judgment? Others pretend expedition, or an equal hearing; but he, who knoweth no obligation but "pacts," is for downright "hiring" of his judges, as a man should hire a hackney coach for an hour. There is no gratitude in hiring; which is unlawful in the buyer, though not so un-

[Exod. xxiii. 8.—Eccles. xx. 29.]

[v] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xviii.] p. 91.
[w] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxii.] p. 117.
[x] [The revolution which placed John Duke of Braganza upon the throne of Portugal, took place in 1640; but the war with Spain which ensued, did not terminate until 1665, and at the date of Bramhall's writing (1657, 8) was being carried on with vigour.]
[y] [Plut., Apophth. Regum. Philip. Numb. xxiv; Op. Moral., tom. i. pp. 497, 498. ed. Wyttenb.]
[z] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxii.] p. 122.

lawful as in the seller, of justice. If any man digged a pit, and did not cover it, so that an ox or an ass fell into it, he who digged it was to make satisfaction. He that hireth his judges with money to be for him right or wrong, diggeth a pit for them; and by the equity of this Mosaical law, will appear not to be innocent. Disc. II Exod 33.

Thus, after the view of his religion, we have likewise surveyed his politics; as full of black ugly dismal rocks as the former, dictated with the same magisterial authority. A man may judge them to be twins upon the first cast of his eye. It was Solomon's advice, "Remove not the ancient land-marks which thy fathers have set." But T. H. taketh a pride in removing all ancient land-marks, between prince and subject, father and child, husband and wife, master and servant, man and man. Nilus after a great overflowing doth not leave such a confusion after it as he doth; nor a hog in a garden of herbs. I wish he would have turned probationer a while, and made trial of his new form of government first in his own house, before he had gone about to obtrude it upon the commonwealth[a]; and that, before his attempts and bold endeavours to reform and to renew the policy of his native country, he had thought more seriously and more sadly of his own application of the fable of Peleus his "foolish daughters,"—"who, desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did, by the counsel of Medea, cut him in pieces and boil him together with strange herbs; but made not of him a new man[b]." Prov. 28.

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CHAP. III.

THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE INCONSISTENT ONE WITH ANOTHER.

My third harping iron is aimed at the head of his Leviathan, or the rational part of his discourse; to shew that his principles are contradictory one to another, and consequently destructive one of another. It is his own observation:—"That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth a religion, or addeth to it when it is [T. H. own sure contradictions

[a] [A saying of Lycurgus.—Plut., in V. Lycurg., tom. i. p. 111. ed. Bryant.]

[b] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxx.] p. 177.

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already formed, is an enjoining a belief of contradictories: for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true; and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an argument of ignorance[c]." How he will free himself from his own censure, I do not understand. Let the reader judge.

[An hereditary kingdom is and is not the best form of government.]

He affirmeth, that an hereditary kingdom is the best form of government;—"We are made subjects to him upon the best condition, whose interest it is that we should be safe and sound; and this cometh to pass when we are the sovereign's inheritance" (that is, in an hereditary kingdom); "for every one doth of his own accord study to preserve his own inheritance[d]." Now let us hear him retract all this. "There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign[e];" and, "Whether he transfer it by testament, or give it or sell it, it is rightly disposed[f]."

[Divine law ought and ought not to be obeyed in preference to human law.]

He affirmeth, "That which is said in the Scripture—'It is better to obey God than man,' hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature[g]." One can scarcely meet with a more absurd, senseless paradox;—that in God's own "kingdom of nature" (where he supposeth all men equal, and no governor but God) it should not be better to obey God than man, the Creator than the creature, the Sovereign rather than a fellow-subject. Of the two it had been the less absurdity to have said, that it had place in "the kingdom of God by nature," and not "by pact;" because, in the kingdom of God by pact, sovereigns are as "mortal gods[h]."

Now let us see him, Penelope like, unweave in the night what he had woven in the day[i], or rather unweave in the day what he had woven in the night. "It is manifest enough, that when [a] man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is God's, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawful sovereign[k]." Take another place more express; speaking of

[c] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xii.] p. 58.

[d] De Cive, c. x. § 18. [p. 119.—"Optimâ conditione illi subjicimur, cujus interest ut salvi et sani simus; atque hoc fit, quando imperantis hæredit us sumus, unusquisque enim sponte suâ hæreditatem suam conservare

[e] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xix.] p. 99.

[f] De Cive, c. ix. § 13. [p. 102. See above p. 560. note c.]

[g] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxxi.] p. 193.

[h] [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.]

[i] [Odyss. ii. 93—110.]

[k] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 321.

the first kingdom of God by pact with Abraham, &c., he hath these words, "Nor was there any contract which could add to or strengthen the obligation, by which both they and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty[l]." And before any such kingdom of God by pact, "as to the moral law they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withal[m]." He fancieth, that God reigned "by pact" over Adam and Eve, but "this pact became presently void[n]." And if it had stood firm, what kingdom of God by nature could have been before it? But he reckons his kingdom of God by pact from Abraham,—"From him the kingdom of God by pact takes its beginning[o]." But in Abraham's time, and before his time, the world was full of kings; every city had a king; was it not better for their subjects to obey God than them? Yet that was "the kingdom of God by nature," or no kingdom of God at all.

[Gen. xiv. 1, 2, 18; xx. 2, &c.]

Sometimes he saith the laws of nature are God's laws:—"Whose laws (such of them as oblige all mankind), in respect of God, as He is the God of nature, are natural; and in respect of the same God, as He is King of Kings, are laws[p];" and, "Right reason is a law[q];" and he defines the law of nature to be "the dictate of right reason[r]." Where by the way observe, what he makes to be the end of the laws of nature;—"the long conservation of our lives and members, so much as is in our power[s]." By this the reader may see what he believes of honesty or the life to come. At other times he saith, that they are no laws:—"Those which we call the laws of nature being nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason, of things to be done or to be left undone,—and a law, if we speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him that commandeth something by right to others, to be done or not to be done,—speaking properly, they are

[The laws of nature are God's laws, and no laws at all.]

[l] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxix.] p. 249.
[m] Ibid.
[p] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxx.] pp. 185, [186.]

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not laws, as they proceed from nature[t]." It is true, he addeth in the same place, that "as they are given by God in Holy Scripture, they are most properly called laws; for the Holy Scripture is the voice of God ruling all things by the greatest right[u]." But this will not salve the contradiction; for so the laws of nature shall be no laws to any but those who have read the Scripture, contrary to the sense of all the world. And even in this he contradicteth himself also:—"The Bible is a law: to whom? to all the world? 896 he knoweth it is not: how came it then to be a law to us? did God speak it *vivâ voce* to us? have we any other warrant for it than the word of the Prophets? have we seen the miracles? have we any other assurance of their certainty than the authority of the Church[x]?" And so he concludeth, that "the authority of the Church" is "the authority of the commonwealth," the authority of the commonwealth the authority of the sovereign, and his authority was given him by us[y]. And so "the Bible was made law by the assent of the subjects[y];" and, "The Bible is there only law, where the civil sovereign hath made it so[z]." Thus, in seeking to prove one contradiction, we have met with two.

He teacheth, that "the laws of nature are eternal and immutable; that which they forbid can never be lawful, that which they command never unlawful[a]." At other times he teacheth, that "in war, and especially in a war of all men against all men, the laws of nature are silent[b]:" and that they do not oblige as laws, before there be a commonwealth constituted;—"When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before[c]."

[The sovereign magistrate is

He saith, "True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both

[t] De Cive, c. iii. § 33. [p. 41.—"Naturæ autem quas vocamus leges, cum nihil aliud sint quam conclusiones quædam ratione intellectæ, de agendis et omittendis; lex autem, proprie atque accurati loquendo, sit oratio ejus qui aliquid fieri vel non fieri aliis jure imperat; non sunt illæ proprie loquendo leges, quatenus a naturâ procedunt."]

[u] [Ibid.—"Quatenus tamen eædem a Deo in Scripturis Sacris latæ sunt, . . legum nomine propriissime appellantur; est enim Scriptura Sacra in omnia maximo jure imperantis Dei oratio."]

[x] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.] p. 136.

[y] Ibid.

[z] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 322.

[a] De Cive, c. iii. § 29. [p. 38.—"Leges naturæ immutabiles et æternæ sunt; quod vetant, nunquam licitum esse potest; quod jubent, nunquam illicitum."]

[b] Ibid., c. v. § 2. [p. 52. See above p. 552. note m.]

[c] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvi.] p. 138.

in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain;" which "lieutenant" upon earth is the "supreme civil magistrate[d]." And yet, contrary to this, he excepteth from the obedience due to sovereign princes, "all things that are contrary to the laws of God, Who ruleth over rulers;" adding, that "we cannot rightly transfer the obedience due to him upon men[e]:" and more plainly, "If a sovereign shall command himself to be worshipped with Divine attributes and actions,—as, such as imply an independence upon God, or immortality, or infinite power, to pray unto them being absent, or to ask those things of them which only God can give, to offer sacrifice, or the like,—although kings command us, we must abstain[f]." He confesseth, "that the subjects of Abraham had sinned," if they had "denied the existence or providence of God," or "done any thing that was expressly against the honour of God," in obedience to his commands[g]: and, "Actions that are naturally signs of contumely, . . cannot be made by human power a part of Divine worship[h]." "Cannot be parts of Divine worship," and yet "religion" may "consist in" such worship, is a contradiction. Disco III and is the ult mate j of reli questi

He confesseth, that "if the commonwealth should command a subject to say or do some thing that is contumelious unto God, or should forbid him to worship God," he "ought not to obey[i]:" and yet maintaineth, that "a Christian holding firmly the faith of Christ in his heart," if he be "commanded by his lawful sovereign," may "deny Christ with his tongue[k]:" alleging, "that profession with the tongue is but an external thing," and "that it is not he in that case, who denieth Christ before men, but his governor and the law of his country[l]." Hath he so soon forgot himself? Is not the denial of Christ "contumelious to God?"

[d] Qu., [T. H. Numb. xxxviii.] p. 334; and [Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii.] p. 341.

[e] De Cive, c. vi. § 13.—[p. 66. "A quâ nihil excipiatur quod non sit contra leges Dei imperantis imperantibus, Cui debitam obedientiam transferre in homines jure non possumus."]

[f] Ibid., c. xv. § 18. [pp. 189, 190. See above p. 496, note u.]

[g] Ibid., c. xvi. § 7. [p. 198.—"Sequitur hinc subditos Abrahami ipsi obediendo peccare non potuisse, modo Abrahamus non imperasset Dei existentiam vel providentiam negare, vel facere aliquid quod esset expressè contra honorem Dei."]

[h] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxxi.] p. 192.

[i] De Cive, c. xv. § 18. [p. 190. See above p. 495. note s.]

[k] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 271.

[l] [Ibid.]

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[A subject may and may not judge of what is good or evil to be done.]

He affirmeth, that if a sovereign shall grant to a subject "any liberty inconsistent with sovereign power, if the subject refuse to obey the sovereign's command," being "contrary to the liberty granted, it is a sin, and contrary to his duty, for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with sovereignty," &c.; "and that such liberty was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof[m]." Then a subject may judge, not only what is fit for his own preservation, but also what are the essential rights of sovereignty; which is contrary to his doctrine elsewhere:—"It belongs to kings to discern what is good and evil," and "private men, who take to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, do covet to be as kings, which consisteth not with the safety of the commonwealth[n];" which he calleth "a seditious doctrine," and one of "the diseases of a commonwealth[o]." Yet such is his forgetfulness, that he himself licenseth his own book for the press[p], and to be "taught in the Universities[q]," as containing "nothing contrary to the Word of God or good manners, or to the disturbance of public tranquillity[r]." Is not this to "take to himself the knowledge of good and evil?"

[The just power of sovereigns absolute, and yet limited.]

In one place he saith, that the just power of sovereigns is "absolute, and to be limited by the strength of the commonwealth and nothing else[s]." In other places he saith, his power is to be limited by the laws of God and nature; as, "There is that in Heaven, though not on earth, which he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey[t];" and, "Though it be not determined in Scripture, what laws every king shall constitute in his dominions, yet it is determined, what laws he shall not constitute[u];" and, "It is true, that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man or commonwealth be abrogated[v]." 897

In one place he maintaineth, that "all men by nature are

[m] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 157.
[n] De Cive, c. xii. § 1. [p. 127. "Quoniam ergo regum est discernere inter bonum et malum," &c. "Privati autem homines, dum cognitionem boni et mali ad se trahunt, cupiunt esse sicut reges; quod salvâ civitate fieri non potest."]
[o] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 168.
[p] Ibid., [Review and Conclusion,] p. 395.
[q] [Ibid.]
[r] [Ibid.]
[s] De Cive, c. vi. § 18. [p. 70.—"Summam sive absolutam, viribus civitatis nec ullâ aliâ re limitandum."]
[t] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 167.
[u] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxiii.] p. 199.
[v] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.

equal among themselves[x];" in another place, that "the father of every man was originally his sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death[y]."

[God is good, and yet the cause of sin.]

He acknowledgeth, that God is not only "good," and "just," and "merciful," but "the best[z];" that "nature doth dictate" to us, that God is to be honoured[a]; and that "to honour is to think as highly of His power and goodness as is possible;" and that nothing ought to be attributed to Him but what is honourable[b]. Nothing can be more contrary to His goodness, or more dishonourable to God, than to make Him to be the cause of all the sin in the world. "Perhaps he will say, that this opinion maketh God the cause of sin; but doth not the Bishop think Him the cause of all actions? and are not sins of commission actions? is murder no action? and doth not God Himself say, '*Non est malum in civitate quod Ego non feci?*' and was not murder one of those evils[c]?" The like doctrine he hath, Qu. pp. 108, and 234[d].

[Amos iii. 6.]

[Children may and may not be punished for the sins of their fathers.]

I chanced to say, that "if a child, before he have the use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion, yet, because he had no malice to incite him to it, nor reason to restrain him from it, he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular justice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case[e];" shewing only what was the law, not what was my opinion.—(An innocent child, for terror to others, in some cases may be deprived of those honours and inheritances which were to have descended upon him from his father, but not of his life. Amaziah slew the murderers of the king his father, "but he slew not their children, but did as it is written in the law, in the book of Moses, 'The fathers shall not die for the children nor the children for the fathers.'")—And he presently taxed me for it:—"The Bishop would make but an ill judge of innocent children[f]." And the same merciful opinion he maintaineth elsewhere:—"All punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the law

2 Chron. xxv. 4. Deut. xxiv. 16.

[x] De Cive, c. i. § 3. [p. 5.—"Sunt igitur omnes homines naturâ inter se æquales."]

[y] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxx.] p. 178.

[z] De Cive, c. xv. § [14. p. 184.]

[a] [Ibid. § 8, p. 181.]

[b] [Animadv. upon Numb. xii. (see above pp. 312, 313), and upon Numb. xx. (see above pp. 396, 397).]

[c] [See above in the Defence, Numb. xxv. p. 169; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 175.

[d] [Animadv. upon Numb. xii. (see above pp. 312, 313), and upon Numb. xx. (see above pp. 396, 397).]

[e] [See above in the Defence, Numb. xxv. p. 169; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

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of nature; for punishment is only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent[g]." Yet within few lines after he changeth his note:—"In subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the commonwealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not only to the fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation[h]." His reason is, because "this offence consisteth in renouncing of subjection;" so they "suffer not as subjects, but as enemies[i]." Well, but the children were born subjects as well as the father, and they never "renounced their subjection:" how come they to lose their birthright and their lives for their fathers' fault, if "there can be no punishment of the innocent?" So the contradiction stands still.

[The magistrate has a right as man to kill, but no right as magistrate to punish, a guilty subject.]

But all this is but a copy of his countenance. I have shewed formerly[j] expressly out of his principles, that "the foundation of the right of punishing, exercised in every commonwealth," is not the just right of the sovereign for crimes committed, but "that right which every man by nature had to kill every man:" which right he saith every subject hath renounced, but the sovereign, by whose authority punishment is inflicted, hath not; so, if he do examine the crime in justice, and condemn the delinquent, then it is properly punishment; if he do not, then it is a "hostile act;" but both ways just and allowable. Reader, if thou please to see what a slippery memory he hath, for thine own satisfaction, read over the beginning of the eight and twentieth chapter of his Leviathan[k]. Innocents cannot be justly punished, but justly killed, upon his principles.

[T. H. zealous for human justice, yet regardeth not Divine.]

But this very man, who would seem so zealous sometimes for human justice, that there can be no just punishment of innocents, no just punishment but for crimes committed, how standeth he affected to Divine justice? He regardeth it not at all, grounding every where God's right to afflict the creatures upon His omnipotence; and maintaining, that God may as justly afflict with eternal torments without sin as for sin.—"Though God have power to afflict a man, and

[g] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 165.
[h] [Ibid.]
[i] [Ibid., pp. 165, 166.]
[j] [Above in c. ii. pp. 561, 562.]
[k] [pp. 161—163: upon "the definition of punishment," and "the right to punish, whence derived."]

not for sin, without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as to afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torments? is it not cruelty? no more than to do the same for sin, when He that afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning[l]." Whether God do "afflict" eternally, or punish eternally; whether the sovereign proceed judicially or in a "hostile" way; so it be not for any crime committed, it is all one as to the justice of God, and the sovereign, and all one as to the sufferings of the innocent. But "it may
898 and doth often happen in commonwealths, that a subject may be put to death by the command of the sovereign power, and yet neither do the other wrong[m];" that is to say, both be innocent, for that is the whole scope of the place. It is against the law of nature to punish innocent subjects, saith one place; but innocent subjects may lawfully be killed or put to death, saith another.

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Sometimes he maketh the institution of sovereignty to be only the laying down the right of subjects, which they had by nature:—"For he who renounceth or passeth away his right, giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature; but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without hindrance from another[n]." And elsewhere, —"The subjects did not give the sovereign that right, but only in laying down theirs strengthened him to use his own," &c.; "so it was not given, but left to him and to him only[o]." And, "The translation of right doth consist only in not resisting[p]." He might as well have said, and with as much sense, 'the transferring of right doth consist in not transferring of right.' At other times he maketh it to be a surrender, or "giving up of the subject's right to govern himself to this man;" a "conferring of all their power and strength upon one man, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one will;" an "appointing of one man . . to bear their person," and "acknowledging themselves to be the authors of

[The i tution soverei an incr and no increas the rig of the s reign.]

[l] Qu., [Fount. of Arg.] p. 13.
[m] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109.
[n] Ibid., [Pt. I. c. xiv.] p. 65.
[o] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 162.
[p] De Cive, c. ii. § 4. [p. 14.—"Juris autem translationem in solâ non resistentiâ consistere, ex hoc intelligitur," &c.]

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whatsoever" the sovereign "shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common safety;" a "submission of their wills to his will, their judgments to his judgment[q]:" and, "David did no injury to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself[r]." Before, we had a transferring without transferring; now we have a giving up without giving up, an appointing or constituting without appointing or constituting, a subjection without subjection, an authorising without authorising. What is this?

[T. H.'s contradictions relative to God.]

He saith, that "it cannot be said honourably of God, that He hath parts or totality, which are the attributes of finite things[s]." If "it cannot be said honourably of God, that He hath parts or totality," then it cannot be said honourably of God, that He is a body; for every body hath parts and totality. Now hear what he saith:—"Every part of the universe is body; and that which is no body, is no part of the universe; and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing[t]." Then if God have no "parts and totality," God is "no thing." Let him judge, how honourable this is for God.

He saith, "We honour not God, but dishonour Him, by any value less than infinite[u]." And how doth he set an infinite value upon God, who every where maketh Him to subsist by "successive duration[v]." "Infinite" is that, to which nothing can be added; but to that which subsisteth by "successive duration," something is added every minute.

[And Christ.]

He saith, "Christ hath not a kingly authority committed to Him by His Father in the world, but only consiliary and doctrinal[x]." He saith on the contrary, that "the kingdom of Judah was His hereditary right from king David," &c., "and when it pleased Him to play the king, He required entire obedience;—Matt. xxi. 2, [3,]—'Go into the village over against you, and straightway ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt with her, loose them and bring them unto Me;

[q] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xvii.] p. 87.
[r] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109.
[s] De Cive, c. xv. § 14. [p. 184.—"Neque dici de Deo honorifice, . . quod habeat partes, aut quod sit totum aliquid, quæ attributa sunt finitorum."]
[t] Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.] p. 371.
[u] Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xlv.] p. 357.
[v] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv.] p. 266.
[x] De Cive, c. xvii. § 6. [p. 223. See above p. 528. note y.]

and if any man say ought unto you, ye shall say, The Lord hath need of them[y].'" Discours. III.

He saith, "The institution of eternal punishment was before sin[z];" and, "If the command be such as cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal death, then it were madness to obey it[a];" and, "What evil hath excommunication in it, but the consequent, eternal punishment[b]?" At other times he saith, there is no eternal punishment:—"It is evident, that there shall be a second death of every one that shall be condemned at the Day of Judgment, after which he shall die no more[c]." He who knoweth no soul nor spirit, may well be ignorant of a spiritual death. [And eternal punishment.]

He saith, it "is a doctrine repugnant to civil society, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin[d]." Yet he himself saith, "It is a sin, whatsoever one doth against his conscience; for they that do that, despise the law[e]." [And sin.]

He saith, "that all power secular and spiritual, under Christ, is united in the Christian commonwealth[f];" that is, the Christian sovereign. Yet he himself saith on the contrary;—"It cannot be doubted of, that the power of binding and loosing, that is, of remitting and retaining sins" (which we call the power of the keys), "was given by Christ to future pastors in the same manner as to the present Apostles, and all power of remitting sin which Christ Himself had was given to the Apostles[g]." All spiritual power is in the Christian magistrate,—some spiritual power (that is, the power of the keys) is in the successors of the Apostles, that is, not in the Christian magistrate,—is a contradiction. [And the power of the keys.]

He confesseth, that "it is manifest," that "from the ascension of Christ until the conversion of kings," the "power eccle- [The Apostles had and had not power ecclesiastical.]

[y] De Cive, c. xi. § 6. [p. 123.—"Christi, Cui jure hæreditario a Davide derivato debebatur regnum Judæorum," &c. "Idem cum placuisset Ei regem agere, obedientiam integram re-

245.

[d] Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 168.

[e] De Cive, c. xii. § 2. [p. 127.—"Peccatum est, quicquid quis fecerit contra conscientiam; nam qui id fa-

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siastical was in the Apostles," and so delivered unto their successors by imposition of hands[k]. And yet straight forgeting himself, he taketh away all power from them, even in that time when there were no Christian kings in the world. He alloweth them no power to make any ecclesiastical laws or constitutions, or to impose any manner of commands upon Christians:—"The office of the Apostles was not to command, but teach[l];" as "schoolmasters, not as commanders[j]." Yet schoolmasters have some power to command. He suffereth not the Apostles to ordain, but those whom the Church appointeth; nor to excommunicate, or absolve, but whom the Church pleaseth. He maketh the determination of all controversies to rest in the Church, not in the Apostles; and resolveth all questions into the authority of the Church;—"The election of doctors and prophets did rest upon the authority of the Church of Antioch;" and, "If it be inquired by what authority it came to pass that it was received for the command of the Holy Ghost, which those prophets and doctors said proceeded from the Holy Ghost, we must necessarily answer, by the authority of the Church of Antioch[k]." Thus every where he ascribeth all authority to the Church, none at all to the Apostles, even in those times before there were Christian kings;—"He saith not, tell it to the Apostles;" but "tell it to the Church," that "we may know the definitive sentence,—whether sin or no sin,—is not left to them, but to the Church[l]:" and, "It is manifest, that all authority in spiritual things doth depend upon the authority of the Church[m]." Thus, not contented with single contradictions, he twisteth them together; for according to his definition of a Church, there was no Christian Church at Antioch, or in those parts of the world, either then or long

[Matt. xviii. 17.]

[h] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 267.

[i] De Cive, c. xvii. § 24. [p. 243.—"Nam ipsorum Apostolorum munus erat, non imperare, sed docere."]

[j] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 269.

[k] De Cive, c. xvii. § 24. [p. 243;—"Etiam Ecclesiæ Antiochiæ authoritati innitebatur doctorum et prophetarum suorum electio."—p. 242;—"Sed si quæratur ulterius, quâ authoritate factum sit, ut pro jussu Spiritus Sancti receptum sit, quod prophetæ et doctores illi profectum a Spiritu Sancto esse dixerint, respondendum necessario est, authoritate Ecclesiæ Antiochenæ."]

[l] Ibid., c. xvii. § 25. [p. 247.—"Non dicit, 'dic Apostolis,' ut sciamus, sententiam definitivam in quæstione, an sit peccatum necne, relinqui non illis sed Ecclesiæ."]

[m] Ibid., c. xviii. § 1. p. 258. ["Eandem" (scil. "authoritatem omnem") "in spiritualibus ab authoritate Ecclesiæ dependere ex proximè antecedentibus manifestum est."]

after. Hear him:—"A Church is a company of men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble[n]." Yet there was no Christian sovereign in those parts of the world then, or for two hundred years after, and by consequence, according to his definition, no Church.

[Infidel sovereigns are and are not to be obeyed in wrongful commands.] [Rom. xiii. 1; 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14; Col. iii. 20, 22; &c.]

He teacheth, that "when the civil sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the laws of God, and rejecteth the counsel of the Apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their princes, and all children and servants to obey their parents and masters in all things[o]." As for not resisting, he is in the right; but for "obeying in all things," in his sense, it is an abominable error. Upon this ground he alloweth Christians to deny Christ, to sacrifice to idols, so they preserve faith in their hearts. He telleth them, "They have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for their faith[p];" that is, they have liberty to do any external acts, which their infidel sovereigns shall command them. Now hear the contrary from himself.—"When sovereigns are not Christians, in spiritual things, that is, in those things which pertain to the manner of worshipping God, some Church of Christians is to be followed[q]:" adding, that when we may not obey them, yet we may not resist them, but "*eundum est ad Christum per martyrium*,"—we ought to suffer for it[r].

[2 Kings v. 17, 18.]

[Matter and power are and are not indifferent to contrary forms and acts.]

He confesseth, that "matter and power are indifferent to contrary forms and contrary acts[s]:" and yet maintaineth every where, that all matter is necessitated by the outward causes to one individual form; that is, it is not indifferent. And all power, by his principles, is limited and determined to one particular act. Thus he scoffeth at me for the contrary:—"Very learnedly; as if there were a power, that were not a

[n] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxix.] p. 248.

[o] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 330.

[p] [Ibid. p. 331.]

[q] De Cive, c. xviii. § 13. [p. 272.—"Imperantibus autem non Christianis, . . in (rebus) spiritualibus, hoc est, in iis quæ pertinent ad modum colendi Dei, sequenda est Ecclesia aliqua Christia-

[r] [Ibid.—"Quid autem? An principibus resistendum est ubi obediendum non est? Minimè sane, hoc enim contra pactum est civile. Quid ergo agendum? Eundum ad Christum per martyrium."]

[s] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxx.] p. 292.

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power to do some particular act; or a power to kill, and yet to kill nobody in particular: . . nor doth power signify anything actually, but those motions and present acts, from which the act that is not now but shall be hereafter, necessarily proceedeth[t]." If every act be necessary, and all power determined to one "particular act," as he saith here, how is power "indifferent to contrary acts," as he saith there?

[The object of sense is and is not the same thing with the sense itself.]

He acknowledgeth, that "though at some certain distance the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another[u];" and yet affirmeth the contrary,—that "the preacher's voice is the same thing with hearing, and a poor fancy in the hearer[x]." Even so he might say, that the colour or the sight is the same thing with seeing. Men utter their voice many times when no man heareth them.

[T. H. denieth and alloweth inspiration.]

He saith, inspiration "implies a gift supernatural, and the immediate hand of God[y]." On the contrary he saith, "To say a man speaks by supernatural inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason[z]." He reckoneth this opinion,—"that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration,"—among "the diseases of a commonwealth[a]." And, lastly, he acknowledgeth no proper inspiration, "but blowing of one thing into" another, nor metaphorical, but "inclining the spirit[b]."

[His contradictory assertions about body.]

He saith,—"Ordinary men understand the word 'body' and 'empty,' . . as well as learned men; and when they hear named an empty vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned mean and understand the same thing, namely, that there is nothing in it that can be seen; and whether it be truly empty, the ploughman and the Schoolman know alike[c]." Now hear him confess the contrary:—"In the sense of common people, not all the universe is called body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling to resist the force, or

[t] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xii.] p. 108.
[u] Leviath., [Pt. I. c. i.] p. 4.
[x] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxii.] p. 245.
[y] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 324.
[z] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxii.] p. 196.
[a] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.
[b] Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 214.
[c] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii.] p. 307.

by the sight of their eyes to hinder them from a farther prospect; therefore, in the common language of men, air and aërial substances use not to be taken for bodies[d]."

[And the power of law over the will.]

He holdeth, that no law may be made to command the will: —"The style of law is, Do this, or, Do not this, or, If thou do this, thou shalt suffer this: but no law runs thus, Will this, or, Will not this, or, If thou have a will to this, thou shalt suffer this[e]." And yet he defineth sin, to be "that which is done, or left undone, or spoken, *or willed*, contrary to the reason of the commonwealth[f]." Then the laws of men are made to bind the will, if that which is "willed" contrary to the laws be a sin.

[And necessity.]

He saith, "Necessary is that which is impossible to be otherwise," or 'that which cannot possibly be;' and "possible and impossible have no signification in reference to the time past, or time present, but only time to come[g]." Yet, in the very same paragraph, he asserteth "a necessity from eternity, or an antecedent necessity derived from the very beginning of time[g]."

He saith, "There is no doubt a man can will one thing or other, or forbear to will it[h]." If a man can both "will" and "forbear to will" the same thing, then a man is as free to will as to do; but he teacheth the contrary every where,—that "a man is free to do if he will, but he is not free to will[i]."

He saith, "Though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he should choose, it doth not follow that He did not also give him the act of election[k];" that is, determine him to that which he should choose. To give a man choice of two things, and determine him to one of them, is contradictory.

[And compulsion.]

He confesseth, that "it is an absurd speech to say the will is compelled[l];" and yet with the same breath he affirmeth, that "a man may be compelled to will[m]." The reason why

[d] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 207.
[e] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.] p. 138.
[f] De Cive, c. xiv. § 17. [p. 168. See above p. 541. note f.]
[g] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numbers i. and iii.] pp. 26 and 36.
[h] Ibid., [Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiii.] p. 310.
[i] [Ibid., State of Quest., p. 4. &c.]
[k] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. ix.] p. 75.
[l] Ibid., [Animadv. upon Numb. xix.] p. 208.
[m] [Ibid.—Hobbes does not affirm this in terms; but after saying, that he "never said 'the will is compelled,'" adds, that "the necessitation or creation of the will is the same thing with the compulsion of *the man*."]

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the will cannot be compelled, is, because it implieth a contradiction. Compulsion is evermore against a man's will. How can a man will that which is against his will? Yet, saith T. H., "Many things may compel a man to do an action in producing his will[n]." That a man may be "compelled to do an action," there is no doubt; but to say he is compelled to do that action which he is willing to do, that is, when a new will is produced, or that a will to do the action is produced then when the man is compelled, is a contradiction.

The sovereign prince the only interpreter of Scripture, et obliged to make use of ecclesiastical doctors duly ordained.]

He maketh the sovereign prince to be the only authentic interpreter of Scripture[o], and "to have pastoral authority *jure Divino*," which "all other pastors have but *jure civili*[p];" yet, in all questions of faith, and interpretation of the Word of God, he obligeth the sovereign to make use of "ecclesiastical doctors, rightly ordained by imposition of hands," to whom he saith "Christ hath promised an infallibility[q]." His gloss—that this infallibility is not such an infallibility, "that they cannot be deceived themselves, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them[r],"—is absurd; for such an infallibility (upon his grounds) the sovereign had without their advice. To pass by his confused and party-coloured discourse, how doth this agree with his former objection[s]? which I shall insert here *mutatis mutandis*:—"That the right interpretation of Scripture should depend upon the infallibility of *ecclesiastical doctors*, many incommodities and absurdities which must follow from thence, do prohibit; the chiefest whereof is this, that not only all civil obedience would be taken away, contrary to the precept of Christ, but also all society and human peace would be dissolved, contrary to the laws of nature: for whilst they make *the ecclesiastical* 901

[n] Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. xix.] p. 208.

[o] De Cive, c. xvii. § 27. [p. 254.]

[p] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 296.

[q] De Cive, c. xvii. § 28. [p. 256. See above p. 501. note g.]

[r] Qu., [Animadv., upon Numb. xix.] p. 214.

[s] [De Cive, c. xvii. § 24. p. 252.—"Ne vero ab arbitrio dependeat *singulorum*" (scil. "jus interpretandi Scripturas"), "prohibent inter alia, consequutura inde incommoda et absurda. Quorum præcipuum est hoc, quod non modo omnis tolleretur (contra præceptum Christi) obedientia civilis, sed etiam omnis societas et pax humana (contra leges naturales) dissolveretur: cum enim Scripturam Sacram *singuli* interpretentur sibi, id est, *unusquisque* judicem *se* faciat quid Deo placeat, quid displiceat, non ante principibus obedire possunt quam *ipsi* de mandatis eorum, utrum conformia sunt Scripturæ necne, judicaverint; atque sic vel non obediunt, vel obediunt propter judicium *proprium*, hoc est, *sibi* obediunt, non civitati; tollitur ergo obedientia civilis."]

doctors the infallible judges, what pleaseth God and what displeaseth Him, the subjects cannot obey their sovereigns, before *the doctors* have judged of their commands, whether they be conformable to Scripture or not; and so, either they do not obey, or they obey for the judgment of *their doctors*, that is, they obey *their doctors*, not their sovereign; thus civil obedience is taken away." These are his own words with a little variation, only putting in "the doctors" for "the subjects." I consider not what is true or false in them for the present, but only shew the inconsistency of his grounds, how he buildeth with one hand and pulleth down with the other.

[The sovereign the sole legislator, yet his hands tied by Scripture.]

He saith, "It is determined in Scripture what laws every Christian king shall not constitute in his dominions[t]:" and, in the next words, "Sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators[u];" and that "those books only are canonical in every nation, which are established for such by the sovereign authority[u]." Then the determinations of Scripture upon his grounds are but civil laws, and do not tie the hands of sovereigns. He teacheth us every where, that "the subsequent command of a sovereign, contrary to his former laws, is an abrogation of them[x];" and that it is "an opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth," that he that hath the sovereign power is "subject to the civil laws[y]." The determinations of Scripture, upon his grounds, do bind the hands of kings, when they themselves please to be bound; no longer.

[Summary of T. H. his contradictions.]

To conclude.—Sometimes he doth admit the soul to be a distinct substance from the body[z], sometimes he denieth it[a]. Sometimes he maketh reason to be a "natural" faculty[b], sometimes he maketh it to be an acquired habit[c]. In some places he alloweth the will to be a rational appetite[d], in other places he disallows it[e]. Sometimes he will have it to be a "law of nature," that men must "stand to their pacts[f];" sometimes he

[t] Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiii.] p. 199.
[u] [Ibid.]
[x] [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xxvii. p. 157.]
[y] [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.
[z] [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 207.—"That aerial substance, which in the body of any living creature gives it life and motion."]
[a] [Ibid., Pt. IV. c. xliv. pp. 339, 340.]
[b] [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxii. p. 195.—&c.]
[c] [Leviath., Pt. I. c. viii. pp. 32, 35.]
[d] [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4. See above pp. 225, 226.]
[e] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 184.—Leviath., Pt. I. c. vi. p. 28.]
[f] [De Cive, c. ii. § 1. p. 14.]

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maketh "covenants of mutual trust in the state of nature" to be "void[g]." Sometimes he will have "no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone[h];" at other times he maketh all crimes to be inevitable[i]. Sometimes he will have the dependence of actions upon the will to be truly liberty[k]; at other times he ascribeth liberty to rivers[l], which have no will. Sometimes he teacheth, that though an action be necessitated, yet "the will to break the law maketh the action to be unjust[m];" at other times he maketh the will to be much more necessitated than the action[n]. He telleth us, that civil "law-makers may err" and sin in making of a law[o]; and yet the law so made is an infallible rule[p]. Yes, to lead a man infallibly into a ditch. What should a man say to this man? How shall one know, when he is in earnest, and when he is in jest? He setteth down his opinion just as gipsies tell fortunes, both ways; that if the one miss, the other may be sure to hit; that when they are accused of falsehood by one, they may appeal to another;

[Matt. xv. 14.]

—"but what did I write" in such a place.

[Matt. xi. 7. &c.]

It was the praise of John Baptist, that he was not like "a reed shaken with the wind," bending or inclining, hither and thither, this way and that way, now to old truths, then to new errors. And it is the honour of every good Christian. St. Paul doth excellently describe such fluctuating Christians by two comparisons, the one of little children, the other of a ship lying at hull[q];—"That we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine;" as a child wavers between his love and duty to his parent or nurse on the one hand, and some apple or other toy which is held forth to him on the other hand, or as a ship lying at anchor changeth its posture with every wave and every puff of wind. As the last company leaves them, or the present occasion makes them, so they vary their discourses.

Eph. iv. 14.

[The causes and grounds of T. H. his errors.]

The time was, when T. H. was very kind to me, to let me see the causes and grounds of my errors:—"Arguments

[g] [De Cive, c. ii. § 11. p. 17.]
[h] [Qu., Fount. of Arg., p. 13.]
[i] [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. pp. 105, 106. &c. See above p. 309.]
[k] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. iii. above p. 27.]
[l] [Ibid., T. H. Numb. xxix. above p. 166.]
[m] [Ibid., T. H. Numb. xiv. above p. 85.]
[n] [Ibid., T. H. Numb. iii. above p. 27. &c. &c.]
[o] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 146.]
[p] [See above pp. 541, 542.]
[q] [See above p. 506. note d.]

seldom work on men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion; if any thing will do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errors[r]." One good turn requireth another. Now I will do as much for him. If it do not work upon himself, yet there is hope it may undeceive some of his disciples.

[1. His fancying to himself a general state of nature.]

A principal cause of his errors is a fancying to himself a general state of nature; which is so far from being general, that there is not an instance to be found of it in the nature of things, where mankind was altogether without laws and without governors, guided only by self-interest, without any sense of conscience, justice, honesty, or honour. He may
902 search all the corners of America[s] with a candle and lanthorn at noon day, and after his fruitless pains, return a '*non est inventus.*'

Yet all plants and living creatures are subject to degenerate and grow wild by degrees. Suppose it should so happen, that some remnant of men, either chased by war or persecution, or forced out of the habitable world for some crimes by themselves committed, or being cast by shipwreck upon some deserts, by long conversing with savage beasts, lions, bears, wolves, and tigers, should in time become more "brutish[s]" (it is his own epithet) than the brutes themselves, would any man in his right wits make that to be the universal condition of mankind, which was only the condition of an odd handful of men? or that to be "the state of nature," which was not the state of nature, but an accidental degeneration?

He that will behold the state of nature rightly, must look upon the family of Adam, and his posterity in their successive generations from the creation to the deluge, and from the deluge until Abraham's time, when the first "kingdom of God by pact" is supposed by T. H. to begin[t]. All this while (which was a great part of that time the world hath stood) from the creation, lasted "the kingdom of God by nature," as

[r] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxviii. above p. 193.]—Qu., [T. H. Numb. xxxviii.] p. 334.

[s] [Leviath., Pt. I. c. xiii. p. 63.—"It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, . . have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner."]

[t] [De Cive, c. xvi. § 1. p. 195.]

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he phraseth it[u]; and yet in those days there were laws and governments, and more kings in the world than there are at this present; we find nine kings engaged in one war, and yet all their dominions but a narrow circuit of land. And so it continued for divers hundreds of years after; as we see by all those kings which Joshua discomfited in the land of Canaan. Every city had its own king. The reason is evident;—the original right of fathers of families was not then extinguished.

Gen. xiv. [1, 2.]

[Josh. xii.]

Indeed T. H. supposeth, that men did spring out of the earth like mushrooms or mandrakes:—"That we may return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if they were even now suddenly sprouted and grown out of the earth, after the manner of mushrooms, without any obligation of one to another[v]." But this supposition is both false and atheistical, howsoever it dropt from his pen. Mankind did not spring out of the earth, but was created by God; not many suddenly, but one, to whom all his posterity were obliged as to their father and ruler.

[2. His gross mistake of the laws of nature.]

A second ground of his errors is his gross mistake of the laws of nature, which he relateth most imperfectly and most untruly. A moral heathen would blush for shame, to see such a catalogue of the laws of nature.

First, he maketh the laws of nature to be laws and no laws:—just as, 'A man and no man, hit a bird and no bird, with a stone and no stone, on a tree and no tree:'—not "laws" but "theorems[x];" laws which required not "performance," but "endeavours[y];" laws which were "silent," and could not be put in execution in the state of nature[z], "where nothing was another man's, and therefore a man could not steal; where all things were common, and therefore no adultery; where there was a state of war, and therefore it was lawful to kill; where all things were defined by a man's own judgment, and therefore what honours he pleased to give unto his father; and, lastly, where there were no public judgments, and therefore no use of witnesses[a]." As

[u] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxxi. p. 186. title, &c.]

[v] De Cive, c. viii. § 1. [p. 89. See above p. 566. note m.]

[x] [Leviath., Pt. I. c. xv. p. 80.]

[y] [Ibid., Pt. I. c. xv. p. 79.]

[z] [De Cive, c. v. § 2. p. 52. See above p. 552. note m.]

[a] De Cive, c. xiv. § 9. [p. 161.—"Nam lex naturalis obligabat in statu naturali: ubi primo (quia natura omnia omnibus dedit) nihil alienum erat, et proinde alienum invadere impossibile; deinde, ubi omnia communia erant,

for the first Table, he doth not trouble himself much with it; except it be to accommodate it unto kings[b]. Every one of these grounds here alleged, are most false, without any verisimilitude in them; and so his superstructure must needs fall flat to the ground.

Secondly, he relateth the laws of nature most imperfectly, smothering and concealing all those principal laws, which concern either piety and our duty towards God, or justice and our duties towards man.

Thirdly, sundry of those laws which he is pleased to take notice of, are either misrelated or misinterpreted by him. He maketh the only end of all the laws of nature to be "the long conservation of a man's life and members[c];" most untruly. He maketh every man by nature the only judge of the means of his own conservation[d]; most untruly. His father and sovereign in the weightiest cases, is more judge than himself. He saith, that "by the law of nature every man hath right to all things, and over all persons[e];" most untruly. He saith, the natural condition of mankind is "a war of all men against all men[f];" most untruly: and that "nature dictateth to us to relinquish this" (feigned) "right of all men to all things[g];" most untruly: and that nature dictateth to a man to retain his right of preserving his life
903 and limbs, though against a "lawful" magistrate, lawfully proceeding[h]; most untruly. I omit his uncouth doctrine about pacts made in the state of nature[i]; and that he knoweth no gratitude, but where there is a "trust"—"*fiducia*[k]." These things are unsound; and the rest of his laws, for the most part, poor trivial things, in comparison of those weightier dictates of nature which he hath omitted.

All other writers of politics do derive commonwealths from [Origin of commonwealths not from mutual fear, as T. H. affirmeth.]

quare etiam' concubitus omnes liciti; tertio, ubi status belli erat, ideoque licitum occidere; quarto, ubi omnia proprio cujusque judicio definita erant, ideoque etiam honores paterni; postremo, ubi nulla judicia publica erant, et propterea nullus usus testimonii dicendi neque veri neque falsi."]

[b] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxx. pp. 177, 178.]

[c] [De Cive, c. ii. § 1. p. 13. See above p. 577. note r.]

[d] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxviii. p. 161.]

[e] [De Cive, c. i. § 10. p. 8.—Leviath., Pt. I. c. xiv. p. 64.]

[f] [De Cive, c. i. § 12. p. 9.—Leviath., Pt. I. c. xiii. p. 63.]

[g] [De Cive, c. ii. § 3. p. 14.—Leviath., Pt. I. c. xiv. pp. 64, 65.]

[h] [De Cive, c. ii. § 18. p. 20.—Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxi. p. 111. margin. See above p. 555. notes b—d.]

[i] [De Cive, c. ii. § 11. p. 17.]

[k] [Ibid., c. iii. § 8. p. 28.]

PART III.

the sociability of nature, which is in mankind; most truly. But he will have the beginning of all human society to be "from mutual fear[l];" as much contrary to reason as to authority. We see some kind of creatures delight altogether in solitude, rarely or never in company. We see others (among which is mankind) delight altogether in company, rarely or never in solitude. Let him tell me, what mutual fear of danger did draw the silly bees into swarms? or the sheep and doves into flocks? and what protection they can hope for, one from another? and I shall conceive it possible, that the beginning of human society might be from fear also.

[His device of absolute sovereignty.]

And thus having invented a fit foundation for his intended building, ycleped "the state of mere nature[m]," which he himself first devised for that purpose, he hath been long moduling and framing to himself a new form of policy, to be builded upon it: but the best is, it hath only been in paper; all this while he hath never had a finger in mortar. This is the new frame of "absolute sovereignty[n];" which T. H. knew right well would never stand, nor he should be ever permitted to rear it up in our European climates, or in any other part of the habitable world, which had ever seen any other form of civil government. Therefore he hath sought out for a fit place in America[o], among the savages; to try if perhaps they might be persuaded, that the laws of God and nature, the names of good and evil, just and unjust, did signify nothing, but at the pleasure of the sovereign prince.

And because there hath been much clashing in these quarters about religion, through the distempered zeal of some, the seditious orations of others, and some pernicious principles, well meant at first, but ill understood, and worse pursued; to prevent all such garboils in his commonwealth, he hath taken an order to make his sovereign to be "Christ's lieutenant upon earth, in obedience to whose commands true religion doth consist[p];" thus making policy to be the building, and religion the hangings, which must be fashioned just according to the proportion of the policy; and not (as Mr.

[l] [De Cive, c. i. § 3. p. 5.]
[m] [Ibid., c. v. § 2. p. 52.—"Status naturæ meræ."]
[n] [Ibid., c. vi. § 13. p. 66.]
[o] [Leviath., Pt. i. c. xiii. p. 63.]
[p] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxviii. above p. 193.]

Cartwright would have had it[q]) making religion to be the building, and policy the hangings, which must be conformed to religion. DISCOURSE III.

Well, the law is costly, and I am for an accommodation;—that T. H. should have the sole privilege of setting up his form of government in America, as being calculated and fitted for that meridian; and if it prosper there, then to have the liberty to transplant it hither. Who knoweth (if there could but be some means devised to make them understand his language), whether the Americans might not choose him to be their sovereign? But all the fear is, that if he should put his principles in practice as magistrally as he doth dictate them, his supposed subjects might chance to tear their "mortal God[r]" in pieces with their teeth, and entomb his sovereignty in their bowels.

AN ADVERTISEMENT TO THE READER.

BECAUSE I know but of one edition of Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan[s], and of his Questions concerning Liberty[t], therefore I have cited them two by the page; Le[viath]. standing for Leviathan, and Qu. for Questions. But because there are sundry editions of his book *De Cive*[u], I have cited that by the chapter and section, according to his Paris edition[x].

[q] [Reply to an Answer made of M. Doctor Whitgift against the Admonition to the Parliament, by T. C., p. 181. 4to. n. p. or year; publ. about 1573.]

[r] [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.]

[s] [folio Lond. 1651; in English.]

[t] [4to. Lond. 1656.]

[u] [4to. Paris. 1642; first edition: —8vo. Amstelod. 1647; second edit.; and again in 1657 (according to the Athen. Oxon., vol. iii. p. 1209. ed. Bliss):—all in Latin. Bramhall's tract was published in 1658.]

[x] [The same editions of each work have been used in the present volume.]

THE END.

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ERRATA.

p. 23. note a. col. 2.	*for* "written also in 1645,"	*read*	"written in 1646."
— 130. l. 11	— "cap. 17"	——	"cap. xvii."
— 170. ll. 8, 9. (vide p. 449.)	— "appetibility, the understanding by directing, so[me inward, as] passions"	—	"appetibility, some inward, as the understanding by directing: so passions"
— 273. note u. l. 3.	— "igitur nostrâ"	——	"igitur nostra"
— 320. title,	— "Castigations upon the Animadversions;— Number xiv."	—	"Castigations of the Animadversions;— Number xiv."